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

THE

COMPLETE WORKS

OF

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE.

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY

UPON HIS

PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL OPINIONS.

EDITED BY

PROFESSOR SHEDD.

IN SEVEN VOLUMES.

VOL. V.

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THE

LITERARY REMAINS

OF

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE.

COLLECTED AND EDITED BY

HENRY NELSON COLERIDGE, ESQ., M.A.

NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS.
1853.

TO

THE RIGHT HONORABLE

JOHN HOOKHAM FRERE,

THE THIRD AND FOURTH VOLUMES

OF

COLERIDGE'S REMAINS,

ARE RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED.

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PREFACE.

For a statement of the circumstances under which the collection of Mr. Coleridge's Literary Remains was undertaken, the Reader is referred to the Preface to the two preceding Volumes published in 1836.* But the graver character of the general contents of this Volume and of that which will immediately follow it, seems to justify the Editor in soliciting particular attention to a few additional remarks.

Although the Author in his will contemplated the publication of some at least of the numerous notes left by him on the margins and blank spaces of books and pamphlets, he most certainly wrote the notes themselves without any purpose beyond that of delivering his mind of the thoughts and aspirations suggested by the text under perusal. His books, that is, any person's books—even those from a circulating library—were to him, whilst reading them, as dear friends; he conversed with them as with their authors, praising, or censuring, or qualifying, as the open page seemed to give him cause; little solicitous in so doing to draw summaries or to strike balances of literary merit, but seeking rather to detect and appreciate the moving principle or moral life, ever one and single, of the work in reference to absolute truth. Thus employed he had few reserves, but in general poured forth, as in a confessional, all his mind upon every subject,—not keeping back any doubt or conjecture which at the time and for the purpose seemed worthy of consideration. In probing another's heart he laid his hand upon his own. He thought pious frauds the worst of all frauds, and the system of economizing truth too near akin to the corruption of it to be generally compatible with the Job-like integrity of a true Chris-

* See Preface to Lectures upon Shakspeare, &c.

tian's conscience. Further, he distinguished so strongly between that internal faith which lies at the base of, and supports, the whole moral and religious being of man, and the belief, as historically true, of several incidents and relations found or supposed to be found in the text of the Scriptures, that he habitually exercised a liberty of criticism with respect to the latter, which will probably seem objectionable to many of his readers in this country.*

His friends have always known this to be the fact; and he vindicated this so openly that it would be folly to attempt to conceal it: nay, he pleaded for it so earnestly—as the only middle path of safety and peace between a godless disregard of the unique and transcendent character of the Bible taken generally, and that scheme of interpretation, scarcely less adverse to the pure spirit of Christian wisdom, which wildly arrays our faith in opposition to our reason, and inculcates the sacrifice of the latter to the former,—that to suppress this important part of his solemn convictions would be to misrepresent and betray him. For he threw up his hands in dismay at the language of some of our modern divinity on this point;—as if a faith not founded on insight were aught else than a specious name for wilful positiveness;—as if the Father of Lights could require, or would accept, from the only one of his creatures whom he had endowed with reason, the sacrifice of fools! Did Coleridge, therefore, mean that the doctrines revealed in the Scriptures were to be judged according to their supposed harmony or discrepancy with the evidence of the senses, or the deductions of the mere understanding from that evidence? Exactly the reverse: he disdained to argue even against Transubstantiation on such a ground, well knowing and loudly proclaiming its utter weakness and instability. But it was a leading principle in all his moral and intellectual views to assert the existence in all men equally of a power or faculty superior to, and independent of, the external senses: in this power or faculty he recognized that image of God in which man was made; and he could as little understand how faith, the indivisibly joint act or efflux of our reason and our will, should be at variance with one of its factors or elements, as how the Author and Upholder of all truth should be in contradiction to himself. He trembled at the dreadful dogma which rests God's right to man's obedience on the fact of his almighty power,—a

* See Table Talk, p. 407.

position falsely inferred from a misconceived illustration of St. Paul's, and which is less humbling to the creature than blasphemous of the Creator; and of the awless doctrine that God might, if he had so pleased, have given to man a religion which to human intelligence should not be rational, and exacted his faith in it—Coleridge's whole middle and later life was one deep and solemn denial. He believed in no God in the very idea of whose existence absolute truth, perfect goodness, and infinite wisdom, were not elements essentially necessary and everlastingly co-present.

Thus minded, he sought to justify the ways of God to man in the only way in which they can be justified to any one who deals honestly with his conscience, namely, by showing, where possible, their consequence from, and in all cases their consistency with, the ideas or truths of the pure reason which is the same in all men. With what success he labored for thirty years in this mighty cause of Christian philosophy, the readers of his other works, especially the Aids to Reflection, will judge: if measured by the number of resolved points of detail his progress may seem small; but if tested by the weight and grasp of the principles which he has established, it may be confidently said that since Christianity had a name few men have gone so far. If ever we are to find firm footing in Biblical criticism between the extremes (how often meeting!) of Socinianism and Popery; —if the indisputable facts of physical science are not forever to be left in a sort of admitted antagonism to the supposed assertions of Scripture;—if ever the Christian duty of faith in God through Christ is to be reconciled with the religious service of a being gifted by the same God with reason and a will, and subjected to a conscience,—it must be effected by the aid, and in the light, of those truths of deepest philosophy which in all Mr. Coleridge's works, published or unpublished, present themselves to the reader with an almost affecting reiteration. But to do justice to those works, and adequately to appreciate the Author's total mind upon any given point, a cursory perusal is insufficient; study and comprehension are requisite to an accurate estimate of the relative value of any particular denial or assertion; and the apparently desultory and discontinuous form of the observations now presented to the Reader more especially calls for the exercise of his patience and thoughtful circumspection.

With this view the Reader is requested to observe the dates which, in some instances, the Editor has been able to affix to the notes with certainty. Most of those on Jeremy Taylor belong to the year 1810, and were especially designed for the perusal of Charles Lamb. Those on Field were written about 1814; on Hacket, in 1818; on Donne, in 1812 and 1829; on the Pilgrim's Progress, in 1833; and on Hooker and the Book of Common Prayer, between 1820 and 1830. Coleridge's mind was a growing and accumulating mind to the last, his whole life one of inquiry and progressive insight, and the dates of his opinions are therefore in some cases important, and in all interesting.

The Editor is deeply sensible of his responsibility in publishing this Volume; as to which he can only say, in addition to a reference to the general authority given by the Author, that to the best of his knowledge and judgment he has not permitted any thing to appear before the public which Mr. Coleridge saw reason to retract; and further express his hope and belief that, with such allowance for defects inherent in the nature of the work as may rightfully be expected from every really liberal mind, nothing contained in the following pages can fairly be a ground of offence to any one.

It only remains to be added that the materials used in the compilation of this Volume were for the greatest part communicated by Mr. Gillman; and that the rest were furnished by Mr. Wordsworth, the Rev. Derwent Coleridge, the Rev. Edward Coleridge, and the Editor.

Lincoln's Inn,
March 26, 1838.

ADVERTISEMENT TO VOLUME FOURTH

OF THE ORIGINAL EDITION.

For some remarks on the character of this publication, the Editor begs to refer the Reader to the Preface to the third volume of these Remains. (See Preface immediately preceding. The third and fourth volumes of the Original Edition, are both embraced in the present volume.)

The various materials arranged in the following pages were preserved, and kindly placed in the Editor's hands, by Mr. Southey, Mr. Green, Mr. Gillman, Mr. Alfred Elwyn of Philadelphia, United States, Mr. Money, Mr. Hartley Coleridge, and the Rev. Edward Coleridge; and to those gentlemen the Editor's best acknowledgments are due.

Lincoln's Inn,
9th May, 1839.

LITERARY REMAINS.

CONFESSIO FIDEI. Nov. 3, 1816.

I.—1.

I BELIEVE that I am a free agent, inasmuch as, and so far as, I have a will, which renders me justly responsible for my actions, omissive as well as commissive. Likewise that I possess reason, or a law of right and wrong, which, uniting with my sense of moral responsibility, constitutes the voice of conscience.

II. Hence it becomes my absolute duty to believe, and I do believe, that there is a God, that is, a Being, in whom supreme reason and a most holy will are one with an infinite power; and that all holy will is coincident with the will of God, and therefore secure in its ultimate consequences by His omnipotence;—having, if such similitude be not unlawful, such a relation to the goodness of the Almighty, as a perfect time-piece will have to the sun.

COROLLARY.

The wonderful works of God in the sensible world are a perpetual discourse, reminding me of his existence, and shadowing out to me his perfections. But as all language presupposes in the intelligent hearer or reader those primary notions, which it symbolizes; as well as the power of making those combinations of these primary notions, which it represents and excites us to combine,—even so I believe, that the notion of God is essential to the human mind; that it is called forth into distinct consciousness principally by the conscience, and auxiliarly by the manifest adaptation of means to ends in the outward creation. It is, therefore, evident to my reason, that the existence of God is abso-

lutely and necessarily insusceptible of a scientific demonstration, and that Scripture has so represented it. For it commands us to believe in one God. *I am the Lord thy God: thou shalt have none other gods but me.* Now all commandment necessarily relates to the will; whereas all scientific demonstration is independent of the will, and is apodictic or demonstrative only as far as it is compulsory on the mind, *volentem, nolentem.*

III. My conscience forbids me to propose to myself the pains and pleasures of this life, as the primary motive, or ultimate end, of my actions;—on the contrary, it makes me perceive an utter disproportionateness and heterogeneity between the acts of the spirit, as virtue and vice, and the things of the sense, such as all earthly rewards and punishments must be. Its hopes and fears, therefore, refer me to a different and spiritual state of being: and I believe in the life to come, not through arguments acquired by my understanding or discursive faculty, but chiefly and effectively, because so to believe is my duty, and in obedience to the commands of my conscience.

Here ends the first table of my creed, which would have been my creed, had I been born with Adam; and which, therefore, constitutes what may in this sense be called natural religion, that is, the religion of all finite rational beings. The second table contains the creed of revealed religion, my belief as a Christian.

II.

IV. I BELIEVE, and hold it as the fundamental article of Christianity, that I am a fallen creature; that I am of myself capable of moral evil, but not of myself capable of moral good, and that an evil ground existed in my will, previously to any given act, or assignable moment of time, in my consciousness. I am born a child of wrath. This fearful mystery I pretend not to understand. I can not even conceive the possibility of it,—but I know that it is so. My conscience the sole fountain of certainty, commands me to believe it, and would itself be a contradiction, were it not so—and what is real must be possible.

V. I receive with full and grateful faith the assurance of revelation, that the Word, which is from all eternity with God, and is God, assumed our human nature in order to redeem me, and all mankind from this our connate corruption. My reason convinces

me, that no other mode of redemption is conceivable, and, as did Socrates, would have yearned after the Redeemer, though it would not dare expect so wonderful an act of divine love, except only as an effort of my mind to conceive the utmost of the infinite greatness of that love.

VI. I believe, that this assumption of humanity by the Son of God was revealed and realized to us by the Word made flesh, and manifested to us in Christ Jesus; and that his miraculous birth, his agony, his crucifixion, death, resurrection, and ascension, were all both symbols of our redemption (*φαινόμενα τῶν νουμένων*) and necessary parts of the awful process.

VII. I believe in the descent and sending of the Holy Spirit, by whose free grace obtained for me by the merits of my Redeemer, I can alone be sanctified and restored from my natural inheritance of sin and condemnation, be a child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of God.

COROLLARY.

The Trinity of persons in the Unity of the God would have been a necessary idea of my speculative reason, deduced from the necessary postulate of an intelligent creator, whose ideas being anterior to the things, must be more actual than those things, even as those things are more actual than our images derived from them; and who, as intelligent, must have had co-eternally an adequate idea of himself, in and through which he created all things both in heaven and earth. But this would only have been a speculative idea, like those of circles and other mathematical figures, to which we are not authorized by the practical reason to attribute reality. Solely in consequence of our Redemption does the Trinity become a doctrine, the belief of which as real is commanded by our conscience. But to Christians it is commanded, and it is false candor in a Christian, believing in original sin and redemption therefrom, to admit that any man denying the divinity of Christ can be a Christian. The true language of a Christian, which reconciles humility with truth would be;—God and not man is the judge of man: which of the two is the Christian, he will determine; but this is evident, that if the theanthropist is a Christian, the psilanthropist can not be so; and *vice versa*. Suppose, that two tribes used the same written characters, but attached different and opposite meanings to

them, so that *niger*, for instance, was used by one tribe to convey the notion *black*, by the other, *white*;—could they, without absurdity, be said to have the same language? Even so, in the instance of the crucifixion, the same image is present to the theanthropist and to the psilanthropist or Socinian—but to the latter it represents a mere man, a good man indeed and divinely inspired, but still a mere man, even as Moses or Paul, dying in attestation of the truth of his preaching, and in order by his resurrection to give a proof of his mission, and inclusively of the resurrection of all men:—to the former it represents God incarnate taking upon himself the sins of the world, and himself thereby redeeming us, and giving us life everlasting, not merely teaching it. The same difference, that exists between God and man, between giving and the declaration of a gift, exists between the Trinitarian and the Unitarian. This might be proved in a few moments, if we would only conceive a Greek or Roman, to whom two persons relate their belief, each calling Christ by a different name. It would be impossible for the Greek even to guess, that they both meant the same person, or referred to the same facts.

FORMULA FIDEI DE SANCTISSIMA TRINITATE. 1830.

THE IDENTITY.

The absolute subjectivity, whose only attribute is the Good; whose only definition is—that which is essentially causative of all possible true being; the ground; the absolute will; the adorable *πρόπρωτον*, which, whatever is assumed as the first, must be presumed as its antecedent; *θεὸς*, without an article, and yet not as an adjective. See John i. 18. *θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακε πώποτε*, as differenced from ib. 1. *καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*.

But that which is essentially causative of all being must be causative of its own,—*causa sui*, *αὐτοπάτωρ*. Thence

THE IPSEITY.

The eternally self-affirmant self-affirmed; the "I Am in that I Am," or the "I shall be that I will to be;" the Father; the relatively subjective, whose attribute is, the Holy One; whose definition is, the essential finific in the form of the infinite; *dat sibi fines*.

But the absolute will, the absolute good, in the eternal act of self-affirmation, the Good as the Holy One, co-eternally begets

THE ALTERITY.

The supreme being; ὁ ὄντως ὤν; the supreme reason; the Jehovah; the Son; the Word; whose attribute is the True (the truth, the light, the *fiat*); and whose definition is the *pleroma* of being, whose essential poles are unity and distinctity; or the essential infinite in the form of the finite;—lastly, the relatively objective, *deitas objectiva* in relation to the I Am as the *deitas subjectiva;* the divine objectivity.

N.B. The distinctities in the *pleroma* are the eternal ideas, the subsistential truths; each considered in itself, an infinite in the form of the finite; but all considered as one with the unity, the eternal Son, they are the energies of the finific; πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο—καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πληρώματος αὐτοῦ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐλάβομεν. John i. 3 and 16.

But with the relatively subjective and the relatively objective, the great idea needs only for its completion a co-eternal which is both, that is, relatively objective to the subjective, relatively subjective to the objective. Hence

THE COMMUNITY.

The eternal life, which is love; the Spirit; relatively to the Father, the Spirit of Holiness, the Holy Spirit; relatively to the Son, the Spirit of truth, whose attribute is Wisdom; *sancta sophia;* the Good in the reality of the True, in the form of actual Life.

Holy! Holy! Holy! ἱλάσθητί μοι.

A NIGHTLY PRAYER. 1831.

Almighty God, by thy eternal Word my Creator, Redeemer and Preserver! who hast in thy free communicative goodness glorified me with the capability of knowing thee, the one only absolute Good, the eternal I Am, as the author of my being, and of desiring and seeking thee as its ultimate end; who, when I fell from thee into the mystery of the false and evil will, didst not abandon me, poor self-lost creature, but in thy condescending mercy didst provide an access and a return to thyself, even to thee the Holy One, in thine only-begotten Son, the way and the

truth from everlasting, and who took on himself humanity, yea, became flesh, even the man Christ Jesus, that for man he might be the life and the resurrection!—O Giver of all good gifts, who art thyself the one only absolute Good, from whom I have received whatever good I have, whatever capability of good there is in me, and from thee good alone,—from myself and my own corrupted will all evil and the consequents of evil,—with inward prostration of will, mind, and affections I adore thy infinite majesty; I aspire to love thy transcendent goodness!—In a deep sense of my unworthiness, and my unfitness to present myself before thee, of eyes too pure to behold iniquity, and whose light, the beatitude of spirits conformed to thy will, is a consuming fire to all vanity and corruption; but in the name of the Lord Jesus, of the dear Son of thy love, in whose perfect obedience thou deignest to behold as many as have received the seed of Christ into the body of his death;—I offer this my bounden nightly sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, in humble trust, that the fragrance of my Saviour's righteousness may remove from it the taint of my mortal corruption. Thy mercies have followed me through all the hours and moments of my life; and now I lift up my heart in awe and thankfulness for the preservation of my life through the past day, for the alleviation of my bodily sufferings and languors, for the manifold comforts which thou hast reserved for me, yea, in thy fatherly compassion hast rescued from the wreck of my own sins or sinful infirmities;—for the kind and affectionate friends thou hast raised up for me, especially for those of this household, for the mother and mistress of this family whose love to me hath been great and faithful, and for the dear friend, the supporter and sharer of my studies and researches; but above all, for the heavenly Friend, the crucified Saviour, the glorified Mediator, Christ Jesus, and for the heavenly Comforter, source of all abiding comforts, thy Holy Spirit! O grant me the aid of thy Spirit, that I may with a deeper faith, a more enkindled love, bless thee, who through thy Son hast privileged me to call thee Abba, Father! O, thou who hast revealed thyself in thy holy word as a God that hearest prayer; before whose infinitude all differences cease of great and small; who like a tender parent foreknowest all our wants, yet listenest well-pleased to the humble petitions of thy children; who hast not alone permitted, but taught us, to call on thee in all our needs,—earnestly I implore

the continuance of thy free mercy, of thy protecting providence, through the coming night. Thou hearest every prayer offered to thee believingly with a penitent and sincere heart. For thou in withholding grantest, healest in inflicting the wound, yea, turnest all to good for as many as truly seek thee through Christ, the Mediator! Thy will be done! But if it be according to thy wise and righteous ordinances, O shield me this night from the assaults of disease, grant me refreshment of sleep unvexed by evil and distempered dreams; and if the purpose and aspiration of my heart be upright before thee who alone knowest the heart of man, O in thy mercy vouchsafe me yet in this my decay of life an interval of ease and strength; if so (thy grace disposing and assisting) I may make compensation to thy church for the unused talents thou hast intrusted to me, for the neglected opportunities, which thy loving-kindness had provided. O let me be found a laborer in the vineyard, though of the late hour, when the Lord and Heir of the vintage, Christ Jesus, calleth for his servant.

Our Father, &c.

To thee, great omnipresent Spirit, whose mercy is over all thy works, who now beholdest me, who hearest me, who hast framed my heart to seek and trust in thee, in the name of my Lord and Saviour Christ Jesus, I humbly commit and commend my body, soul, and spirit.

Glory be to thee, O God!

NOTES ON THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER.

PRAYER.

A MAN may pray night and day, and yet deceive himself; but no man can be assured of his sincerity, who does not pray. Prayer is faith passing into act; a union of the will and the intellect realizing in an intellectual act. It is the whole man that prays. Less than this is wishing, or lip-work; a charm or a mummery. *Pray always*, says the Apostle;—that is, have the habit of prayer, turning your thoughts into acts by connecting them with the idea of the redeeming God, and even so reconverting your actions into thoughts.

THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST.

The best preparation for taking this sacrament, better than any or all of the books or tracts composed for this end, is, to read over and over again, and often on your knees—at all events with a kneeling and praying heart—the Gospel according to St. John, till your mind is familiarized to the contemplation of Christ, the Redeemer and Mediator of mankind, yea, and of every creature, as the living and self-subsisting Word, the very truth of all true being, and the very being of all enduring truth; the reality, which is the substance and unity of all reality; *the light which lighteth every man*, so that what we call reason, is itself a light from that light, *lumen a luce*, as the Latin more distinctly expresses this fact. But it is not merely light, but therein is life; and it is the life of Christ, the co-eternal Son of God, that is the only true life-giving light of men. We are assured, and we believe that Christ is God; God manifested in the flesh. As God, he must be present entire in every creature—(for how can God, or indeed any spirit, exist in parts?)—but he is said to dwell in the regenerate, to come to them who receive him by faith in his name, that is, in his power and influence; for this is the meaning of the word 'name' in Scripture when applied to God or his Christ. Where true belief exists, Christ is not only present with or among us;—for so he is in every man, even the most wicked; —but to us and for us. *That was the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not. But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe in his name; which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us.* John i. 9–14. Again—*We will come unto him, and make our abode with him.* John xiv. 23. As truly and as really as your soul resides constitutively in your living body, so truly, really, personally, and substantially does Christ dwell in every regenerate man.

After this course of study, you may then take up and peruse sentence by sentence the communion service, the best of all comments on the Scriptures appertaining to this mystery. And this is the preparation which will prove, with God's grace, the surest

preventive of, or antidote against, the freezing poison, the lethargizing hemlock, of the doctrine of the Sacramentaries, according to whom the Eucharist is a mere practical metaphor, in which things are employed instead of articulated sounds for the exclusive purpose of recalling to our minds the historical fact of our Lord's crucifixion; in short—(the profaneness is with them, not with me)—just the same as when Protestants drink a glass of wine to the glorious memory of William III.! True it is, that the remembrance is one end of the sacrament; but it is, *Do this in remembrance of me*,—of all that Christ was and is, hath done and is still doing for fallen mankind, and of course of his crucifixion inclusively, but not of his crucifixion alone. 14 December, 1827.

COMPANION TO THE ALTAR.

First, then, that we may come to this heavenly feast holy, and adorned with the wedding garment, *Matt.* xxii. 11, we must search our hearts, and examine our consciences, not only till we see our sins, but until we hate them.

But what if a man, seeing his sin, earnestly desire to hate it? Shall he not at the altar offer up at once his desire, and the yet lingering sin, and seek for strength? Is not this sacrament medicine as well as food? Is it an end only, and not likewise the means? Is it merely the triumphal feast; or is it not even more truly a blessed refreshment for and during the conflict?

This confession of sins must not be in general terms only, that we are sinners with the rest of mankind, but it must be a special declaration to God of all our most heinous sins in thought, word, and deed.

Luther was of a different judgment. He would have us feel and groan under our sinfulness and utter incapability of redeeming ourselves from the bondage, rather than hazard the pollution of our imaginations by a recapitulation and renewing of sins and their images in detail. Do not, he says, stand picking the flaws out one by one, but plunge into the river and drown them!—I venture to be of Luther's doctrine.

COMMUNION SERVICE.

In the first Exhortation, before the words 'meritorious Cross and Passion,' I should propose to insert 'his assumption of humanity, his incarnation, and.' Likewise, a little lower down, after the word 'sustenance,' I would insert 'as.' For not in that

sacrament exclusively, but in all the acts of assimilative faith, of which the Eucharist is a solemn, eminent, and representative instance, an instance and the symbol, Christ is our spiritual food and sustenance.

MARRIAGE SERVICE.

Marriage, simply as marriage, is not the means 'for the procreation of children,' but for the humanization of the offspring procreated. Therefore in the Declaration at the beginning, after the words 'procreation of children,' I would insert, 'and as the means for securing to the children procreated enduring care, and that they may be,' &c.

COMMUNION OF THE SICK.

Third rubric at the end.

But if a man, either by reason of extremity of sickness, &c.

I think this rubric, in what I conceive to be its true meaning, a precious document, as fully acquitting our Church of all Romish superstition, respecting the nature of the Eucharist, in relation to the whole scheme of man's redemption. But the latter part of it—'he doth eat and drink the Body and Blood of our Saviour Christ profitably to his soul's health, although he do not receive the Sacrament with his mouth'—seems to me very incautiously expressed, and scarcely to be reconciled with the Church's own definition of a sacrament in general. For in such a case, where is 'the outward and visible sign of the inward and spiritual grace given ?'*

XI. SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

Epistle—1 Cor. xv. 1.

Brethren, I declare unto you the Gospel which I preached unto you.

Why should the obsolete, though faithful, Saxon translation of

* 'Should it occur to any one that the doctrine blamed in the text, is but in accordance with that of the Church of England, in her rubric concerning spiritual communion, annexed to the Office for Communion of the Sick: he may consider, whether that rubric, explained (as if possible it must be) in consistency with the definition of a sacrament in the Catechism, can be meant for any but rare and extraordinary cases: cases as strong in regard of the Eucharist, as that of martyrdom, or the premature death of a well-disposed catechumen, in regard of Baptism.' Keble's Pref. to Hooker, p. 85, n. 70.—*Ed.*

εὐαγγέλιον be retained? Why not 'good tidings?' Why thus change a most appropriate and intelligible designation of the matter into a mere conventional name of a particular book?

Ib.

—how that Christ died for our sins.

But the meaning of ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν is, that Christ died through the sins, and for the sinners. He died through our sins, and we live through his righteousness.

Gospel, Luke xviii. 14.

This man went down to his house justified rather than the other.

Not simply justified, observe; but justified rather than the other, ἢ ἐκεῖνος,—that is, less remote from salvation.

XXV. SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

Collect.

—that they, plenteously bringing forth the fruit of good works, may of thee be plenteously rewarded.

Rather—"that with that enlarged capacity, which without thee we can not acquire, there may likewise be an increase of the gift, which from thee alone we can wholly receive."

PS. VIII.

V. 2. *Out of the mouth of very babes and sucklings hast thou ordained strength, because of thine enemies: that thou mightest still the enemy and the avenger.*

To the dispensations of the twilight dawn, to the first messengers of the redeeming word, the yet lisping utterers of light and life, a strength and a power were given *because of the enemies*, greater and of more immediate influence, than to the seers and proclaimers of a clearer day:—even as the first re-appearing crescent of the eclipsed moon shines for men with a keener brilliance, than the following larger segments, previously to its total emersion.

Ib. v. 5.

Thou madest him lower than the angels, to crown him with glory and worship.

Power + idea = angel.
Idea — power = man, or Prometheus.

PS. LXVIII.

V. 34. *Ascribe ye the power to God over Israel: his worship and strength is in the clouds.*

The 'clouds' in the symbolical language of the Scriptures mean the events and course of things, seemingly effects of human will or chance, but over-ruled by Providence.

PS. LXXII.

This Psalm admits no other interpretation but of Christ, as the Jehovah incarnate. In any other sense, it would be a specimen of more than Persian or Moghul hyperbole and bombast, of which there is no other instance in Scripture, and which no Christian would dare to attribute to an inspired writer. We know, too, that the elder Jewish Church ranked it among the Messianic Psalms. N.B. The Word in St. John, and the Name of the Most High in the Psalms, are equivalent terms.

V. 1. *Give the king thy judgments, O God; and thy righteousness unto the king's son.*

God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, the only begotten, the Son of God and God, King of Kings, and the Son of the King of Kings!

PS. LXXIV.

V. 2. *O think upon thy congregation, whom thou hast purchased and redeemed of old.*

The Lamb sacrificed from the beginning of the world, the God-Man, the Judge, the self-promised Redeemer to Adam in the garden!

V. 15. *Thou smotest the heads of Leviathan in pieces; and gavest him to be meat for the people in the wilderness.*

Does this allude to any real tradition?* The Psalm appears to have been composed shortly before the captivity of Judah.

PS. LXXXII. VV. 6–7.

The reference which our Lord made to these mysterious verses, gives them an especial interest. The first apostasy, the fall of the angels, is, perhaps, intimated.

* According to Bishop Horne, the allusion is to the destruction of Pharaoh and his host in the Red Sea.—*Ed.*

PS. LXXXVII.

I would fain understand this Psalm; but first I must collate it word by word with the original Hebrew. It seems clearly Messianic.

PS. LXXXVIII.

VV. 10–12. *Dost thou show wonders among the dead, or shall the dead rise up again and praise thee? &c.*

Compare Ezekiel xxxvii.

PS. CIV.

I think the Bible version might with advantage be substituted for this, which in some parts is scarcely intelligible.

V. 6. *The waters stand in the hills.*

No; *stood above the mountains.* The reference is to the Deluge.

PS. CV.

V. 3. *Let the heart of them rejoice that seek the Lord.*

If even to seek the Lord be joy, what will it be to find him? Seek me, O Lord, that I may be found by thee!

PS. CX.

V. 2. *The Lord shall send the rod of thy power out of Zion;* (saying) *Rule, &c.*

v. 3. Understand—'Thy people shall offer themselves willingly in the day of conflict in holy clothing, in their best array, in their best arms and accoutrements. As the dew from the womb of the morning, in number and brightness like dew-drops; so shall be thy youth, or the youth of thee, the young volunteer warriors.'

v. 5. 'He shall shake,' concuss, *concutiet reges die iræ suæ.*

v. 6. For 'smite in sunder, or wound, the heads;' some word answering to the Latin *conquassare.*

v. 7. For 'therefore,' translate 'then shall he lift up his head again;' that is, as a man languid and sinking from thirst and fatigue after refreshment.

N.B. I see no poetic discrepancy between vv. 1 and 5.

PS. CXVIII.

To be interpreted of Christ's church.

PS. CXXVI.

V. 5. *As the rivers in the south.*

Does this allude to the periodical rains ?*

As a transparency on some night of public rejoicing, seen by common day, with the lamps from within removed—even such would the Psalms be to me uninterpreted by the Gospel. O honored Mr. Hurwitz ! Could I but make you feel what grandeur, what magnificence, what an everlasting significance and import Christianity gives to every fact of your national history—to every page of your sacred records !

ARTICLES OF RELIGION.

XX. It is mournful to think how many recent writers have criminated our Church in consequence of their own ignorance and inadvertence in not knowing, or not noticing, the contra-distinction here meant between power and authority. Rites and ceremonies the Church may ordain *jure proprio :* on matters of faith her judgment is to be received with reverence, and not gainsaid but after repeated inquiries, and on weighty grounds.

XXXVII. It is lawful for Christian men, at the commandment of the magistrate, to wear weapons, and to serve in the wars.

This is a very good instance of an unseemly matter neatly wrapped up. The good men recoiled from the plain words—' It is lawful for Christian men at the command of a king to slaughter as many Christians as they can !'

Well ! I could most sincerely subscribe to all these articles.
September, 1831.

NOTES ON HOOKER.†

P. 67. LIFE OF HOOKER BY WALTON.

Mr. Travers excepted against Mr. Hooker, for that in one of his sermons he declared, ' That the assurance of what we believe by the word of God, is not to us so certain as that which we perceive by sense.' And Mr. Hooker confesseth he said so, and endeavors to justify it by the reasons following.

* See Horne in loc. note.—*Ed.*

† The references are to Mr. Keble's edition (1836).—*Ed.*

There is, I confess, a shade of doubt on my mind as to this position of Hooker's. Yet I do not deny that it expresses a truth. The question in my mind is, only, whether it adequately expresses the whole truth. The ground of my doubt lies in my inability to compare two things that differ in kind. It is impossible that any conviction of the reason, even where no act of the will advenes as a co-efficient, should possess the vividness of an immediate object of the senses; for the vividness is given by sensation. Equally impossible is it that any truth of the super-sensuous reason should possess the evidence of the pure sense. Even the mathematician does not find the same evidence in the results of transcendental algebra as in the demonstrations of simple geometry. But has he less assurance? In answer to Hooker's argument I say,—that God refers to our sensible experience to aid our will by the vividness of sensible impressions, and also to aid our understanding of the truths revealed,—not to increase the conviction of their certainty where they have been understood.

WALTON'S APPENDIX.

Ib. p. 116.

It is a strange, blind story this of the last three books, and of Hooker's live relict, the Beast without Beauty. But Saravia?—If honest Isaac's account of the tender, confidential, even confessional, friendship of Hooker and Saravia be accurate, how chanced it that Hooker did not intrust the manuscripts to his friend who stood beside him in his last moments? At all events, Saravia must have known whether they had or had not received the author's last hand. Why were not Mr. Charke and the other Canterbury parson called to account, or questioned at least as to the truth of Mrs. Joan's story? Verily, I can not help suspecting that the doubt cast on the authenticity of the latter books by the high church party originated in their dislike of portions of the contents.—In short, it is a blind story, a true Canterbury tale, dear Isaac![*]

OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY.

Pref. c. iii. 7, p. 182.

The next thing hereunto is, to impute all faults and corruptions, where-

* But see Mr. Keble's statement (Pref. xxix.), and the argument founded on discoveries and collation of MSS. since the note in the text was written.—*Ed.*

with the world aboundeth, unto the kind of ecclesiastical government established.

How readily would this, and indeed all the disputes respecting the powers and constitution of Church government have been settled, or perhaps prevented, had there been an insight into the distinct nature and origin of the National Church and the Church under Christ!* To the ignorance of this, all the fierce contentions between the Puritans and the Episcopalians under Elizabeth and the Stuarts, all the errors and exorbitant pretensions of the Church of Scotland, and the heats and antipathies of our present Dissenters, may be demonstrably traced.

Ib. 9, p. 183.

Pythagoras, by bringing up his scholars in the speculative knowledge of numbers, made their conceits therein so strong, that when they came to the contemplation of things natural, they imagined that in every particular thing they even beheld as it were with their eyes, how the elements of number gave essence and being to the works of nature: a thing in reason impossible; which notwithstanding, through their mis-fashioned pre-conceit, appeared unto them no less certain, than if nature had written it in the very foreheads of all the creatures of God.

I am not so conversant with the volumes of Duns Scotus as to be able to pronounce positively whether he is an exception, but I can think of no other instance of high metaphysical genius in an Englishman. Judgment, solid sense, invention in specialities, fortunate anticipations and instructive foretact of truth,—in these we can show giants. It is evident from this example from the Pythagorean school that not even our incomparable Hooker could raise himself to the idea, so rich in truth, which is contained in the words *numero, pondere, et mensura generantur cœli et terra.* O, that Hooker had ever asked himself concerning will, absolute will,—ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὑπεραρίθμιος, *numerus omnes numeros ponens, nunquam positus!*†

Ib. p. 183.

When they of the 'Family of Love' have it once in their heads, that Christ doth not signify any one person, but a quality whereof many are partakers, &c.

If the Familists thought of Christ as a quality, it was a griev-

* See Mr. Coleridge's work 'On the constitution of the Church and State according to the idea of each.'—*Ed.*

† See E. P. l. ii. 3, p. 252.—*Ed.*

ous error indeed. But I have my doubts whether this was not rather an inference drawn by their persecutors.

Ib. 15, p. 191.

When instruction doth them no good, let them feel but the least degree of most mercifully-tempered severity, they fasten on the head of the Lord's vicegerents here on earth, whatsoever they anywhere find uttered against the cruelty of blood-thirsty men, and to themselves they draw all the sentences which Scripture hath in favor of innocency persecuted for the truth.

How great the influence of the age on the strongest minds, when so eminently wise a man as Richard Hooker could overlook the obvious impolicy of inflicting punishments which the sufferer himself will regard as merits, and all who have any need to be deterred will extol as martyrdom! Even where the necessity could be plausibly pretended, it is war, not punitive law;—and then Augustine's argument for Sarah!

Ib. c. iv. 1, p. 194.

We require you to find out but one church upon the face of the whole earth, that hath been ordered by your discipline, or hath not been ordered by ours, that is to say, by episcopal regiment, sithence the time that the blessed apostles were here conversant.

Hooker was so good a man that it would be wicked to suspect him of knowingly playing the sophist. And yet strange it is, that he should not have been aware that it was prelacy, not primitive episcopacy, the thing, not the name, that the reformers contended against, and, if the Catholic Church and the national Clerisy were (as both parties unhappily took for granted) one and the same, contended against with good reason. Knox's ecclesiastical polity (worthy of Lycurgus), adopted bishops under a different name, or rather under a translation instead of corruption of the name ἐπίσκοποι. He would have had superintendents.

Ib. c. v. 2, p. 204.

A law is the deed of the whole body politic, whereof if ye judge yourselves to be any part, then is the law even your deed also.

This is a fiction of law for the purpose of giving to that, which is necessarily empirical, the form and consequence of a science, to the reality of which a code of laws can only be approximate by compressing all liberty and individuality into a despotism. As Justinian to Alfred, and Constantinople, the Consuls and Senate of Rome to the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council of

London; so is the imperial Roman code to the common and statute law of England. The advocates of the discipline would, according to our present notions of civil rights, have been justified in putting fact against fiction, and might have challenged Hooker to show, first, that the constitution of the Church of Christ was a congruous subject of parliamentary legislation; that the legislators were *bona fide* determined by spiritual views, and that the jealousy and arbitrary principles of the Queen, aided by motives of worldly state policy,—for example, the desire of conciliating the Roman Catholic potentates by retaining all she could of the exterior of the Romish Church, its hierarchy, its ornaments, and its ceremonies,—were not the substitutes for the Holy Spirit in influencing the majorities in the two Houses of Parliament. It is my own belief that the Puritans and the Prelatists divided the truth between them; and, as half-truths are whole errors, were both equally in the wrong;—the Prelatists in contending for that as incident to the Church in Christ, that is, the collective number τῶν ἐκκαλουμένων, or *ecclesia*, which only belonged, but which rightfully did belong, to the National Church as a component estate of the realm, the *enclesia*;—the Puritans in requiring of the *enclesia* what was only requisite or possible for the *ecclesia*.* Archbishop Grindal is an illustrious exception. He saw the whole truth, and that the functions of the enclesiastic and those of the ecclesiastic were not the less distinct, because both were capable of being exercised by the same person; and *vice versa*, not the less compatible in the same subject because distinct in themselves. The Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench is a Fellow of the Royal Society.

Ib. c. vi. 3, p. 209.

God was not ignorant, that the priests and judges, whose sentences in matters of controversy he ordained should stand, both might and oftentimes would be deceived in their judgment. However, better it was in the eye of His understanding, that sometime an erroneous sentence definitive should prevail, till the same authority perceiving such oversight, might afterwards correct or reverse it, than that strifes should have respite to grow, and not come speedily to some end.

It is difficult to say, which most shines through this whole passage, the spirit of wisdom or the spirit of meekness. The

* See the 'Church and State,' in which the *ecclesia* or Church in Christ, is distinguished from the *enclesia*, or national Church.—*Ed.*

fatal error of the Romish Church did not consist in the inappellability of the Councils, or that an acquiescence in their decisions and decree was a duty binding on the conscience of the dissentients,—not, I say, in contending for a practical infallibility of Council or Pope; but in laying claim to an actual and absolute immunity from error, and consequently for the unrepealability of their decisions by any succeeding Council or Pope. Hence, even wise decisions—wise under the particular circumstances and times—degenerated into mischievous follies, by having the privilege of immortality without any exemption from the dotage of superannuation. Hence errors became like *glaciers*, or icebergs in the frozen ocean, unthawed by summer, and growing from the fresh deposits of each returning winter.

Ib. 6, p. 212.

An argument necessary and demonstrative is such, as being proposed unto any man, and understood, the mind can not choose but inwardly assent. Any one such reason dischargeth, I grant, the conscience, and setteth it at full liberty.

I would not concede even so much as this. It may well chance that even an argument demonstrative, if understood, may be adducible against some one sentence of a whole liturgy; and yet the means of removing it without a palpable overbalance of evil may not exist for a time; and either there is no command against schism, or we are bound in such small matters to offer the sacrifice of willing silence to the public peace of the Church. This would not, however, prevent a minister from pointing out the defect in his character as a doctor or learned theologian.

Ib. c. viii. 1, p. 220.

For adventuring to erect the discipline of Christ without the leave of the Christian magistrate, haply ye may condemn us as fools, in that we hazard thereby our estates and persons further than you which are that way more wise think necessary: but of any offence or sin therein committed against God, with what conscience can you accuse us, when your own positions are, that the things we observe should every of them be dearer unto us than ten thousand lives; that they are the peremptory commandments of God; that no mortal man can dispense with them, and that the magistrate grievously sinneth in not constraining thereunto?

Hoc argumentum ad invidiam nimis sycophanticum est quam ut mihi placeat a tanto viro. Besides, it contradicts Hooker's own very judicious rule, that to discuss and represent is the office of the learned, as individuals, because the truth may be

entire in any one mind ; but to do belongs to the supreme power as the will of the whole body politic, and in effective action individuals are mere fractions without any legitimate referee to add them together. Hooker's objection from the nobility and gentry of the realm is unanswerable and within half a century afterwards proved insurmountable. Imagine a sun containing within its proper atmosphere a multitude of transparent satellites, lost in the glory, or all joining to form the visible *phasis* or disk ; and then beyond the precincts of this sun a number of opake bodies at various distances, and having a common centre of their own round which they revolve, and each more or less according to the lesser or greater distance partaking of the light and natural warmth of the sun, which I have been supposing ; but not sharing in its peculiar influences, or in the solar life sustainable only by the vital air of the solar atmosphere. The opake bodies constitute the national churches, the sun the churches spiritual. The defect of the simile, arising necessarily out of the incompossibility of spiritual prerogatives with material bodies under the proprieties and necessities of space, is, that it does not, as no concrete or visual image can, represent the possible duplicity of the individuals, the aggregate of whom constitutes the national church, so that any one individual, or any number of such individuals, may at the same time be, by an act of their own, members of the church spiritual, and in every congregation may form an *ecclesia* or Christian community : and how to facilitate and favor this without any schism from the *enclesia*, and without any disturbance of the body politic, was the problem which Grindal and the bishops of the first generation of the Reformed Church sought to solve, and it is the problem which every earnest Christian endued with competent gifts, and who is at the same time a patriot and a philanthropist, ought to propose to himself, as the *ingens desiderium proborum*.—8th Sept. 1826.

Ib. c. viii. 7, p. 232.

Baptizing of infants, although confessed by themselves, to have been continued ever sithence the very apostles' own times, yet they altogether condemned.

Quære. I can not say what the fanatic Anabaptists, of whom Hooker is speaking, may have admitted ; but the more sober and learned Antipædobaptists, who differed in this point only from the reformed churches, have all, I believe, denied the practice of infant baptism during the first century.

B. i. c. ii. 1, p. 249.

That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure, of working, the same we term a law

See the essays on method, in The Friend.* Hooker's words literally and grammatically interpreted seem to assert the antecedence of the thing to its kind, that is, to its essential characters ;—and to its force together with its form and measure of working, that is, to its specific and distinctive characters ; in short, the words assert the pre-existence of the thing to all its constituent powers, qualities, and properties. Now this is either—first, equivalent to the assertion of a *prima et nuda materia*, so happily ridiculed by the author of Hudibras,† and which under any scheme of cosmogony is a mere phantom, having its whole and sole substance in an impotent effort of the imagination or sensuous fancy, but which is utterly precluded by the doctrine of creation which it in like manner negatives :—or secondly, the words assert a self-destroying absurdity, namely, the antecedence of a thing to itself; as if having asserted that water consisted of hydrogen = 77, and oxygen = 23, I should talk of water as existing before the creation of hydrogen and oxygen. All laws, indeed, are constitutive ; and it would require a longer train of argument than a note can contain, to show what a thing is ; but this at least is quite certain, that in the order of thought it must be posterior to the law that constitutes it. But such in fact was Hooker's meaning, and the word, thing, is used *proleptice* in favor of the imagination, as appears from the sentences that follow, in which the creative idea is declared to be the law of the things thereby created. A productive idea, manifesting itself and its reality in the product is a law ; and when the product is phænomenal (that is, an object of the outward senses), it is a law of nature. The law is *res noumenon :* the thing is *res phænomenon.*‡ A physical law is the right sense of the term, is the sufficient cause of the appearance,—*causa sub-faciens.*

P.S. What a deeply interesting volume might be written on

* See the essays generally from the fourth to the ninth, both inclusively, in Section Second, pp. 408–448, more especially, the fifth essay.—*Ed.*

† Part i. c. i. vv. 151–6.—*Ed.*

‡ See the Essay on the idea of the Prometheus of Æschylus. IV. p. 344.—*Ed.*

the symbolic import of the primary relations and dimensions of space—long, broad, deep, or depth ; surface ; upper, under, above and below, right, left, horizontal, perpendicular, oblique :—and then the order of causation, or that which gives intelligibility, and the reverse order of effects, or that which gives the conditions of actual existence ! Without the higher the lower would want its intelligibility ; without the lower the higher could not have existed. The infant is a riddle of which man is the solution ; but the man could not exist but with the infant as his antecedent.

Ib. 2, p. 250.

In which essential Unity of God, a Trinity personal nevertheless subsisteth, after a manner far exceeding the possibility of man's conceit.

If 'conceit' here means conception, the remark is most true ; for the Trinity is an idea, and no idea can be rendered by a conception. An idea is essentially inconceivable. But if it be meant that the Trinity is otherwise inconceivable than as the divine eternity and every attribute of God is and must be, then neither the commonness of the language here used, nor the high authority of the user, can deter me from denouncing it as untrue and dangerous. So far is it from being true, that on the contrary, the Trinity is the only form in which an idea of God is possible, unless indeed it be a Spinosistic or World-God.

Ib. c. iv. 1, p. 264.

But now that we may lift up our eyes (as it were) from the footstool to the throne of God, and leaving these natural, consider a little the state of heavenly and divine, creatures : touching angels which are spirits immaterial and intellectual, &c.

All this disquisition on the angels confirms my remark that our admirable Hooker was a giant of the race Aristotle *versus* Plato. Hooker was truly judicious,—the consummate *synthesis* of understanding and sense. An ample and most ordonnant conceptionist, to the tranquil empyrean of ideas he had not ascended Of the passages cited from Scripture how few would bear a strict scrutiny ; being either, 1. divine appearances, Jehovah in human form ; or 2. the imagery of visions and all symbolic ; or 3. names of honor given to prophets, apostles, or bishops ; or lastly, mere accommodations to popular notions !

Ib. 3, p. 267.

Since their fall, their practices have been the clean contrary unto those

before mentioned. For being dispersed, some in the air, some on the earth, some in the water, some among the minerals, dens, and caves, that are under the earth; they have, by all means labored to effect a universal rebellion against the laws, and as far as in them lieth, utter destruction of the works of God.

Childish; but the childishness of the age, without which neither Hooker nor Luther could have acted on their contemporaries with the intense and beneficent energy with which, they (God be praised!) did act.

Ib. p. 268.

Thus much therefore may suffice for angels, the next unto whom in degree are men.

St. Augustine well remarks that only three distinct *genera* of living beings are conceivable:—1. the infinite rational: 2. the finite rational: 3. the finite irrational: that is, God, man, brute animal. *Ergo*, angels can only be men with wings on their shoulders. Were our bodies transparent to our souls, we should be angels.

Ib. c. x. 4, p. 303.

It is no improbable opinion therefore which the arch-philosopher was of.

There are, and can be, only two schools of philosophy, differing in kind and in source. Differences in degree and in accident, there may be many; but these constitute schools kept by different teachers with different degrees of genius, talent, and learning;—auditories of philosophizers, not different philosophies. Schools of psilology (the love of empty noise) and misosophy are here out of the question. Schools of real philosophy there are but two,—best named by the arch-philosopher of each, namely, Plato and Aristotle. Every man capable of philosophy at all (and there are not many such) is a born Platonist or a born Aristotelian.* Hooker, as may be discerned from the epithet of arch-

* 'Every man is born an Aristotelian, or a Platonist. I do not think it possible that any one born an Aristotelian can become a Platonist; and I am sure no born Platonist can ever change into an Aristotelian. They are the two classes of men, beside which it is next to impossible to conceive a third. The one considers reason a quality, or attribute; the other considers it a power. I believe that Aristotle never could get to understand what Plato meant by an idea. * * * * * Aristotle was, and still is, the sovereign lord of the understanding; the faculty judging by the senses. He was a conceptualist, and never could raise himself into that higher state, which was natural to Plato, and has been so to others, in which the under-

philosopher applied to the Stagyrite, *sensu monarchico*, was of the latter family,—a comprehensive, vigorous, discreet, and discretive conceptualist, but not an ideist.

Ib. 8, p. 308.

Of this point therefore we are to note, that sith men naturally have no free and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent, we could in such sort be at no man's commandment living. And to be commanded we do consent, when that society whereof we are part hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement. Wherefore as any man's deed past is good as long as himself continueth; so the act of a public society of men done five hundred years sithence standeth as theirs who presently are of the same societies, because corporations are immortal; we were then alive in our predecessors, and they in their successors do live still. Laws therefore human, of what kind soever, are available by consent.

No nobler or clearer example than this could be given of what an idea is as contra-distinguished from a conception of the understanding, correspondent to some fact or facts, *quorum notæ communes concapiuntur*,—the common characters of which are taken together under one distinct exponent, hence named a conception; and conceptions are internal subjective words. Reflect on an original social contract, as an event or historical fact; and its gross improbability, not to say impossibility, will stare you in the face. But an ever originating social contract as an idea, which exists and works continually and efficaciously in the moral being of every free citizen, though in the greater number unconsciously, or with a dim and confused consciousness,—what a power it is!* As the vital power compared with the mechanic; as a father compared with a moulder in wax or clay, such is the power of ideas compared with the influence of conceptions and notions.

Ib. 15, p. 316.

—— I nothing doubt but that Christian men should much better frame themselves to those heavenly precepts, which our Lord and Saviour with so great instancy gave us concerning peace and unity, if we did all concur in desire to have the use of ancient Councils again renewed, rather than these proceedings continued, which either make all contentions endless, or bring

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standing is distinctly contemplated, and, as it were, looked down upon, from the throne of actual ideas, or living, inborn, essential truths.'—*Table Talk*, p. 336.—*Ed.*

* See the "Church and State," c. i.—*Ed.*

them to one only determination, and that of all other the worst, which is by sword.

This is indeed a subject that deserves a serious consideration: and it may be said in favor of Hooker's proposal, namely, that the use of ancient Councils be renewed, that a deep and universal sense of the abuse of Councils progressively from the Nicene to that of Trent, and our knowledge of the causes, occasions, and mode of such abuse, are so far presumptive for its non-recurrency as to render it less probable that honest men will pervert them from ignorance, and more difficult for unprincipled men to do so designedly. Something too must be allowed for an honorable ambition on the part of the persons so assembled, to disappoint the general expectation, and win for themselves the unique title of the honest Council. But still comes the argument, the blow of which I might more easily blunt than parry, that if Roman Catholic and Protestant, or even Protestant Episcopalian and Protestant Presbyterian divines were generally wise and charitable enough to form a Christian General Council, there would be no need of one.

N.B. The reasoning in his note, as far as it is in discouragement of a recurrence to general Councils, does not, *me saltem judice*, conclude against the suffering our Convocation to meet. The virtual abrogation of this branch of our constitution I have long regarded as one of three or four Whig patriotisms, that have succeeded in de-anglicizing the mind of England.

Ib. c. xi. 4, p. 323.

So that nature even in this life doth plainly claim and call for a more divine perfection than either of these two that have been mentioned.

Whenever I meet with an ambiguous or multivocal word, without its meaning being shown and fixed, I stand on my guard against a sophism. I dislike this term, 'nature,' in this place. If it mean the *light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world*, it is an inapt term; for reason is supernatural. Now that reason in man must have been first actuated by a direct revelation from God, I have myself proved, and do not therefore deny that faith as the means of salvation was first made known by revelation; but that reason is incapable of seeing into the fitness and superiority of these means, or that it is a mystery in any other sense than as all spiritual truths are mysterious, I do deny

and deem it both a false and a dangerous doctrine. 15 Sept. 1826.

Ib. 6, p. 327.

Concerning that faith, hope and charity, without which there can be no salvation; was there ever any mention made saving only in that law which God himself hath from heaven revealed? There is not in the world a syllable muttered with certain truth concerning any of these three, more than hath been supernaturally received from the mouth of the eternal God.

That reason could have discovered these divine truths is one thing; that when discovered by revelation, it is capable of apprehending the beauty and excellence of the things revealed is another. I may believe the latter, while I utterly reject the former. That all these cognitions, together with the fealty or faithfulness in the will whereby the mind of the flesh is brought under captivity to the mind of the spirit (the sensuous understanding to the reason) are supernatural, I not only freely grant, but fervently contend. But why the very perfection of reason, namely, those ideas or truth-powers, in which both the spiritual light and the spiritual life are co-inherent and one, should be called super-rational, I do not see. For reason is practical as well as theoretical; or even though I should exclude the practical reason, and confine the term reason to the highest intellective power,—still I should think it more correct to describe the mysteries of faith as *plusquam rationalia* than super-rational. But the assertions that provoke the remark arose for the greater part, and still arise, out of the confounding of the reason with the understanding. In Hooker, and the great divines of his age, it was merely an occasional carelessness in the use of the terms that reason is ever put where they meant the understanding; for, from other parts of their writings, it is evident that they knew and asserted the distintcion, nay, the diversity of the things themselves; to wit, that there was in man another and higher light than that of the faculty judging according to sense, that is our understandings. But, alas! since the Revolution, it has ceased to be a mere error of language, and in too many it now amounts to a denial of reason!

B. ii. c. v. 3, p. 379.

To urge any thing as part of that supernatural and celestially revealed truth which God hath taught, and not to show it in Scripture; this did the ancient Fathers evermore think unlawful, impious, execrable.

Even this must be received *cum grano salis*. To be sure, with the licenses of interpretation, which the Fathers of the first three or four centuries allowed themselves, and with the *arcana* of evolution by word, letter, allegory, yea, punning, which they applied to detached sentences or single phrases of Holy Writ, it would not be easy to imagine a position which they could not 'show in Scripture.' Let this be elucidated by the texts even now cited by the Romish priests for the truth of purgatory, indulgence, image-worship, invocation of dead men, and the like. The assertion therefore must be thus qualified. The ancient Fathers anathematized any doctrine not consentaneous with Scripture and deducible from it, either *pari ratione* or by consequence; as when Scripture clearly commands an end, but leaves the means to be determined according to the circumstances, as for example, the frequent assembly of Christians. The appointment of a Sunday or Lord's day is evidently the fittest and most effectual mean to this end; but yet it was not practicable, that is, the mean did not exist till the Roman government became Christian. But as soon as this event took place, the duty of keeping the Sunday holy is truly, though implicitly contained in the Apostolic text.

Ib. vi. 3, p. 392.

Again, with a negative argument, David is pressed concerning the purpose he had to build a temple unto the Lord: *Thus saith the Lord, Thou shalt not build me a house to dwell in. Wheresoever I have walked with all Israel, spake I one word to any of the judges of Israel, whom I commanded to feed my people, saying, Why have ye not built me a house?*

The wisdom of the divine goodness both in the negative, the not having authorized any of the preceding Judges from Moses downwards to build a temple—and in the positive, in having commanded David to prepare for it, and Solomon to build it—I have not seen it put in the full light in which it so well deserves to be. The former or negative, or the evils of a splendid temple-worship and its effects on the character of the priesthood—evils, when not changed to good by becoming the antidote and preventive of far greater evils—would require much thought both to set forth and to comprehend. But to give any reflecting reader a sense of the providential foresight evinced in the latter, and this foresight beyond the reach of any but the Omniscient, it will be only necessary to remind him of the separation of the ten tribes and the breaking up of the realm into the two kingdoms of Judah

and Israel in the very next reign. Without the continuity of succession provided for by this vast and splendid temple, built and arranged under the divine sanction attested by miracles—what criterion would there have existed for the purity of this law and worship? what security for the preservation and incorruption of the inspired writings?

Ib. vii. 3, p. 403.

That there is a city of Rome, that Pius Quintus and Gregory the Thirteenth, and others, have been Popes of Rome, I suppose we are certainly enough persuaded. The ground of our persuasion, who never saw the place nor persons before-named, can be nothing but man's testimony. Will any man here notwithstanding allege those mentioned human infirmities as reasons why these things should be mistrusted or doubted of? Yea, that which is more, utterly to infringe the force and strength of man's testimony, were to shake the very fortress of God's truth.

In a note on a passage in Skelton's Deism Revealed,* I have detected the subtle sophism that lurks in this argument, as applied by later divines in vindication of proof by testimony, in relation to the miracles of the Old and New Testament. As thus applied, it is a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, though so unobvious, that a very acute and candid reasoner might use the argument without suspecting the paralogism. It is not testimony as testimony, that necessitates us to conclude that there is such a city as Rome—but a reasoning, that forms a branch of mathematical science. So far is our conviction from being grounded on our confidence in human testimony that it proceeds on our knowledge of its fallible character, and therefore can find no sufficient reason for its coincidence on so vast a scale, but in the real existence of the object. That a thousand lies told by as many several and unconnected individuals should all be one and the same, is a possibility expressible only by a fraction that is already, to all intents and purposes, equal to naught.

B. iii. c. iii. 1, p. 447.

The mixture of those things by speech, which by nature are divided, is the mother of all error.

'The division in thought of those things which in nature are distinct, yet one, that is, distinguished without breach of unity, is the mother,'—so I should have framed the position. Will, reason, life,—ideas in relation to the mind, are instances; *entiæ in-*

* See *post.*—*Ed.*

divise interdistinctæ; and the main arguments of the atheists, materialists, deniers of our Lord's divinity and the like, all rest on the asserting of division as a necessary consequence of distinction.

B. v. c. xix. 3, vol. ii. p. 87.

Of both translations the better I willingly acknowledge that which cometh nearer to the very letter of the original verity; yet so that the other may likewise safely enough be read, without any peril at all of gainsaying as much as the least jot or syllable of God's most sacred and precious truth.

Hooker had far better have rested on the impossibility and the uselessness, if possible, of a faultless translation; and admitting certain mistakes and oversights, have recommended them for notice at the next revision; and then asked, what objection such harmless trifles could be to a Church that never pretended to infallibility! But in fact the age was not ripe enough even for a Hooker to feel, much less with safety to expose, the Protestants' idol, that is, their Bibliolatry.

Ib. c. xxii. 10, p. 125.

Their only proper and direct proof of the thing in question had been to show, in what sort and how far man's salvation doth necessarily depend upon the knowledge of the word of God; what conditions, properties, and qualities there are, whereby sermons are distinguished from other kinds of administering the word unto that purpose; and what special property or quality that is, which being nowhere found but in sermons, maketh them effectual to save souls, and leaveth all other doctrinal means besides destitute of vital efficacy.

Doubtless, Hooker was a theological Talus, with a club of iron against opponents with pasteboard helmets, and armed only with crab-sticks! But yet, I too, too often find occasion to complain of him as abusing his superior strength. For in a good man it is an abuse of his intellectual superiority, not to use a portion of it in stating his Christian opponents' cause, his brethren's (though dissentient, and perhaps erring, yet still brethren's) side of the question, not as they had stated and argued it, but as he himself with his higher gifts of logic and foresight could have set it forth. But Hooker flies off to the general, in which he is unassailable; and does not, as in candor he should have done, inquire whether the question would not admit of, nay, demand, a different answer, when applied solely or principally to the circumstances, the condition and the needs of the English parishes, and the population at large, at the particular time when the Puritan divines wrote,

and he, Hooker, replied to them. Now let the cause be tried in this way, and I should not be afraid to attempt the proof of the paramount efficacy of preaching on the scheme, and in the line of argument laid down by himself in this section. In short, Hooker frequently finds it convenient to forget the homely proverb; 'the proof of the pudding is in the eating.' Whose parishes were the best disciplined, whose flocks the best fed, the soberest livers, and the most awakened and best informed Christians, those of the zealous preaching divines, or those of the prelatic clergy with their readers? In whose churches and parishes were all the other pastoral duties, catechizing, visiting the poor and the like, most strictly practised?

Ib. 11.

The people which have no way to come to the knowledge of God, no prophesying, no teaching, perish. But that they should of necessity perish, where any one way of knowledge lacketh, is more than the words of Solomon import.

But what was the fact? Were those congregations that had those readers of whom the Puritans were speaking—were they, I say, equally well acquainted with, and practically impressed by, the saving truths of the Gospel? Were they not rather perishing for lack of knowledge? To reply—It was their own fault; they ought to have been more regular in their attendance at church, and more attentive, when there, to what was there read—is to my mind too shocking, nay, antichristian.

Ib. 16, p. 137.

Now all these things being well considered, it shall be no intricate matter for any man to judge with indifferency, on which part the good of the church is most conveniently sought; whether on ours, whose opinion is such as hath been showed, or else on theirs, who leaving no ordinary way of salvation for them unto whom the word of God is but only read, do seldom name them but with great disdain and contempt, who execute that service in the church of Christ.

If so, they were much to be blamed. But surely this was not the case with the better and wiser part of those who, clinging to the tenets and feelings of the first Reformer, and honoring Archbishop Grindal as much as they dreaded his Arminian successors, were denominated Puritans! They limited their censures to exclusive reading,—to reading as the substitute for, and too often for the purpose of doing away with, preaching.

Ib. lxv. 8, p. 415.

Thus was the memory of that sign which they had in baptism a kind of bar or prevention to keep them even from apostasy, whereinto the frailty of flesh and blood, overmuch fearing to endure shame, might peradventure the more easily otherwise have drawn them.

I begin to fear that Hooker is not suited to my nature. I can not bear round-abouts for the purpose of evading the short cut straight before my eyes. *Exempli gratia;* I find myself tempted in this place to ejaculate Psha! somewhat abruptly, and ask, "How many in twenty millons of Christian men and women ever reverted to the make-believe impression of the Cross on their forehead in unconscious infancy, by the wetted tip of the clergyman's finger as a preservative against anger and resentment?" "The whole church of God!" Was it not the same church which, neglecting and concealing the Scriptures of God, introduced the adoration of the Cross, the worshiping of relics, holy water, and all the other countless mummeries of Popery? Something might be pretended for the material images of the Cross worn at the bosom or hung up in the bed-chamber. These may, and doubtless often do, serve as silent monitors; but this eye-falsehood or pretence of making a mark that is not made, is a gratuitous superstition, that can not be practised without serious danger of leading the vulgar to regard it as a charm. Hooker should have asked—Has it hitherto had this effect on Christians generally? Is it likely to produce this effect, and this principally? In common honesty he must have answered, No!—Do I then blame the Church of England for retaining this ceremony? By no means. I justify it as a wise and pious condescension to the inveterate habits of a people newly dragged, rather than drawn, out of Papistry; and as a pledge that the founders and fathers of the Reformation in England regarded innovation as *per se* an evil, and therefore requiring for its justification not only a cause, but a weighty cause. They did well and piously in deferring the removal of minor spots and stains to the time when the good effects of the more important reforms had begun to show themselves in the minds and hearts of the laity.—But they do not act either wisely or charitably who would eulogize these *maculæ* as beauty-spots, and vindicate as good what their predecessors only tolerated as the lesser evil.—12th August, 1826.

Ib. 15, p. 424.

For in actions of this kind we are more to respect what the greatest part of men is commonly prone to conceive, than what some few men's wits may devise in construction of their own particular meanings. Plain it is, that a false opinion of some personal divine excellency to be in those things which either nature or art hath framed causeth always religious adoration.

How strongly might this most judicious remark be turned against Hooker's own mode of vindicating this ceremony!

Ib. lxvi. 2, p. 432.

The Church had received from Christ a promise that such as have believed in him, these signs and tokens should follow them. "To cast out devils, to speak with tongues, to drive away serpents, to be free from the harm which any deadly poison could work, and to cure diseases by imposition of hands."—*Mark* xvi.

The man who verily and sincerely believes the narrative in St. John's Gospel of the feeding of five thousand persons with a few loaves and small fishes, and of the raising of Lazarus, in the plain and literal sense, can not be reasonably suspected of rejecting, or doubting, any narrative concerning Christ and his Apostles, simply as miraculous. I trust, therefore, that no disbelief of, or prejudice against, miraculous events and powers will be attributed to me as the ground or cause of my strong persuasion, that the latter verses of the last chapter of St. Mark's Gospel were an additament of a later age, for which St. Luke's Acts of the Apostles misunderstood supplied the hints.

Ib. lxxii. 15 and 16, p. 539.

If Richard Hooker had written only these two precious paragraphs, I should hold myself bound to thank the Father of lights and Giver of all good gifts for his existence and the preservation of his writings.

B. viii. c. ix. 2, vol. iii. p. 537.

As there could be in natural bodies no motion of any thing, unless there were some which moveth all things, and continueth immovable; even so in politic societies, there must be some unpunishable, or else no man shall suffer punishment.

It is most painful to connect the venerable, almost sacred, name of Richard Hooker with such a specimen of puerile sophistry, scarcely worthy of a court bishop's trencher chaplain in the slavering times of our Scotch Solomon. It is, however, of some value, some interest at least, as a striking example of the confu-

sion of an idea with a conception. Every conception has its sole reality in its being referable to a thing or class of things, of which, or of the common characters of which, it is a reflection. An idea is a power, *δύναμις νοερά*, which constitutes its own reality, and is in order of thought necessarily antecedent to the things in which it is more or less adequately realized, while a conception is as necessarily posterior.

SERMON OF THE CERTAINTY AND PERPETUITY OF FAITH IN THE ELECT.

Vol. iii. p. 583.

The following truly admirable discourse is, I think, the concluding sermon of a series unhappily not preserved.

Ib. p. 584.

If it were so in matters of faith, then, as all men have equal certainty of this, so no believer should be more scrupulous and doubtful than another. But we find the contrary. The angels and spirits of the righteous in heaven have certainty most evident of things spiritual: but this they have by the light of glory. That which we see by the light of grace, though it be indeed more certain; yet it is not to us so evidently certain, as that which sense or the light of nature will not suffer a man to doubt of.

Hooker's meaning is right; but he falls into a sad confusion of words, blending the thing and the relation of the mind to the thing. The fourth moon of Jupiter is certain in itself; but evident only to the astronomer with his telescope.

Ib. pp. 585–588.

The other, which we call the certainty of adherence, is when the heart doth cleave and stick unto that which it doth believe. This certainty is greater in us than the other * * * * (*down to*) the fourth question resteth, and so an end of this point.

These paragraphs should be written in gold. O! may these precious words be written on my heart! 1. That we all need to be redeemed, and that therefore we are all in captivity to an evil:—2. That there is a Redeemer:—3. That the redemption relatively to each individual captive is, if not effected under certain conditions, yet manifestable as far as is fitting for the soul by certain signs and consequents:—and 4. That these signs are in myself; that the conditions under which the redemption offered to all men is promised to the individual, are fulfilled in myself;—these are the four great points of faith, in which the humble

Christian finds and feels a gradation from trembling hope to full assurance; yet the will, the act of trust, is the same in all. Might I not almost say, that it rather increases with the decrease of the consciously discerned evidence? To assert that I have the same assurance of mind that I am saved as that I need a Saviour, would be a contradiction to my own feelings, and yet I may have an equal, that is, an equivalent assurance. How is it possible that a sick man should have the same certainty of his convalescence as of his sickness? Yet he may be assured of it. So again, my faith in the skill and integrity of my physician may be complete, but the application of it to my own case may be troubled by the sense of my own imperfect obedience to his prescriptions. The sort of our beliefs and assurances is necessarily modified by their different subjects. It argues no want of saving faith on the whole, that I can not have the same trust in myself as I have in my God. That Christ's righteousness can save me, —that Christ's righteousness alone can save—these are simple positions, all the terms of which are steady and copresent to my mind. But that I shall be so saved,—that of the many called I have been one of the chosen,—this is no mere conclusion of mind on known or assumed premisses. I can remember no other discourse that sinks into and draws up comfort from the depths of our being below our own distinct consciousness, with the clearness and godly loving-kindness of this truly evangelical God-to-be-thanked-for sermon. But how large, how important a part of our spiritual life goes on like the circulation, absorptions, and secretions of our bodily life, unrepresented by any specific sensation, and yet the ground and condition of our total sense of existence!

While I feel, acknowledge, and revere the almost measureless superiority of the sermons of the divines, who labored in the first, and even the first two centuries of the Reformation, from Luther to Leighton, over the prudential morals and apologizing theology that have characterized the unfanatical clergy since the Revolution in 1688, I can not but regret, especially while I am listening to a Hooker, that they withheld all light from the truths contained in the word 'Satan,' 'the Serpent,' 'the Evil Spirit,' and this last used plurally.

A DISCOURSE OF JUSTIFICATION, WORKS, AND HOW THE FOUNDATION OF FAITH IS OVERTHROWN.

Ib. s. 31, pp. 659–661.

But we say, our salvation is by Christ alone; therefore howsoever, or whatsoever, we add unto Christ in the matter of salvation, we overthrow Christ. Our case were very hard, if this argument, so universally meant as it is proposed, were sound and good. We ourselves do not teach Christ alone, excluding our own faith, unto justification; Christ alone, excluding our own work, unto sanctification; Christ alone, excluding the one or the other as unnecessary unto salvation. * * * * * As we have received, so we teach that besides the bare and naked work, wherein Christ, without any other associate, finished all the parts of our redemption and *purchased* salvation himself alone; for conveyance of this eminent blessing unto us, many things are required, as, to be known and chosen of God *before* the foundations of the world; *in* the world to be called, justified, sanctified; *after* we have left the world to be received into glory; Christ in every of these hath somewhat which he worketh alone, &c. &c.

Nowhere out of the Holy Scripture have I found the root and pith of Christian faith so clearly and purely propounded as in this section. God, whose thoughts are eternal, beholdeth the end, and in the completed work seeth and accepteth every stage of the process. I dislike only the word 'purchased;'—not that it is not Scriptural, but because a metaphor well and wisely used in the enforcement and varied elucidation of a truth, is not therefore properly employed in its exact enunciation. I will illustrate, amplify, and *divide* the word with Paul; but I will propound it collectively with John. If in this admirable passage aught else dare be wished otherwise, it is the division and yet confusion of time and eternity, by giving an anteriority to the latter.

I am persuaded, that the practice of the Romish church tendeth to make vain the doctrine of salvation by faith in Christ alone; but judging by her most eminent divines, I can find nothing dissonant from the truth in her express decisions on this article. Perhaps it would be safer to say:—Christ alone saves us, working in us by the faith which includes hope and love.

Ib. s. 34, p. 671.

If it were not a strong deluding spirit which hath possession of their hearts; were it possible but that they should see how plainly they do herein gainsay the very ground of apostolic faith? * * * The Apostle, as if he had foreseen how the Church of Rome would abuse the world in time by ambiguous terms, to declare in what sense the name of grace must be

taken, when we make it the cause of our salvation, saith, *He saved us according to his mercy*, &c.

In all Christian communities there have been and ever will be too many Christians in name only;—too many in belief and notion only; but likewise, I trust, in every acknowledged Church, Eastern or Western, Greek, Roman, Protestant, many of those in belief, more or less erroneous, who are Christians in faith and in spirit. And I neither do nor can think, that any pious member of the Church of Rome did ever in his heart attribute any merit to any work as being his work.* A grievous error and a mischievous error there was practically in mooting the question at all of the condignity of works and their rewards. In short, to attribute merit to any agent but God in Christ, our faith as Christians forbids us; and to dispute about the merit of works abstracted from the agent, common sense ought to forbid us.

A SUPPLICATION MADE TO THE COUNCIL BY MASTER WALTER TRAVERS.

Ib. p. 698.

I said directly and plainly to all men's understanding, that it was not indeed to be doubted, but many of the Fathers were saved; but the means, said I, was not their ignorance, which excuseth no man with God, but their knowledge and faith of the truth, which, it appeareth, God vouchsafed them, by many notable monuments and records extant of it in all ages.

Not certainly, if the ignorance proceeded directly or indirectly from a defect or sinful propensity of the will; but where no such cause is imaginable, in such cases this position of Master Travers is little less than blasphemous to the divine goodness, and in direct contradiction to an assertion of St. Paul's,† and to an evident consequence from our Saviour's own words on the polygamy of the fathers.‡

* But see the language of the Council of Trent:—Si quis dixerit justitiam acceptam non conservari *atque etiam augeri coram Deo per bona opera;* sed opera ipsa fructus solummodo et signa esse justificationis adeptæ, *non autem ipsius augendæ causam;* anathema sit. *Sess.* VI. *Can.* 24. * * * Si quis dixerit hominis justificati *bona opera* ita esse dona Dei, *ut non sint etiam bona ipsius justificati merita;* aut ipsum justificatum *bonis operibus*, quæ ab eo per Dei gratiam, et Jesu Christi meritum, cujus vivum membrum est, fiunt, *non vere mereri augmentum gratiæ, vitam æternam, et ipsius vitæ æternæ, si tamen in gratia decesserit, consecutionem atque etiam gloriæ augmentum*, anathema sit. *Ib. Can.* 32.—*Ed.*

† Rom. ii. 12.—*Ed.*

‡ Matt. xix. 8.—*Ed.*

ANSWER TO TRAVERS.

Ib. p. 719.

The next thing discovered, is an opinion about the assurance of men's persuasion in matters of faith. I have taught, he saith, 'That the assurance of things which we believe by the word, is not so certain as of that we perceive by sense.'

A useful instance to illustrate the importance of distinct, and the mischief of equivocal or multivocal, terms. Had Hooker said that the fundamental truths of religion, though perhaps even more certain, are less evident than the facts of sense, there could have been no misunderstanding. Thus the demonstrations of algebra possess equal certainty with those of geometry, but can not lay claim to the same evidence. Certainty is positive, evidence relative; the former, strictly taken, insusceptible of more or less, the latter capable of existing in many different degrees.

Writing a year or more after the preceding note, I am sorry to say that Hooker's reasoning on this point seems to me sophistical throughout. That a man must see what he sees is no persuasion at all, nor bears the remotest analogy to any judgment of the mind. The question is, whether men have a clearer conception and a more steadfast conviction of the objective reality to which the image moving their eye appertains, than of the objective reality of the things and states spiritually discovered by faith. And this Travers had a right to question wherever a saving faith existed.

August, 1826.

SERMON IV.

A REMEDY AGAINST SORROW AND FEAR.

Ib. p. 801.

In spirit I am with you to the world's end.

O how grateful should I be to be made intuitive of the truth intended in the words—*In spirit I am with you!*

Ib. p. 808.

Touching the latter affection of fear, which respecteth evils to come, as the other which we have spoken of doth present evils; first, in the nature thereof it is plain that we are not of every future evil afraid. Perceive we not how they, whose tenderness shrinketh at the least rase of a needle's point, do kiss the sword that pierceth their souls quite thorow?

In this and in sundry similar passages of this venerable writer there is ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, a very plausible, but even therefore the more dangerous, sophism; but the due detection and exposure of which would exceed the scanty space of a marginal comment. Briefly, what does Hooker comprehend in the term 'pain?' Whatsoever the soul finds adverse to her well-being, or incompatible with her free action? In this sense Hooker's position is a mere truism. But if pain be applied exclusively to the soul finding itself as life, then it is an error.

Ib. p. 811.

Fear then in itself being mere nature can not in itself be sin, which sin is not nature, but therefore an accessary deprivation.

I suspect a misprint, and that it should be *depravation*. But if not nature, then it must be a super-induced and incidental depravation of nature. The principal, namely fear, is nature; but the sin, that is, that it is a sinful fear, is but an accessary.

NOTES ON FIELD ON THE CHURCH.*

Fly-leaf.—Hannah Scollock, her book, February 10, 1787.

This, Hannah Scollock! may have been the case;
Your writing therefore I will not erase.
But now this book, once yours, belongs to me,
The Morning Post's and Courier's S. T. C.;—
Elsewhere in College, knowledge, wit and scholarage
To friends and public known, as S. T. Coleridge.
Witness hereto my hand, on Ashly Green,
One thousand, twice four hundred, and fourteen
Year of our Lord—and of the month November,
The fifteenth day, if right I do remember.

† My dear Derwent, 28 *March*, 1819.

This one volume, thoroughly understood and appropriated, will place you in the highest ranks of doctrinal Church of England divines (of such as now are), and in no mean rank as a true doctrinal Church historian. Next to this I recommend Baxter's own Life, edited by Sylvester, with my marginal notes. Here, more than in any of the prelatical and Arminian divines from Laud

* Folio 1628.—*Ed.*

† The following letter was written on, and addressed with, the book to the Rev. Derwent Coleridge.—*Ed.*

to the death of Charles II., you will see the strength and beauty of the Church of England, that is, its liturgy, homilies, and articles. By contrasting, too, its present state with that which such excellent men as Baxter, Calamy, and the so-called Presbyterian or Puritan divines, would have made it, you will bless it as the bulwark of toleration.

Thirdly, you must read Eichorn's Introduction to the Old and New Testament, and the Apocrypha, and his comment on the Apocalypse; to all which my notes and your own previous studies will supply whatever antidote is wanting;—these will suffice for your Biblical learning, and teach you to attach no more than the supportable weight to these and such like outward evidences of our holy and spiritual religion.

So having done, you will be in point of professional knowledge such a clergyman as will make glad the heart of your loving father, S. T. Coleridge.

N.B.—See book iv. chap. vii. p. 351, both for a masterly confutation of the Paleyo-Grotian evidences of the Gospel, and a decisive proof in what light that system was regarded by the Church of England in its best age. Like Grotius himself, it is half-way between Popery and Socinianism.

B. i. c. iii. p. 5.

But men desired only to be like unto God in omniscience and the general knowledge of all things which may be communicated to a creature, as in Christ it is to his human soul.

Surely this is more than doubtful; and even the instance given is irreconcilable with Christ's own assertion concerning the last day, which must be understood of his human soul, by all who hold the faith delivered from the foundation, namely, his deity. Field seems to have excerpted this incautiously from the Schoolmen, who on this premiss could justify the communicability of adoration, as in the case of the saints. Omniscience, it may be proved, implies omnipotence. The fourth of the arguments in this section, and, as closely connected with it, the first (only somewhat differently stated) seem the strongest, or rather the only ones. For the second is a mere anticipation of the fourth, and all that is true in the third is involved in it.

Ib. c. v. p. 9.

And began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance.

That is, I humbly apprehend, in other than the Hebrew and Syrochaldaic languages, which (with rare and reluctant exceptions in favor of the Greek) were appropriated to public prayer and exhortation, just as the Latin in the Romish Church. The new converts preached and prayed, each to his companions in his and their dialect;—they were all Jews, but had assembled from all the different provinces of the Roman and Parthian empires, as the Quakers among us to the yearly meeting in London; this was a sign, not a miracle. The miracle consisted in the visible and audible descent of the Holy Ghost, and in the fulfilment of the prophecy of Joel, as explained by St. Peter himself. *Acts* ii. 15.

Ib. p. 10.

Aliud est etymologia nominis et aliud significatio nominis. Etymologia attenditur secundum id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum: nominis vero significatio secundum id ad quod significandum imponitur.

This passage from Aquinas would be an apt motto for a critique on Horne Tooke's Diversions of Purley. The best service of etymology is, when the sense of a word is still unsettled, and especially when two words have each two meanings; A=a-b, and B=a-b, instead of A=a and B=b. Thus reason and understanding as at present popularly confounded. Here the *etyma*, —*ratio*, the relative proportion of thoughts and things,—and understanding, as the power which substantiates *phænomena* (*substat eis*)—determine the proper sense. But most often the *etyma* being equivalent, we must proceed *ex arbitrio*, as 'law compels,' 'religion obliges;' or take up what had been begun in some one derivative. Thus 'fanciful' and 'imaginative,' are discriminated; and this supplies the ground of choice for giving to fancy and imagination, each its own sense. Cowley is a fanciful writer, Milton an imaginative poet. Then I proceed with the distinction, how ill fancy assorts with imagination, as instanced in Milton's Limbo.*

Ib.

I should rather express the difference between the faithful of the Synagogue and those of the Church, thus:—That the former hoped generally by an implicit faith;—"It shall in all things be well with all that love the Lord; therefore it can not but be good for us and well with us to rest with our forefathers." But the

* P. L. iii. 487.—*Ed.*

Christian hath an assured hope by an explicit and particular faith, a hope because its object is future, not because it is uncertain. The one was on the road journeying toward a friend of his father's, who had promised he would be kind to him even to the third and fourth generation. He comforts himself on the road, first, by means of the various places of refreshment, which that friend had built for travellers and continued to supply; and secondly, by anticipation of a kind reception at the friend's own mansion-house. But the other has received an express invitation to a banquet, beholds the preparations, and has only to wash and put on the proper robes, in order to sit down.

Ib. p. 11.

The reason why our translators, in the beginning, did choose rather to use the word 'congregation' than 'Church,' was not, as the adversary maliciously imagineth, for that they feared the very name of the Church; but because as by the name of religion and religious men, ordinarily in former times, men understood nothing but *factitias religiones*, as Gerson out of Anselme calleth them, that is, the professions of monks and friars, so, &c.

For the same reason the word *religion* for θρησκεια in St. James* ought now to be altered to ceremony or ritual. The whole version has by change of language become a dangerous mistranslation, and furnishes a favorite text to our moral preachers, Church Socinians and other christened pagans now so rife amongst us. What was the substance of the ceremonial law is but the ceremonial part of the Christian religion; but it is its solemn ceremonial law, and though not the same, yet one with it and inseparable, even as form and substance. Such is St. James's doctrine, destroying at one blow Antinomianism and the Popish popular doctrine of good works.

Ib. c. 18, p. 27.

But if the Church of God remains in Corinth, where there were *divisions, sects, emulations, &c.* * * * who dare deny those societies to be the Churches of God, wherein the tenth part of these horrible evils and abuses is not to be found?

It is rare to meet with sophistry in this sound divine; but here he seems to border on it. For first the Corinthian Church upon admonition repented of its negligence; and secondly, the objection of the Puritans was, that the constitution of the Church precluded discipline.

* I. 27. See Aids to Reflection, p. 127. n.—*Ed.*

B. ii. c. 2, p. 31.

'Miscreant' is twice used in this page in its original sense of misbeliever.

Ib. c. 4, p. 35.

'Discourse' is here used for the discursive acts of the understanding, even as 'discursive' is opposed to 'intuitive' by Milton* and others. Thus understand Shakspeare's "discourse of reason" for those discursions of mind which are peculiar to rational beings.

B. iii. c. 1, p. 53.

The first publishers of the Gospel of Christ delivered a rule of faith to the Christian Churches which they founded, comprehending all those articles that are found in that *epitome* of Christian religion, which we call the Apostles' Creed.

This needs proof. I rather believe that the so-called Apostles' Creed was really the Creed of the Roman or Western church (and possibly in its present form, the catechismal rather than the baptismal creed),—and that other churches in the East had Creeds equally ancient, and, from their being earlier troubled with Anti-Trinitarian heresies, more express on the divinity of Christ than the Roman.

Ib. p. 58.

Fourthly, that it is no less absurd to say, as the Papists do, that our satisfaction is required as a condition, without which Christ's satisfaction is not appliable unto us, than to say, Peter hath paid the debt of John, and he to whom it was due accepteth of the same payment, conditionally if he pay it himself also.

† This propriation of a metaphor, namely, forgiveness of sin and abolition of guilt through the redemptive power of Christ's love and of his perfect obedience during his voluntary assumption of humanity, expressed, on account of the sameness of the consequences in both cases, by the payment of a debt for another, which debt the payer had not himself incurred,—the propriation of this, I say, by transferring the sameness from the consequents to the antecedents is the one point of orthodoxy (so called, I mean)

* ——— whence the soul
Reason receives, and reason is her being,
Discursive or intuitive. P. L. v. 426.—*Ed.*

† The reader of the Aids to Reflection will recognize in this note the rough original of the passages p. 307, *et seq.* of that work.—*Ed.*

in which I still remain at issue. It seems to me so evidently a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. A metaphor is an illustration of something less known by a more or less partial identification of it with something better understood. Thus St. Paul illustrates the consequences of the act of redemption by four different metaphors drawn from things most familiar to those, for whom it was to be illustrated, namely, sin-offerings or sacrificial expiation; reconciliation; ransom from slavery; satisfaction of a just creditor by vicarious payment of the debt. These all refer to the consequences of redemption. Now, St. John without any metaphor declares the mode by and in which it is effected; for he identifies it with a fact, not with a consequence, and a fact too not better understood in the one case than in the other, namely, by generation and birth. There remains, therefore, only the redemptive act itself, and this is transcendent, ineffable, and *à fortiori*, therefore, inexplicable. Like the act of primal apostasy, it is in its own nature a mystery, known only through faith in the spirit. James owes John £100, which (to prevent James's being sent to prison) Henry pays for him; and John has no longer any claim. But James is cruel and ungrateful to Mary, his tender mother. Henry, though no relation, acts the part of a loving and dutiful son to Mary. But will this satisfy the mother's claims on James, or entitle him to her esteem, approbation, and blessing? If, indeed, by force of Henry's example or persuasion, or any more mysterious influence, James repents and becomes himself a good and dutiful child, then, indeed, Mary is wholly satisfied; but then the case is no longer a question of debt in that sense in which it can be paid by another, though the effect, of which alone St. Paul was speaking, is the same in both cases to James as the debtor, and to James as the undutiful son. He is in both cases liberated from the burden, and in both cases he has to attribute his exoneration to the act of another; as cause simply in the payment of the debt, or as likewise *causa causæ* in James's reformation. Such is my present opinion: God grant me increase of light either to renounce or confirm it.

Perhaps the different terms of the above position may be more clearly stated thus:—1. *agens causator:* 2. *actus causativus:* 3. *effectus causatus:* 4. *consequentia ab effecto.* 1. The coeternal Son of the living God, incarnate, tempted, crucified, resurgent, communicant of his spirit, ascendant, and obtaining for

his church the descent of the Holy Ghost. 2. A spiritual and transcendent mystery. 3. The being born anew, as before in the flesh to the world, so now in the spirit to Christ: where the differences are, the spirit opposed to the flesh, and Christ to the world; the *punctum indifferens*, or combining term, remaining the same in both, namely, a birth. 4. Sanctification from sin and liberation from the consequences of sin, with all the means and process of sanctification, being the same for the sinner relatively to God and his own soul, as the satisfaction of a creditor for a debt, or as the offering of an atoning sacrifice for a transgressor of the law; as a reconciliation for a rebellious son or a subject to his alienated parent or offended sovereign; and as a ransom is for a slave in a heavy captivity. Now my complaint is that our systematic divines transfer the paragraph 4 to the paragraphs 2 and 3, interpreting *proprio sensu et ad totum* what is affirmed *sensu metaphorico et ad partem*, that is, *ad consequentia a regeneratione effecta per actum causativum primi agentis, nempe Λόγου redemptoris*, and by this interpretation substituting an identification absolute for an equation proportional.—4th May, 1819.

Ib. p. 62.

Personality is nothing but the existence of nature itself.

God alone had his nature in himself; that is, God alone contains in himself the ground of his own existence. But were this definition of Field's right, we might predicate personality of a worm, or wherever we find life. Better say,—personality is individuality existing in itself, but with a nature as its ground.

Ib. p. 66.

Accursing Eutyches as a heretic.

It puzzles me to understand what sense Field gave to the word, heresy. Surely every slight error, even though persevered in, is not to be held a heresy, or its asserters accursed. The error ought at least to respect some point of faith essential to the great ends of the Gospel. Thus the phrase 'cursing Eutyches,' is to me shockingly unchristian. I could not dare call even the opinion cursed, till I saw how it injured the faith in Christ, weakened our confidence in him, or lessened our love and gratitude.

Ib. p. 71.

If ye be circumcised ye are fallen from grace, and Christ can profit you nothing.

It seems impossible but that these words had a relation to the particular state of feeling and belief, out of which the anxiety to be circumcised did in those particular persons proceed, and not absolutely, and at all times to the act itself, seeing that St. Paul himself circumcised Timothy from motives of charity and prudence.

Ib. c. 3, p. 76.

The things that pertain to the Christian faith and religion are of two sorts; for there are some things *explicite*, some things *implicite credenda;* that is, there are some things that must be particularly and expressly known and believed, as that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost God, and yet they are not three Gods but one God; and some other, which though all men, at all times, be not bound upon the peril of damnation to know and believe expressly, yet whosoever will be saved must believe them at least *implicite*, and in generality, as that Joseph, Mary, and Jesus fled into Egypt.

Merciful Heaven! Eternal misery and the immitigable wrath of God, and the inextinguishable fire of hell amid devils, parricides and haters of God and all goodness—this is the verdict which a Protestant divine passes against the man, who though sincerely believing the whole Nicene creed and every doctrine and precept taught in the New Testament, and living accordingly, should yet have convinced himself that the first chapters of St. Matthew and St. Luke were not parts of the original Gospels!

Ib. p. 77.

So in the beginning, Nestorius did not err, touching the unity of Christ's person in the diversity of the natures of God and man; but only disliked that Mary should be called the mother of God: which form of speaking when some demonstrated to be very fitting and unavoidable, if Christ were God and man in the unity of the same person, he chose rather to deny the unity of Christ's person than to acknowledge his temerity and rashness in reproving that form of speech, which the use of the church had anciently received and allowed.

A false charge grounded on a misconception of the Syriac terms. Nestorius was perfectly justifiable in his rejection of the epithet *θεοτόκος*, as applied to the mother of Jesus. The Church was even then only too ripe for the idolatrous *hyper-dulia* of the Virgin. Not less weak is Field's defence of the propriety of the

term. Set aside all reference to this holy mystery, and let me ask, I trust without offence, whether by the same logic a mule's dam might not be called ἱπποτόκος, because the horse and ass were united in one and the same subject. The difference in the perfect God and perfect man does not remove the objection; for an epithet, which conceals half of a truth, the power and special concerningness of which relatively to our redemption by Christ, depends on our knowledge of the whole, is a deceptive and a dangerously deceptive epithet.

Ib. c. 20, p. 110.

Thus, then, the Fathers did sometimes, when they had particular occasions to remember the Saints, and to speak of them, by way of *apostrophe*, turn themselves unto them, and use words of doubtful compellation, praying them, if they have any sense of these inferior things, to be remembrancers to God for them.

The distinct gradations of the process, by which commemoration and rhetorical apostrophes passed finally into idolatry, supply an analogy of mighty force against the heretical *hypothesis* of the modern Unitarians. Were it true, they would have been able to have traced the progress of the Christolatry from the lowest sort of *Christodulia* with the same historical distinctness against the universal Church, that the Protestants have that of hierolatry against the Romanists. The gentle and soft censures which our divines during the reign of the Stuarts pass on the Roman Saint worship, or hieroduly, as an inconvenient superstition, must needs have alarmed the faithful adherents to the Protestantism of Edward VI. and the surviving exiles of bloody Queen Mary's times, and their disciples.

Ib. p. 111.

The miracles that God wrought in times past by them made many to attribute more to them than was fit, as if they had a generality of presence, knowledge, and working; but the wisest and best advised never durst attribute any such thing unto them.

To a truly pious mind awfully impressed with the surpassing excellency of God's ineffable love to fallen man, in the revelation of himself to the inner man through the reason and conscience by the spiritual light and substantiality—for the conscience is to the spirit or reason what the understanding is to the sense, a substantiative power); this consequence of miracles is so fearful, that it can not but redouble his zeal against that fashion of modern theol-

ogists which would convert miracles from a motive to attention and solicitous examination, and at best from a negative condition of revelation, into the positive foundation of Christian faith.

Ib. c. 22, p. 116.

But if this be as vile a slander as ever Satanist devised, the Lord reward them that have been the authors and advisers of it according to their works.

Oh no! no! this the good man did not utter from his heart, but from his passion. A vile and wicked slander it was and is. O may God have turned the hearts of those who uttered it, or may it be among their unknown sins done in ignorance, for which the infinite merits of Christ may satisfy! I am most assured that if Dr. Field were now alive, or if any one had but said this to him, he would have replied—"I thank thee, brother, for thy Christian admonition. Add thy prayer, and pray God to forgive me my inconsiderate zeal!"

Ib. c. 23, p. 119.

For what rectitude is due to the specifical act of hating God? or what rectitude is it capable of?

Is this a possible act to any man understanding by the word God what we mean by God?

Ib. p. 129.

It is this complicated dispute, as to the origin and permission of evil, which supplies to atheism its most plausible, because its only moral, arguments; but more especially to that species of atheism which existed in Greece in the form of polytheism, admitting moral and intelligent shapers and governors of the world, but denying an intelligent ground, or self-conscious Creator of the universe; their gods being themselves the offspring of chaos and necessity, that is, of matter and its essential laws or properties The Leibnitzian distinction of the Eternal Reason, or nature of God, *τὸ θεῖον* (the *νοῦς καὶ ἀνάγκη* of Timæus Locrus) from the will or personal attributes of God—(*θέλημα καὶ βούλησις—ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἀγαθὸν βούλημα*)—planted the germ of the only possible solution, or rather perhaps, in words less exceptionable and more likely to be endured in the schools of modern theology, brought forward the truth involved in Behmen's too bold distinction of God and the ground of God;—who yet in this is to be excused, not only for his good aim and his ignorance of scholastic terms

but likewise because some of the Fathers expressed themselves no less crudely in the other extreme; though it is not improbable that the meaning was the same in both. At least Behmen constantly makes self-existence a positive act, so as that by an eternal περιχώρησις or mysterious intercirculation God wills himself out of the *ground* (τὸ θεῖον,—τὸ ἓν καὶ πᾶν,—*indifferentia absoluta realitatis infinitæ et infinitæ potentialitatis*)—and again by his will, as God existing, gives being to the ground, αὐτογενὴς—αὐτοφυὴς—υἱὸς ἑαυτοῦ. *Solus Deus est;—itaque principium, qui ex seipso dedit sibi ipse principium. Deus ipse sui origo est, sucque causa substantiæ, id quod est, ex se et in se continens. Ex seipso procreatus ipse se fecit*, &c., of Synesius, Jerome, Hilary, and Lactantius and others involve the same conception.

Ib. c. 27, p. 140.

The seventh is the heresy of Sabellius, which he saith was revived by Servetus. So it was indeed, that Servetus revived in our time the damnable heresy of Sabellius, long since condemned in the first ages of the Church. But what is that to us? How little approbation he found amongst us, the just and honorable proceeding against him at Geneva will witness to all posterity.

Shocking as this act must and ought to be to all Christians at present; yet this passage and a hundred still stronger from divines and Church letters contemporary with Calvin, prove Servetus' death not to be Calvin's guilt especially, but the common *opprobrium* of all European Christendom,—of the Romanists whose laws the Senate of Geneva followed, and from fear of whose reproaches (as if Protestants favored heresy) they executed them,—and of the Protestant churches who applauded the act and returned thanks to Calvin and the Senate for it.*

Ib. c. 30, p. 143.

The twelfth heresy imputed to us is the heresy of Jovinian, concerning whom we must observe, that Augustine ascribeth unto him two opinions which Hierome mentioneth not; who yet was not likely to spare him, if he might truly have been charged with them. The first, that Mary ceased to be a virgin when she had borne Christ; the second, that all sins are equal.

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* See Table Talk, p. 498. Melancthon's words to Calvin are:—*Tuo judicio prorsus assentior. Affirmo etiam vestros magistratus juste fecisse, quod hominem blasphemum, re ordine judicata, interfecerunt.* 14th Oct. 1554.—*Ed.*

Neither this nor that is worthy the name of opinion; it is mere unscriptural, nay, anti-scriptural gossiping. Are we to blame, or not rather to praise, the anxiety manifested by the great divines of the church of England under the Stuarts not to remove further than necessary from the Romish doctrines? Yet one wishes a bolder method; for example, as to Mary's private history after the conception and birth of Christ, we neither know nor care about it.

Ib. c. 31, p. 146.

For the opinions wherewith Hierome chargeth him, this we briefly answer. First, if he absolutely denied that the Saints departed do pray for us, as it seemeth he did by Hierome's reprehension, we think he erred.

Yet not heretically; and if he meant only that we being wholly ignorant, whether they do or no, ought to act as if we knew they did not, he is perfectly right; for whatever ye do, do it in faith. As to the ubiquity of saints, it is Jerome who is the heretic, nay, idolater, if he reduced his opinion to practice. It perplexes me, that Field speaks so doubtingly on a matter so plain as the incommunicability of omnipresence.

Ib. c. 32, p. 147.

Touching the second objection, that Bucer and Calvin deny original sin, though not generally, as did Zuinglius, yet at least in the children of the faithful. If he had said that these men affirm the earth doth move, and the heavens stand still, he might have as soon justified it against them, as this he now saith.

Very noticeable. A similar passage occurs even so late as in Sir Thomas Brown, just at the dawn of the Newtonian system, and after Kepler. What a lesson of diffidence!*

Ib. p. 148.

For we do not deny the distinction of venial and mortal sins; but do think, that some sins are rightly said to be mortal and some venial; not for that some are worthy of eternal punishment and therefore named mortal, others of temporal only, and therefore judged venial as the Papists imagine: but for that some exclude grace out of that man in which they are found and so leave him in a state wherein he hath nothing in himself that can or will procure him pardon: and other, which though in themselves con-

* 'But to circle the earth, *as the heavenly bodies do*,' &c. 'So we may see that the opinion of Copernicus touching the rotation of the earth, which astronomy itself can not correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the *phænomena*, yet *natural history may correct*.'

Advancement of Learning, B. ii.—*Ed.*

sidered, and never remitted, they be worthy of eternal punishment, yet do not so far prevail as to banish grace, the fountain of remission of all misdoings.

Would not the necessary consequence of this be, that there are no actions that can be pronounced mortal sins by mortals; and that what we might fancy venial might in individual cases be mortal and *vice versa*.

Ib.

First, because every offence against God may justly be punished by him in the strictness of his righteous judgments with eternal death, yea, with annihilation; which appeareth to be most true, for that there is no punishment so evil, and so much to be avoided, as the least sin that may be imagined. So that a man should rather choose eternal death, yea, utter annihilation, than commit the least offence in the world.

I admit this to be Scriptural; but what is wanted is, clearly to state the difference between eternal death and annihilation. For who would not prefer the latter, if the former mean everlasting misery?

Ib. c. 41, p. 62, *marg.*

But he will say, Cyprian calleth the Roman Church the principal Church whence sacerdotal unity hath her spring; hereunto we answer, that the Roman Church, not in power of overruling all, but in order is the first and principal; and that therefore while she continueth to hold the truth, and encroacheth not upon the right of other Churches, she is to have the priority; but that in either of these cases she may be forsaken without breach of that unity, which is essentially required in the parts of the Church.

This is too large a concession. The real ground of the priority of the Roman see was that Rome, for the first three or perhaps four centuries, was the metropolis of the Christian world. Afterwards for the very same reason the Patriarch of New Rome or Constantinople claimed it; and never ceased to assert at least a co-equality. Had the Apostolic foundation been the cause, Jerusalem and Antioch must have had priority; not to add that the Roman Church was not founded by either Paul or Peter as is evident from the epistle to the Romans.

Append. B. iii. p. 205.

I do not think the attack on Transubstantiation the most successful point of the orthodox Protestant controversialists. The question is, what is meant in Scripture, as in *John* vi. by Christ's body or flesh and blood. Surely not the visible, tangible, accidental body, that is, a cycle of images and sensations in the im-

agination of the beholders; but his super-sensual body, the *noumenon* of his human nature which was united to his divine nature. In this sense I understand the Lutheran ubiquity. But may not the "oblations" referred to by Field in the old canon of the Mass, have meant the alms, offerings always given at the Eucharist? If by "substance" in the enunciation of the article be meant *id quod vere est*, and if the divine nature be the sole *ens vere ens*, then it is possible to give a philosophically intelligible sense to Luther's doctrine of consubstantiation; at least to a doctrine that might bear the same name;—at all events the mystery is not greater than, if it be not rather the same as, the assumption of the human by the divine nature. Now for the possible conception of this we must accurately discriminate the *incompossibile negativum* from the *incompatibile privativum*. Of the latter are all positive imperfections, as error, vice, and evil passions; of the former simple limitation. Thus if (*per impossible*) human nature could make itself sinless and perfect, it would become or pass into God; and if God should abstract from human nature all imperfection, it might without impropriety be affirmed, even as Scripture doth affirm, that God assumed or took up into himself the human nature. Thus, to use a dim similitude and merely as a faint illustration, all materiality abstracted from a circle, it would become space, and though not infinite, yet one with infinite space. The mystery of omnipresence greatly aids this conception; *totus in omni parte:* and in truth this is the divine character of all the Christian mysteries, that they aid each other, and many incomprehensibles render each of them, in a certain qualified sense, less incomprehensible.

Ib. p. 208.

But first, it is impious to think of destroying Christ in any sort. For though it be true, that in sacrificing of Christ on the altar of the cross, the destroying and killing of him was implied, and this his death was the life of the world, yet all that concurred to the killing of him, as the Jews, the Roman soldiers, Pilate, and Judas sinned damnably, and so had done, though they had shed his blood with an intention and desire, that by it the world might be redeemed.

Is not this going too far? Would it not imply almost that Christ himself could not righteously sacrifice himself, especially when we consider that the Romanists would have a right to say, that Christ himself had commanded it? But Bellarmine's con-

ceit* is so absurd that it scarce deserves the compliment of a serious confutation. For if sacramental being be opposed to natural or material, as *noumenon* to *phænomenon*, place is no attribute or possible accident of it *in se;* consequently, no alteration of place relatively to us can affect, much less destroy, it; and even were it otherwise, yet translocation is not destruction; for the body of Christ, according to themselves, doth indeed nourish our souls, even as a fish eaten sustains another fish, but yet with this essential difference, that it ceases not to be and remain itself, and instead of being converted converts; so that truly the only things sacrificed in the strict sense are all the evil qualities or deficiencies which divide our souls from Christ.

Ib. p. 218.

That which we do is done in remembrance of that which was then done; for he saith, *Do this in remembrance of me.*

This is a *metastasis* of Scripture. *Do this in remembrance of me*, that is, that which Christ was then doing. But Christ was not then suffering, or dying on the cross.

Ib. p. 223.

That the saints do pray for us *in genere*, desiring God to be merciful to us, and to do unto us whatsoever in any kind he knoweth needful for our good, there is no question made by us.

To have placed this question in its true light, so as to have allowed the full force to the Scriptures asserting the communion of Saints and the efficacy of their intercession without undue concessions to the *hierolatria* of the Romish church, would have implied an acquaintance with the science of transcendental analysis, and an insight into the philosophy of ideas not to be expected in Field, and which was then only dawning in the mind of Lord Bacon. The proper reply to Brerely would be this: the communion and intercession of Saints is an idea, and must be kept such. But the Romish church has changed it away into the detail of particular and individual conceptions, and imaginations, into names and fancies.

N.B.—Instead of the 'Roman Catholic' read throughout in this and all other works, and everywhere and on all occasions,

* That Christ had a twofold being, natural and sacramental; that the Jews destroyed and sacrificed his natural being, and that Christian priests destroy and sacrifice in the Mass his sacramental being.—*Ed.*

unless where the duties of formal courtesy forbid, say, the 'Romish anti-Catholic Church;' Romish—to mark that the corruptions in discipline, doctrine and practice do for the worst and far larger part owe both their origin and their perpetuation to the court and local tribunals of the city of Rome, and are not and never have been the catholic, that is, universal faith of the Roman empire, or even of the whole Latin or Western church; and anti-Catholic,—because no other Church acts on so narrow and excommunicative a principle, or is characterized by such a jealous spirit of monopoly and particularism, counterfeiting catholicity by a negative totality and heretical self-circumscription, cutting off, or cutting herself off from, all the other members of Christ's Body.—12th March, 1824.

It is of the utmost importance, wherever clear and distinct conceptions are required, to make out in the first instance whether the term in question, or the main terms of the question in dispute, represents or represent a fact or class of facts simply, or some self-established and previously known idea or principle, of which the facts are instances and realizations, or which is introduced in order to explain and account for the facts. Now the term 'merits,' as applied to Abraham and the saints, belongs to the former. It is a mere *nomen appellativum* of the facts.

Ib. c. 5, p. 252.

The Papists and we agree that original sin is the privation of original righteousness; but they suppose there was in nature without that addition of grace, a power to do good, &c.

Nothing seems wanting to this argument but a previous definition and explanation of the term, 'nature.' Field appears to have seen the truth, namely, that nature itself is a peccant (I had almost said an unnatural) state, or rather no state at all, *οὐ στάσις, ἀλλ' ἀπόστασις.*

Ib. c. 6, p. 269.

And surely the words of Augustine do not import that she had no sin, but that she overcame it, which argueth a conflict; neither doth he say he will acknowledge she was without sin, but that he will not move any question touching her, in this dispute of sins and sinners.

Why not say at once, that this anti-Scriptural superstition had already begun? I scarcely know whether to be pleased or grieved with that edging on toward the Roman creed, that exceeding, almost Scriptural, tenderness for the divines of the fourth, fifth,

and sixth centuries, which distinguishes the Church of England dignitaries, from Elizabeth inclusively to our Revolution in 1688, from other Protestants.

Ib. c. 10, p. 279.

Derwent! should this page chance to fall under your eye, for my sake read, fag, subdue, and take up into your proper mind this chapter 10 of Free Will.

Ib. p. 281.

Of these five kinds of liberty, the two first agree only to God, so that in the highest degree τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, that is, freedom of will is proper to God only; and in this sense Calvin and Luther rightly deny that the will of any creature is or ever was free.

I add, except as in God, and God in us. Now the latter alone is will; for it alone is *ens super ens*. And here lies the mystery, which I dare not openly and promiscuously reveal.

Ib.

Yet doth not God's working upon the will take from it the power of dissenting, and doing the contrary; but so inclineth it, that having liberty to do otherwise, yet she will actually determine so.

This will not do. Were it true, then my understanding would be free in a mathematical proportion; or the whole position amounts only to this, that the will, though compelled, is still the will. Be it so; yet not a free will. In short, Luther and Calvin are right so far. A creaturely will can not be free; but the will in a rational creature may cease to be creaturely, and the creature, ἀπόστασις, finally cease in consequence; and this neither Luther nor Calvin seem to have seen. In short, where omnipotence is on one side, what but utter impotence can remain for the other? To make freedom possible, the *antithesis* must be removed. The removal of this *antithesis* of the creature to God is the object of the Redemption, and forms the glorious liberty of the Gospel. More than this I am not permitted to expose.

Ib. p. 283.

It is not given, nor is it wanting, to all men to have an insight into the mystery of the human will and its mode of inherence on the will which is God, as the ineffable *causa sui;* but this chapter will suffice to convince you that the doctrines of Calvin were those of Luther in this point;—that they are intensely metaphysical, and that they are diverse *toto genere* from the merely moral and psychological tenets of the modern Calvinists. Calvin would

have exclaimed, 'fire and fagots!' before he had gotten through a hundred pages of Dr. Williams's Modern Calvinism.

Ib. c. 11, p. 296.

Neither can Vega avoid the evidence of the testimonies of the Fathers, and the decree of the Council of Trent, so that he must be forced to confess that no man can so collectively fulfil the law as not to sin, and consequently, that no man can perform that the law requireth.

The paralogism of Vega as to this perplexing question seems to lurk in the position that God gives a law which it is impossible we should obey collectively. But the truth is, that the law which God gave, and which from the essential holiness of his nature it is impossible he should not have given, man deprived himself of the ability to obey. And was the law of God therefore to be annulled? Must the sun cease to shine because the earth has become a morass, so that even that very glory of the sun hath become a new cause of its steaming up clouds and vapors that strangle the rays? God forbid! *But for the law I had not sinned.* But had I not been sinful the law would not have occasioned me to sin, but would have clothed me with righteousness, by the transmission of its splendor. *Let God be just, and every man a liar.*

B. iv. c. 4, p. 346.

The Church of God is named the 'Pillar of Truth;' not as if truth did depend on the Church, &c.

Field might have strengthened his argument, by mention of the custom of not only affixing records and testimonials to the pillars, but books, &c.

Ib. c. 7, p. 353.

Others therefore, to avoid this absurdity, run into that other before mentioned, that we believe the things that are divine by the mere and absolute command of our will, not finding any sufficient motives and reasons of persuasion.

Field, nor Count Mirandula have penetrated to the heart of this most fundamental question. In all proper faith the will is the prime agent, but not therefore the choice. You may call it reason if you will, but then carefully distinguish the speculative from the practical reason, and the reason itself from the understanding.

Ib. c. 8, p. 356.

Illius virtute (saith he) *illuminati, jam non aut nostro, aut aliorum judicio*

credimus a Deo esse Scripturam, sed supra humanum judicium certo certius constituimus, non secus ac si ipsius Dei numen illic intueremur, hominum ministerio ab ipsissimo Dei ore fluxisse.

Greatly doth this fine passage need explanation, that knowing what it doth mean, the reader may understand what it doth not mean, nor of necessity imply. Without this insight, our faith may be terribly shaken by difficulties and objections. For example: If all the Scripture, then each component part; thence every faithful Christian infallible, and so on.

Ib. p. 357.

In the second the light of divine reason causeth approbation of that they believe: in the third sort, the purity of divine understanding apprehendeth most certainly the things believed, and causeth a foretasting of those things that hereafter more fully shall be enjoyed.

Here too Field distinguishes the understanding from the reason, as experience following perception of sense. But as perception through the mere presence of the object perceived, whether to the outward or inner sense, is not insight which belongs to the 'light of reason,' therefore Field marks it by 'purity' that is unmixed with fleshly sensations or the *idola* of the bodily eye. Though Field is by no means consistent in his *epitheta* of the understanding, he seldom confounds the word itself. In theological Latin, the understanding, as influenced and combined with the affections and desires, is most frequently expressed by *cor*, the heart. Doubtless the most convenient form of appropriating the terms would be to consider the understanding as man's intelligential faculty, whatever be its object, the sensible or the intelligible world; while reason is the tri-unity, as it were, of the spiritual eye, light, and object.

Ib. c. 10, p. 358.

Of the Papists preferring the Church's authority before the Scripture.

Field, from the nature and special purpose of his controversy, is reluctant to admit any error in the Fathers,—too much so indeed; and this is an instance. We all know what we mean by the Scriptures, but how know we what they mean by the Church, which is neither thing nor person? But this is a very difficult subject.

Ib. p. 359.

First, so as if the Church might define contrary to the Scriptures, as she may contrary to the writings of particular men, how great soever.

Verbally, the more sober divines of the Church of Rome do not assert this; but practically and by consequence they do. For if the Church assign a sense contradictory to the true sense of the Scripture, none dare gainsay it.*

Ib.

This we deny, and will in due place *improve* their error herein.

That is, prove against, detect, or confute.

Ib. c. 11, p. 360.

If the comparison be made between the Church consisting of all the believers that are and have been since Christ appeared in the flesh, so including the Apostles, and their blessed assistants the Evangelists, we deny not but that the Church is of greater authority, antiquity, and excellency than the Scriptures of the New Testament, as the witness is better than his testimony, and the law-giver greater than the laws made by him, as Stapleton allegeth.

The Scriptures may be and are an intelligible and real one, but the Church on earth can in no sense be such in and through itself, that is, its component parts, but only by their common adherence to the body of truth made present in the Scripture. Surely you would not distinguish the Scripture from its contents?

Ib. c. 12, p. 361.

For the better understanding whereof we must observe, as Occam fitly noteth, that an article of faith is sometimes strictly taken only for one of those divine verities, which are contained in the Creed of the Apostles: sometimes generally for any catholic verity.

I am persuaded that this division will not bear to be expanded into all its legitimate consequences *sine periculo vel fidei vel charitatis*. I should substitute the following: 1. The essentials of that saving faith, which having its root and its proper and primary seat in the moral will, that is, in the heart and affections, is necessary for each and every individual member of the church of Christ:—2. Those truths which are essential and necessary in order to the logical and rational possibility of the former, and the belief and assertion of which are indispensable to the Church at large, as those truths without which the body of believers, the Christian world, could not have been and can not be continued,

* *Fides catholica*, says Bellarmine, *docet omnen virtutem esse bonam, omne vitium esse malum. Si autem erraret Papa præcipiendo vitia vel prohibendo virtutes, teneretur Ecclesia credere vitia esse bona et virtutes malas, nisi vellet contra conscientiam peccare. De Pont. Roman.* iv. 5.—*Ed.*

though it be possible that in this body this or that individual may be saved without the conscious knowledge of, or an explicit belief in them.

Ib.

And therefore before and without such determination, men seeing clearly the deduction of things of this nature from the former, and refusing to believe them, are condemned of heretical pertinacy.

Rather, I should think, of a nondescript lunacy than of a heretical pravity. A child may explicitly know that $5+5=10$, yet not see that therefore $10—5=5$; but when he has seen it how he can refrain from believing the latter as much as the former, I have no conception.

Ib. c. 16, p. 367.

And the third of jurisdiction; and so they that have supreme power, that is, the Bishops assembled in a general Council, may interpret the Scriptures, and by their authority suppress all them that shall gainsay such interpretations, and subject every man that shall disobey such determinations as they consent upon, to excommunication and censures of like nature.

This would be satisfactory, if only Field had cleared the point of the communion in the Lord's Supper; whether taken spiritually, though in consequence of excommunication not ritually, it yet sufficeth to salvation. If so, excommunication is merely declarative, and the evil follows not the declaration but that which is truly declared, as when Richard says that Francis deserves the gallows, as a robber. The gallows depends on the fact of the robbery, not on Richard's saying.

Ib. c. 29, p. 391.

In the 1 Cor. 15, the Greek, that now is, hath in all copies: *the first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from heaven.* The latter part of this sentence Tertullian supposeth to have been corrupted, and altered by the Marcionites. Instead of that the Latin text hath: *the second man was from heaven, heavenly*, as Ambrose, Hierome, and many of the Fathers read also.

There ought to be, and with any man of taste there can be, no doubt that our version is the true one. That of Ambrose and Jerome is worthy of mere rhetoricians; a flat formal play of *antithesis* instead of the weight and solemnity of the other.* Ac-

* The ordinary Greek text is:—*ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος, ὁ Κύριος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ.* The Vulgate is:—*primus homo de terra, terrenus; secundus homo de cœlis, cœlestis.—Ed.*

cording to the former the scales are even, in the latter the scale of Christ drops down at once, and the other flies to the beam like a feather weighed against a mass of gold.

Append. Part i. s. 4, p. 752.*

And again he saith, that every soul, immediately upon the departure hence, is in this appointed invisible place, having there either pain, or ease and refreshing; that there the rich man is in pain, and the poor in a comfortable estate. For, saith he, why should we not think, that the souls are tormented, or refreshed in this invisible place, appointed for them in expectation of the future judgment?

This may be adduced as an instance, specially, of the evil consequences of introducing the *idolon* of time as an *ens reale* into spiritual doctrines, thus understanding literally what St. Paul had expressed by figure and adaptation. Hence the doctrine of a middle state, and hence Purgatory with all its abominations; and an instance, generally, of the incalculable possible importance of speculative errors on the happiness and virtue of mankind.

NOTES ON DONNE.*

There have been many, and those illustrious, divines in our Church from Elizabeth to the present day, who, overvaluing the accident of antiquity, and arbitrarily determining the appropriation of the words 'ancient,' 'primitive,' and the like to a certain date, as, for example, to all before the fourth, fifth, or sixth century, were resolute protesters against the corruptions and tyranny of the Romish hierarch, and yet lagged behind Luther and the Reformers of the first generation. Hence I have long seen the necessity or expedience of a threefold division of divines. There are many, whom God forbid that I should call Papistic, or, like Laud, Montague, Heylyn, and others, longing for a Pope at Lambeth, whom yet I dare not name Apostolic. Therefore, I divide our theologians into, 1. Apostolic or Pauline; 2. Patristic; 3. Papal. Even in Donne, and still more in Bishops Andrews and Hackett, there is a strong Patristic leaven. In Jeremy Taylor this taste for the Fathers and all the Saints and Schoolmen before the Reformation amounted to a dislike of the divines of the continental Protestant Churches, Lutheran or Calvinistic. But this must, in part at least, be attributed to Taylor's keen feelings

* The LXXX. Sermons, fol. 1640.—*Ed.*

as a Carlist, and a sufferer by the Puritan and anti-prelatic party.

I would thus class the pentad of operative Christianity :—

	Prothesis. Christ, the Word.	
Thesis. The Scriptures.	*Mesothesis.* The Holy Spirit.	*Antithesis.* The Church.
	Synthesis. The Preacher.	

The Papacy elevated the Church to the virtual exclusion or suppression of the Scriptures : the modern Church of England, since Chillingworth, has so raised up the Scriptures as to annul the Church ; both alike have quenched the Holy Spirit, as the *mesothesis* of the two, and substituted an alien compound for the genuine Preacher, who should be the *synthesis* of the Scriptures and the Church, and the sensible voice of the Holy Spirit.

Serm. I. Coloss. i. 19, 20, p. 1.

Ib. E.

What could God pay for me? What could God suffer? God himself could not; and therefore God hath taken a body that could.

God forgive me,—or those who first set abroad this strange *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, this debtor and creditor scheme of expounding the mystery of Redemption, or both! But I never can read the words, 'God himself could not ; and therefore took a body that could'—without being reminded of the monkey that took the cat's paw to take the chestnuts out of the fire, and claimed the merit of puss's sufferings. I am sure, however, that the ludicrous images, under which this gloss of the Calvinists embodies itself to my fancy, never disturb my recollections of the adorable mystery itself. It is clear that a body, remaining a body, can only suffer as a body : for no faith can enable us to believe that the same thing can be at once A. and not A. Now that the body of our Lord was not transelemented or transnatured by the *pleroma* indwelling, we are positively assured by Scripture. Therefore it would follow from this most unscriptural doctrine, that the divine justice had satisfaction made to it by the suffering of a body which had been brought into existence for this special purpose, in lieu of the debt of eternal misery due from, and leviable on, the bodies and souls of all mankind! It is to this gross perversion of the sublime idea of the Redemption by

the cross, that we must attribute the rejection of the doctrine of redemption by the Unitarian, and of the Gospel *in toto* by the more consequent deist.

Ib. p. 2. C.

And yet, even this dwelling fulness, even in this person Christ Jesus, by no title of merit in himself, but only *quia complacuit*, because it pleased the Father it should be so.

This, in the intention of the preacher, may have been sound, but was it safe, divinity? In order to the latter, methinks, a less equivocal word than 'person' ought to have been adopted; as 'the body and soul of the man Jesus, considered abstractedly from the divine Logos, who in it took up humanity into deity, and was Christ Jesus.' Dare we say that there was no self-subsistent, though we admit no self-originated, merit in the Christ? It seems plain to me, that in this and sundry other passages of St. Paul, *the Father* means the total triune Godhead.

It appears to me, that dividing the Church of England into two æras—the first from Ridley to Field, or from Edward VI. to the commencement of the latter third of the reign of James I., and the second ending with Bull and Stillingfleet, we might characterize their comparative excellences thus: That the divines of the first æra had a deeper, more genial, and a more practical insight into the mystery of Redemption, in the relation of man toward both the act and the author, namely, in all the inchoative states, the regeneration and the operations of saving grace generally;—while those of the second æra possessed clearer and distincter views concerning the nature and necessity of Redemption, in the relation of God toward man, and concerning the connection of Redemption with the article of Tri-unity; and above all, that they surpassed their predecessors in a more safe and determinate scheme of the divine economy of the three persons in the one undivided Godhead. This indeed, was mainly owing to Bishop Bull's masterly work *De Fide Nicæna*,* which in the

* "Mr. Coleridge's admiration of Bull and Waterland as high theologians was very great. Bull he used to read in the Latin *Defensio Fidei Nicænæ*, using the Jesuit Zola's edition of 1784, which, I think, he bought at Rome. He told me once, that when he was reading a Protestant English Bishop's work on the Trinity, in a copy edited by an Italian Jesuit in Italy, he felt proud of the Church of England, and in good humor with the Church of Rome."—*Table Talk*, works, VI. p. 289. (Note.)—*Ed.*

next generation Waterland so admirably maintained, on the one hand, against the philosophy of the Arians,—the combat ending in the death and burial of Arianism, and its descent and *metempsychosis* into Socinianism, and thence again into modern Unitarianism,—and on the other extreme, against the oscillatory creed of Sherlock, now swinging to Tritheism in the recoil from Sabellianism, and again to Sabellianism in the recoil from Tritheism.

Ib.

First, we are to consider this fulness to have been in Christ, and then, from this fulness arose his merits; we can consider no merit in Christ himself before, whereby he should merit this fulness; for this fulness was in him before he merited any thing; and but for this fulness he had not so merited. *Ille homo, ut in unitatem filii Dei assumeretur, unde meruit?* How did that man (says St. Augustine, speaking of Christ, as of the son of man), how did that man merit to be united in one person with the eternal Son of God? *Quid egit ante? Quid credidit?* What had he done? Nay, what had he believed? Had he either faith or works before that union of both natures?

Dr. Donne and St. Augustine said this without offence; but I much question whether the same would be endured now. That it is, however, in the spirit of Paul and of the Gospel, I doubt not to affirm, and that this great truth is obscured by what in my judgment is the post-Apostolic *Christopædia*, I am inclined to think.

Ib.

What canst thou imagine he could foresee in thee? a propenseness, a disposition to goodness, when his grace should come? Either there is no such propenseness, no such disposition in thee, or, if there be, even that propenseness and disposition to the good use of grace, is grace; it is an effect of former grace, and his grace wrought before he saw any such propenseness, any such disposition; grace was first, and his grace is his, it is none of thine.

One of many instances in dogmatic theology, in which the half of a divine truth has passed into a fearful error by being mistaken for the whole truth.

Ib. p. 6. D.

God's justice required blood, but that blood is not spilt, but poured from that head to our hearts, into the veins and wounds of our own souls: there was blood shed, but no blood lost.

It is affecting to observe how this great man's mind sways and oscillates between his reason, which demands in the word 'blood' a symbolic meaning, a spiritual interpretation, and the habitual

awe for the letter; so that he himself seems uncertain whether he means the physical lymph, *serum*, and globules that trickled from the wounds of the nails and thorns down the sides and face of Jesus, or the blood of the Son of Man, which he who drinketh not can not live. Yea, it is most affecting to see the struggles of so great a mind to preserve its inborn fealty to the reason under the servitude to an accepted article of belief, which was, alas! confounded with the high obligations of faith;—faith the co-adunation of the finite individual will with the universal reason, by the submission of the former to the latter. To reconcile redemption by the material blood of Jesus with the mind of the spirit, he seeks to spiritualize the material blood itself in all men! And a deep truth lies hidden even in this. Indeed the whole is a profound subject, the true solution of which may best, God's grace assisting, be sought for in the collation of Paul with John, and specially in St. Paul's assertion that we are baptized into the death of Christ, that we may be partakers of his resurrection and life.* It was not on the visible cross, it was not directing attention to the blood-drops on his temples and sides, that our blessed Redeemer said, *This is my body*, and *this is my blood!*

Ib. p. 9. A.

But if we consider those who are in heaven, and have been so from the first minute of their creation, angels, why have they, or how have they any reconciliation? &c.

The history and successive meanings of the term 'angels' in the Old and New Testaments, and the idea that shall reconcile all as so many several forms, and as it were perspectives, of one and the same truth—this is still a *desideratum* in Christian theology.

Ib. C.

For, at the general resurrection (which is rooted in the resurrection of Christ, and so hath relation to him), the creature *shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God; for which the whole creation groans, and travails in pain yet.* (Rom. viii. 21.) This deliverance then from this bondage the whole creature hath by Christ, and that is their reconciliation. And then are we reconciled by the blood of his cross, when having crucified ourselves by a true repentance, we receive the real reconciliation in his blood in the sacrament. But the most proper and most literal sense of these words, is, that all things in heaven and earth be reconciled to God (that is, to his glory, to a fitter disposition to glorify him) by being reconciled to another in Christ; that in him, as

* Rom. vi. 3, 4, 5.—*Ed.*

head of the church, they in heaven, and we upon earth, be united together as one body in the communion of saints.

A very meagre and inadequate interpretation of this sublime text. The philosophy of life, which will be the *corona et finis coronans* of the sciences of comparative anatomy and zoology, will hereafter supply a fuller and nobler comment.

Ib. p. 9. A. and B.

The blood of the sacrifices was brought by the high priest *in sanctum sanctorum*, into the place of greatest holiness; but it was brought but once, *in festo expiationis*, in the feast of expiation; but in the other parts of the temple it was sprinkled every day. The blood of the cross of Christ Jesus hath had this effect *in sancto sanctorum*, &c. * * * * (*to*) Christ Jesus.

A truly excellent and beautiful paragraph.

Ib. C.

If you will mingle a true religion, and a false religion, there is no reconciling of God and Belial in this text. For the adhering of persons born within the Church of Rome to the Church of Rome, our law says nothing to them if they come; but for reconciling to the Church of Rome, for persons born within the allegiance of the king, or for persuading of men to be so reconciled, our law hath called by an infamous and capital name of treason, and yet every tavern and ordinary is full of such traitors, &c.

A strange transition from the Gospel to the English statute-book! But I may observe, that if this statement could be truly made under James I., there was abundantly ampler ground for it in the following reign. And yet with what bitter spleen does Heylyn, Laud's creature, arraign the Parliamentarians for making the same complaint!

Serm. II. Isaiah vii. 14, p. 11.

The fear of giving offence, especially to good men, of whose faith in all essential points we are partakers, may reasonably induce us to be slow and cautious in making up our minds finally on a religious question, and may, and ought to, influence us to submit our conviction to repeated revisals and rehearings. But there may arrive a time of such perfect clearness of view respecting the particular point, as to supersede all fear of man by the higher duty of declaring the whole truth in Jesus. Therefore, having now overpassed six sevenths of the ordinary period allotted to human life—resting my whole and sole hope of salvation

and immortality on the divinity of Christ, and the redemption by his cross and passion, and holding the doctrine of the Triune God as the very ground and foundation of the Gospel faith—I feel myself enforced by conscience to declare and avow, that, in my deliberate judgment, the *Christopædia* prefixed to the third Gospel, and incorporated with the first, but, according to my belief, in its present form the latest of the four, was unknown to, or not recognized by, the Apostles Paul and John; and that instead of supporting the doctrine of the Trinity, and the Filial Godhead of the Incarnate Word, as set forth by John i. 1, and by Paul, it, if not altogether irreconcilable with this faith, doth yet greatly weaken and bedim its evidence; and that, by the too palpable contradictions between the narrative in the first Gospel and that in the third, it has been a fruitful magazine of doubts respecting the historic character of the Gospels themselves. I have read most of the criticisms on this text, and my impression is, that no learned Jew can be expected to receive the common interpretation as the true primary sense of the words. The severely literal Aquila renders the Hebrew word νεᾶνις. But were it asked of me: Do you then believe our Lord to have been the Son of Mary by Joseph? I reply: It is a point of religion with me to have no belief one way or the other. I am in this way like St. Paul, more than content not to know Christ himself κατὰ σάρκα. It is enough for me to know, that the Son of God *became flesh*, σὰρξ ἐγένετο γενόμενος ἐκ γυναικὸς,* and more than this, it appears to me, was unknown to the Apostles, or, if known, not taught by them as appertaining to a saving faith in Christ.—October, 1831.

Note the affinity in sound of *son* and *sun*, *Sohn* and *Sonne*, which is not confined to the Saxon and German, or the Gothic dialects generally. And observe *conciliare versöhnen* = *confiliare*, *facere esse cum filio*, one with the Son.

Ib. p. 17. B.

It is a singular testimony, how acceptable to God that state of virginity is. He does not dishonor physic that magnifies health; nor does he dishonor marriage, that praises virginity; let them embrace that state that can, &c.

One of the sad relics of Patristic super-moralization, aggravated by Papal ambition, which clung to too many divines, especially

* John i. 14. Gal. iv. 4.—*Ed.*

to those of the second or third generation after Luther. Luther himself was too spiritual, of too heroic faith, to be thus blinded by the declamations of the Fathers, whom, with the exception of Augustine, he held in very low esteem.

Ib. D.

And Helvidius said, she had children after.

Annon Scriptura ipsa? And a 'heresy,' too! I think I might safely put the question to any serious, spiritual-minded Christian: What one inference tending to edification, in the discipline of will, mind, or affections, he can draw from the speculations of the last two or three pages of this Sermon respecting Mary's pregnancy and parturition?—*Can*—I write it emphatically—*can* such points appertain to our faith as Christians, which every parent would decline speaking of before a family, and which, if the questions were propounded by another in the presence of my daughter, aye, or even of my, no less, in mind and imagination, innocent wife, I should resent as an indecency?

Serm. III. Gal. iv. 4, 5, p. 20.

God sent forth his Son made of a woman.

I never can admit that γενόμενον and ἐγένετο in St. Paul and St. John are adequately, or even rightly, rendered by the English 'made.'

Ib. p. 21. A.

What miserable revolutions and changes, what downfalls, what breaknecks and precipitations may we justly think ourselves ordained to, if we consider, that in our coming into this world out of our mother's womb, we do not make account that a child comes right, except it come with the head forward, and thereby prefigure that headlong falling into calamities which it must suffer after?

The taste for these forced and fantastic analogies, Donne, with the greater number of the learned prelatic divines from James I. to the Restoration, acquired from that too great partiality for the Fathers, from Irenæus to Bernard, by which they sought to distinguish themselves from the Puritans.

Ib. C.

That now they (the Jews) express a kind of conditional acknowledgment of it, by this barbarous and inhuman custom of theirs, that they always

keep in readiness the blood of some Christian, with which they anoint the body of any that dies amongst them, with these words : "If Jesus Christ were the Messias, then may the blood of this Christian avail thee to salvation!"

Is it possible that Donne could have given credit to this absurd legend! It was, I am aware, not an age of critical *acumen;* grit, bran, and flour, were swallowed in the unsifted mass of their erudition. Still that a man like Donne should have imposed on himself such a set of idle tales, as he has collected in the next paragraph for facts of history, is scarcely credible; that he should have attempted to impose them on others, is most melancholy.

Ib. p. 22. D. E.

He takes the name of the son of a woman, and *wanes* the miraculous name of the son of a virgin.——Christ *waned* the glorious name of Son of God, and the miraculous name of Son of a virgin too; which is not omitted to draw into doubt the perpetual virginity of the blessed virgin, the mother of Christ, &c.

Very ingenious; but likewise very presumptuous, this arbitrary attribution of St. Paul's silence, and presumable ignorance of the virginity of Mary, to Christ's own determination to have the fact passed over.

N. B. Is 'wane' a misprint for 'wave' or 'waive?' It occurs so often, as to render its being an *erratum* improbable: yet I do not remember to have met elsewhere 'wane' used for 'decline' as a verb active.

Ib. p. 23. A.

If there were reason for it, it were no miracle.

The announcement of the first comet, that had ever been observed, might excite doubt in the mind of an astronomer, to whom, from the place where he lived, it had not been visible. But his reason could have been no objection to it. Had God pleased, all women might have conceived, ἄνευ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς, as many of the *polypi* and *planariæ* do. Not on any such grounds do I suspend myself on this as an article of faith; but because I doubt the evidence.

Ib. p. 25. A.—E.

Though we may think thus in the law of reason, yet, &c.

It is, and has been, a misfortune, a grievous and manifold loss and hindrance for the interests of moral and spiritual truth, that even our best and most vigorous theologians and philosophers of

the age from Edward VI. to James II. so generally confound the terms, and so too often confound the subjects themselves, reason and understanding; yet the diversity, the difference in kind, was known to, and clearly admitted by, many of them,—by Hooker for instance, and it is implied in the whole of Bacon's *Novum Organum*. Instead of the 'law of reason,' Donne meant, and ought to have said, 'judging according to the ordinary presumptions of the understanding,' that is, the faculty which, generalizing particular experiences, judges of the future by analogy to the past.

Taking the words, however, in their vulgar sense, I most deliberately protest against all the paragraphs in this page, from A to E, and should cite them, with a host of others, as sad effects of the confusion of the reason and the understanding, and of the consequent abdication of the former, instead of the bounden submission of the latter to a higher light. Faith itself is but an act of the will, assenting to the reason on its own evidence without, and even against, the understanding. This indeed is, I fully agree, to be brought into captivity to the faith.*

Ib. p. 26. A. B.

And therefore to be *under the Law*, signifies here thus much; to be a debtor to the law of nature, to have a testimony in our hearts and consciences, that there lies a law upon us, which we have no power in ourselves to perform, &c.

This exposition of the term *law* in the epistles of St. Paul is most just and important. The whole should be adopted among the notes to the epistle to the Romans, in every Bible printed with notes.

Ib. p. 27. A.

And this was his first work, *to redeem*, to vindicate them from the usurper, to deliver them from the intruder, to emancipate them from the tyrant, to cancel the covenant between hell and them, and restore them so far to their liberty, as that they might come to their first master, if they would; this was *redeeming*.

There is an absurdity in the notion of a finite divided form, and superaddible to, the infinite,—of a particular *quantum* of power separated from, not included in, omnipotence, or all-power. But, alas! we too generally use the terms that are meant to ex-

* See the whole argument on the difference of the reason and the understanding, in the Aids to Reflection, pp. 241–262.—*Ed.*

press the absolute, as mere comparatives taken superlatively. In one thing only are we permitted and bound to assert a diversity, namely, in God and *Hades*, the good and the evil will. This awful mystery, this truth, at once certain and incomprehensible, is at the bottom of all religion; and to exhibit this truth free from the dark phantom of the Manicheans, or the two co-eternal and co-ordinate principles of good and evil, is the glory of the Christian religion.

But this mysterious dividuity of the good and the evil will, the will of the spirit and the will of the flesh, must not be carried beyond the terms 'good' and 'evil.' There can be but one good will—the spirit in all;—and even so, all evil wills are one evil will, the devil or evil spirit. But then the One exists for us as finite intelligences, necessarily in a two-fold relation, universal and particular. The same Spirit within us pleads to the Spirit as without us; and in like manner is every evil mind in communion with the evil spirit. But, O comfort! the good alone is the actual, the evil essentially potential. Hence the devil is most appropriately named the 'tempter,' and the evil hath its essence in the will: it can not pass out of it. Deeds are called evil in reference to the individual will expressed in them; but in the great scheme of Providence they are, only as far as they are good, coerced under the conditions of all true being; and the devil is the drudge of the All-good.

Serm. IV. Luke ii. 29, 30, p. 29.

Ib. p. 30. B.

We shall consider that that preparation, and disposition, and acquiescence, which Simeon had in his epiphany, in his visible seeing of Christ then, is offered to us in this epiphany, in this manifestation and application of Christ in the sacrament; and that therefore every penitent, and devout, and reverent, and worthy receiver hath had in that holy action his *now;* there are all things accomplished to him; and his *for, for his eyes have seen his salvation;* and so may be content, nay glad, *to depart in peace.*

O! would that Donne, or rather that Luther before him, had carried out this just conception to its legitimate consequences;—that as the sacrament of the Eucharist is the epiphany for as many as receive it in faith, so the crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension of Christ himself in the flesh, were the epiphanies, the

sacramental acts and *phænomena* of the *Deus patiens*, the visible words of the invisible Word that was in the beginning, symbols in time and historic fact of the redemptive functions, passions, and procedures of the Lamb crucified from the foundation of the world ;—the incarnation, cross, and passion,—in short, the whole life of Christ in the flesh, dwelling a man among men, being essential and substantive parts of the process, the total of which they represented ; and on this account proper symbols of the acts and passions of the Christ dwelling in man, as the Spirit of truth, and for as many as in faith have received him, in Seth and Abraham no less effectually than in John and Paul ! For this is the true definition of a symbol, as distinguished from the thing, on the one hand, and from a mere metaphor, or conventional exponent of a thing, on the other. Had Luther mastered this great idea, this master-truth, he would never have entangled himself in that most mischievous Sacramentary controversy, or had to seek a murky hiding-hole in the figment of Consubstantiation.

Ib. B. C.

In the first part, then * * * * More he asks not, less he takes not for any man, upon any pretence of any unconditional decree.

A beautiful paragraph, well worth extracting, aye, and repreaching.

Ib. p. 34. E.

When thou comest to this seal of thy peace, the sacrament, pray that God will give thee that light that may direct and establish thee in necessary and fundamental things; that is, the light of faith to see that the Body and Blood of Christ is applied to thee in that action ; but for the manner, how the Body and Blood of Christ is there, wait his leisure, if he have not yet manifested that to thee : grieve not at that, wonder not at that, press not for that ; for he hath not manifested that, not the way, not the manner of his presence in the Sacrament to the Church.

O ! I have ever felt, and for many years thought that this *rem credimus, modum nescimus*, is but a poor evasion! It seems to me an attempt so to admit an irrational proposition as to have the credit of denying it, or to separate an irrational proposition from its irrationality. I admit $2+2=5$; how I do not pretend to know, but in some way not in contradiction to the multiplication table. To spiritual operations the very term 'mode' is perhaps inapplicable, for these are immediate. To the linking of this

with that, of A. with Z. by *intermedia*, the term 'mode,'—the question 'how?' is properly applied. The assimilation of the spirit of a man to the Son of God, to God as the Divine Humanity, —this spiritual transubstantiation, like every other process of operative grace, is necessarily modeless. The whole question is concerning the transmutation of the sensible elements. Deny this, and to what does the *modum nescimus* refer? We can not ask how that is done, which we declare not done at all. Admit this transmutation, and you necessarily admit by implication the Romish dogma, of the separation of a sensible thing from the sensible accidents which constitute all we ever meant by the thing. To rationalize this figment of his church, Bossuet has recourse to Spinosism, and dares make God the substance and sole *ens reale* of all body, and by this very *hypothesis* baffles his own end, and does away all miracle in the particular instance.

Ib. p. 35. B.

When I pray in my chamber, I build a temple there that hour; and that minute, when I cast out a prayer in the street, I build a temple there; and when my soul prays without any voice, my very body is then a temple.

Good; but it would be better to regard solitary, family, and templar devotion as distinctions in sort, rather than differences in degree. All three are necessary.

Ib. E.

And that more fearful occasion of coming, when they came only to elude the law, and proceeding in their treacherous and traitorous religion in their heart, and yet communicating with us, draw God himself into their conspiracies; and to mock us, make a mock of God, and his religion too.

What, then, was their guilt, who by terror and legal penalties tempted their fellow Christians to this treacherous mockery? Donne should have asked himself that question.

Serm. V. Exod. iv. 13, p. 39.

Ib. p. 39. C. D.

It hath been doubted, and disputed, and denied too, that this text, *O my Lord, send I pray thee by the hand of him whom thou wilt send*, hath any relation to the sending of the Messiah, to the coming of Christ, to Christmas day; yet we forbear not to wait upon the ancient Fathers, and as they said, to say, that Moses * * at last * * determines all in this, *O my Lord*, &c. It is a work, next to the great work of the redemption of the whole

world, to redeem Israel out of Egypt; and therefore do both works at once, put both into one hand, and *mitte quem missurus es, Send him whom* I know *thou wilt send;* him, whom, pursuing thine own decree, *thou shouldest send;* send Christ, send him now, to redeem Israel from Egypt.

This is one of the happier accommodations of the *gnosis*, that is, the science of detecting the mysteries of faith in the simplest texts of the Old Testament history, to the contempt or neglect of the literal and contextual sense. It was, I conceive, in part at least, this *gnosis*, and not knowledge, as our translation has it, that St. Paul warns against, and most wisely, as puffing up, inflating the heart with self-conceit, and the head with idle fancies.

Ib. E.

But as a thoughtful man, a pensive, considerative man, that stands still for a while with his eyes fixed upon the ground before his feet, when he casts up his head, hath presently, instantly the sun or the heavens for his object; he sees not a tree, nor a house, nor a steeple by the way, but as soon as his eye is departed from the earth where it was long fixed, the next thing he sees is the sun or the heavens;—so when Moses had fixed himself long upon the consideration of his own insufficiency for this service, when he took his eye from that low piece of ground, himself, considered as he was then, he fell upon no tree, no house, no steeple, no such consideration as this—God may endow me, improve me, exalt me, enable me, qualify me with faculties fit for this service, but his first object was that which presented an infallibility with it, Christ Jesus himself, the Messias himself, &c.

Beautifully imagined, and happily applied.

Ib. p. 40. B.

That *germen Jehovæ*, as the prophet Esay calls Christ, that offspring of Jehova, that bud, that blossom, that fruit of God himself, the Son of God, the Messiah, the Redeemer, Christ Jesus, grows upon every tree in this paradise, the Scripture; for Christ was the occasion before, and is the consummation after, of all Scripture.

If this were meant to the exclusion or neglect of the primary sense,—if we are required to believe that the sacred writers themselves had such thoughts present to their minds,—it would, doubtless, throw the doors wide open to every variety of folly and fanaticism. But it may admit of a safe, sound, and profitable use, if we consider the Bible as one work, intended by the Holy Spirit for the edification of the Church in all ages, and having, as such, all its parts synoptically interpreted, the eldest by the latest, the last by the first, and the middle by both. Moses, or David, or Jeremiah (we might in this view affirm) meant so and

so, according to the context, and the light under which, and the immediate or proximate purposes for which, he wrote: but we, who command the whole scheme of the great dispensation, may see a higher and deeper sense, of which the literal meaning was a symbol or a type; and this we may justifiably call the sense of the spirit.

Ib. p. 41. B.

So in our liturgy * * we stand up at the profession of the creed * * thereby to declare to God and his Church our readiness to stand to, and our readiness to proceed in, that profession.

Another Church might sit down, thereby denoting a resolve to abide in this profession. These things are indifferent; but charity, love of peace, and on indifferent points to prefer another's liking to our own, and to observe an order once established for order's sake,—these are not indifferent.

Ib. p. 42. C.

This paragraph is excellent. Alas! how painfully applicable it is to some of our day!

Ib. p. 46. C.

Howsoever all intend that this is a name that denotes essence, being: Being is the name of God, and of God only.

Rather, I should say, 'the eternal antecedent of being;' *I that shall be in that I will to be;* the absolute will; the ground of being; the self-affirming *actus purissimus.*

Serm. VI. Isaiah liii. 1, p. 52.

A noble sermon in thought and diction

Ib. p. 59. E.

Therefore we have a clearer light than this: *firmiorem, propheticum sermonem,* says St. Peter; *we have a more sure word of the prophets;* that is, as St. Augustine reads that place, *clariorem,* a more manifest, a more evident, declaration in the prophets, than in nature, of the will of God towards man, &c.

The sense of this text, as explained by the context, seems to me this;—that, in consequence of the fulfilment of so large a proportion of the oracles, the Christian Church has not only the additional light given by the teaching and miracles of Christ, but

even the light vouchsafed to the old Church (the prophetic) stronger and clearer.

Ib. p. 60. A.

He spake personally, and he spake aloud, in the declaration of miracles; but *quis credidit auditui Filii?* Who believed even his report? Did they not call his preaching sedition, and call his miracles conjuring? Therefore, we have a clearer, that is, a nearer light than the written Gospel, that is, the Church.

True; yet he who should now venture to assert this truth, or even contend for a co-ordinateness of the Church and the Written Word, must bear to be thought a semi-Papist, an *ultra* high-Churchman. Still the truth is the truth.

Serm. VII. John x. 10, p. 62.

Since the Revolution in 1688 our Church has been chilled and starved too generally by preachers and reasoners Stoic or Epicurean;—first, a sort of pagan morality was substituted for the righteousness by faith, and latterly, prudence or Paleyanism has been substituted even for morality. A Christian preacher ought to preach Christ alone, and all things in him and by him. If he find a dearth in this, if it seem to him a circumscription, he does not know Christ, as the *pleroma*, the fulness. It is not possible that there should be aught true, or seemly, or beautiful, in thought, will, or deed, speculative or practical, which may not, and which ought not to, be evolved out of Christ and the faith in Christ;—no folly, no error, no evil to be exposed, or warred against, which may not, and should not, be convicted and denounced from its contrariancy and enmity to Christ. To the Christian preacher Christ should be in all things, and all things in Christ: he should abjure every argument that is not a link in the chain, of which Christ is the staple and staple ring.

Ib. p. 64.

In this page Donne passes into rhetorical extravagance, after the manner of too many of the Fathers from Tertullian to Bernard.

Ib. p. 66. A.

Some of the latter authors in the Roman Church * * have noted (*in several of the Fathers*) some inclinations towards that opinion, that the

devil, retaining still his faculty of free-will, is therefore capable of repentance, and so of benefit by this coming of Christ.

If this be assumed,—namely, the free-will of the devil,—as a consequence would indeed follow his capability of repenting, and the possibility that he may repent. But then he is no longer what we mean by the devil; he is no longer the evil spirit, but simply a wicked soul.

Ib. p. 68. C.

As though God had said *Qui sum*, my name is *I am;* yet in truth it is *Qui ero*, my name is *I shall be.*

Nay, *I will or shall be in that I will to be.* I am that only one who is self-originant, *causa sui*, whose will must be contemplated as antecedent in idea to or deeper than his own co-eternal being. But 'antecedent,' 'deeper,' &c. are mere *vocabula impropria*, words of accommodation, that may suggest the idea to a mind purified from the intrusive phantoms of space and time, but falsify and extinguish the truth, if taken as adequate exponents.

Ib. p. 69. C.

We affirm that it is not only as impious and irreligious a thing, but as senseless and as absurd a thing, to deny that the Son of God hath redeemed the world, as to deny that God hath created the world.

A bold but a true saying. The man who can not see the redemptive agency in the creation has but a dim apprehension of the creative power.

Ib. D. E. p. 70. A.

These paragraphs exhibit a noble instance of giving importance to the single words of a text, each word by itself a pregnant text. Here, too, lies the excellence, the imitable, but alas! unimitated, excellence of our divines from Elizabeth to William III.

Ib. D.

O, that our clergy did but know and see that their tithes and glebes belong to them as officers and functionaries of the nationalty,—as clerks, and not exclusively as theologians, and not at all as ministers of the Gospel;—but that they are likewise ministers of the Church of Christ, and that their claims and the powers of that Church are no more alienated or affected by their being at the same time the established clergy, than they are by the common coincidence of being justices of the peace, or heirs to

an estate, or stockholders.* The Romish divines placed the Church above the Scriptures; our present divines give it no place at all.

But Donne and his great contemporaries had not yet learnt to be afraid of announcing and enforcing the claims of the Church, distinct from, and co-ordinate with, the Scriptures. This is one evil consequence, though most unnecessarily so, of the union of the Church of Christ with the national Church, and of the claims of the Christian pastor and preacher with the legal and constitutional rights and revenues of the officers of the national clerisy. Our clergymen in thinking of their legal rights, forget those rights of theirs which depend on no human law at all.

Ib. p. 71. A.

This is the difference between God's mercy and his judgments, that sometimes his judgments may be plural, complicated, enwrapped in one another; but his mercies are always so, and can not be otherwise.

A just sentiment beautifully expressed.

Ib. C.

Whereas the Christian religion is, as Gregory Nazianzen says, *simplex et nuda, nisi prave in artem difficillimam converteretur:* it is a plain, an easy, a perspicuous truth.

A religion of ideas, spiritual truths, or truth-powers,—not of notions and conceptions, the manufacture of the understanding,—is therefore *simplex et nuda*, that is, immediate; like the clear blue heaven of Italy, deep and transparent, an ocean unfathomable in its depth, and yet ground all the way. Still as meditation soars upwards, it meets the arched firmament with all its suspended lamps of light. O, let not the *simplex et nuda* of Gregory be perverted to the Socinian, 'plain and easy for the meanest understandings!' The truth in Christ, like the peace of Christ, passeth all understanding. If ever there was a mischievous misuse of words, the confusion of the terms, 'reason' and 'understanding,' 'ideas' and 'notions,' or 'conceptions,' is most mischievous; a Surinam toad with a swarm of toadlings sprouting out of its back and sides.

* See the author's entire argument upon this subject in the Church and State.—*Ed.*

Serm. VIII. Matt. v. 16, p. 77.

Ib. C.

Either of the names of this day were text enough for a sermon, Purification or Candlemas. Join we them together, and raise we only this one note from both, that all true purification is in the light, &c.

The illustration of the name of the day contained in the first two or three paragraphs of this sermon would be censured as quaint by our modern critics. Would to heaven we had but even a few preachers capable of such quaintnesses!

Ib. D.

Every good work hath faith for the root; but every faith hath not good works for the fruit thereof.

Faith, that is, fidelity—the fealty of the finite will and understanding to the reason, *the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world*, as one with, and representative of, the absolute will, and to the ideas or truths of the pure reason, the supersensuous truths, which in relation to the finite will, and as meant to determine the will, are moral laws, the voice and dictates of the conscience; this faith is properly a state and disposition of the will, or rather of the whole man, the I, or finite will, self-affirmed. It is therefore the ground, the root, of which the actions, the works, the believings, as acts of the will in the understanding, are the trunk and the branches. But these must be in the light. The disposition to see must have organs, objects, direction, and an outward light. The three latter of these our Lord gives to his disciples in this blessed sermon on the Mount, preparatorily, and, as Donne rightly goes on to observe, presupposing faith as the ground and root. Indeed the whole of this and the next page affords a noble specimen, how a minister of the Church of England should preach the doctrine of good works, purified from the poison of the practical Romish doctrine of works, as the mandioc is evenomated by fire, and rendered safe, nutritious, a bread of life. To Donne's exposition the heroic Solifidian, Martin Luther himself, would have subscribed, hand and heart.

Ib. p. 78. C.

And therefore our latter men of the Reformation are not to be blamed, who for the most, pursuing St. Cyril's interpretation, interpret this universal *light that lighteneth every man* to be the light of nature.

The error here, and it is a grievous error, consists in the word 'nature.' There is, there can be, no light of nature: there may be a light in or upon nature; but this is the light that shineth down into the darkness, that is, the nature, and the darkness comprehendeth it not. All ideas, or spiritual truths, are supernatural.

Ib. p. 79.

Throughout this page, Donne rather too much plays the rhetorician. If the faith worketh the works, what is true of the former must be equally affirmed of the latter;—*causa causæ causa causati.* Besides, he falls into something like a confusion of faith with belief, taken as a conviction or assent of the judgment. The faith and the righteousness of a Christian are both alike his, and not his—the faith of Christ in him, the righteousness in and for him. *I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet, not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me.**

Donne was a truly great man; but, after all, he did not possess that full, steady, deep, and yet comprehensive insight into the nature of faith and works which was vouchsafed to Martin Luther. Donne had not attained to the reconciling of distinctity with unity,—ours, yet God's; God's, yet ours.

Ib. D.

'*Velle et nolle nostrum est,* to assent, or to dis-assent, is our own.

Is not this, even with the saving afterwards, too nakedly expressed?

Ib.

And certainly our works are more ours than our faith is; and man concurs otherwise in the acting and perpetration of a good work, than he doth in the reception and admission of faith.

Why? Because Donne confounds the act of faith with the assent of the fancy and understanding to certain words and conceptions. Indeed, with all my reverence for Dr. Donne, I must warn against the contents of this page, as scarcely tenable in logic, unsound in metaphysics, and unsafe, slippery divinity; and principally in that he confounds faith—essentially an act, the fundamental work of the Spirit—with belief, which is then only good when it is the effect and accompaniment of faith.

* Galat. ii. 20.—*Ed.*

Ib. p. 80. D.

Because things good in their institution may be depraved in their practice—*ergone nihil ceremoniarum rudioribus dabitur, ad juvandam eorum imperitiam?*

Some ceremonies may be for the conservation of order and civility, or to prevent confusion and unseemliness; others are the natural or conventional language of our feelings, as bending the knees, or bowing the head; and to neither of these two sorts do I object. But as to the *adjuvandam rudiorum imperitiam*, I protest against all such ceremonies, and the pretexts for them, *in toto*. What? Can any ceremony be more instructive than the words required to explain the ceremony? I make but two exceptions, and those where the truths signified are so vital, so momentous, that the very occasion and necessity of explaining the sign are of the highest spiritual value. Yet, alas! to what gross and calamitous superstitions have not even the visible signs in Baptism and the Eucharist given occasion!

Ib. p. 81. E.

Blessed St. Augustine reports (if that epistle be St. Augustine's) that when himself was writing to St. Hierome, to know his opinion of the measure and quality of the joy and glory of heaven, suddenly in his chamber there appeared *ineffabile lumen*, says he, an unspeakable, an unexpressible light, * * * and out of that light issued this voice, *Hieronymi anima sum*, &c.

The grave recital of this ridiculous legend is one instance of what I have called the Patristic leaven in Donne, who assuredly had no belief himself in the authenticity of this letter. But yet it served a purpose. As to Master Conradus, just above, who could read at night by the light at his fingers' ends, he must of course have very recently been shaking hands with Lucifer.

Ib. p. 83. D.

Eve's recognition upon the birth of her first son, *Cain I have gotten, I possess a man from the Lord.*

I have gotten the Jehovah-man, is, I believe, the true rendering and sense of the Hebrew words. Eve, full of the promise, supposed her first-born, the first-born on earth, to be the promised deliverer.

Ib. p. 84. D. E.
Serm. IX. Rom. xiii. 7, p. 86.
Ib. p. 90. A.
That soul that is accustomed, &c.
Ib. p. 94. A. B.
} Admirable passages.

Serm. XII. Matt. v. 2, p. 112.

Ib. B. C. D.

The disposition of our Church divines, under James I., to bring back the stream of the Reformation to the channel and within the banks formed in the first six centuries of the Church, and their alienation from the great patriarchs of Protestantism, Luther, Calvin, Zuinglius, and others, who held the Fathers of the *ante*-Papal Church, with exception of Augustine, in light esteem, this disposition betrays itself here and in many other parts of Donne. For here Donne plays the Jesuit, disguising the truth, that even as early as the third century the Church had begun to Paganize Christianity, under the pretext, and no doubt in the hope, of Christianizing Paganism. The mountain would not go to Mahomet, and therefore Mahomet went to the mountain.

Ib. p. 115. A.

An excellent passage.

Ib. p. 117. E.

And therefore when the prophet says, *Quis sapiens, et intelliget hæc? Who is so wise as to find out this way?* he places this cleanness which we inquire after in wisdom. What is wisdom?

The primitive Church appropriated the name to the third *hypostasis* of the Trinity; hence *Sancta Sophia* became the distinctive name of the Holy Ghost; and the temple at Constantinople, dedicated by Justinian to the Holy Ghost, is called the Church—alas! now the mosque—of Santa Sophia. Now this suggests, or rather implies, a far better and more precise definition of wisdom than Donne's. The distinctive title of the Father, as the Supreme Will, is the Good; that of the only-begotten Word, as the Supreme Reason (*Ens Realissimum*, Ὁ Ὢν, the Being), is the True; and the Spirit proceeding from the Good through the True is the Wisdom. Goodness in the form of truth is wisdom. Wisdom is the pure will, realizing itself intelligently, or the good manifesting itself as the truth, and realized in the act. Wisdom, life, love, beauty, the beauty of holiness, are all *synonyma* of the Holy Spirit.—6 December, 1831.

Ib. p. 121. A.

The Arians' opinion, that God the Father only was invisible, but the Son * * and the Holy Ghost * * might be seen.

Here we have an instance, one of many, of the inconveniences

and contradictions that arise out of the assumed contrary essences of body and soul; both substances, and independent of each other, yet so absolutely diverse as that the one is to be defined by the negation of the other.

Serm. XIII. Job xvi. 17, 18, 19, p. 127.

Ib. p. 129. A. B. C.

Ib. pp. 134, 135.

Truly excellent.

Serm. XV. 1 Cor. xv. 26, p. 144.

Ib. D.

Who, then, is this enemy? an enemy that may thus far think himself equal to God, that as no man ever saw God, and lived; so no man ever saw this enemy, and lived; for it is death.

This borders rather too closely on the Irish Franciscan's conclusion to his sermon of thanksgiving: "Above all, brethren, let us thankfully laud and extol God's transcendent mercy in putting death at the end of life, and thereby giving us all time for repentance!" Dr. Donne was an eminently witty man in a very witty age; but to the honor of his judgment let it be said, that though his great wit is evinced in numberless passages, in a few only is it shown off. This paragraph is one of those rare exceptions.

N.B.—Nothing in Scripture, nothing in reason, commands or authorizes us to assume or suppose any bodiless creature. It is the incommunicable attribute of God. But all bodies are not flesh, nor need we suppose that all bodies are corruptible. *There are bodies celestial.* In the three following paragraphs of this sermon, we trace wild fantastic positions grounded on the arbitrary notion of man as a mixture of heterogeneous components, which Des Cartes shortly afterwards carried into its extremes. On this doctrine the man is a mere phenomenal result, a sort of brandy-sop or toddy-punch. It is a doctrine unsanctioned by, and indeed inconsistent with, the Scriptures. It is not true that body *plus* soul makes man. Man is not the *syntheton* or composition of body and soul, as the two component units. No; man is the unit, the *prothesis*, and body and soul are the two poles, the positive and negative, the *thesis* and *antithesis* of the man; even as

attraction and repulsion are the two poles in and by which one and the same magnet manifests itself.

Ib. p. 146. B.

For it is not so great a depopulation to translate a city from merchants to husbandmen, from shops to ploughs, as it is from many husbandmen to one shepherd; and yet that hath been often done.

For example, in the Highlands of Scotland in our own day.

Ib. p. 148. A.

The ashes of an oak in the chimney are no epitaph of that oak, to tell me how high or how large that was. It tells me not what flocks it sheltered while it stood, nor what men it hurt when it fell. The dust of great persons' graves is speechless too, it says nothing, it distinguishes nothing. As soon the dust of a wretch whom thou wouldst not, as of a prince whom thou couldst not, look upon, will trouble thine eyes, if the wind blow it thither; and when a whirlwind hath blown the dust of the churchyard unto the church, and the man sweeps out the dust of the church into the church-yard, who will undertake to sift those dusts again, and to pronounce;—this is the patrician, this is the noble, flour, and this the yeomanly, this the plebeian, bran.*

Very beautiful indeed.

Ib. p. 149. C.

But when I lie under the hands of that enemy, that hath reserved himself to the last, to my last bed; then when I shall be able to stir no limb in any other measure than a fever or a palsy shall shake them; when everlasting darkness shall have an inchoation in the present dimness of mine eyes, and the everlasting gnashing in the present chattering of my teeth, and the everlasting worm in the present gnawing of the agonies of my body and anguishes of my mind; when the last enemy shall watch my remediless body, and my disconsolate soul there,—there, where not the physician in his way, perchance not the priest in his, shall be able to give any assistance; and when he hath sported himself with my misery, &c.

This is powerful; but is too much in the style of the monkish preachers: *Papam redolet.* Contrast with this Job's description of death,† and St. Paul's *sleep in the Lord.*

Ib. p. 150. A.

Neither doth Calvin carry those emphatical words which are so often cited for a proof of the last resurrection,—*that he knows his Redeemer lives, that he knows he shall stand the last man upon earth, that though his body be destroyed, yet in his flesh and with his eyes shall he see God*—to any

* Compare Hamlet, Act v. sc. 1. This sermon was preached, March 8, 1628–9.—*Ed.*

† C. iii. 13, &c.—*Ed.*

higher sense than so, that how low soever he be brought, to what desperate state soever he be reduced in the eyes of the world, yet he assures himself of a resurrection, a reparation, a restitution to his former bodily health, and worldly fortune which he had before. And such a resurrection we all know Job had.

I incline to Calvin's opinion, but am not decided. *After my skin*, must be rendered 'according to, or as far as my skin is concerned.' *Though the flies and maggots in my ulcers have destroyed my skin, yet still, and in my flesh, I shall see God as my Redeemer.* Now St. Paul says, that flesh and blood can not (σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα—οὐ δύνανται) inherit the kingdom of heaven, that is, the spiritual world. Besides how is the passage, as commonly interpreted, consistent with the numerous expressions of doubt and even of despondency in Job's speeches ?*

Ib. B. C. (Ezekiel's vision xxxvii.)

I can not but think that Dr. Donne, by thus antedating the distinct belief of the Jews in the resurrection, "which you all know already," destroys in great measure the force and sublimity of this vision. Besides, it does not seem, in the common people at least, to have been much more than a mongrel Egyptian-catacomb sort of faith, or rather superstition.

In fine. This is one of Donne's least estimable discourses; the worst sermon on the best text. Yet what a Donne-like passage is this that follows!

P. 146. A.

Let the whole world be in thy consideration as one house; and then consider in that, in the peaceful harmony of creatures, in the peaceful succession, and connection of causes and effects, the peace of nature. Let this kingdom, where God hath blessed thee with a being, be the gallery, the best room of that house, and consider in the two walls of that gallery, the Church and the state, the peace of a royal and religious wisdom. Let thine own family be a cabinet in this gallery, and find in all the boxes thereof, in the several duties of wife and children, and servants, the peace of virtue, and of the father and mother of all virtues, active discretion, passive obedience; and then lastly, let thine own bosom be the secret box and reserve in this cabinet, and then the gallery of the best home that can be had,

* See, however, the author's expressions at, I believe, a rather later period. "I now think, after many doubts, that the passage; *I know that my Redeemer liveth*, &c. may fairly be taken as a burst of determination, a *quasi* prophecy. I know not how this can be; but in spite of all my difficulties, this I do know, that I shall be recompensed!"—*Table Talk*, p. 322.—*Ed.*

peace with the creature, peace in the Church, peace in the state, peace in thy house, peace in thy heart, is a fair model, and a lovely design even of the heavenly Jerusalem, which is *visio pacis*, where there is no object but peace.

Serm. XVI. John xi. 35, p. 153.

Ib. C.

The Masorites (the Masorites are the critics upon the Hebrew Bible, the Old Testament) can not tell us, who divided the chapters of the Old Testament into verses: neither can any other tell, who did it in the New Testament.*

How should the Masorites, when the Hebrew Scriptures were not as far as we know divided into verses at all in their time? The Jews seem to have adopted the invention from the Christians, who were led to it in the construction of Concordances.

Ib. p. 154. E.

If they killed Lazarus, had not Christ done enough to let them see that he could raise him again?

Malice, above all party-malice, is indeed a blind passion, but one can scarcely conceive the chief priests such dolts as to think that Christ could raise Lazarus again. Their malice blinded them as to the nature of the incident, made them suppose a conspiracy between Jesus and the family of Lazarus, a mock burial, in short; and this may be one, though it is not, I think, the principal, reason for this greatest miracle being omitted in the other Gospels.

Ib. p. 155. B.

Christ might ungirt himself, and give more scope and liberty to his passions than any other man; both because he had no original sin within to drive him, &c.

How then is he said to have *condemned sin in the flesh?* Without guilt, without actual sin, assuredly he was; but ἐγένετο σὰρξ, and what can we mean by original sin relatively to the flesh, but that man is born with an animal life and a material organism that render him temptable to evil, and which tends to

* How so? Is it not admitted that Robert Stephens first divided the New Testament into verses in 1551? See the testimony to that effect of Henry Stephens, his son, in the Preface to his Concordance.—*Ed.*

dispose the life of the will to contradict the light of the reason? Did St. Paul by *ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας* mean a deceptive resemblance?*

Ib. D.

I can see no possible edification that can arise from these *ultra*-Scriptural speculations respecting our Lord.

Ib. p. 157. A.

Though the Godhead never departed from the carcase * * yet because the human soul was departed from it, he was no man.

Donne was a poor metaphysician; that is, he never closely questioned himself as to the absolute meaning of his words. What did he mean by the 'soul?' what by the 'body?'†

Ib. D.

And I know that there are authors of a middle nature, above the philosophers, and below the Scriptures, the Apocryphal books.

A whimsical instance of the disposition in the mind for every pair of opposites to find an intermediate,—a *mesothesis* for every *thesis* and *antithesis*. Thus Scripture may be opposed to philosophy; and then the Apocryphal books will be philosophy relatively to Scripture, and Scripture relatively to philosophy.

Ib. p. 159. B.

And therefore the same author (Epiphanius) says, that because they

* *Rom.* viii. 3. Mr. C. afterwards expressed himself to the same effect: "Christ's body, as mere body, or rather carcase (for body is an associated word), was no more capable of sin or righteousness than mine or yours; that his humanity had a capacity of sin, follows from its own essence. He was of like passions as we, and was tempted. How could he be tempted, if he had no formal capacity of being seduced?"—*Table Talk*, p. 479.—*Ed.*

† See Hooker's admirable declaration of the doctrine:—"These natures from the moment of their first combination have been and are forever inseparable. For even when his soul forsook the tabernacle of his body, his Deity forsook neither body nor soul. If it had, then could we not truly hold either that the person of Christ was buried, or that the person of Christ did raise up itself from the dead. For the body separated from the Word can in no true sense be termed the person of Christ; nor is it true to say that the Son of God in raising up that body did raise up himself, if the body were not both with him and of him even during the time it lay in the sepulchre. The like is also to be said of the soul, otherwise we are plainly and inevitably Nestorians. The very person of Christ therefore forever one and the self-same, was only touching bodily substance concluded within the grave, his soul only from thence severed, but by personal union his Deity still unseparably joined with both."—E. P. V. 52. 4.—*Keble's edit.*—*Ed.*

thought it an uncomely thing for Christ to weep for any temporal thing, some men have expunged and removed that verse out of St. Luke's Gospel, that *Jesus, when he saw that city, wept.**

This, by the by, rather indiscreetly lets out the liberties, which the early Christians took with their sacred writings. Origen, who, in answer to Celsus's reproach on this ground, confines the practice to the heretics, furnishes proofs of the contrary himself in his own comments.

Ib. p. 161. D.

That world, which finds itself truly in an autumn in itself, finds itself in a spring in our imaginations.

Worthy almost of Shakspeare!

Serm. XVII. Matt. xix. 17, p. 163.

Ib. E.

The words are part of a dialogue, of a conference, between Christ and a man who proposed a question to him; to whom Christ makes an answer by way of another question, *Why callest thou me good?* &c. In the words, and by occasion of them, we consider the text, the context, and the pretext; not as three equal parts of the building; but the context, as the situation and prospect of the house, the pretext, as the access and entrance into the house, and then the text itself, as the house itself, as the body of the building: in a word, in the text the words; in the context the occasion of the words; in the pretext the purpose, the disposition of him who gave the occasion.

What a happy example of elegant division of a subject! And so also the *compendium* of Christianity in the preceding paragraph (D.). Our great divines were not ashamed of the learned discipline to which they had submitted their minds under Aristotle and Tully, but brought the purified products as sacrificial gifts to Christ. They baptized the logic and manly rhetoric of ancient Greece.

Ib. p. 164. A. B.

Excellent illustration of fragmentary morality, in which each man takes his choice of his virtues and vices.

Ib. D.

Men perish with whispering sins, nay, with silent sins, sins that never tell the conscience they are sins, as often as with crying sins.

Yea, I almost doubt whether the truth here so boldly asserted

* xix. 41.—*Ed.*

is not of more general necessity for ordinary congregations, than the denunciation of the large sins that can not remain *in incognito*.

Ib. p. 165. A.

Venit procurrens, he came running. Nicodemus came not so, Nicodemus durst not avow his coming, and therefore he came creeping, and he came softly, and he came seldom, and he came by night.

Ah! but we trust in God that he did in fact come. The adhesion, the thankfulness, the love which arise and live after the having come, whether from spontaneous liking, or from a beckoning hope, or from a compelling good, are the truest *criteria* of the man's Christianity.

Ib. B.

When I have just reason to think my superiors would have it thus, this is music to my soul; when I hear them say they would have it thus, this is rhetoric to my soul; when I see their laws enjoin it to be thus, this is logic to my soul; but when I see them actually, really, clearly, constantly do thus, this is a demonstration to my soul, and demonstration is the powerfullest proof. The eloquence of inferiors is in words, the eloquence of superiors is in action.

A just representation, I doubt not, of the general feeling and principle at the time Donne wrote. Men regarded the gradations of society as God's ordinances, and had the elevation of a self-approving conscience in every feeling and exhibition of respect for those of ranks superior to their own. What a contrast with the present times! Is not the last sentence beautiful? "The eloquence of inferiors is in words, the eloquence of superiors is in action."

Ib. B. and C.

He came to Christ, he ran to him; and when he was come, as St. Mark relates it, *he fell upon his knees to Christ.* He stood not then Pharisaically upon his own legs, his own merits, though he had been a diligent observer of the commandments before, &c.

All this paragraph is an independent truth; but I doubt whether in his desire to make every particle exemplary, to draw some Christian moral from it, Donne has not injudiciously attributed, *quasi per prolepsin*, merits inconsistent with the *finale* of a wealthy would-be proselyte. At all events, a more natural and, perhaps, not less instructive interpretation might be made of the sundry movements of this religiously earnest and zealous ad-

mirer of Christ, and worshiper of Mammon. O, I have myself known such!

Ib. D.

He was no ignorant man, and yet he acknowledged that he had somewhat more to learn of Christ than he knew yet. Blessed are they that inanimate all their knowledge, consummate all in Christ Jesus, &c.

The whole paragraph is pure gold. Without being aware of this passage in Donne, I expressed the same conviction, or rather declared the same experience, in the appendix* to the Statesman's Manual. O! if only one day in a week, Christians would consent to have the Bible as the only book, and their minister's labor to make them find all substantial good of all other books in their Bibles!

Ib. E.

I remember one of the Panegyrics celebrates and magnifies one of the Roman emperors for this, that he would marry when he was young; that he would so soon confine and limit his pleasures, so soon determine his affections in one person.

It is surely some proof of the moral effect which Christianity has produced, that in all Protestant countries, at least, a writer would be ashamed to assign this as a ground of panegyric; as if promiscuous intercourse with those of the other sex had been a natural good, a privilege, which there was a great merit in foregoing! O! what do not women owe to Christianity! As Christians only it is that they do, or ordinarily can, cease to be things for men, instead of co-persons in one spiritual union.

Ib. p. 166. A.

But such is often the corrupt inordinateness of greatness, that it only carries them so much beyond other men, but not so much nearer to God.

Like a balloon, away from earth, but not a whit nearer the arch of heaven. There is a praiseworthy relativeness and life in the morality of our best old divines. It is not a cold law in brass or stone; but "this I may and should think of my neighbor, this of a great man," &c.

* (B.) Works, Vol. I. p. 477. "The object of the preceding discourse was to recommend the Bible as the end and centre of our reading and meditation. I can truly affirm of myself, that my studies have been profitable and availing to me only so far, as I have endeavored to use all my other knowledge as a glass enabling me to receive more light in a wider field of vision from the Word of God."—*Ed.*

Ib. p. 167. A.

Christ was pleased to redeem this man from this error, and bring him to know truly what he was, that he was God. Christ therefore doth not rebuke this man, by any denying that he himself was good; for Christ doth assume that addition to himself, *I am the good shepherd.* Neither doth God forbid that those good parts which are in men should be celebrated with condign praise. We see that God, as soon as he saw that any thing was good, he said so, he uttered it, he declared it, first of the light, and then of other creatures. God would be no author, no example of smothering the due praise of good actions. For surely that man hath no zeal to goodness in himself, that affords no praise to goodness in other men.

Very fine. But I think another—not, however, a different—view might be taken respecting our Lord's intention in these words. The young noble, who came to him, had many praiseworthy traits of character; but he failed in the ultimate end and aim. What ought only to have been valued by him as means, was loved, and had a worth given to it, as an end in itself. Our Lord, who knew the hearts of men, instantly in the first words applies himself to this, and takes the occasion of an ordinary phrase of courtesy addressed to himself, to make the young man aware of the difference between a mere relative good and that which is absolutely good; that which may be called good, when regarded as a mean to good, but which must not be mistaken for, or confounded with, that which is good, and itself the end.

Ib. B. C. D.

All excellent, and D. most so. Thus, thus our old divines showed the depth of their love and appreciation of the Scriptures, and thus led their congregations to feel and see the same. Here is Donne's authority (*Deus non est ens*, &c.) for what I have so earnestly endeavored to show, that *Deus est ens super ens*, the ground of all being, but therein likewise absolute Being, in that he is the eternal self-affirmant, the I Am in that I Am; and that the key of this mystery is given to us in the pure idea of the will, as the alone *Causa Sui*.

O! compare this manhood of our Church divinity with the feeble dotage of the Paleyan school, the 'natural' theology, or watchmaking scheme, that knows nothing of the maker but what can be proved out of the watch, the unknown nominative case of the verb impersonal *fit—et natura est;* the 'it,' in short, in 'it rains,' 'it snows,' 'it is cold,' and the like. When, after reading the biographies of Walton and his contemporaries, I reflect on the

crowded congregations, on the thousands, who with intense interest came to their hour and two hour long sermons, I can not but doubt the fact of any true progression, moral or intellectual, in the mind of the many. The tone, the matter, the anticipated sympathies in the sermons of an age form the best moral criterion of the character of that age.

Ib. E.

His name of Jehova we admire with a reverence.

Say, rather, Jehova, his name. It is not so properly a name of God, as God the name—God's name and God.

Ib. p. 169. A.

Land, and money, and honor must be called goods, though but of fortune, &c.

We should distinguish between the conditions of our possessing goods and the goods themselves. Health, for instance, is ordinarily a condition of that working and rejoicing for and in God, which are goods in the end, and of themselves. Health, competent fortune, and the like are good as the negations of the preventives of good; as clear glass is good in relation to the light, which it does not exclude. Health and ease without the love of God are plate-glass in the darkness.

Ib. p. 170.

Much of this page consists of play on words; as, that which is useful as rain, and that which is of use as rain on a garden after drouth. There is also much sophistry in it. Pain is not necessarily an ultimate evil. As the mean of ultimate good, it may be a relative good; but surely that which makes pain, anguish, heaviness necessary in order to good, must be evil. And so the Scripture determines. They are the *wages of sin;* but God's infinite mercy raises them into sacraments, means of grace. Sin is the only absolute evil; God the only absolute good. But as myriads of things are good relatively through participation of God, so are many things evil as the fruits of evil.

What is the apostasy, or fall of spirits? That that which from the essential perfection of the Absolute Good could not but be possible, that is, have a potential being, but never ought to have been actual, did nevertheless strive to be actual?—But this involved an impossibility; and it actualized only its own potentiality.

What is the consequence of the apostasy? That no philosophy is possible of man and nature but by assuming at once a zenith and a nadir, God and *Hades;* and an ascension from the one through and with a condescension from the other; that is, redemption by prevenient and then auxiliary grace.

Ib. p. 171. B.

So says St. Augustine, *Audeo dicere*, though it be boldly said, yet I must say it, *utile esse cadere in aliquod manifestum peccatum*, &c.

No doubt, a sound sense may be forced into these words; but why use words, into which a sound sense must be forced? Besides, the subject is too deep and too subtle for a sermon. In the two following paragraphs especially, Dr. Donne is too deep, and not deep enough. He treads waters, and dangerous waters. N.B.—The Familists.

Serm. XVIII. Acts ii. 36, p. 175.

Ib. B. I would paraphrase, or rather lead the way to this text, something as follows:—

Truth is a common interest; it is every man's duty to convey it to his brother, if only it be a truth that concerns or may profit him, and he be competent to receive it. For we are not bound to say the truth, where we know that we can not convey it, but very probably may impart a falsehood instead; no falsehoods being more dangerous than truths misunderstood, nay, the most mischievous errors on record having been half-truths taken as the whole.

But let it be supposed that the matter to be communicated is a fact of general concernment, a truth of deep and universal interest, a momentous truth involved in a most awe-striking fact, which all responsible creatures are competent to understand, and of which no man can safely remain in ignorance. Now this is the case with the matter, on which I am about to speak; *therefore let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ!*

Ib. p. 176. A. B. C.

True Christian love not only permits, but enjoins, courtesy. God himself, says Donne, gave us the example.

Ib. p. 177. A. C. E.

All excellent, and E. of deeper worth. All that is wanting here is to determine the true sense of 'knowing God,'—that sense in which it is revealed that to know God is life everlasting.

Ib. p. 178. A.

Now the universality of this mercy hath God enlarged and extended very far, in that he proposes it even to our knowledge; *sciant*, let all know it. It is not only *credant*, let all believe it; for the infusing of faith is not in our power; but God hath put it in our power to satisfy their reason, &c.

A question is here affirmatively started of highest importance and of deepest interest, that is, faith so distinguished from reason, *credat* from *sciat*, that the former is an infused grace 'not in our power;' the latter an inherent quality or faculty, on which we are able to calculate as man with man. I know not what to say to this. Faith seems to me the co-adunation of the individual will with the reason, enforcing adherence alike of thought, act, and affection to the Universal Will, whether revealed in the conscience, or by the light of reason, however the same may contravene, or apparently contradict, the will and mind of the flesh, the presumed experience of the senses and of the understanding, as the faculty, or intelligential yet animal instinct, by which we generalize the notices of the senses, and substantiate their *spectra* or *phænomena*. In this sense, therefore, and in this only, I agree with Donne. *No man cometh to Christ unless the Father lead him.* The corrupt will can not, without prevenient as well as auxiliary grace, be unitively subordinated to the reason, and again, without this union of the moral will, the reason itself is latent. Nevertheless, I see no advantage in not saying the 'will,' or in substituting the term 'faith' for it. But the sad non-distinction of the reason and the understanding throughout Donne, and the confusion of ideas and conceptions under the same term, painfully inturbidates his theology. Till this distinction of the νοῦς and the φρόνημα σαρκὸς be seen, nothing can be seen aright. Till this great truth be mastered, and with the sight that is insight, other truths may casually take possession of the mind, but the mind can not possess them. If you know not this, you know nothing; for if you know not the diversity of reason from the understanding, you know not reason; and reason alone is knowledge.

All that follows in B. is admirable, worthy of a divine of the Church of England, the National and the Christian, and indeed proves that Donne was at least possessed by the truth which I have always labored to enforce, namely, that faith is the *apotheosis* of the reason in man, the complement of reason, the will in the form of the reason. As the basin-water to the fountain-shaft, such is will to reason in faith. The whole will shapes itself in the image of God wherein it had been created, and shoots on high toward, and in the glories of, Heaven!

Ib. D.

If we could have been in Paradise, and seen God take a clod of red earth, and make that wretched clod of contemptible earth such a body as should be fit to receive his breath, &c.

A sort of pun on the Hebrew word *Adam* or red earth, common in Donne's age, but unworthy of Donne, who was worthy to have seen deeper into the Scriptual sense of the 'ground,' the Hades, the multeity, the many *absque numero et infra numerum*, that which is below, as God is that which transcends, intellect.

Ib. p. 179. B.

We place in the School, for the most part, the infinite merit of Christ Jesus * * rather *in pacto* than *in persona*, rather that this contract was thus made between the Father and the Son, than that whatsoever that person, thus consisting of God and Man, should do, should, only in respect of the person, be of an infinite value and extension to that purpose, &c.

O, this is sad misty divinity! far too scholastical for the pulpit, far too vague and unphilosophic for the study.

Ib. p. 180. A.

Quis nisi infidelis negaverit apud inferos fuisse Christum? says St. Augustine.

Where?* Pearson expressly asserts and proves that the clause was in none of the ancient creeds or confessions. And even now the sense of those words, *He descended into hell*, is in no Reformed Church determined as an article of faith.

Ib. p. 182. D.

Audacter dicam, says St. Hierome, *cum omnia posset Deus, suscitare virginem post ruinam non potest.*

One instance among hundreds of the wantonness of phrase and fancy in the Fathers. What did Jerome mean? *quod Deus*

* Ep. 99. See Pearson, Art. v.—*Ed.*

membranam hymenis luniformem reproducere nequit? No; that were too absurd. What then?—that God can not make what has been not to have been? Well then, why not say that, since that is all you can mean?

Serm. XIX. Rev. xx. 6, p. 183.

The exposition of the text in this sermon is a lively instance how much excellent good sense a wise man, like Donne, can bring forth on a passage which he does not understand. For to say that it may mean either X, or Y, or Z, is to confess he knows not what it means; but that if it be X. then, &c.; if Y. then, &c.; and lastly if it be Z. then, &c.; that is to say, that he understands X, Y, and Z; but does not understand the text itself.

Ib. p. 185. B.

Seas of blood and yet but brooks, tuns of blood and yet but basins, compared with the sacrifices, the sacrifices of the blood of men, in the persecutions of the primitive Church. For every ox of the Jew, the Christian spent a man; and for every sheep and lamb, a mother and her child, &c.

Whoo! Had the other nine so-called persecutions been equal to the tenth, that of Diocletian, Donne's assertion here would be extravagant.

Serm. XXXIV. Rom. viii. 16, p. 332.

Ib. p. 335. A.

But by what manner comes He from them? By proceeding.

If this mystery be considered as words, or rather sounds vibrating on some certain ears, to which the belief of the hearers assigned a supernatural cause, well and good! What else can be said? Such were the sounds: what their meaning is, we know not; but such sounds not being in the ordinary course of nature, we of course attribute them to something extra-natural. But if God made man in his own image, therein as in a mirror, misty no doubt at best, and now cracked by peculiar and inherited defects—yet still our only mirror—to contemplate all we can of God, this word 'proceeding' may admit of an easy sense. For if a man first used it to express as well as he could a notion found

in himself as man *in genere*, we have to look into ourselves, and there we shall find that two facts of vital intelligence may be conceived; the first, a necessary and eternal outgoing of intelligence (νοῦς) from being (τὸ ὄν), with the will as an accompaniment, but not from it as a cause,—in order, though not necessarily in time, precedent. This is true filiation. The second is an act of the will and the reason, in their purity strict identities, and therefore not begotten or filiated, but proceeding from intelligent essence and essential intelligence combining in the act, necessarily and co-eternally. For the co-existence of absolute spontaneity with absolute necessity is involved in the very idea of God, one of whose intellectual definitions is, *the synthesis, generative ad extra, et annihilative, etsi inclusive, quoad se*, of all conceivable *antitheses;* even as the best moral definition—(and, O! how much more godlike to us in this state of antithetic intellect is the moral beyond the intellectual!)—is, God is love. This is to us the high prerogative of the moral, that all its dictates immediately reveal the truths of intelligence, whereas the strictly intellectual only by more distant and cold deductions carries us towards the moral. For what is love? Union with the desire of union. God therefore is the cohesion and the oneness of all things; and dark and dim is that system of ethics, which does not take oneness as the root of all virtue. Being, Mind, Love in action, are ideas distinguishable though not divisible; but Will is incapable of distinction or division: it is equally implied in vital action, in essential intelligence, and in effluent love or holy action. Now will is the true principle of identity, of selfness, even in our common language. The will, therefore, being indistinguishably one, but the possessive powers triply distinguishable, do perforce involve the notion expressed by a Trinity of three Persons and one God. There are three Persons eternally co-existing, in whom the one Will is totally all in each; the truth of which mystery we may know in our own minds, but can understand by no analogy. For "the wind ministrant to divers at the same moment"—thence, to aid the fancy—borrows or rather steals from the mind the idea of 'total *in omni parte*,' which alone furnishes the analogy; but that both it and by it a myriad of other material images do enwrap themselves *in hac veste non sua*, and would be even no objects of conception if they did not; yea, that even the very words, 'conception,' 'comprehension,' and all in all lan-

guages that answer to them, suppose this trans-impression from the mind, is an argument better than all analogy.

Serm. XXXV. Matt. xii. 31, p. 341

Ib. p. 342. B.

First then, for the first term, *sin*, we use to ask in the school, whether any action of man's can have *rationem demeriti;* whether it can be said to offend God, or to deserve ill of God? for whatsoever does so, must have some proportion with God.

This appears to me to furnish an interesting example of the bad consequences in reasoning, as well as in morals, of the *cui bono? cui malo?* system of ethics,—that system which places the good and evil of actions in their painful or pleasurable effects on the sensuous or passive nature of sentient beings, not in the will, the pure act itself. For, according to this system, God must be either a passible and dependent being,—that is, not God,—or else he must have no interest, and therefore no motive or impulse, to reward virtue or punish vice. The veil which the Epicureans threw over their atheism, was itself an implicit atheism. Nay, the world itself could not have existed; and as it does exist, the origin of evil (for if evil means no more than pain *in genere*, evil has a true being in the order of things) is not only a difficulty of impossible solution, but is a fact necessarily implying the non-existence of an omnipotent and infinite goodness,—that is, of God. For to say that I believe in a God, but not that he is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good, is as mere a contradiction in terms as to say, I believe in a circle, but not that all the rays from its centre to its circumference are equal.

I can not read the profound truth so clearly expressed by Donne in the next paragraph—"it does not only want that rectitude, but it should have that rectitude, and therefore hath a sinful want"—without an uneasy wonder at its incongruity with the preceding dogmas.

Serm. LXXI. Matt. iv. 18, 19, 20, p. 717.

Ib. p. 725. A.

But still consider, that they did but leave their nets, they did not burn them. And consider, too, that they left but nets, those things which might entangle them, and retard them in their following of Christ, &c.

An excellent paragraph grounded on a mere pun. Such was the taste of the age; and it is an awful joy to observe, that not great learning, great wit, great talent, not even (as far as without great virtue that can be) great genius, were effectual to preserve the man from the contagion, but only the deep and wise enthusiasm of moral feeling. Compare in this light Donne's theological prose even with that of the honest Knox; and, above all, compare Cowley with Milton.

Serm. LXXII. Matt. iv. 18, 19, 20, p. 726.

Ib. p. 727. A.—E.

It is amusing to see the use which the Christian divines make of the very facts in favor of their own religion, with which they triumphantly battered that of the heathens; namely, the gross and sinful anthropomorphitism of their representations of the Deity; and yet the heathen philosophers and priests—Plutarch for instance—tell us as plainly as Donne or Aquinas can do, that these are only accommodations to human modes of conception,—the divine nature being in itself impassible;—how otherwise could it be the prime agent?

Paganism needs a true philosophical judge. Condemned it will be, perhaps, more heavily than by the present judges, but not from the same statutes, nor on the same evidence.

In fine.

If our old divines, in their homiletic expositions of Scripture, wire-drew their text, in the anxiety to evolve out of the words the fulness of the meaning expressed, implied, or suggested, our modern preachers have erred more dangerously in the opposite extreme, by making their text a mere theme, or *motto*, for their discourse. Both err in degree; the old divines, especially the Puritans, by excess, the modern by defect. But there is this difference to the disfavor of the latter, that the defect in degree alters the kind. It was on God's holy word that our Hookers, Donnes, Andrewses preached; it was Scripture bread that they divided, according to the needs and seasons. The preacher of our days expounds, or appears to expound, his own sentiments

and conclusions, and thinks himself evangelic enough if he can make the Scripture seem in conformity with them.

Above all, there is something to my mind at once elevating and soothing in the idea of an order of learned men reading the many works of the wise and great, in many languages, for the purpose of making one book contain the life and virtue of all others, for their brethren's use who have but that one to read. What, then, if that one book be such, that the increase of learning is shown by more and more enabling the mind to find them all in it! But such, according to my experience—hard as I am on threescore—the Bible is, as far as all moral, spiritual, and prudential,—all private, domestic, yea, even political, truths and interests are concerned. The astronomer, chemist, mineralogist, must go elsewhere; but the Bible is the book for the man.

HENRY MORE'S THEOLOGICAL WORKS.*

THERE are three principal causes to which the imperfections and errors in the theological schemes and works of our elder divines, the glories of our Church,—men of almost unparalleled learning and genius, the rich and robust intellects from the reign of Elizabeth to the death of Charles II.,—may, I think, be reasonably attributed. And striking, unusually striking, instances of all three abound in this volume; and in the works of no other divine are they more worthy of being regretted: for hence has arisen a depreciation of Henry More's theological writings, which yet contain more original, enlarged, and elevating views of the Christian dispensation than I have met with in any other single volume. For More had both the philosophic and the poetic genius, supported by immense erudition. But unfortunately the two did not amalgamate. It was not his good fortune to discover, as in the preceding generation William Shakspeare discovered, a *mordaunt* or common base of both, and in which both the poetic and the philosophical power blended in one.

These causes are,—

First, and foremost,—the want of that logical προπαιδεία δοκιμαστική, that critique of the human intellect, which, previously to the weighing and measuring of this or that, begins by assay-

* Folio. 1708.—*Ed.*

ing the weights, measures, and scales themselves; that fulfilment of the heaven-descended *nosce teipsum*, in respect to the intellective part of man, which was commenced in a sort of tentative broadcast way by Lord Bacon in his *Novum Organum*, and brought to a systematic completion by Immanuel Kant in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft, der Urtheilskraft, und der metaphysiche Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft.*

From the want of this searching logic, there is a perpetual confusion of the subjective with the objective in the arguments of our divines, together with a childish or anile overrating of human testimony, and an ignorance in the art of sifting it, which necessarily engendered credulity.

Second,—the ignorance of natural science, their physiography scant in fact, and stuffed out with fables; their physiology imbrangled with an inapplicable logic and a misgrowth of *entia rationalia*, that is, substantiated abstractions; and their physiogony a blank or dreams of tradition, and such "intentional colors" as occupy space but can not fill it. Yet if Christianity is to be the religion of the world, if Christ be that Logos or Word that *was in the beginning*, by whom all things *became;* if it was the same Christ who said, *Let there be light;* who in and by the creation commenced that great redemptive process, the history of life which begins in its detachment from nature, and is to end in its union with God;—if this be true, so true must it be that the book of nature and the book of revelation, with the whole history of man as the intermediate link, must be the integral and coherent parts of one great work: and the conclusion is, that a scheme of the Christian faith which does not arise out of, and shoot its beams downward into, the scheme of nature, but stands aloof as an insulated afterthought, must be false or distorted in all its particulars. In confirmation of this position, I may challenge any opponent to adduce a single instance in which the now exploded falsities of physical science, through all its revolutions from the second to the seventeenth century of the Christian æra, did not produce some corresponding warps in the theological systems and dogmas of the several periods.

The third and last cause, and especially operative in the writings of this author, is the presence and regnancy of a false and fantastic philosophy, yet shot through with refracted light from the not risen but rising truth,—a scheme of physics and physiol-

ogy compounded of Cartesian mechanics and empiricism (for it was the credulous childhood of experimentalism), and a corrupt, mystical, theurgical, pseudo-Platonism, which infected the rarest minds under the Stuart dynasty. The only not universal belief in witchcraft and apparitions, and the vindication of such monster follies by such men as Sir M. Hale, Glanville, Baxter, Henry More, and a host of others, are melancholy proofs of my position. Hence, in the first chapters of this volume, the most idle inventions of the ancients are sought to be made credible by the most fantastic hypotheses and analogies.

To the man who has habitually contemplated Christianity as interesting all rational finite beings, as the very *spirit of truth*, the application of the prophecies as so many fortune-tellings and soothsayings to particular events and persons, must needs be felt as childish—like faces seen in the moon, or the sediments of a teacup. But reverse this, and a Pope and a Bonaparte can never be wanting,—the molehill becomes an Andes. On the other hand, there are few writers whose works could be so easily defecated as More's. Mere omission would suffice; and perhaps one half (an unusually large proportion) would come forth from the furnace pure gold; if but a fourth, how great a gain!

EXPLANATION OF THE GRAND MYSTERY OF GODLINESS.

Dedication. *Servorum illius omnium indignissimus.*

Servus indignissimus, or *omnino indignus*, or any other positive self-abasement before God, I can understand; but how an express avowal of unworthiness, comparatively superlative, can consist with the Job-like integrity and sincerity of profession especially required in a solemn address to Him, to whom all hearts are open, this I do not understand in the case of such men as Henry More, Jeremy Taylor, Richard Baxter were, and by comparison at least with the multitude of evil-doers, must have believed themselves to be.

Ib. v. c. 14, s. 3.

This makes me not so much wonder at that passage of Providence, which allowed so much virtue to the bones of the martyr Babylas, once bishop of Antioch, as to stop the mouth of Apollo Daphneus when Julian would have enticed him to open it by many a fat sacrifice. To say nothing of several

other memorable miracles that were done by the reliques of saints and martyrs in those times.

Strange lingering of childish credulity in the most learned and in many respects enlightened divines of the Protestant Episcopal Church even to the time of James II.! The Popish controversy at that time made a great clearance.

Ib. s. 9.

At one time Professor Eichorn had persuaded me that the Apocalypse was authentic; that is, a Danielitic dramatic poem written by the Apostle and Evangelist John, and not merely under his name. But the repeated perusal of the vision has sadly unsettled my conclusion. The entire absence of all spirituality perplexes me, as forming so strong a contrast with the Gospel and Epistles of John; and then the too great appearance of an allusion to the fable of Nero's return to life and empire, to Simon Magus and Apollonius of Tyana on the one hand (that is, the Eichornian hypothesis), and the insurmountable difficulties of Joseph Mede and others on to Bicheno and Faber on the other. In short, I feel just as both Luther and Calvin felt,—that is, I know not what to make of it, and so leave it alone.

It is much to be regretted that we have no contemporary history of Apollonius, or of the reports concerning him, and the popular notions in his own time. For from the romance of Philostratus we can not be sure as to the fact of the lies themselves. It may be a lie, that there ever was such or such a lie in circulation.

Ib. c. 15, s. 2.

Fourthly. The *little horn*, Dan. vii., that rules *for a time and times and half a time*, it is evident that it is not Antiochus Epiphanes, because this *little horn* is part of the fourth beast—namely, the Roman.

Is it quite clear that the Macedonian was not the fourth empire;—1. the Assyrian; 2. the Median; 3. the Persian; 4. the Macedonian? However, what a strange prophecy, that, *e confesso* having been fulfilled, remains as obscure as before!

Ib. s. 6.

And ye shall have the tribulation of ten days,—that is, the utmost extent of tribulation; beyond which there is nothing further, as there is no number beyond ten.

It means, I think, the very contrary. *Decem dierum* is used

even in Terence for a very short time.* In the same way we say, a nine days' wonder.

Ib. c. 16, s. 1.

But for further conviction of the excellency of Mr. Mede's way above that of Grotius, I shall compare some of their main interpretations.

Hard to say which of the two, Mede's or Grotius', is the more improbable. Beyond doubt, however, the Cherubim are meant as the scenic ornature borrowed from the Temple.

Ib. s. 2.

That this *rider of the white horse* is Christ, they both agree in.

The *white horse* is, I conceive, Victory or Triumph—that is, of the Roman power—followed by Slaughter, Famine, and Pestilence. All this is plain enough. The difficulty commences after the writer is deserted by his historical facts, that is, after the sacking of Jerusalem.

Ib. s. 5.

It would be no easy matter to decide, whether Mede *plus* More was at a greater distance from the meaning, or Grotius from the poetry, of this eleventh chapter of the Revelations; whether Mede was more wild, or Grotius more tame, flat, and prosaic.

Ib. c. 17, s. 8.

The Old and New Testament, which by a *prosopopœia* are here called the *two witnesses.*

Where is the probability of this so long before the existence of the collection since called the New Testament?

Ib. vi. c. 1, s. 2.

We may draw from this passage (1 *Thess.* iv. 16, 17), the strongest support of the fact of the ascension of Christ, or at least of St. Paul's (and of course of the first generation of Christians') belief of it. For had they not believed his ascent, whence could they have derived the universal expectation of his descent,—his bodily, personal descent? The only scruple is, that all these circumstances were parts of the Jewish *cabala* or idea of the Messiah by the spiritualists before the Christian æra, and therefore taken for granted with respect to Jesus as soon as he was admitted to be the Messiah.

* *Decem dierum vix mihi est familia.* Heaut. v. i.—*Ed.*

Ib. s. 6.

But light-minded men, whose hearts are made dark with infidelity, care not what antic distortions they make in interpreting Scripture, so they bring it to any show of compliance with their own fancy and incredulity.

Why so very harsh a censure? What moral or spiritual, or even what physical, difference can be inferred from all men's dying, this of one thing, that of another, a third, like the martyrs, burnt alive, or all in the same way? In any case they all die, and all pass to judgment.

Ib. c. 15.

With his *semi*-Cartesian, *semi*-Platonic, *semi*-Christian notions, Henry More makes a sad jumble in his assertion of chronochorhistorical Christianity. One decisive reference to the ascension of the visible and tangible Jesus from the surface of the earth upward through the clouds, pointed out in the writings of St. Paul or in the Gospel, beginning as it certainly did, and as in the copy according to Mark it now does, with the baptism of John, or in the writings of the Apostle John, would have been more effective in flooring Old Nic of Amsterdam* and his familiars, than volumes of such "may be's" "perhapses," and "should be rendered," as these.

Ib. viii. c. 2, c. 6.

I must confess our Saviour compiled no books, it being a piece of pedantry below so noble and divine a person, &c.

Alas! all this is wofully beneath the dignity of Henry More, and shockingly against the majesty of the High and Holy One, so very unnecessarily compared with Hendrick Nicholas, of Amsterdam, mercer!

Ib. x. c. 13, s. 5, 6.

A new sect naturally attracts to itself a portion of the madmen of the time, and sets another portion into activity as alarmists and oppugnants. I can not therefore pretend to say what More might not have found in the writings, or heard from the mouth, of some lunatic who called himself a Quaker. But I do not recollect, in any work of an acknowledged Friend, a denial of facts narrated by the Evangelists, as having really taken place in the same sense as any other facts of history. If they were symbols of spiritual acts and processes, as Fox and Penn contended,

* Hendrick Nicholas and the Family of Love.—*Ed.*

they must have been, or happened ;—else how could they be symbols ?

It is too true, however, that the positive creed of the Quakers is and ever has been extremely vague and misty. The deification of the conscience, under the name of the Spirit, seems the main article of their faith ; and of the rest they form no opinion at all, considering it neither necessary nor desirable. I speak of Quakers in general. But what a lesson of experience does not this thirteenth chapter of so great and good a man as H. More afford to us, who know what the Quakers really are ! Had the followers of George Fox, or any number of them collectively, acknowledged the mad notions of this Hendrick Nicholas ? If not

INQUIRY INTO THE MYSTERY OF INIQUITY.

Part II. ii. c. 2.

Confutation of Grotius on the 17th chapter of the Apocalypse.

Has or has not Grotius been overrated ? If Grotius applied these words (*magnus testis et historiarum diligentissimus inquisitor*) to Epiphanius in honest earnest, and not ironically, he must have been greatly inferior in sound sense and critical tact both to Joseph Scaliger and to Rhenferd. Strange, that to Henry More, a poet and a man of fine imagination, it should never have occurred to ask himself, whether this scene, Patmos, with which the drama commences, was not a part of the poem, and like all other parts, to be interpreted symbolically ? That the poetic—and I see no reason for doubting the real—date of the Apocalypse is under Vespasian, is so evidently implied in the five kings preceding (for Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, were abortive emperors) that it seems to me quite lawless to deny it. That *Λατεῖνος* is the meaning of the 666 (c. xiii. 18), and the treasonable character of this, are both shown by Irenæus's pretended rejection, and his proposal of the perfectly senseless *Teitan* instead.

HEINRICHS'S COMMENTARY ON THE APOCALYPSE.*

P. 245.

It seems clear that Irenæus invented the unmeaning *Teitan*, in

* Göttingen, 1821. The few following notes are, something out of order, inserted here in consequence of their connection with the immediately preceding remarks in the text.—*Ed.*

order to save himself from the charge of treason, to which the *Lateinos* might have exposed him. See Rabelais *passim*.

P. 246.

Nec magis blandiri poterit alterum illud nomen, Teitan, quod studiose commendavit Irenæus.

No! *non studiose, sed ironice commendavit Irenæus.* Indeed it is ridiculous to suppose that Irenæus was in earnest with *Teitan*. His meaning evidently is :—if not *Lateinos*, which has a meaning, it is some one of the many names having the same numeral power, to which a meaning is to be found by the fulfilment of the prophecy. My own conviction is, that the whole is an ill-concerted conundrum, the secret of which died with the author. The general purpose only can be ascertained, namely, some test, partaking of religious obligation, of allegiance to the sovereignty of the Roman Emperor.

If I granted for a moment the truth of Heinrichs's supposition, namely, that, according to the belief of the Apocalypt, the line of the Emperors would cease in Titus the seventh or complete number (Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, being omitted) by the advent of the Messiah ;—if I found my judgment more coerced by his arguments than it is,—then I should use this book as evidence of the great and early discrepance between the Jewish-Christian Church and the Pauline ; and my present very serious doubts respecting the identity of John the Theologian and John the Evangelist would become fixed convictions of the contrary.

P. 91. Rev. xvii. 11.

Among other grounds for doubting this interpretation (that *the eighth* in v. 11, is Satan), I object, 1. that it almost necessitates the substitution of the Coptic ἄγγελος for ὄγδοος against all the MSS. and without any Patristic hint. For it seems a play with words unworthy the writer, to make Satan, who possessed all the seven, himself an *eighth*, and still worse if *the eighth* :—2. that it is not only a great and causeless inconcinnity in style, but a wanton adding of obscurity to the obscure to have, first, so carefully distinguished (c. xiii. 1–11) the δράκων from the two θάρια, and the one θηρίον from the other, and then to make θηρίον the appellative of the δράκων : as if having in one place told of Nicholas *senior*, Dick and another Dick his cousin, I should soon after talk of Dick, meaning old Nicholas by that name ; that is, having discriminated Nicholas from Dick, then to say Dick, meaning Nicholas !

Rev. xix. 9.

These words might well bear a more recondite interpretation; that is, οὗτοι (these blessed ones) are the true λόγοι or τέκνα Θεοῦ, as the *Logos* is the υἱὸς Θεοῦ.

Ib. 10.

According to the law of symbolic poetry this sociable angel (the Beatrice of the Hebrew Dante) ought to be, and I doubt not is, *sensu symbolico*, an angel; that is, the angel of the Church of Ephesus, John the Evangelist, according to the opinion of Eusebius.

P. 294. Rev. xx. *Millennium.*

Die vorzüglichsten Bekenner Jesu sollen auferstehen, die übrigen Menschen sollen es nicht. Hiesse jenes, sie sollen noch nach ihrem Tode fortwürken, so wäre das letztere falsch: denn auch die übrigen würken nach ihrem Tode durch ihre schriften, ihre Andenken, ihre Beispiel.

Euge! Heinrichi. O, the sublime bathos of thy prosaism—the muddy eddy of thy logic! Thou art the only man to understand a poet!

I have too clearly before me the idea of a poet's genius to deem myself other than a very humble poet; but in the very possession of the idea, I know myself so far a poet as to feel assured that I can understand and interpret a poem in the spirit of poetry, and with the poet's spirit. Like the ostrich, I can not fly, yet have I wings that give me the feeling of flight; and as I sweep along the plain, can look up toward the bird of Jove, and can follow him and say:—"Sovereign of the air,—who descendest on thy nest in the cleft of the inaccessible rock, who makest the mountain pinnacle thy perch and halting-place, and, scanning with steady eye the orb of glory right above thee, imprintest thy lordly talons in the stainless snows, that shoot back and scatter round his glittering shafts,—I pay thee homage. Thou art my king. I give honor due to the vulture, the falcon, and all thy noble baronage; and no less to the lowly bird, the sky-lark, whom thou permittest to visit thy court, and chant her matin song within its cloudy curtains; yea the linnet, the thrush, the swallow are my brethren:—but still I am a bird, though but a bird of the earth.

"Monarch of our kind, I am a bird, even as thou; and I have shed plumes, which have added beauty to the beautiful, and grace to terror, waving over the maiden's brow and on the helmed head of the war-chief; and majesty to grief, drooping o'er the car of death!"

LIFE OF BISHOP HACKET.*

Ib. p. 8.

Yet he would often dispute the necessity of a country living for a London minister to retire to in hot summer time, out of the sepulchral air of a churchyard, where most of them are housed in the city, and found for his own part that by Whitsuntide he did *rus anhelare*, and unless he took fresh air in the vacation, he was stopt in his lungs and could not speak clear after Michaelmas.

A plausible reason certainly why A. and B. should occasionally change posts, but a very weak one, methinks, for A.'s having both livings all the year through.

Ib. pp. 42, 43.

The bishop was an enemy to all separation from the Church of England; but their hypocrisy he thought superlative that allowed the doctrine, and yet would separate for mislike of the discipline. * * * And therefore he wished that as of old all kings and other Christians subscribed to the Conciliary Decrees, so now a law might pass that all justices of peace should do so in England, and then they would be more careful to punish the depravers of Church Orders.

The little or no effect of recent experience and sufferings still more recent, in curing the mania of persecution! How was it possible that a man like Bishop Hacket should not have seen that if separation on account of the imposition of things by himself admitted to be indifferent, and as such justified, was criminal in those who did not think them indifferent,—how doubly criminal must the imposition have been, and how tenfold criminal the perseverance in occasioning separation; how guilty the imprisoning, impoverishing, driving into wildernesses their Christian brethren for admitted indifferentials in direct contempt of St. Paul's positive command to the contrary!

HACKET'S SERMONS.

Serm. I. Luke ii. 7.

Moreover as the woman Mary did bring forth the son who bruised the serpent's head, which brought sin into the world by the woman Eve, so the Virgin Mary was the occasion of grace as the Virgin Eve was the cause of damnation. Eve had not known Adam as yet when she was beguiled and seduced the man; so Mary, &c.

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* By Thomas Plume. Folio, 1676.—*Ed.*

A Rabbinical fable or gloss on Gen. iii. 1. Hacket is offensively fond of these worse than silly vanities.

Ib. p. 5.

The more to illustrate this, you must know that there was a twofold root or foundation of the children of Israel for their temporal being: Abraham was the root of the people; the kingdom was rent from Saul, and therefore David was the root of the kingdom; among all the kings in the pedigree none but he hath the name; and Jesse begat David the king, and David the king begat Solomon; and therefore so often as God did profess to spare the people, though he were angry, he says he would do it for Abraham's sake: so often as he professeth to spare the kingdom of Judah, he says he would do it for his servant David's sake; so that *ratione radicis*, as Abraham and David are roots of the people and kingdom, especially Christ is called the Son of David, the Son of Abraham.

A valuable remark, and confirmative of my convictions respecting the conversion of the Jews, namely, that whatever was ordained for them as *Abrahamidæ* is not repealed by Christianity, but only what appertained to the republic, kingdom, or state. The modern conversions are, as it seems to me, in the face of God's commands.

Ib.

I come to the third strange condition of the birth; it was without travel, or the pangs of woman, as I will show you out of these words; *fasciis involvit*, that *she wrapt him in swaddling clouts, and laid him in a manger. Ipsa genitrix fuit obstetrix*, says St. Cyprian. Mary was both the mother and the midwife of the child; far be it from us to think that the weak hand of the woman could facilitate the work which was guided only by the miraculous hand of God. The Virgin conceived our Lord without the lusts of the flesh, and therefore she had not the pangs and travail of woman upon her, she brought him forth without the curse of the flesh. These be the Fathers' comparisons. As bees draw honey from the flower without offending it, as Eve was taken out of Adam's side without any grief to him, as a sprig issues out of the bark of a tree, as the sparkling light from the brightness of the star, such ease was it to Mary to bring forth her first-born son; and therefore having no weakness in her body, feeling no want of vigor, she did not deliver him to any profane hand to be drest, but by a special ability, above all that are newly delivered, she wrapt him in swaddling clouts. *Gravida, sed non gravabatur;* she had a burden in her womb, before she was delivered, and yet she was not burdened for her journey which she took so instantly before the time of the child's birth. From Nazareth to Bethlem was above forty miles, and yet she suffered it without weariness or complaint, for such was the power of the Babe, that rather he did support the Mother's weakness than was supported; and as he lighted his Mother's travel by the way from Nazareth to Bethlem that it was not tedious to her

tender age, so he took away all her dolor and imbecility from her travail in child-birth, and therefore *she wrapt him in swaddling clouts.*

A very different paragraph indeed, and quite on the cross-road to Rome! It really makes me melancholy; but it is one of a thousand instances of the influence of Patristic learning, by which the Reformers of the Latin Church were distinguished from the renovators of the Christian religion.

Can we wonder that the strict Protestants were jealous of the backsliding of the Arminian prelatical clergy and of Laud their leader, when so strict a Calvinist as Bishop Hacket could trick himself up in such fantastic rags and lappets of Popish monkery! —could skewer such frippery patches, cribbed from the tiring-room of Romish Parthenolatry, on the sober gown and cassock of a Reformed and Scriptural Church!

Ib. p. 7.

But to say the truth, was he not safer among the beasts than he could be elsewhere in all the town of Bethlem? His enemies perchance would say unto him, as Jael did to Sisera, *Turn in, turn in, my Lord,* when she purposed to kill him; as the men of Keilah made a fair show to give David all courteous hospitality, but the issue would prove, if God had not blessed him, that they meant to deliver him into the hands of Saul that sought his blood. So there was no trusting of the Bethlemites. Who knows, but that they would have prevented Judas, and betrayed him for thirty pieces of silver unto Herod? More humanity is to be expected from the beasts than from some men, and therefore *she laid him in a manger.*

Did not the life of Archbishop Williams prove otherwise, I should have inferred from these Sermons that Hacket from his first boyhood had been used to make themes, epigrams, copies of verses, and the like, on all the Sunday feasts and festivals of the Church; had found abundant nourishment for this humor of points, quirks, and quiddities in the study of the Fathers and glossers; and remained a *junior soph* all his life long. I scarcely know what to say: on the one hand, there is a triflingness, a showman's or relique-hawker's gossip, that stands in offensive contrast with the momentous nature of the subject, and the dignity of the ministerial office; as if a preacher having chosen the Prophets for his theme should entertain his congregation by exhibiting a traditional shaving-rag of Isaiah's with the Prophet's stubble hair on the dried soap-sud. And yet, on the other hand, there is an innocency in it, a security of faith, a fulness evinced in the play and plash of its overflowing, that at other times

give one the same sort of pleasure as the sight of blackberry bushes and children's handkerchief-gardens on the slopes of a rampart, the promenade of some peaceful old town, that stood the last siege in the Thirty Years' war!

Ib. Serm. II. Luke ii. 8.

Tiberius propounded his mind to the senate of Rome, that Christ, the great prophet in Jewry, should be had in the same honor with the other gods which they worshiped in the Capitol. The motion did not please them, says Eusebius; and this was all the fault, because he was a god not of their own, but of Tiberius' invention.

Here, I own, the negative evidence of the silence of Seneca and Suetonius—above all, of Tacitus and Pliny—outweigh in my mind the positive testimony of Eusebius, which rested, I suspect, on the same ground with the letters of Pontius Pilate, so boldly appealed to by Tertullian.*

Ib. Serm. III. Luke ii. 9.

But our bodies shall revive out of that dust into which they were dissolved, and live forever in the resurrection of the righteous.

I never could satisfy myself as to the continuance and catholicity of this strange Egyptian tenet in the very face of St. Paul's indignant, *Thou fool! not that*, &c. I have at times almost been tempted to conjecture that Paul taught a different doctrine from the Palestine disciples on this point, and that the Church preferred the sensuous and therefore more popular belief of the Evangelists' *κατὰ σάρκα* to the more intelligible faith of the spiritual sage of the other Athens; for so Tarsus was called.

And was there no symptom of a commencing relapse to the errors of that Church which had equalled the traditions of men, yea, the dreams of phantasts, with the revelations of God, when a chosen elder with the law of truth before him, and professing to divide and distribute the bread of life, could, paragraph after paragraph, place such unwholesome vanities as these before his flock, without even a hint which might apprise them that the gew-gaw comfits were not part of the manna from heaven? All this superstitious trash about angels, which the Jews learned from the Persian legends, asserted as confidently as if Hacket had translated it word for word from one of the four Gospels! Sal-

* *Ea omnia super Christo Pilatus, et ipse jam pro sua conscientia Christianus, Cæsari tum Tiberio nuntiavit.* Apologet. ii. 624. See the account in Eusebius. Hist. Eccl. ii. 2.—*Ed.*

masius, if I mistake not, supposes the original word to have been bachelors, young unmarried men. Others interpret angels as meaning the bishop and elders of the Church. More probably it was a proverbial expression derived from the Cherubim in the Temple : something as the country folks used to say to children, Take care, the Fairies will hear you ! It was a common notion among the Jews, in the time of St. Paul, that their angels were employed in carrying up their prayers to the throne of God. Of course they must have been in special attendance in a house of prayer.

After much search and much thought on the subject of angels as a diverse kind of finite beings, I find no sufficing reason to hold it for a revealed doctrine, and if not revealed it is assuredly no truth of philosophy, which, as I have elsewhere remarked, can conceive but three kinds ; 1. the infinite reason ; 2. the finite rational ; and 3. the finite irrational—that is, God, man, and beast. What indeed, even for the vulgar, is or can an archangel be but a man with wings, better or worse than the wingless species, according as the feathers are white or black ? I would that the word had been translated instead of Anglicized in our English Bible.

The following paragraph is one of Hacket's sweetest passages. It is really a beautiful little hymn.

> By this it appears how suitably a beam of admirable light did concur in the angels' message to set out the majesty of the Son of God : and I beseech you observe,—all you that would keep a good Christmas as you ought,—that the glory of God is the best celebration of his Son's nativity ; and all your pastimes and mirth (which I disallow not, but rather commend in moderate use) must so be managed, without riot, without surfeiting, without excessive gaming, without pride and vain pomp, in harmlessness, in sobriety, as if the glory of the Lord were round about us. Christ was born to save them that were lost ; but frequently you abuse his nativity with so many vices, such disordered outrages, that you make this happy time an occasion for your loss rather than for your salvation. Praise him in the congregation of the people ! praise him in your inward heart ! praise him with the sanctity of your life ! praise him in your charity to them that need and are in want ! This is the glory of God shining round, and the most Christian solemnizing of the birth of Jesus.

SERMONS ON THE TEMPTATION.

As the Temptation is found in the three Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, it must have formed part of the *Prot-evangelion*,

or original Gospel;—from the Apostles, therefore, it must have come, and from some or all who had heard the account from our Lord himself. How, then, are we to understand it? To confute the whims and superstitious nugacities of these Sermons, and the hundred other comments and interpretations *ejusdem farinæ*, would be a sad waste of time. Yet some meaning, and that worthy of Christ, it must have had. The struggle with the suggestions of the evil principle, first, to force his way and compel belief by a succession of miracles, disjoined from moral and spiritual purpose,—miracles for miracles' sake;—second, doubts of his Messianic character and divinity, and temptations to try it by some ordeal at the risk of certain death;—third, to interpret his mission, as his countrymen generally did, to be one of conquest and royalty;—these perhaps—but I am lost in doubt.

IV. SERMON ON THE TRANSFIGURATION. LUKE IX. 33.

I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh. Rom. ix. 3.

St. Paul does not say, "I would desire to be accursed," nor does he speak of any deliberated result of his consideration; but represents a transient passion of his soul, an actual but undetermined impulse,—an impulse existing in and for itself in the moment of its ebullience, and not completed by an act and confirmation of the will,—as a striking proof of the exceeding interest which he continued to feel in the welfare of his countrymen. His heart so swelled with love and compassion for them, that if it were possible, if reason and conscience permitted it, 'Methinks,' says he, 'I could wish that myself were accursed, if so they might be saved.' Might not a mother, figuring to herself as possible and existing an impossible or not existing remedy for a dying child, exclaim, 'Oh, I could fly to the end of the earth to procure it!' Let it not be irreverent, if I refer to the fine passage in Shakspeare—Hotspur's rapture-like reverie—so often ridiculed by shallow wits. In great passion, the crust opake of present and existing weakness and boundedness is, as it were, fused and vitrified for the moment, and through the transparency the soul, catching a gleam of the infinity of the potential in the will of man, reads the future for the present. Percy is wrapt in the contemplation of the physical might inherent in the concen-

trated will; the inspired Apostle in the sudden sense of the depth of its moral strength.

I. SERMON ON THE RESURRECTION. ACTS II. 4.

Thirdly, the necessity of it: *for it was not possible that he should be holden of death.*

One great error of textual divines is their inadvertence to the dates, occasion, object and circumstances, at and under which the words were written or spoken. Thus the simple assertion of one or two facts introductory to the teaching of the Christian religion is taken as comprising or constituting the Christian religion itself. Hence the disproportionate weight laid on the simple fact of the resurrection of Jesus, detached from the mysteries of the Incarnation and Redemption.

Ib.

St. Austin says, that Tully, in his 3 *lib. de Republica*, disputed against the reuniting of soul and body. His argument was, To what end? Where should they remain together? For a body can not be assumed into heaven. I believe God caused those famous monuments of his wit to perish, because of such impious opinions wherewith they were farced.

I believe, however, that these books have recently themselves enjoyed a resurrection by the labor of Angelo Mai.*

Ib.

And let any equal auditor judge if Job were not an Anti-Socinian; Job xix. 26. *Though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God, whom I shall behold for myself, and mine eyes shall see, and not another.*

This text rightly rendered is perhaps nothing to the purpose, but may refer to the dire cutaneous disease with which Job was afflicted. It may be merely an expression of Job's confidence of his being justified in the eyes of men, and in this life.†

In the whole wide range of theological *mirabilia*, I know none stranger than the general agreement of orthodox divines to forget to ask themselves what they precisely meant by the word 'body.' Our Lord's and St. Paul's meaning is evident enough, that is, the personality.

* See *M. T. Ciceronis de Republica quæ supersunt. Zell. Stuttgardt.* 1827.—*Ed.*

† See *supra.*—*Ed.*

Ib.

St. Chrysostom's judgment upon it (*having loosed the pains of death*) is, that when Christ came out of the grave, death itself was delivered from pain and anxiety—ὥδικε κατέχων αὐτὸν φάνατος, καὶ τὰ δεινὰ ἔπασχε. Death knew it held him captive whom it ought not to have seized upon, and therefore it suffered torments like a woman in travail till it had given him up again. Thus he. But the Scripture elsewhere testifies, that death was put to sorrow because it had lost its sting, rather than released from sorrow by our Saviour's resurrection.

Most noticeable! See the influence of the surrounding myriotheism in the *dea Mors!*

Ib.

Let any competent judge read Hacket's Life of Archbishop Williams, and then these Sermons, and so measure the stultifying, nugifying effect of a blind and uncritical study of the Fathers, and the exclusive prepossession in favor of their authority in the minds of many of our Church dignitaries in the reign of Charles I.

HACKET'S LIFE OF LORD KEEPER WILLIAMS.*

Prudence installed as virtue, instead of being employed as one of her indispensable handmaids, and the products of this exemplified and illustrated in the life of Archbishop Williams, as a work, I could warmly recommend to my dearest Hartley. Williams was a man bred up to the determination of being righteous, both honorably striving and selfishly ambitious, but all within the bounds and permission of the law, the reigning system of casuistry; in short, an egotist in morals, and a worldling in impulses and motives. And yet by pride and by innate nobleness of nature munificent and benevolent, with all the negative virtues of temperance, chastity, and the like,—take this man on his road to his own worldly aggrandizement. Winding his way through a grove of powerful rogues, by flattery, professions of devoted attachment, and by actual and zealous as well as able services, and at length becoming in fact nearly as great a knave as the knaves (Duke of Buckingham for example) whose favor and support he had been conciliating,—till at last in some dilemma, some strait between conscience and fear, and increased confidence in his own political strength, he opposes or hesitates to further some too foolish or

* Folio. 1693.—*Ed.*

wicked project of his patron knave, or affronts his pride by counselling a different course (not a less wicked, but one more profitable and conducive to his Grace's elevation);—and then is *floored* or crushed by him, and falls unknown and unpitied. Such was that truly wonderful scholar and statesman, Archbishop Williams.

Part i. s. 61.

'And God forbid that any other course should be attempted. For this liberty was settled on the subject, with such imprecations upon the infringers, that if they should remove these great landmarks, they must look for vengeance, as if entailed by public vows on them and their posterity. These were the Dean's instructions, &c.

He deserves great credit for them. They put him in strong contrast with Laud.

Ib. s. 80.

Thus for them both together he solicits:—My most noble lord, what true applause and admiration the King and your Honor have gained, &c.

All this we, in the year 1833, should call abject and base; but was it so in Bishop Williams? In the history of the morality of a people, prudence, yea cunning, is the earliest form of virtue. This is expressed in Jacob, and in Ulysses and all the most ancient fables. It will require the true philosophic calm and serenity to distinguish and appreciate the character of the morality of our great men from Henry VIII. to the close of James I.,—*nullum numen abest, si sit prudentia,*—and of those of Charles I. to the Restoration The difference almost amounts to contrast.

Ib. s. 81–2.

How is it that any deeply-read historian should not see how imperfect and precarious the rights of personal liberty were during this period; or, seeing it, refuse to do justice to the patriots under Charles I.? The truth is, that from the reign of Edward I. (to go no farther backward), there was a spirit of freedom in the people at large, which all our kings in their senses were cautious not to awaken by too rudely treading on it; but for individuals as such, there was none till the conflict with the Stuarts.

Ib. s. 84.

Of such a conclusion of state, *quæ aliquando incognita, semper justa,* &c.

This perversion of words respecting the decrees of Providence to the caprices of James and his beslobbered minion the Duke of

Buckingham, is somewhat nearer to blasphemy than even the euphuism of the age can excuse.

Ib. s. 85.

——— *tuus, O Jacobe, quod optas*
Explorare labor, mihi jussa capessere fas est.

In our times this would be pedantic wit: in the days of James I., and in the mouth of Archbishop Williams it was witty pedantry.

Ib. s. 89.

He that doth much in a short life products his mortality.

'Products' for 'produces;' that is, lengthens out, *ut apud geometros*. But why Hacket did not say 'prolongs,' I know not.

Ib.

See what a globe of light there is in natural reason, which is the same in every man: but when it takes well, and riseth to perfection, it is called wisdom in a few.

The good affirming itself—(the will, I am)—begetteth the true, and wisdom is the spirit proceeding. But in the popular acceptation, common sense in an uncommon degree is what the world calls wisdom.

Ib. s. 92.

A well-spirited clause, and agreeable to holy assurance, that truth is more like to win than love. Could the light of such a Gospel as we profess be eclipsed with the interposition of a single marriage?

And yet Hacket must have lived to see the practical confutation of this shallow Gnathonism in the result of the marriage with the Papist Henrietta of France!

Ib. s. 96.

"Floud," says the Lord Keeper, "since I am no Bishop in your opinion, I will be no Bishop to you."

I see the wit of this speech; but the wisdom, the Christianity, the beseemingness of it in a Judge and a Bishop,—what am I to say of that?

Ib.

And after the period of his presidency (of the Star Chamber), it is too well known how far the enhancements were stretched. *But the wringing of the nose bringeth forth blood.* Prov. 30–33.

We may learn from this and fifty other passages, that it did not require the factious prejudices of Prynne or Burton to look with

aversion on the proceedings of Laud. Bishop Hacket was as hot a royalist as a loyal Englishman could be, yet Laud was *allii nimis*.

Ib. s. 97.

New stars have appeared and vanished: the ancient asterisms remain; there's not an old star missing.

If they had been, they would not have been old. This, therefore, like many of Lord Bacon's illustrations, has more wit than meaning. But it is a good trick of rhetoric. The vividness of the image, *per se*, makes men overlook the imperfection of the simile. "You see my hand, the hand of a poor, puny fellow-mortal; and will you pretend not to see the hand of Providence in this business? He who sees a mouse must be wilfully blind if he does not see an elephant!"

Ib. s. 100.

The error of the first James,—an ever well-intending, well-resolving, but, alas! ill-performing monarch, a kind-hearted, affectionate, and fondling old man, really and extensively learned, yea, and as far as quick wit and a shrewd judgment go to the making up of wisdom, wise in his generation, and a pedant by the right of pedantry, conceded at that time to all men of learning (Bacon for example)—his error, I say, consisted in the notion, that because the stalk and foliage were originally contained in the seed, and were derived from it, therefore they remained so in point of right after their evolution. The kingly power was the seed; the House of Commons and the municipal charters and privileges the stock of foliage; the unity of the realm, or what we mean by the constitution, is the root. Meanwhile the seed is gone, and reappears as the crown and glorious flower of the plant. But James, in my honest judgment, was an angel compared with his son and grandsons. As Williams to Laud, so James I. was to Charles I.

Ib.

Restraint is not a medicine to cure epidemical diseases.

A most judicious remark.

Ib. s. 103.

The least connivance in the world towards the person of a Papist.

It is clear to us that this illegal or *præter*-legal and desultory toleration by connivance at particular cases—this precarious de-

pending on the momentary mood of the King, and this in a stretch of a questioned prerogative—could neither satisfy nor conciliate the Roman Catholic potentates abroad, but was sure to offend and alarm the Protestants at home. Yet on the other hand, it is unfair as well as unwise to censure the men of an age for want of that which was above their age. The true principle, much more the practicable rules, of toleration were in James's time obscure to the wisest; but by the many, laity no less than clergy, would have been denounced as soul-murder and disguised atheism. In fact—and a melancholy fact it is—toleration then first becomes practicable when indifference has deprived it of all merit. In the same spirit I excuse the opposite party, the Puritans and Papaphobists.

Ib. s. 104.

It was scarcely to be expected that the passions of James's age would allow of this wise distinction between Papists, the intriguing restless partisans of a foreign potentate, and simple Roman Catholics, who preferred the *mumpsimus* of their grandsires to the corrected *sumpsimus* of the Reformation. But that in our age this distinction should have been neglected in the Roman Catholic Emancipation Bill!

Ib. s. 105.

But this invisible consistory shall be confusedly diffused over all the kingdom, that many of the subjects shall, to the intolerable exhausting of the wealth of the realm, pay double tithes, double offerings, double fees, in regard of their double consistory. And if Ireland be so poor as it is suggested, I hold, under correction, that this invisible consistory is the principal cause of the exhausting thereof.

A memorable remark on the evil of the double priesthood in Ireland.

Ib.

Dr. Bishop, the new Bishop of Chalcedon, is to come to London privately, and I am much troubled at it, not knowing what to advise his majesty as things stand at this present. If you were shipped with the Infanta, the only counsel were to let the judges proceed with him presently; hang him out of the way, and the King to blame my lord of Canterbury or myself for it.

Striking instance and illustration of the tricksy policy which in the seventeenth century passed for state wisdom even with the comparatively wise. But there must be a Ulysses before there can be an Aristides and Phocion.

Poor King James's main errors arose out of his superstitious notions of a sovereignty inherent in the person of the king. Hence he would be a sacred person, though in all other respects he might be a very devil. Hence his yearning for the Spanish match; and the ill effects of his toleration became rightly attributed by his subjects to foreign influence, as being against his own acknowledged principle, not on a principle.

Ib. s. 107.

I have at times played with the thought, that our bishoprics, like most of our college fellowships, might advantageously be confined to single men, if only it were openly declared to be on ground of public expediency, and on no supposed moral superiority of the single state.

Ib. s. 108.

That a rector or vicar had not only an office in the church, but a freehold for life, by the common law, in his benefice.

O! if Archbishop Williams had but seen in a clear point of view what he indistinctly aims at—the essential distinction between the nationality and its trustees and holders, and the Christian Church and its ministers.*

Ib. s. 111.

I will represent him (the archbishop of Spalato) in a line or two, that he was as indifferent, or rather dissolute, in practice as in opinion. For in the same chapter, art. 35, this is his Nicolaitan doctrine:—*A pluralitate uxorum natura humana non abhorret, imo fortasse neque ab earum communitate.*

How so? The words mean only that the human animal is not withholden by any natural instinct from plurality or even community of females. It is not asserted, that reason and revelation do not forbid both the one and the other, or that man unwithholden would not be a Yahoo, morally inferior to the swallow. The emphasis is to be laid on *natura*, not on *humana*. Humanity forbids plural and promiscuous intercourse, not however by the animal nature of man, but by the reason and religion that constitute his moral and spiritual nature.

Ib. s. 112.

But being thrown out into banishment, and hunted to be destroyed as a partridge in the mountain, he subscribed against his own hand, which yet

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* See the Church and State.—*Ed.*

did not prejudice Athanasius his innocency:—*τὰ γὰρ ἐκ βασάνων παρὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γνώμην γιγνόμενα, ταῦτα οὐ τῶν φοβηθέντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν βασανιζόντων ἐστὶ βουλήματα.*

I have ever said this of Sir John Cheke. I regret his recantation as one of the cruelties suffered by him, and always see the guilt flying off from him and settling on his persecutors.

Ib. s. 151.

I conclude, therefore, that his Highness having admitted nothing in these oaths or articles, either to the prejudice of the true, or the equalizing or authorizing of the other, religion, but contained himself wholly within the limits of penal statutes and connivances, wherein the state hath ever challenged and usurped a directing power, &c.

Three points seem wanting to render the Lord Keeper's argument air-tight;—1. The proof that a king of England even then had a right to dispense, not with the execution in individual cases of the laws, but with the laws themselves *in omne futurum;* that is, to repeal laws by his own act;—2. the proof that such a tooth-and-talon drawing of the laws did not endanger the equalizing and final mastery of the unlawful religion;—3. the utter want of all reciprocity on the part of the Spanish monarch. In short, it is pardonable in Hacket, but would be contemptible in any other person, not to see this advice of the Lord Keeper's as a black blotch in his character, both as a Protestant Bishop and as a councillor of state in a free and Protestant country.

Ib. s. 152.

Yet opinions were so various, that some spread it for a fame, that, &c.

Was it not required of—at all events usual for—all present at a Council to subscribe their names to the act of the majority? There is a modern case in point, I think, that of Sir Arthur Wellesley's signature to the Convention of Cintra.

Ib. s. 164.

For to forbid judges against their oath, and justices of peace (sworn likewise), not to execute the law of the land, is a thing unprecedented in this kingdom. *Durus sermo,* a harsh and bitter pill to be digested upon a sudden, and without some preparation.

What a fine India-rubber conscience Hacket, as well as his patron, must have had! 'Policy with innocency,' 'cunning with conscience,' lead up the dance to the tune of '*Tantara* rogues all!'

Upon my word I can scarcely conceive a greater difficulty

than for an honest, warm-hearted man of principle of the present day so to discipline his mind by reflection on the circumstances and received moral system of the Stuarts' age (from Elizabeth to the death of Charles I.), and its proper place in the spiral line of ascension, as to be able to regard the Duke of Buckingham as not a villain, and to resolve many of the acts of those Princes into passions, conscience-warped and hardened by half-truths and the secular creed of prudence, as being itself virtue instead of one of her handmaids, when interpreted by minds constitutionally and by their accidental circumstances imprudent and rash, yet fearful and suspicious ; and with casuists and codes of casuistry as their conscience-leaders ! One of the favorite works of Charles I. was Sanderson *de Juramento*.

Ib. s. 200.

Wherefore he waives the strong and full defence he had made upon stopping of an original writ, and deprecates all offence by that maxim of the law which admits of a mischief rather than an inconvenience : which was as much as to say, that he thought it far less evil to do the lady the probability of an injury (in her own name), than to suffer those two courts to clash together again.

All this is a tangle of sophisms. The assumption is, it is better to inflict a private wrong than a public one : we ought to wrong one rather than many. But even then, it is badly stated. The principle is true only where the tolerating of the private wrong is the only means of preventing a greater public wrong. But in this case it was the certainty of the wrong of one to avoid the chance of an inconvenience that might perchance be the occasion of wrong to many, and which inconvenience both easily might and should have been remedied by rightful measures, by mutual agreement between the Bishop and Chancellor, and by the King, or by an act of Parliament.

Ib. s. 203.

'Truly, Sir, this is my dark lantern, and I am not ashamed to inquire of a Dalilah to resolve a riddle ; for in my studies of divinity I have gleaned up this maxim, *licet uti alieno peccato ;* though the devil make her a sinner, I may make good use of her sin.' Prince, merrily, 'Do you deal in such ware ?' 'In good faith, Sir,' says the Keeper, 'I never saw her face.'

And Hacket's evident admiration, and not merely approbation, of this base Jesuitry,—this divinity which had taught the Archbishop *licere uti alieno peccato* ! But Charles himself was

a student of such divinity, and yet (as rogues of higher rank comfort the pride of their conscience by despising inferior knaves) I suspect that the 'merrily' was the Sardonic mirth of bitter contempt; only, however, because he disliked Williams, who was simply a man of his age, his baseness being for us, not for his contemporaries, or even for his own mind. But the worst of all is the Archbishop's heartless disingenuousness and moon-like nodes towards his kind old master the King. How much of truth was there in the Spaniard's information respecting the intrigues of the Prince and the Duke of Buckingham? If none, if they were mere slanders, if the Prince had acted the filial part toward his father and King, and the Duke the faithful part towards his master and only too fond and affectionate benefactor, what more was needed than to expose the falsehoods? But if Williams knew that there was too great a mixture of truth in the charges, what a cowardly ingrate to his old friend to have thus curried favor with the rising sun by this base jugglery!

Ib. s. 209.

He was the topsail of the nobility, and in power and trust of offices far above all the nobility.

James I. was no fool, and though through weakness of character an unwise master, yet not an unthinking statesman; and I still want a satisfactory solution of the accumulation of offices on Buckingham.

Ib. s. 212.

Prudent men will continue the oblations of their forefathers' piety.

The danger and mischief of going far back, and yet not half far enough! Thus Hacket refers to the piety of individuals our forefathers as the origin of Church property. Had he gone further back, and traced to the source, he would have found these partial benefactions to have been mere restitutions of rights co-original with their own property, and as a national reserve for the purposes of national existence—the condition *sine qua non* of the equity of their proprieties; for without civilization a people can not be, or continue to be, a nation. But, alas! the ignorance of the essential distinction of a national clerisy, the *Ecclesia*, from the Christian Church. The *Ecclesia* has been an eclipse to the intellect of both Churchmen and Sectarians, even from Elizabeth to the present day, 1833.

Ib. s. 214.

And being threatened, his best mitigation was, that perhaps it was not safe for him to deny so great a lord; yet it was safest for his lordship to be denied. * * * The king heard the noise of these crashes, and was so pleased, that he thanked God, before many witnesses, that he had put the Keeper into that place: 'For,' says he, 'he that will not wrest justice for Buckingham's sake, whom I know he loves, will never be corrupted with money, which he never loved.'

Strange it must seem to us; yet it is evident that Hacket thought it necessary to make a mid something, half apology and half eulogy, for the Lord Keeper's timid half-resistance to the insolence and iniquitous interference of the minion Duke. What a portrait of the times! But the dotage of the King in the maintenance of the man, whose insolence in wresting justice he himself admits! Yet how many points, both of the times and of the King's personal character, must be brought together before we can fairly solve the intensity of James's minionism, his kingly egotism, his weak kind-heartedness, his vulgar coarseness of temper, his systematic jealousy of the ancient nobles, his timidity, and the like!

Ib.

'Sir,' says the Lord Keeper, 'will you be pleased to listen to me, taking in the Prince's consent, of which I make no doubt, and I will show how you shall furnish the second and third brothers with preferments sufficient to maintain them, that shall cost you nothing. * * * If they fall to their studies, design them to the bishopries of Durham and Winchester, when they become void. If that happen in their nonage, which is probable, appoint commendatories to discharge the duty for them for a laudable allowance, but gathering the fruits for the support of your grandchildren, till they come to virility to be consecrated,' &c.

Williams could not have been in earnest in this villanous counsel, but he knew his man. This conceit of dignifying dignities by the Simoniacal prostitution of them to blood-royal was just suited to James's fool-cunningness.

Part ii. s. 74.

* * To yield not only passive obedience (which is due) but active also, &c.

'Which is due.' What in the name of common sense can this mean, that is, speculatively? Practically, the meaning is clear enough, namely, that we should do what we can to escape hanging; but the distinction is for decorum, and so let it pass.

Ib. s. 75.

This is the venom of this new doctrine, that by making us the King's creatures, and in the state of minors or children, to take away all our property; which would leave us nothing of our own, and lead us (but that God hath given us just and gracious Princes) into slavery.

And yet this just and gracious Prince prompts, sanctions, supports, and openly rewards this envenomer, in flat contempt of both Houses of Parliament,—protects and prefers him and others of the same principles and professions on account of these professions! And the Parliament and nation were inexcusable, forsooth, in not trusting to Charles's assurances, or rather the assurances put in his mouth by Hyde, Falkland, and others, that he had always abhorred these principles.

Ib. s. 136.

When they saw he was not *selfish* (it is a word of their own new mint), &c.

Singular! From this passage it would seem that our so very common word 'selfish' is no other than the latter part of the reign of Charles I.

Ib. s. 137.

Their political aphorisms are far more dangerous, that His Majesty is not the highest power in his realms; that he hath not absolute sovereignty; and that a Parliament sitting is co-ordinate with him in it.

Hacket himself repeatedly implies as much; for would he deny that the King with the Lords and Commons is not more than the King without them? or that an act of Parliament is not more than a proclamation?

Ib. s. 154.

What a venomous spirit is in that serpent Milton, that black-mouthed Zoilus, that blows his viper's breath upon those immortal devotions from the beginning to the end! This is he that wrote with all irreverence against the Fathers of our Church, and showed as little duty to the father that begat him: the same that wrote for the Pharisees, that it was lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause,—and against Christ, for not allowing divorces; the same, O horrid! that defended the lawfulness of the greatest crime that ever was committed, to put our thrice-excellent King to death: a petty school-boy scribbler, that durst grapple in such a cause with the prince of the learned men of his age, Salmasius, *φιλοσοφίας πάσης αφροδίτη καὶ λύρα*, as Eunapius says of Ammonius, Plutarch's scholar in Egypt, the delight, the music of all knowledge, who would have scorned to drop a pen-full of ink against so base an adversary, but to maintain the honor of so good a King. * * * * Get thee behind me, Milton! Thou savorest not the things that be of truth and loyalty, but of pride, bitterness,

and falsehood. There will be a time, though such a Shimei, a dead dog in Abishai's phrase, escape for a while. * * * It is no marvel if this canker-worm, Milton, &c.

A contemporary of Bishop Hacket's designates Milton as the author of a profane and lascivious poem entitled Paradise Lost. The biographer of our divine bard ought to have made a collection of all such passages. A German writer of a Life of Salmasius acknowledges that Milton had the better in the conflict in these words: 'Hans (Jack) von Milton—not to be compared in learning and genius with the incomparable Salmasius, yet a shrewd and cunning lawyer,' &c. *O sana posteritas!*

Ib. s. 178.

Dare they not trust him that never broke with them? And I have heard his nearest servants say, that no man could ever challenge him of the least lie.

What! this after the publication of Charles's letters to the Queen! Did he not within a few months before his death enter into correspondence with, and sign contradictory offers to, three different parties, not meaning to keep any one of them; and at length did he not die with something very like a falsehood in his mouth in allowing himself to be represented as the author of the Icon Basilike?

Ib. s. 180.

If an under-sheriff had arrested Harry Martin for debt, and pleaded that he did not imprison his membership, but his Martinship, would the Committee for privileges be fobbed off with that distinction?

To make this good in analogy, we must suppose that Harry Martin had notoriously neglected all the duties, while he perverted and abused all the privileges, of membership: and then I answer, that the Committee of privileges would have done well and wisely in accepting the under-sheriff's distinction, and, out of respect for the membership, consigning the Martinship to the due course of law.

Ib.

That every soul should be subject to the higher powers. The higher power under which they lived was the mere power and will of Cæsar, bridled in by no law.

False, if meant *de jure;* and if *de facto*, the plural *powers* would apply to the Parliament far better than to the King, and to Cromwell as well as to Nero. Every even decently good Em-

peror professed himself the servant of the Roman Senate. The very term *Imperator*, as Gravina observes, implies it; for it expresses a delegated and instrumental power. Before the assumption of the Tribunitial character by Augustus, by which he became the representative of the majority of the people,—*majestatem indutus est,—Senatus consulit, Populus jubet, imperent Consules*, was the constitutional language.

Ib. s. 190.

Yet so much dissonancy there was between his tongue and his heart, that he triumphed in the murder of Cæsar, the only Roman that exceeded all their race in nobleness, and was next to Tully in eloquence.

There is something so shameless in this self-contradiction as of itself almost to extinguish the belief that the prelatic royalists were conscientious in their conclusions. For if the Senate of Rome were not a lawful power, what could be? And if Cæsar, the thrice perjured traitor, was neither perjured nor traitor, only because he by his Gaulish troops turned a republic into a monarchy,—with what face, under what pretext, could Hacket abuse 'Sultan Cromwell?'

NOTES ON JEREMY TAYLOR.

I HAVE not seen the late Bishop Heber's edition of Jeremy Taylor's Works; but I have been informed that he did little more than contribute the Life, and that in all else it is a mere London booksellers' job. This, if true, is greatly to be regretted. I know no writer whose works more require, I need not say deserve, the annotations, aye, and occasional animadversions, of a sound and learned divine. One thing is especially desirable in reference to that most important, because (with the exception perhaps of the Holy Living and Dying) the most popular, of Taylor's works, The Liberty of Prophesying; and this is a careful collation of the different editions, particularly of the first printed before the Restoration, and the last published in Taylor's life-time, and after his promotion to the episcopal bench. Indeed, I regard this as so nearly concerning Taylor's character as a man, that if I find that it has not been done in Heber's edition, and if I find a first edition in the British Museum, or Sion College, or Dr. Williams's library, I will, God permitting, do it myself. There seems something cruel in giving the name, Anabap-

tist, to the English Anti-pædobaptists ; but still worse in connecting this most innocent opinion with the mad Jacobin ravings of the poor wretches who were called Anabaptists, in Munster, as if the latter had ever formed part of the Baptists' creeds. In short The Liberty of Prophesying is an admirable work, in many respects, and calculated to produce a much greater effect on the many than Milton's treatise on the same subject : on the other hand, Milton's is throughout unmixed truth ; and the man who in reading the two does not feel the contrast between the single-mindedness of the one, and the *strabismus* in the other, is—in the road of preferment.

GENERAL DEDICATION OF THE POLEMICAL DISCOURSES.*

Vol. vii. p. ix.

And the breath of the people is like the voice of an exterminating angel, not so killing but so secret.

That is, in such wise. It would be well to note, after what time 'as' became the requisite correlative to 'so,' and even, as in this instance, the preferable substitute. We should have written 'as' in both places probably, but at all events in the latter, transplacing the sentences 'as secret though not so killing ;' or 'not so killing, but quite as secret.' It is not generally true that Taylor's punctuation is arbitrary, or his periods reducible to the post-Revolutionary standard of length by turning some of his colons or semicolons into full stops. There is a subtle, yet just and systematic logic followed in his pointing, as often as it is permitted by the higher principle, because the proper and primary purpose of our stops, and to which alone from their paucity they are adequate,—that I mean of enabling the reader to prepare and manage the proportions of his voice and breath. But for the true scheme of punctuation, ὡς ἐμοῖγε δοκεῖ, see the blank page over leaf which I will try to disblank into a prize of more worth than can be got at the E.O.'s and little goes of Lindley Murray.†

Ib. p. xv.

But the most complained that, in my ways to persuade a toleration, I

* The references are here given to Heber's edition, 1822.—*Ed.*

† The page however remains a blank. But a little essay on punctuation by the Author is in the Editor's possession, and will be published hereafter.—*Ed.*

helped some men too far, and that I armed the Anabaptists with swords instead of shields, with a power to offend us, besides the proper defensitives of their own. * * * But wise men understand the thing and are satisfied. But because all men are not of equal strength; I did not only in a discourse on purpose demonstrate the true doctrine in that question, but I have now in this edition of that book answered all their pretensions, &c.

No; in the might of his genius he called up a spirit which he has in vain endeavored to lay, or exorcise from the conviction.

Ib. p. xvii.

For episcopacy relies not upon the authority of Fathers and Councils, but upon Scripture, upon the institution of Christ, or the institution of the Apostles, upon a universal tradition, and a universal practice, not upon the words and opinions of the doctors: it hath as great a testimony as Scripture itself hath, &c.

We must make allowance for the intoxication of recent triumph and final victory over a triumphing and victorious enemy; or who but would start back at the aweless temerity of this assertion? Not to mention the evasion; for who ever denied the historical fact, or the Scriptural occurrence of the word expressing the fact, namely, *episcopi*, *episcopatus?* What was questioned by the opponents was, 1;—Who and what these *episcopi* were; whether essentially different from the presbyter, or a presbyter by kind in his own *ecclesia*, and a president or chairman by accident in a synod of presbyters: 2;—That whatever the *episcopi* of the Apostolic times were, yet were they prelates, lordly diocesans; were they such as the Bishops of the Church of England? Was there Scripture authority for Archbishops? 3;—That the establishment of Bishops by the Apostle Paul being granted (as who can deny it?)—yet was this done *jure Apostolico* for the universal Church in all places and ages; or only as expedient for that time and under those circumstances; by Paul not as an Apostle, but as the head and founder of those particular churches, and so entitled to determine their bye-laws?

DEDICATION OF THE SACRED ORDER AND OFFICES OF EPISCOPACY.

Ib. p. xxiii.

But the interest of the Bishops is conjunct with the prosperity of the King, besides the interest of their own security, by the obligation of secular advantages. For they who have their livelihood from the King, and are in expectance of their fortune from him, are more likely to pay a tribute of exacter duty, than others, whose fortunes are not in such immediate dependency on His Majesty.

The cat out of the bag! Consult the whole reigns of Charles I. and II. and the beginning of James II. Jeremy Taylor was at this time (blamelessly for himself and most honorably for his patrons) ambling on the high road of preferment; and to men so situated, however sagacious in other respects, it is not given to read the signs of the times. Little did Taylor foresee that to indiscreet avowals, like these, on the part of the court clergy, the exauctorations of the Bishops and the temporary overthrow of the Church itself would be in no small portion attributable. But the scanty measure and obscurity (if not rather, for so bright a luminary, the occultation) of his preferment after the Restoration is a problem, of which perhaps his virtues present the most probable solution.

Ib. p. xxv.

A second return that episcopacy makes to royalty, is that which is the duty of all Christians, the paying tributes and impositions.

This is true; and it was an evil hour for the Church,—and led to the loss of its Convocation, the greatest and, in an enlarged state-policy, the most impolitic affront ever offered by a government to its own established Church,—in which the clergy surrendered their right of taxing themselves.

Ib. p. xxvii.

I mean the conversion of the kingdom from Paganism by St. Augustine, Archbishop of Canterbury; and the Reformation begun and promoted by Bishops.

From Paganism in part; but in part from primitive Christianity to Popery. But neither this nor the following boast will bear narrow looking into, I suspect.

In fine.

Like all Taylor's dedications and dedicatory epistles, this is easy, dignified, and pregnant. The happiest *synthesis* of the divine, the scholar, and the gentleman was perhaps exhibited in him and Bishop Berkeley.

OF THE SACRED ORDER AND OFFICES OF EPISCOPACY.

Introd. p. 3.

In all those accursed machinations, which the device and artifice of hell hath invented for the supplanting of the Church, *inimicus homo*, that old

superseminator of heresies and crude mischiefs, hath endeavored to be curiously compendious, and, with Tarquin's device, *putare summa papaverum. Quære—spiritualiter papaveratorum.*

Ib.

His next onset was by Julian, and *occidere presbyterium*, that was his province. To shut up public schools, to force Christians to ignorance, to impoverish and disgrace the clergy, to make them vile and dishonorable, these are his arts; and he did the devil more service in this fineness of undermining, than all the open battery of ten great rams of persecution.

What felicity, what vivacity of expression! Many years ago Mr. Mackintosh gave it as an instance of my perverted taste, that I had seriously contended that in order to form a style worthy of Englishmen, Milton and Taylor must be studied instead of Johnson, Gibbon, and Junius; and now I see by his introductory Lecture given at Lincoln's Inn, and just published, he is himself imitating Jeremy Taylor, or rather copying his semicolon punctuation, as closely as he can. Amusing it is to observe, how by the time the modern imitators are at the halfway of the long-breathed period, the asthmatic thoughts drop down, and the rest is,—words! I have always been an obstinate hoper: and even this is a *datum* and a symptom of hope to me, that a better, an ancestral spirit is forming and will appear in the rising generation.

Ib. p. 5.

First, because here is a concourse of times; for now after that these times have been called the last times for 1600 years together, our expectation of the great revelation is very near accomplishing.

Rather a whimsical consequence, that because a certain party had been deceiving themselves for sixteen centuries they were likely to be in the right at the beginning of the seventeenth. But indeed I question whether in all Taylor's voluminous writings there are to be found three other paragraphs so vague and mistymagnific as this is. It almost reminds me of the "very cloudy and mighty alarming" in Foote.

S. i. p. 5.

If there be such a thing as the power of the keys, by Christ concredited to his Church, for the binding and loosing delinquents and penitents respectively on earth, then there is clearly a court erected by Christ in his Church.

We may, without any heretical division of person, economically distinguish our Lord's character as Jesus, and as Christ, so far

that during his sojourn on earth, from his baptism at least to his crucifixion, he was in some respects his own Elias, bringing back the then existing Church to the point at which the Prophets had placed it; that is, distinguishing the *ethica* from the *politica*, what was binding on the Jews as descendants of Abraham and inheritors of the patriarchal faith from the statutes obligatory on them as members of the Jewish state. Jesus fulfilled the Law, which culminated in a pure religious morality in principles, affections, and acts; and this he consolidated and levelled into the ground-stead on which the new temple *not made with hands*, wherein Himself, even Christ the Lord, is the Shechinah, was to rise and be raised. Thus he taught the spirit of the Mosaic Law, while by his acts, sufferings, death, resurrection, ascension, and demission of the Comforter, he created and realized the contents, objects, and materials of that redemptive faith, the everlasting Gospel, which from the day of Pentecost his elect disciples, *τῶν μυστηρίων ἱεροκήρυκες*, were sent forth to disperse and promulgate with suitable gifts, powers, and evidences. In this view, I interpret our Lord's sayings concerning the Church, applying wholly to the Synagogue or established Church then existing, while the binding and loosing refers, immediately and primarily as I conceive, to the miraculous gifts of healing diseases communicated to the Apostles; and I am not afraid to avow the conviction, that the first three Gospels are not the books of the New Testament, in which we should expect to find the peculiar doctrines of the Christian faith explicitly delivered, or forming the predominant subject or contents of the writing.

S. viii. p. 25.

Imposition of hands for Ordination does indeed give the Holy Ghost, but not as he is that promise which is called *the promise of the truth.*

Alas! but in what sense that does not imply some infusion of power or light, something given and inwardly received, which would not have existed in and for the recipient without this immission by the means or act of the imposition of the hands? What sense that does not amount to more and other than a mere delegation of office, a mere legitimating acceptance and acknowledgment, with respect to the person, of that which already is in him, can be attached to the words, *Receive the Holy Ghost*, without shocking a pious and single-minded candidate? The miraculous nature of the giving does not depend on the particular

kind or quality of the gift received, much less demand that it should be confined to the power of working miracles.

For "miraculous nature" read "supernatural character;" and I can subscribe this pencil note written so many years ago, even at this present time, 2d March, 1824.

S. xxi. p. 91.

Postquam unusquisque eos quos baptizabat suos putabat esse, non Christi, et diceretur in populis, Ego sum Pauli, Ego Apollo, Ego autem Cephæ, in toto orbe decretum est ut unus de presbyteris electus superponeretur cæteris, ut schismatum semina tollerentur.

The natural inference would, methinks, be the contrary. There would be more persons inclined and more likely to attach an ambition to their belonging to a single eminent leader and head than to a body,—rather to Cæsar, Marius, or Pompey, than to the Senate. But I have ever thought that the best, safest, and at the same time sufficient argument is, that by the nature of human affairs, and the appointments of God's ordinary providence every assembly of functionaries will and must have a president; that the same qualities which recommended the individual to this dignity, would naturally recommend him to the chief executive power during the intervals of legislation, and at all times in all points already ruled; that the most solemn acts, Confirmation and Ordination, would as naturally be confined to the head of the executive in the state ecclesiastic, as the sign-manual and the like to the king in all limited monarchies; and that in course of time when many presbyteries would exist in the same district, Archbishops and Patriarchs would arise *pari ratione* as Bishops did in the first instance. Now it is admitted that God's extraordinary appointments never repeal but rather perfect the laws of his ordinary providence: and it is enough that all we find in the New Testament tends to confirm and nowhere forbids, contradicts, or invalidates the course of government, which the Church, we are certain, did in fact pursue.

Ib. s. xxxvi. p. 171.

But those things which Christianity, as it prescinds from the interest of the republic, hath introduced, all them, and all the causes emergent from them, the Bishop is judge of * * * * Receiving and disposing the patrimony of the Church, and whatsoever is of the same consideration according to the forty-first canon of the Apostles. *Præcipimus ut in potestate sua episcopus ecclesiæ res habeat.* Let the Bishops have the disposing of the goods of the Church; adding this reason: *si enim animæ hominum pre-*

tiosæ illi sint creditæ, multo magis eum oportet curam pecuniarum gerere. He that is intrusted with our precious souls may much more be intrusted with the offertories of faithful people.

Let all these belong to the overseer of the Church: to whom else so properly? but what is the nature of the power by which he is to enforce his orders? By secular power? Then the Bishop's power is no derivative from Christ's royalty; for his kingdom is not of the world; but the moneys are Cæsar's; and the *cura pecuniarum* must be vested where the donors direct, the law of the land permitting.

Ib.

Such are the delinquencies of clergymen, who are both clergy and subjects too; *clerus Domini*, and *regis subditi:* and for their delinquencies, which are in *materia justitiæ*, the secular tribunal punishes, as being a violation of that right which the state must defend; but because done by a person who is a member of the sacred hierarchy, and hath also an obligation of special duty to his Bishop, therefore the Bishop also may punish him; and when the commonwealth hath inflicted a penalty, the Bishop also may impose a censure, fer every sin of a clergyman is two.

But why of a clergyman only? Is not every sheep of his flock a part of the Bishop's charge, and of course the possible object of his censure? The clergy, you say, take the oath of obedience. Aye! but this is the point in dispute.

Ib. p. 172.

So that ever since then episcopal jurisdiction hath a double part, an external and an internal: this is derived from Christ, that from the king, which because it is concurrent in all acts of jurisdiction, therefore it is that the king is supreme of the jurisdiction, namely, that part of it which is the external compulsory.

If Christ delegated no external compulsory power to the Bishops, how came it the duty of princes to God to do so? It has been so since—yes! since the first grand apostasy from Christ to Constantine.

Ib. s. xlviii. p. 248.

Bishops *ut sic* are not secular princes, must not seek for it; but some secular princes may be Bishops, as in Germany and in other places to this day they are. For it is as unlawful for a Bishop to have any land, as to have a country; and a single acre is no more due to the order than a province; but both these may be conjunct in the same person, though still, by virtue of Christ's precept, the functions and capacities must be distinguished.

True; but who with more indignant scorn attacked this very distinction when applied by the Presbyterians to the kingship,

when they professed to fight for the King against Charles? And yet they had on their side both the spirit of the English constitution and the language of the law. The King never dies; the King can do no wrong. Elsewhere, too, Taylor could ridicule the Romish prelate, who fought and slew men as a captain at the head of his vassals, and then in the character of a Bishop absolved his other homicidal self. However, whatever St. Peter might understand by Christ's words, St. Peter's three-crowned successors have been quite of Taylor's opinion that they are to be paraphrased thus:—"Simon Peter, as my Apostle, you are to make converts only by humility, voluntary poverty, and the words of truth and meekness; but if by your spiritual influence you can induce the Emperor Tiberius to make you Tetrarch of Galilee or Prefect of Judæa, then καταχυρίευε—you may lord it as loftily as you will, and deliver as Tetrarch or Prefect those stiff-necked miscreants to the flames for not having been converted by you as an Apostle."

Ib. p. 276.

I end with the golden rule of Vincentius Lirinensis:—*magnopere curandum est ut id teneamus, quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est.*

Alas! this golden rule comes full and round from the mouth; nor do I deny that it is pure gold: but like too many other golden rules, in order to make it cover the facts which the orthodox asserter of episcopacy at least, and the chaplain of Archbishop Laud and King Charles the Martyr must have held himself bound to bring under it, it must be made to display another property of the sovereign metal, its malleableness to wit; and must be beaten out so thin, that the weight of truth in the portion appertaining to each several article in the orthodox systems of theology will be so small, that it may better be called gilt than gold; and if worth having at all, it will be for its show, not for its substance. For instance, the *aranea theologica* may draw out the whole web of the Westminster Catechism from the simple creed of the beloved Disciple,—*whoever believeth with his heart, and professeth with his mouth, that Jesus is Lord and Christ*,—shall be saved. If implicit faith only be required, doubtless certain doctrines, from which all other articles of faith imposed by the Lutheran, Scotch, or English Churches, may be deduced, have been believed *ubique, semper, et ab omnibus*. But if explicit and conscious be-

lief be intended, I would rather that the Bishop than I should defend the golden rule against Semler.

APOLOGY FOR AUTHORIZED AND SET FORMS OF LITURGY.

Preface, s. vi. p. 286.

Not like women or children when they are affrighted with fire in their clothes. We shaked off the coal indeed, but not our garments, lest we should have exposed our Churches to that nakedness which the excellent men of our sister Churches complained to be among themselves.

O, what convenient things metaphors and similes are, so charmingly indeterminate! On the general reader the literal sense operates: he shivers in sympathy with the poor shiftless matron, the Church of Geneva. To the objector the answer is ready—it was speaking metaphorically, and only meant that she had no shift on the outside of her gown, that she made a shift without an over-all. Compare this sixth section with the manful, senseful, irrebuttable fourth section—a folio volume in a single paragraph! But Jeremy Taylor would have been too great for man, had he not occasionally fallen below himself.

Ib. s. x. p. 288.

And since all that cast off the Roman yoke thought they had title enough to be called Reformed, it was hard to have pleased all the private interests and peevishness of men that called themselves friends; and therefore that only in which the Church of Rome had prevaricated against the word of God, or innovated against Apostolical tradition, all that was pared away.

Aye! here is the *ovum*, as Sir Everard Home would say, the *proto*-parent of the whole race of controversies between Protestant and Protestant; and each had Gospel on their side. Whatever is not against the word of God is for it,—thought the founders of the Church of England. Whatever is not in the word of God is a word of man, a will-worship presumptuous and usurping,—thought the founders of the Church of Scotland and Geneva. The one proposed to themselves to be reformers of the Latin Church, that is, to bring it back to the form which it had during the first four centuries; the latter to be the renovators of the Christian religion as it was preached and instituted by the Apostles and immediate followers of Christ thereunto specially inspired. Where the premisses are so different, who can wonder at the difference in the conclusions?

Ib. s. xii. ib.

It began early to discover its inconvenience; for when certain zealous persons fled to Frankfort to avoid the funeral piles kindled by the Roman Bishops in Queen Mary's time, as if they had not enemies enough abroad, they fell foul with one another, and the quarrel was about the Common Prayer Book.

But who began the quarrel? Knox and his recent biographer lay it to Dr. Cox and the Liturgists.

Ib. s. xiii. p. 289.

Here therefore it became law, was established by an act of Parliament, was made solemn by an appendant penalty against all that on either hand did prevaricate a sanction of so long and so prudent consideration.

Truly evangelical way of solemnizing a party measure, and sapientizing Calvin's *tolerabiles ineptias* by making them *ineptias usque ad carcerem et verbera intolerantes!*

Ib. s. xiv. ib.

But the Common Prayer Book had the fate of St. Paul; for when it had scaped the storms of the Roman See, yet a viper sprung out of Queen Mary's fires, &c.

As Knox and his friends confined themselves to the inspired word, whether vipers or no, they were not adders at all events.

Ib. xxvi. p. 296.

For, if we deny to the people a liberty of reading the Scriptures, may they not complain, as Isaac did against the inhabitants of the land, that the Philistines had spoiled his well and the fountains of living water? If a free use to all of them and of all Scriptures were permitted, should not the Church herself have more cause to complain of the infinite licentiousness and looseness of interpretations, and of the commencement of ten thousand errors, which would certainly be consequent to such permission? Reason and religion will chide us in the first, reason and experience in the latter. * * * The Church with great wisdom hath first held this torch out; and though for great reasons intervening and hindering, it can not be reduced to practice, yet the Church hath shown her desire to avoid the evil that is on both hands, and she hath shown the way also, if it could have been insisted in.

If there were not, at the time this Preface, or this paragraph at least, was written or published, some design on foot or *sub lingua* of making advances to the continental catholicism for the purpose of conciliating the courts of Austria, France and Spain, in favor of the Cavalier and Royalist party at home and abroad, this must be considered as a useless and worse than useless avowal.

The Papacy at the height of its influence never asserted a higher or more anti-Protestant right than this of dividing the Scriptures into permitted and forbidden portions. If there be a functionary of divine institution, synodical or unipersonal, who with the name of the 'Church' has the right, under circumstances of its own determination, to forbid all but such and such parts of the Bible, it must possess potentially, and under other circumstances, a right of withdrawing the whole book from the unlearned, who yet can not be altogether unlearned; for the very prohibition supposes them able to do what, a few centuries before, the majority of the clergy themselves were not qualified to do, that is, read their Bible throughout. Surely it would have been politic in the writer to have left out this sentence, which his Puritan adversaries could not fail to translate into the Church showing her teeth though she dared not bite. I bitterly regret these passages; neither our incomparable Liturgy, nor this full, masterly, and unanswerable defence of it, requiring them.

Ib. s. xlv. p. 308.

So that the Church of England, in these manners of dispensing the power of the keys, does cut off all disputings and impertinent wranglings, whether the priest's power were judicial or declarative; for possibly it is both, and it is optative too, and something else yet; for it is an emanation from all the parts of his ministry, and he never absolves, but he preaches or prays, or administers a sacrament; for this power of remission is a transcendent, passing through all the parts of the priestly offices. For the keys of the kingdom of heaven are the promises and the threatenings of the Scripture, and the prayers of the Church, and the Word, and the Sacraments, and all these are to be dispensed by the priest, and these keys are committed to his ministry, and by the operation of them all he opens and shuts heaven's gates ministerially.

No more ingenious way of making nothing of a thing than by making it every thing. Omnify the disputed point into a transcendent, and you may defy the opponent to lay hold of it. He might as well attempt to grasp an *aura electrica*.

Apology, &c. s. ii. p. 320.

And it may be when I am a little more used to it, I shall not wonder at a synod, in which not one Bishop sits in the capacity of a Bishop, though I am most certain this is the first example in England since it was first christoned.

Is this quite fair? Is it not, at least logically considered and at the commencement of an argument, too like a *petitio princi-*

pii or *presumptio rei litigatæ?* The Westminster divines were confessedly not prelates, but many in that assembly were, in all other points, orthodox and affectionate members of the Establishment, who with Bedell, Lightfoot, and Usher, held them to be Bishops in the primitive sense of the term, and who yet had no wish to make any other change in the hierarchy than that of denominating the existing English prelates Archbishops. They thought that what at the bottom was little more than a question of names among Episcopalians, ought not to have occasioned such a dispute; but yet the evil having taken place, they held a change of names not too great a sacrifice, if thus the things themselves could be preserved, and Episcopacy maintained against the Independents and Presbyterians.

Ib. s. v. p. 321.

It is a thing of no present importance, but as a point of history, it is worth a question whether there were any divines in the Westminster Assembly who adopted by anticipation the notions of the Seekers, Quakers and others *ejusdem farinæ*. Baxter denies it. I understand the controversy to have been, whether the examinations at the admission to the ministry did or not supersede the necessity of any directive models besides those found in the sacred volumes:—if not necessary, whether there was any greater expedience in providing by authority forms of prayers for the minister than forms of sermons. Reading, whether of prayers or sermons, might be discouraged without encouraging unpremeditated praying and preaching. But the whole question as between the prelatists and the Assembly divines has like many others been best solved by the trial. A vast majority among the Dissenters themselves consider the antecedents to the sermon, with exception of their congregational hymns, as the defective part of their public service, and admit the superiority of our Liturgy.

P.S.—It seems to me, I confess, that the controversy could never have risen to the height it did, if all the parties had not thrown too far into the background the distinction in nature and object between the three equally necessary species of worship, that is, public, family, and private or solitary, devotion. Though the very far larger proportion of the blame falls on the anti-Liturgists, yet on the other hand, too many of our Church divines —among others that *exemplar* of a Churchman and a Christian,

the every way excellent George Herbert—were scared by the growing fanaticism of the Geneva malcontents into the neighborhood of the opposite extreme; and in their dread of enthusiasm, will-worship, insubordination, indecency, carried their preference of the established public forms of prayer almost to superstition by exclusively both using and requiring them even on their own sick-beds. This most assuredly was neither the intention nor the wish of the first compilers. However, if they erred in this, it was an error of filial love excused, and only not sanctioned, by the love of peace and unity, and their keen sense of *the beauty of holiness* displayed in their mother Church. I mention this the rather, because our Church, having in so incomparable a way provided for our public devotions, and Taylor having himself enriched us with such and so many models of private prayer and devotional exercise—(from which, by-the-by, it is most desirable that a well-arranged collection should be made; a selection is requisite rather from the opulence, than the inequality, of the store);—we have nothing to wish for but a collection of family and domestic prayers and thanksgivings equally (if that be not too bold a wish) appropriate to the special object, as the Common Prayer Book is for a Christian community, and the collection from Taylor for the Christian in his closet or at his bed-side. Here would our author himself again furnish abundant materials for the work. For surely, since the Apostolic age, never did the spirit of supplication move on the deeps of a human soul with a more genial life, or more profoundly impregnate the rich gifts of a happy nature, than in the person of Jeremy Taylor! To render the fruits available for all, we need only a combination of Christian experience with that finer sense of propriety which we may venture to call devotional taste in the individual choosing, or chosen, to select, arrange and methodize; and no less in the dignitaries appointed to revise and sanction the collections.

Perhaps another want is a scheme of Christian psalmody fit for all our congregations, and which should not exceed 150 or 200 psalms and hymns. Surely if the Church does not hesitate in the titles of the Psalms and of the chapters of the Prophets to give the Christian sense and application, there can be no consistent objection to the same in its spiritual songs. The effect on the morals, feelings, and information of the people at large is not to be calculated. It is this more than any other single cause that

has saved the peasantry of Protestant Germany from the contagion of infidelity.

Ib. s. xvii. p. 325.

Thus the Holy Ghost brought to their memory all things which Jesus spake and did, and, by that means, we come to know all that the Spirit knew to be necessary for us.

Alas! it is one of the sad effects or results of the enslaving Old Bailey fashion of defending, or, as we may well call it, apologizing for, Christianity,—introduced by Grotius and followed up by the modern *Alogi*, whose wordless, lifeless, spiritless scheme of belief it alone suits,—that we dare not ask, whether the passage here referred to must necessarily be understood as asserting miraculous remembrancing, distinctly sensible by the Apostles; whether the gift had any especial reference to the composition of the Gospels; whether the assumption is indispensable to a well-grounded and adequate confidence in the veracity of the narrators or the verity of the narration; if not, whether it does not unnecessarily entangle the faith of the acute and learned inquirer in difficulties, which do not affect the credibility of history in its common meaning—rather indeed confirm our reliance on its authority in all the points of agreement, that is, in every point which we are in the least concerned to know,—and expose the simple and unlearned Christian to objections best fitted to perplex, because easiest to be understood, and within the capacity of the shallowest infidel to bring forward and exaggerate; and lastly, whether the Scriptures must not be read in that faith which comes from higher sources than history, that is, if they are read to any good and Christian purpose. God forbid that I should become the advocate of mechanical infusions and possessions, superseding the reason and responsible will. The light *à priori*, in which, according to my conviction, the Scriptures must be read and tried, is no other than the earnest, *What shall I do to be saved?* with the inward consciousness,—the gleam or flash let into the inner man through the rent or cranny of the prison of sense, however produced by earthquake, or by decay,—as the ground and antecedent of the question; and with a predisposition towards, and an insight into, the *à priori* probability of the Christian dispensation as the necessary consequents. This is the holy spirit in us praying to the Spirit, without which *no man can say that Jesus is the Lord:* a text which of itself seems to me

sufficient to cover the whole scheme of modern Unitarianism with confusion, when compared with that other,—*I am the Lord (Jehovah): that is my name; and my glory will I not give to another*. But in the Unitarian's sense of 'Lord,' and on his scheme of evidence, it might with equal justice be affirmed, that no man can say that Tiberius was the Emperor but by the Holy Ghost.

Ib. s. xxix. p. 331.

And that this is for this reason called *a gift and grace*, or issue of the Spirit, is so evident and notorious, that the speaking of an ordinary revealed truth, is called in Scripture, *a speaking by the spirit*, 1 Cor. xii. 8. *No man can say that Jesus is the Lord but by the Holy Ghost.* For, though the world could not acknowledge Jesus for the Lord without a revelation, yet now that we are taught this truth by Scripture, and by the preaching of the Apostles, to which they were enabled by the Holy Ghost, we need no revelation or enthusiasm to confess this truth, which we are taught in our creeds and catechisms, &c.

I do not, nay I dare not, hesitate to denounce this assertion as false in fact and the paralysis of all effective Christianity. A greater violence offered to Scripture words is scarcely conceivable. St. Paul asserts that *no man can*. Nay, says Taylor, every man that knows his catechism can; but unless some six or seven individuals had said it by the Holy Ghost some seventeen or eighteen hundred years ago, no man could say so.

Ib. s. xxxii. p. 334.

And yet, because the Holy Ghost renewed their memory, improved their understanding, supplied to some their want of human learning, and so assisted them that they should not commit an error in fact or opinion, neither in the narrative nor dogmatical parts, therefore they wrote by the spirit.

And where is the proof?—and to what purpose, unless a distinct and plain diagnostic were given of the divinities and the humanities which Taylor himself expressly admits in the text of the Scriptures? And even then what would it avail unless the interpreters and translators, not to speak of the copyists in the first and second centuries, were likewise assisted by inspiration? As to the larger part of the Prophetic books, and the whole of the Apocalypse, we must receive them as inspired truths, or reject them as simple inventions or enthusiastic delusions. But in what other book of Scripture does the writer assign his own work to a miraculous dictation or infusion? Surely the contrary is implied in St. Luke's preface. Does the hypothesis rest on one possible construction of a single passage in St. Paul, 2 Tim. iii.

16? And that construction resting materially on a καὶ (θεόπνευστος, καὶ ὠφέλιμος) not found in the oldest MSS., when the context would rather lead us to understand the words as parallel with the other assertion of the Apostle, that all good works are given from God,—that is, *Every divinely inspired writing is profitable, &c.* Finally, will not the certainty of the competence and single-mindedness of the writers suffice; this too confirmed by the high probability, bordering on certainty, that God's especial grace worked in them; and that an especial providence watched over the preservation of writings, which we know, both are and have been of such pre-eminent importance to Christianity, and yet by natural means? But alas! any thing will be pretended, rather than admit the necessity of internal evidence, or than acknowledge, among the external proofs, the convictions and spiritual experiences of believers, though they should be common to all the faithful in all ages of the Church! But in all superstition there is a heart of unbelief, and, *vice versa*, where an individual's belief is but a superficial acquiescence, credulity is the natural result and accompaniment, if only he be not required to sink into the depths of his being, where the sensual man can no longer draw breath. It is not the profession of Socinian tenets, but the spirit of Socinianism in the Church itself that alarms me. This, this, is the dry rot in the beams and timbers of the Temple!

Ib. s. li. p. 348.

So that let the devotion be ever so great, set forms of prayer will be expressive enough of any desire, though importunate as extremity itself.

This, and much of the same import in this treatise, is far more than Taylor, mature in experience and softened by afflictions, would have written. Besides, it is in effect, though not in logic, a deserting of his own strong and unshaken ground of the means and ends of public worship.

Ib. s. s. lxix. lxx. pp. 359–60.

These two sections are too much in the vague mythical style of the Italian and Jesuit divines, and the argument gives to these a greater advantage against our Church than it gains over the Sectarians in its support. We well know who and how many the compilers of our Liturgy were under Edward VI., and know too well what the weather-cock Parliaments were, both

then and under Elizabeth, by which the compilation was made law. The argument therefore should be inverted ;—not that the Church (A. B., C. D., F. L., &c.) compiled it ; *ergo*, it is unobjectionable ; but (and truly we may say it) it is so unobjectionable, so far transcending all we were entitled to expect from a few men in that state of information and such difficulties, that we are justified in concluding that the compilers were under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. But the same order holds good even with regard to the Scriptures. We can not rightly affirm they were inspired, and therefore they must be believed ; but they are worthy of belief, because excellent in so universal a sense to ends commensurate with the whole moral, and therefore the whole actual, world, that as sure as there is a moral Governor of the world, they must have been in some sense or other, and that too an efficient sense, inspired. Those who deny this, must be prepared to assert, that if they had what appeared to them good historic evidence of a miracle, in the world of the senses, they would receive the hideous immoral doctrines of Mahomet or Brahma, and thus disobey the express commands both of the Old and New Testament. Though an angel should come from heaven and work all miracles, yet preach another doctrine, we are to hold him accursed. *Gal.* i. 8.

Ib. s. lxxv. p. 356.

When Christ was upon the Mount, he gave it for a pattern, &c.

I can not thoroughly agree with Taylor in all he says on this point. The Lord's Prayer is an encyclopedia of prayer, and of all moral and religious philosophy under the form of prayer. Besides this, that nothing shall be wanting to its perfection, it is itself singly the best and most divine of prayers. But had this been the main and primary purpose, it must have been thenceforward the only prayer permitted to Christians ; and surely some distinct references to it would have been found in the Apostolic writings.

Ib. s. lxxx. p. 358.

Now then I demand, whether the prayer of Manasses be so good a prayer as the Lord's prayer, ? Or is the prayer of Judith, or of Tobias, or of Judas Maccabeus, or of the son of Sirach, is any of these so good ? Certainly no man will say they are ; and the reason is, because we are not sure they are inspired by the Holy Spirit of God.

How inconsistent Taylor often is, the result of the system of economizing truth ! The true reason is the inverse. The prayers

of Judith and the rest are not worthy to be compared with the Lord's Prayer; therefore neither is the spirit in which they were conceived worthy to be compared with the spirit from which the Lord's Prayer proceeded: and therefore with all fulness of satisfaction we receive the latter, as indeed and in fact our Lord's dictation.

In all men and in all works of great genius the characteristic fault will be found in the characteristic excellence. Thus in Taylor, fulness, overflow, superfluity. His arguments are a procession of all the nobles and magnates of the land in their grandest, richest, and most splendid *paraphernalia:* but the total impression is weakened by the multitudes of lacqueys and ragged intruders running in and out between the ranks. As far as the Westminster divines were the antagonists to be answered—and with the exception of these, and those who like Baxter, Calamy, and Bishop Reynolds, contended for a reformation or correction only of the Church Liturgy, there were none worth answering,—the question was, not whether the use of one and the same set of prayers on all days in all churches was innocent, but whether the exclusive imposition of the same was comparatively expedient and conducive to edification? Let us not too severely arraign the judgment or the intentions of the good men who determined for the negative. If indeed we confined ourselves to the comparison between our Liturgy, and any and all of the proposed substitutes for it, we could not hesitate: but those good men, in addition to their prejudices, had to compare the lives, the conversation, and the religious affections and principles of the prelatic and anti-prelatic parties in general. And do not we ourselves now do the like? Are we not, and with abundant reason, thankful that Jacobinism is rendered comparatively feeble and its deadly venom neutralized, by the profligacy and open irreligion of the majority of its adherents? Add the recent cruelties of the Star Chamber under Laud—(I do not say the intolerance; for that which was common to both parties, must be construed as an error in both, rather than a crime in either);—and do not forget the one great inconvenience to which the prelatic divines were exposed from the very position which it was the peculiar honor of the Church of England to have taken and maintained, namely, the golden mean—(for in consequence of this their arguments as Churchmen would often have the appearance of contrasting with their grounds of controversy as Protestants),—and we shall find

enough to sanction our charity as brethren, without detracting a tittle from our loyalty as members of the established Church. As to this Apology, the victory doubtless remains with Taylor on the whole; but to have rendered it full and triumphant, it would have been necessary to do what perhaps could not at that time, and by Jeremy Taylor, have been done with prudence; namely, not only to disprove in part, but likewise in part to explain, the alleged difference of the spiritual fruits in the ministerial labors of the high and low party in the Church—(for remember that at this period both parties were in the Church, even as the Evangelical, Reformed and Pontifical parties before the establishment of a schism by the actually schismatical Council of Trent),—and thus to demonstrate that the differences to the disadvantage of the established Church, as far as they were real, were as little attributable to the Liturgy, as the wound in the heel of Achilles to the shield and breast-plate which his immortal mother had provided for him from the forge divine.

Ib. s. lxxxvi. p. 361.

That the Apostles did use the prayer their Lord taught them, I think needs not much be questioned.

Ad contra, see above. But that they did not till the siege of Jerusalem deviate unnecessarily from the established usage of the Synagogue is beyond rational doubt. We may therefore safely maintain that a set form was sanctioned by Apostolic practice; though the form was probably settled after the converts from Paganism began to be the majority of Christians.

Ib. s. lxxxvii. p. 361.

Now that they tied themselves to recitation of the very words of Christ's prayer *pro loco et tempore*, I am therefore easy to believe, because I find they were strict to a scruple in retaining the sacramental words which Christ spake when he instituted the blessed Sacrament.

Not a case in point. Besides it assumes the controverted sense of *οὕτως* as "in these words" *versus* "to this purport." Grotius and Lightfoot, however, have settled this dispute by proving that the Lord's Prayer is a selection of prayers from the Jewish ritual: and a most happy and valuable inference against novelties obtruded for novelty's sake does Grotius draw from this fact. When I consider the manner in which the Jews usually quoted or referred to particular passages of Scripture, it does not seem altogether improbable that the several articles of the *Oratio Domi-*

nica might have been the initial sentences of several prayers; but I have not the least doubt that by the loud utterance of the *My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me?* our blessed Redeemer referred to and recalled to John and Mary that most wonderful and prophetic twenty-second Psalm. And what a glorious light does not this throw on the whole scene of the crucifixion, and in what additional loveliness does it not present the godlike character of the crucified Son of Man! With the very facts before them, of which the former and larger portion of the Psalm referred to resembles a detailed history rather than a prophecy,—with what force, and with what lively consolation and infusion of steadfast hope and faith, when all human grounds of hope had sunk from under them, must not the obvious and inevitable inference have flashed on the convictions of the holy mother and the beloved disciple! "If all we now behold was pre-ordained and so distinctly predicted; if the one mournful half of the prophecy has been so entirely and minutely fulfilled, after so great a lapse of ages, dare we, can we, doubt for a moment that the glorious remainder will with equal fidelity be accomplished?" Thus to his very last moments did our Lord (setting as it beseemed the sun of righteousness to set) manifest with a wider and wider face of glory his self-oblivious love. In the act he was offering, he himself was a sacrifice of love for the whole creation; and yet the cup overflowed into particular streams; first, for his enemies, his persecutors, and murderers; then for his friends and humanly nearest relative; *Woman, behold thy son!* O what a transfer! Nor does the proposed interpretation preclude any inward and mysterious sense of the words *My God! my God!*—though I confess I have never yet met with a single plausible resolution of the words into any one of the mysteries of the Trinity, or the Incarnation, or the Passion. Nay, were there any necessity for supposing such an allusion, which there is not, the obvious interpretation would, I fear, too dangerously favor the heresy of those who divided and severed the divinity from the humanity; so that not the incarnate God, very God of very God, would have atoned for us on the cross, but the incarnating man; a heresy which either denies or reduces to an absurdity the whole doctrine of redemption, that is, Christianity itself, which rests on the two articles of faith; first, the necessity, and secondly, the reality of a Redeemer —both articles alike incompatible with redemption by a mere man.

Ib. s. lxxxviii. p. 362.

And I the rather make the inference from the preceding argument because of the cognation one hath with the other; for the Apostles did also in the consecration of the Eucharist use the Lord's Prayer; and that together with the words of institution was the only form of consecration, saith St. Gregory; and St. Jerome affirms, that the Apostles, by the command of their Lord, used this prayer in the benediction of the elements.

This section is an instance of impolitic management of a cause, into which Jeremy Taylor was so often seduced by the fertility of his intellect and the opulence of his erudition. An antagonist by exposing the improbability of the tradition (and most improbable it surely is), and the little credit due to Saint Gregory and Saint Jerome (not forgetting a Miltonic sneer at their saintship), might draw off the attention from the unanswerable parts of Taylor's reasoning and leave an impression of his having been confuted.

Ib. s. lxxxix. p. 362.

But besides this, when the Apostles had received great measures of the spirit, and by their gift of prayer composed more forms for the help and comfort of the Church, &c.

Who would not suppose, that the first two lines were an admitted point of history, instead of a bare conjecture in the form of a bold assertion? O, dearest man! so excellent a cause did not need such Bellarminisms.

Ib. p. 363.

And the Fathers of the Council of Antioch complain against Paulus Samosatenus, *quod Psalmos et cantus, qui ad Domini nostri Jesu Christi honorem decantari solent, tanquam recentiores, et a viris recentioris memoriæ editos, exploserit.*

This Sam-in-satin-hose, or Paul, the same-as-Satan-is, might, I think, have found his confutation in Pliny's Letter to Trajan. *Carmen Christo, quasi Deo, dicere secum invicem.*

Ib. s. xc. p. 364.

Which, together with the τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν προφήτων, the *lectionarium* of the Church, the books of the Apostles and Prophets spoken of by Justin Martyr, and said to be used in the Christian congregations, are the constituent parts of liturgy.

An ingenious but not tenable solution of Justin Martyr's ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων which were presumably a Gospel not the same, and yet so nearly the same, as our Matthew, that its history and character involve one of the hardest problems of

Christian antiquity. By-the-by, one cause of the small impression—(small in proportion to their vast superiority in knowledge and genius)—which Jeremy Taylor and his compeers made on the religious part of the community by their controversial writings during the life of Charles I. is to be found in their undue predilection for Patristic learning and authority. This originated in the wish to baffle the Papists at their own weapons; but it could not escape notice, that the latter, though regularly beaten, were yet not so beaten, but that they always kept the field: and when the same mode of warfare was employed against the Puritans, it was suspected as Papistical.

Ib. s. xci. pp. 364–5.

For the offices of prose we find but small mention of them in the very first time, save only in general terms, and that such there were, and that St. James, St. Mark, St. Peter, and others of the Apostles and Apostolical men, made Liturgies; and if these which we have at this day were not theirs, yet they make probation that these Apostles left others, or else they were impudent people that prefixed their names so early, and the Churches were very incurious to swallow such a bole, if no pretension could have been reasonably made for their justification.

A rash and dangerous argument. 1810.

A many-edged weapon, which might too readily be turned against the common faith by the common enemy. For if these Liturgies were rightly attributed to St. James, St. Mark, St. Peter, and others of the Apostles and Apostolical men, how could they have been superseded? How could the Church have excluded them from the Canon? But if falsely, and yet for a time and at so early an age generally believed to have been composed by St. James and the rest, it is to be feared that the difference will not stop at the point to which Paul of Samosata carried it;—a fearful consideration for a Christian of the Grotian and Paleyan school. It would not, however, shake my nerves, I confess. The Epistles of St. Paul, and the Gospel, Epistles, and Apocalypse of St. John, contain an evidence of their authenticity, which no uncertainty of ecclesiastic history, no proof of the frequency and success of forgery or ornamental titles (as the Wisdom of Solomon) mistaken for matter-of-fact, can wrest from me; and with these for my guides and sanctions, what one article of Christian faith could be taken from me, or even unsettled? It seems to me, as it did to Luther, incomparably more probable that the

eloquent treatise, entitled an Epistle to the Hebrews, was written by Apollos than by Paul; and what though it was written by neither? It is demonstrable that it was composed before the siege of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Temple; and scarcely less satisfactory is the internal evidence that it was composed by an Alexandrian. These two *data* are sufficient to establish the fact, that the Pauline doctrine at large was common to all Christians at that early period, and therefore the faith delivered by Christ. And this is all I want; nor this for my own assurance, but as arming me with irrefragable arguments against those psilanthropists who as falsely, as arrogantly, call themselves Unitarians, on the one hand; and against the infidel fiction, that Christianity owes its present shape to the genius and rabbinical *cabala* of Paul on the other: while at the same time it weakens the more important half of the objection to, or doubt concerning, the authenticity of St. Peter's Epistles. To this too I attach a high controversial value (for the beauty and excellence of the Epistles themselves are not affected by the question); and I receive them as authentic, for they have all the circumstantial evidence that I have any right to expect. But I feel how much more genial my conviction would become, should I discover, or have pointed out to me, any positive internal evidence equivalent to that which determines the date of the Epistle to the Hebrews, or even to that which leaves no doubt on my mind that the writer was an Alexandrian Jew. This, my dear Lamb, is one of the advantages which the previous evidence supplied by the reason and the conscience secures for us. We learn what in its nature *passes all understanding*, and what belongs to the understanding, and on which, therefore, the understanding may and ought to act freely and fearlessly: while those who will admit nothing above the understanding (φρόνημα σαρκὸς), which in its nature has no legitimate object but history and outward *phænomena*, stand in slavish dread like a child at its house of cards, lest a single card removed may endanger the whole foundationless edifice. 1819.

Ib. s. xcii. p. 365.

Now here dear Jeremy Taylor begins to be himself again; for with all his astonishing complexity, yet versatile agility, of powers, he was too good and of too catholic a spirit to be a good polemic. Hence he so continually is now breaking, now varying, the thread of the argument: and hence he is so again and again

forgetting that he is reasoning against an antagonist, and falls into conversation with him as a friend,—I might almost say, into the literary chit-chat and unwithholding frankness of a rich genius whose sands are seed-pearl. Of his controversies, those against Popery are the most powerful, because there he had subtleties and obscure reading to contend against; and his wit, acuteness, and omnifarious learning found stuff to work on. Those on Original Sin are the most eloquent. But in all alike it is the digressions, overgrowths, parenthetic *obiter et in transitu* sentences, and, above all, his anthropological reflections and experiences—(for example, the inimitable account of a religious dispute, from the first collision to the spark, and from the spark to the world in flames, in his Dissuasive from Popery),—these are the costly gems which glitter, loosely set, on the chain armor of his polemic Pegasus, that expands his wings chiefly to fly off from the field of battle, the stroke of whose hoof the very rock can not resist, but beneath the stroke of which the opening rock sends forth a Hippocrene. The work in which all his powers are confluent, in which deep, yet gentle, the full stream of his genius winds onward, and still forming peninsulas in its winding course —distinct parts that are only not each a perfect whole—or in less figurative style—(yet what language that does not partake of poetic eloquence can convey the characteristics of a poet and an orator?)—the work which I read with most admiration, but likewise with most apprehension and regret, is the Liberty of Prophesying. If indeed, like some Thessalian drug, or the strong herb of Anticyra,

> ——— that helps and harms,
> Which life and death have sealed with counter-charms—

it could be administered by special prescription, it might do good service as a narcotic for zealotry, or a solvent for bigotry.

The substance of the preceding tract may be comprised as follows:—During the period immediately following our Lord's Ascension, or the so-called Apostolic age, all the gifts of the Spirit, and of course the gift of prayer, as graces bestowed, not merely or principally for the benefit of the Apostles and their contemporaries, but likewise and eminently for the advantage

of all after-ages, and as means of establishing the foundations of Christianity, differed in kind, degree, mode, and object, from those ordinary graces promised to all true believers of all times; and possessed a character of extraordinary partaking of the nature of miracles, to which no believer under the present and regular dispensations of the Spirit can make pretence without folly and presumption.

2. Yet it is certain that even the first miraculous gifts and graces bestowed on the Apostles themselves supervened on, but did not supersede, their natural faculties and acquired knowledge, nor enable them to dispense with the ordinary means and instruments of cultivating the one, and applying the other, by study, reading, past experience, and whatever else Providence has appointed for all men as the conditions and efficients of moral and intellectual progression. The capabilities of deliberating, selecting, and aptly disposing of our thoughts and works are God's good gifts to man, which the superadded graces of the Spirit, vouchsafed to Christians, work on and with, call forth and perfect. Therefore deliberation, selection, and method become duties, inasmuch as they are the bases and recipients of the Spirit, even as the polished crystal is of the light. But if the Prophets and Apostles did not (as Taylor demonstrates that they did not) find in miraculous aids any such infusions of light as precluded or rendered superfluous the exertion of their natural faculties and personal attainments, then *à fortiori* not the possessors or legatees of the ordinary graces bequeathed by Christ to his Church as the usufructuary property of all its members; and he who wilfully lays aside all premeditation, selection, and ordonnance that he may enter unprepared on the highest and most awful function of the soul,—that of public prayer,—is guilty of no less indecency and irreverence than if, having to present a petition as the representative of a community before the throne, he purposely put off his seemly garments in order to enter into the presence of the monarch naked or in rags: and expects no less an absurdity than to become a passive *automaton*, in which the Holy Spirit is to play the ventriloquist.

3. If, then, each congregation is to receive a prepared form of prayer from its head or minister, why not rather from the collective wisdom of the Church represented in the assembled heads and spiritual Fathers?

4. This is admitted by implication by the Westminster Assembly. But they are not contented with the existing form, and therefore substitute for it a Directory as the fruits of their meditations and counsels. The whole question, then, is now reduced to the comparative merits and fitness of the Directory and the book of Common Prayer; and how complete the victory of the latter, how glaring the defects, how many the deficiencies, of the former, Jeremy Taylor evinces unanswerably. Such is the substance of this Tract. What the author proposed to prove he has satisfactorily proved. The faults of the work are:—1. The intermixture of weak and strong arguments, and the frequent interruption of the stream of his logic by doubtful, trifling, and impolitic interruptions; arguments resting in premisses denied by the antagonists, and yet taken for granted; in short, appendages that cumber, accessions that subtract, and confirmations that weaken:—2. That he commences with a proper division of the subject into two distinct branches, that is, extempore prayer as opposed to set forms, and, The Directory, as prescribing a form opposed to the existing Liturgy; but that in the sequel he blends and confuses and intermingles one with the other, and presses most and most frequently on the first point, which a vast majority of the party he is opposing had disowned and reprobated no less than himself, and which, though easiest to confute, scarcely required confutation.

DISCOURSE OF THE LIBERTY OF PROPHESYING, WITH ITS JUST LIMITS AND TEMPER.

Epistle Dedicatory, p. ccccciii.

And first I answer, that whatsoever is against the foundation of faith is out of the limits of my question, and does not pretend to compliance or toleration.

But as all truths hang together, what error is there which may not be proved to be against the foundation of faith? An inquisitor might make the same code of toleration, and in the next moment light the fagots around a man who had denied the infallibility of Pope and Council.

Ib. p. ccccxxix.

Indeed if by a heresy we mean that which is against an article of creed, and breaks part of the covenant made between God and man by the mediation of Jesus Christ, I grant it to be a very grievous crime, a calling God's veracity into question, &c.

How can he be said to question God's veracity, whose belief is that God never declared it,—who perhaps disbelieves it, because he thinks it opposite to God's honor? For example:—Original sin, in the literal sense of the article, was held by both Papists and Protestants (with the exception of the Socinians) as the fundamental article of Christianity; and yet our Jeremy Taylor himself attacked and reprobated it. Why? because he thought it dishonored God. Why may not another man believe the same of the Incarnation, and affirm that it is equal to a circle assuming the essence of a square, and yet remaining a circle? But so it is; we spoil our cause, because we dare not plead it *in toto;* and a half-truth serves for a proof of the opposite falsehood. Jeremy Taylor dared not carry his argument into all its consequences

LIBERTY OF PROPHESYING.

S. i. p. 443.

Of the nature of faith, and that its duty is completed in believing the articles of the Apostles' creed.

This section is for the most part as beautifully written as it was charitably conceived; yet how vain the attempt! Jeremy Taylor ought to have denied that Christian faith is at all intellectual primarily, but only probably; as, *cæteris paribus*, it is probable that a man with a pure heart will believe an intelligent Creator. But the faith resides in the predisposing purity of heart, that is, in the obedience of the will to the uncorrupted conscience. For take Taylor's instances; and I ask whether the words or the sense be meant? Surely the latter. Well then, I understand, and so did the dear Bishops, by these texts the doctrine of a Redeemer, who by his agonies of death actually altered the relations of the spirits of all men to their Maker, redeemed them from sin and death eternal, and brought life and immortality into the world. But the Socinian uses the same texts; and means only that a good and gifted teacher of pure morality died a martyr to his opinions, and by his resurrection proved the possibility of all men rising from the dead. He did nothing;—he only taught and afforded evidence. Can two more diverse opinions be conceived? God here; mere man there. Here a redeemer from guilt and corruption, and a satisfaction for offended holiness; there a mere declarer that God imputed no guilt wherever, with or without Christ, the person had repented of it. What could

Jeremy Taylor say for the necessity of his sense (which is mine) but what might be said for the necessity of the Nicene Creed? And then as to Rom. x. 9, how can the text mean any thing, unless we know what St. Paul implied in the words *the Lord Jesus*. From other parts of his writings we know that he meant by the word *Lord* his divinity or at least essential super-humanity. But the Socinian will not allow this; or, allowing it, denies St. Paul's authority in matters of speculative faith. As well then might I say, it is sufficient for you to believe and repeat the words *forte miles reddens;* and though one of you mean by it "Perhaps I may be balloted for the militia," and the other understands it to mean, that "Reading is forty miles from London," you are still co-symbolists and believers! While a third person may say, I believe, but do not comprehend, the words; that is, I believe that the person who first used them meant something that is true,—what I do not know; that is, I believe his veracity.

O! had this work been published when Charles I., Archbishop Laud, whose chaplain Taylor was, and the other Star Chamber inquisitors, were sentencing Prynne, Bastwick, Leighton, and others, to punishments that have left a brand-mark on the Church of England, the sophistry might have been forgiven for the sake of the motive, which would then have been unquestionable. Or if Jeremy Taylor had not in effect retracted after the Restoration;—if he had not, as soon as the Church had gained its power, most basely disclaimed and disavowed the principle of toleration, and apologized for the publication by declaring it to have been a *ruse de guerre*, currying pardon for his past liberalism by charging, and most probably slandering, himself with the guilt of falsehood, treachery, and hypocrisy, his character as a man would at least have been stainless. Alas, alas, most dearly do I love Jeremy Taylor; most religiously do I venerate his memory! But this is too foul a blotch of leprosy to be forgiven. He who pardons such an act in such a man partakes of its guilt.

Ib. s. vii. pp. 346–7.

In the pursuance of this great truth, the Apostles, or the holy men, their contemporaries and disciples, composed a creed to be a rule of faith to all Christians; as appears in Irenæus, Tertullian, St. Cyprian, St. Austin, Ruffinus, and divers others; which creed, unless it had contained all the entire object of faith, and the foundation of religion, &c.

Jeremy Taylor does not appear to have been a critical scholar. His reading had been oceanic; but he read rather to bring out the growths of his own fertile and teeming mind than to inform himself respecting the products of those of other men. Hence his reliance on the broad assertions of the Fathers; yet it is strange that he should have been ignorant that the Apostles' Creed was growing piecemeal for several centuries.

Ib. p. 447.

All catechumens in the Latin Church coming to baptism were interrogated concerning their faith, and gave satisfaction on the recitation of this Creed.

I very much doubt this, and rather believe that our present Apostles' Creed was no more than the first instruction of the catechumens prior to baptism; and (as I conclude from Eusebius) that at baptism they professed a more mysterious faith;—the one being the milk, the other the strong meat. Where is the proof that Tertullian was speaking of this creed? Eusebius speaks in as high terms of the *Symbolum Fidei*, and, defending himself against charges of heresy, says, "Did I not at my baptism, in the *Symbolum Fidei*, declare my belief in Christ as God and the co-eternal Word?" The true Creed it was impiety to write down; but such was never the case with the present or initiating Creed. Strange, too, that Jeremy Taylor, who has in this very work written so divinely of tradition, should assume as a certainty that this Creed was in a proper sense Apostolic. Is then the Creed of greater authority than the inspired Scriptures? And can words in the Creed be more express than those of St. Paul to the Colossians, speaking of Christ as the creative mind of his Father, before all worlds, *begotten before all things created?*

Ib. s. x. p. 449.

This paragraph is indeed a complexion, as Taylor might call it, of sophisms. Thus;—unbelief from want of information or capacity, though with the disposition of faith, is confounded with disbelief. The question is not, whether it may not be safe for a man to believe simply that Christ is his Saviour, but whether it be safe for a man to disbelieve the article in any sense which supposes an essential supra-humanity in Christ,—any sense that would not have been equally applicable to John, had God chosen to raise him instead of his cousin?

Ib. s. xi. p. 450.

Neither are we obliged to make these Articles more particular and minute than the Creed. For since the Apostles and indeed our blessed Lord himself, promised heaven to them who believed him to be the Christ that was to come into the world, and that he who believes in him should be partaker of the resurrection and life eternal, he will be as good as his word. Yet because this Article was very general, and a complexion rather than a single proposition, the Apostles and others our Fathers in Christ did make it more explicit: and though they have said no more than what lay entire and ready formed in the bosom of the great Article, yet they made their extracts to great purpose and absolute sufficiency; and therefore there needs no more deduction or remoter consequences from the first great Article than the Creed of the Apostles.

Most true; but still the question returns, what was meant by the phrase *the Christ?* Contraries can not both be true. *The Christ* could not be both mere man and incarnate God. One or the other must believe falsely on this great key-stone of all the intellectual faith in Christ. For so it is; alter it, and every thing alters; as is proved in Trinitarianism and Socinianism. No two religions can be more different;—I know of no two equally so.

Ib. s. xii. p. 451.

The Church hath power to intend our faith, but not to extend it; to make our belief more evident, but not more large and comprehensive.

This and the preceding pages are scarcely honest. For Jeremy Taylor begins with admitting that the Creed might have been composed by others. He has no proof of that most absurd fable of the twelve Apostles clubbing to make it; yet here all he says assumes its inspiration as a certain fact.

Ib. p. 454.

But for the present there is no insecurity in ending there where the Apostles ended, in building where they built, in resting where they left us, unless the same infallibility which they had had still continued, which I think I shall hereafter make evident it did not.

What a tangle of contradictions Taylor thrusts himself into by the attempt to support a true system, a full third of which he was afraid to mention, and another third was by the same fear induced to deny—at least to take for granted the contrary: for example, the absolute plenary inspiration and infallibility of the Apostles and Evangelists; and yet that their whole function, as far as the consciences of their followers were concerned, was to

repeat the two or three sentences, that *Jesus was Christ* (so says one of the Evangelists), the *Christ of God* (so says another), the *Christ the Son of the living God* (so says a third), that he rose from the dead, and for the remission of sins, to as many as believed or professed that he was the Christ or the Lord, and died and rose for the remission of sins. Surely no miraculous communication of God's infallibility was necessary for this. But if this infallibility was stamped on all they said and wrote, is it credible that any part should not be equally binding? I declare I can make nothing out of this section, but that it is necessary for men to believe the Apostles' Creed; but what they believe by it is of no consequence. For instance: what if I chose to understand by the word 'dead' a state of trance or suspended animation;—language furnishing plenty of analogies—dead in a swoon—dead drunk—and so on;—should I still be a Christian? 'Born of the Virgin Mary.' What if, as Priestley and others, I interpreted it as if we should say, 'the former Miss Vincent was his mother?' I need not say that I disagree with Taylor's premisses only because they are not broad enough, and with his aim and principal conclusion only because it does not go far enough. I would have the law grounded wholly in the present life, religion only on the life to come. Religion is debased by temporal motives, and law rendered the drudge of prejudice and passion by pretending to spiritual aims. But putting this aside, and judging of this work solely as a chain of reasoning, I seem to find one leading error in it; namely, that Taylor takes the condition of a first admission into the Church of Christ for the fulness of faith which was to be gradually there acquired. The simple acknowledgment, that they accepted Christ as their Lord and King was the first lisping of the infant believer at which the doors were opened, and he began the process of growth in the faith.

Ib. s. ii. p. 457.

The great heresy that troubled them was the doctrine of the necessity of keeping the law of Moses, the necessity of circumcision, against which doctrine they were therefore zealous, because it was a direct overthrow to the very end and excellency of Christ's coming.

The Jewish converts were still bound to the rite of circumcision, not indeed as under the Law, or by the covenant of works, but as the descendants of Abraham, and by that especial covenant which St. Paul rightly contends was a covenant of grace

and faith. But the heresy consisted wholly in the attempt to impose this obligation on the Gentile converts, in the infatuation of some of the Galatians, who, having no pretension to be descendants of Abraham, could, as the Apostle urges, only adopt the rite as binding themselves under the law of works, and thereby apostatizing from the covenant of faith by free grace. And this was the decision of the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem. *Acts* xv. Rhenferd, in his Treatise on the Ebionites and other pretended heretics in Palestine, so grossly and so ignorantly calumniated by Epiphanius, has written excellently well on this subject. Jeremy Taylor is mistaken throughout.

Ib. s. iv. p. 459.

And so it was in this great question of circumcision.

It is really wonderful that a man like Bishop Taylor could have read the New Testament, and have entertained a doubt as to the decided opinion of all the Apostles, that every born Jew was bound to be circumcised. Opinion? The very doubt never suggested itself. When something like this opinion was slanderously attributed to Paul, observe the almost ostentatious practical contradiction of the calumny which was adopted by him at the request and by the advice of the other Apostles. (*Acts* xxi. 21–26.) The rite of circumcision, I say, was binding on all the descendants of Abraham through Isaac for all time even to the end of the world; but the whole law of Moses was binding on the Jewish Christians till the heaven and the earth—that is, the Jewish priesthood and the state—had passed away in the destruction of the temple and city; and the Apostles observed every tittle of the Law.

Ib. s. vi. p. 460.

The heresy of the Nicolaitans.

Heresy is not a proper term for a plainly anti-Christian sect. Nicolaitans is the literal Greek translation of Balaamites; destroyers of the people. *Rev.* ii. 14, 15.

Ib. s. viii. p. 461.

For heresy is not an error of the understanding, but an error of the will.

Most excellent. To this Taylor should have adhered, and to its converse. Faith is not an accuracy of logic, but a rectitude of heart.

Ib. p. 462.

It was the heresy of the Gnostics, that it was no matter how men lived, so they did but believe aright.

I regard the extinction of all the writings of the Gnostics among the heaviest losses of Ecclesiastical literature. We have only the account of their inveterate enemies. Individual madmen there have been in all ages, but I do not believe that any sect of Gnostics ever held this opinion in the sense here supposed.

Ib.

And, indeed, if we remember that St. Paul reckons heresy amongst the works of the flesh, and ranks it with all manner of practical impieties, we shall easily perceive that if a man mingles not a vice with his opinion,—if he be innocent in his life, though deceived in his doctrine,—his error is his misery, not his crime; it makes him an argument of weakness and an object of pity, but not a person sealed up to ruin and reprobation.

O admirable! How could Taylor, after this, preach and publish his Sermon in defence of persecution, at least against toleration!

Ib. s. xxii. p. 479.

Ebion, Manes.

No such man as Ebion ever, as I can see, existed;* and Manes is rather a doubtful *ens*.

Ib. s. xxxi. p. 487.

But I shall observe this, that although the Nicene Fathers in that case, at that time, and in that conjuncture of circumstances, did well, &c.

What Bull and Waterland have urged in defence of the Nicene Fathers is (like every thing else from such men) most worthy of all attention. They contend that no other term but ὁμοούσια could secure the Christian faith against both the two contrary errors, Tritheism with subversion of the unity of the Godhead on the one hand, and creature-worship on the other. For, to use Waterland's mode of argument,† either Eusebius of Nicomedia with the four other dissenters at Nice were right or wrong in their assertion, that Christ could not be of the οὐσία of the self-originated First by derivation, as a son from a father:—if they were right, they either must have discovered some third distinct and intelligible form of origination in addition to *begotten* and *created*, or they had not and could not. Now the latter was no-

* See Euseb. Hist. iii. 27.—*Ed.*

† Vindication, &c. Quer. 13, 14, 15.—*Ed.*

toriously the fact. Therefore to deny the ὁμοουσία was implicitly to deny the generation of the second Person, and thus to assert his creation. But if he was a creature, he could not be adorable without idolatry. Nor did the chain of inevitable consequences stop here. His characteristic functions of Redeemer, Mediator, King, and final Judge, must all cease to be attributable to Christ; and the conclusion is, that between the Homoousian scheme and mere Psilanthropism there is no intelligible *medium*. If this, then, be not a fundamental article of faith, what can be?

To this reasoning I really can discern no fair reply within the sphere of conceptual logic, if it can be made evident that the term ὁμοούσιος is really capable of achieving the end here set forth. One objection to the term is, that it was not translatable into the language of the Western Church. Consubstantial is not the translation: *substantia* answers to ὑπόστασις, not to οὐσία; and hence, when ὑπόστασις was used by the Nicene Fathers in distinction from οὐσία, the Latin Church was obliged to render it by some other word, and thus introduced that most unhappy and improper term *persona*. Would you know my own inward judgment on this question, it is this: first, that this pregnant idea, the root and form of all ideas, is not within the sphere of conceptual logic,—that is, of the understanding,—and is therefore of necessity inexpressible; for no idea can be adequately represented in words;—secondly, that I agree with Bull and Waterland against Bishop Taylor, that there was need of a public and solemn decision on this point:—but, lastly, that I am more than doubtful respecting the fitness or expediency of the term ὁμοούσιος, and hold that the decision ought to have been negative. For at first all parties agreed in the positive point, namely, that Christ was the Son of God, and that the Son of God was truly God, "or very God of very God." All that was necessary to be added was, that the only-begotten Son of God was not created nor begotten in time. More than this might be possible, and subject of insight; but it was not determinable by words, and was therefore to be left among the rewards of the Spirit to the pure in heart in inward vision and silent contemplation.

Ib. s. xl. p. 495.

All that is necessary to give a full and satisfactory import to this excellent paragraph, and to secure it from all inconvenient consequences, is to understand the distinction between the objective

and general revelation, by which the whole Church is walled around and kept together (*principium totalitatis et cohæsionis*), and the subjective revelation, the light from the life (*John* i. 4), by which the individual believers, each according to the grace given, grow in faith. For the former, the Apostles' Creed, in its present form, is more than enough; for the latter, it might be truly said in the words of the fourth Gospel, that all the books which the world could contain would not suffice to set forth explicitly that mystery in which all treasures of knowledge are hidden, *reconduntur*.

From the Apostles' Creed, nevertheless, if regarded in the former point of view, several clauses must be struck out, not as false, but as not necessary. "I believe that Jesus of Nazareth, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, rose from the dead on the third day; and I receive him as the Christ, the Son of the living God, who died for the remission of the sins of as many as believe in the Father through him, in whom we have the promise of life everlasting." This is the sufficient creed. More than this belongs to the Catechism, and then to the study of the Scriptures.

Ib. s. vi. p. 506.

So did the ancient Papias understand Christ's millenary reign upon earth, and so depressed the hopes of Christianity and their desires to the longing and expectation of temporal pleasures and satisfactions. And he was followed by Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, Lactantius, and indeed, the whole Church generally, till St. Austin and St. Jerome's time, who, first of any whose works are extant, did reprove the error.

Bishop Taylor is, I think, mistaken in two points; first, that the Catholic Millenaries looked forward to carnal pleasures in the kingdom of Christ;—for even the Jewish Rabbis of any note represented the *Millennium* as the preparative and transitional state to perfect spiritualization:—second, that the doctrine of Christ's reign upon earth rested wholly or principally on the twentieth chapter of the Revelations, which actually, in my judgment, opposes it.

I more than suspect that Austin's and Jerome's strongest ground for rejecting the second coming of our Lord in his kingly character, was, that they were tired of waiting for it. How can we otherwise interpret the third and fourth clauses of the Lord's Prayer, or, perhaps, the ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ, *in hoc seculo* (x. 30), of St. Mark? If the first three Gospels, joined with the unbroken

faith and tradition of the Church for nearly three centuries, can decide the question, the Millenarians have the best of the argument.

Vol. viii. s. ix. p. 22.

One thing only I observe (and we shall find it true in most writings, whose authority is urged in questions of theology), that the authority of the tradition is not it which moves the assent, but the nature of the thing; and because such a canon is delivered, they do not therefore believe the sanction or proposition so delivered, but disbelieve the tradition if they do not like the matter, and so do not judge of the matter by the tradition, but of the tradition by the matter.

This just and acute remark is, in fact, no less applicable to Scripture in all doctrinal points, and if infidelity is not to overspread England as well as France, the same criterion (that is, the internal evidence) must be extended to all points, to the narratives no less than to the precept. The written words must be tried by the Word from the beginning, in which is life, and that life the light of men. Reduce it to the noetic pentad, or universal form of contemplation, except where all the terms are absolute, and consequently there is no *punctum indifferens,—in divinis tetras, in omnibus aliis pentas,* and the form stands thus.*

Ib. s. iii. p. 36.

So that it can not make it divine and necessary to be heartily believed. It may make it lawful, not make it true; that is, it may possibly, by such means, become a law, but not a truth.

This is a sophism which so evident a truth did not need. Apply the reasoning to an act of Parliament previously to the royal sanction. Will it hold good to say, if it was law after the sanction, it was law before? The assertion of the Papal theologians is, that the divine providence may possibly permit even the majority of a legally convened Council to err; but by force of a divine promise can not permit both a majority and the Pope to err on the same point. The flaw in this is, that the Romish divines rely on a conditional promise unconditionally. To Taylor's next argument the Romish respondent would say, that an exception, grounded on a specific evident necessity, does not invalidate the rule in the absence of any equally evident necessity.

Taylor's argument is a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. It is not the truth, but the sign or mark, by which the Church at large may

* See the form previously exhibited in this volume, p. 74.—*Ed.*

know that it is truth, which is here provided for; that is, not the truth simply, but the obligation of receiving it as such. Ten thousand may apprehend the latter, only ten of whom might be capable of determining the former.

Ib. 5.

So that now (that we may apply this) there are seven general Councils, which by the Church of Rome are condemned of error. * * * The council of Ariminum, consisting of six hundred Bishops.

It is the mark of a faction that it never hesitates to sacrifice a greater good common to them and to their opponents to a lesser advantage obtained over those opponents. Never was there a stranger instance of imprudence, at least, than the act of the Athanasian party in condemning so roundly the great Council of Ariminum as heretical, and for little more than the charitable wish of the many hundred Bishops there assembled to avoid a word that had set all Christendom by the ears. They declared that ὁ ἀγέννητος πατὴρ, καὶ ὁ ἀχρόνως γεννητὸς υἱὸς, καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκπορευόμενον were substantially (ὑποστατικῶς) distinct, but nevertheless, one God; and though there might be some incautious phrases used by them, the good Bishops declared that if their decree was indeed Arian, or introduced aught to the derogation of the Son's absolute divinity, it was against their knowledge and intention, and that they renounced it.

Ib. s. x. p. 46.

Gratian says, that the Council means by a concubine a wife married *sine dote et solennitate;* but this is daubing with untempered mortar.

Here I think Taylor wrong and Gratian right; for not a hundred years ago the very same decree was passed by the Lutheran clergy in Prussia, determining that left-hand marriages were to be discouraged, but did not exclude from communion. These marriages were invented for the sake of poor nobles: they could have but that one wife, and the children followed the rank and title of the mother, not of the father.

Ib. s. vii. p. 56.

Thirdly; for *pasce oves*, there is little in that allegation besides the boldness of the objectors.

I have ever thought that the derivation of the Papal monarchy from the thrice-repeated command, *pasce oves*, the most brazen of all the Pope's bulls. It was because Peter had given too good

proof that he was more disposed to draw the sword for Christ than to perform the humble duties of a shepherd, that our Lord here strongly, though tenderly, reminds him of his besetting temptation. The words are most manifestly a reproof and a warning, not a commission. In like manner the very letter of the famous paronomastic text proves that Peter's confession, not Peter himself, was the rock. His name was, perhaps, not so much stone as stoner; not so much rock as rockman; and Jesus hearing this unexpected confession of his mysterious Sonship (for this is one of the very few cases in which the internal evidence decides for the superior fidelity of the first Gospel), and recognizing in it an immediate revelation from heaven, exclaims, "Well, art thou the man of the rock; *and upon this rock will I build my church*," not on this man. Add too, that the law revealed to Moses and the confession of the divine attributes, are named the rock, both in the Pentateuch and in the Psalms.

Mark has simply, *Thou art the Christ;* Luke, *The Christ of God;** but that Jesus was the Messiah had long been known by the Apostles, at all events conjectured. Had not John so declared him at the baptism? Besides, it was included among the opinions concerning our Lord which led to this question, the aim of which was not simply as to the Messiahship, but that the Messiah, instead of a mere descendant of David, destined to re-establish and possess David's throne, was the Jehovah himself, *the Son of the living God; God manifested in the flesh.* 1 *Tim.* iii. 16.

Ib. s. viii. p. 62.

And yet again, another degree of uncertainty is, to whom the Bishops of Rome do succeed. For St. Paul was as much Bishop of Rome as St. Peter was; there he presided, there he preached, and he it was that was the doctor of the uncircumcision and of the Gentiles, St. Peter of the circumcision and of the Jews only; and therefore the converted Jews at Rome might with better reason claim the privilege of St. Peter, than the Romans and the Churches in her communion, who do not derive from Jewish parents.

I wonder that Taylor should have introduced so very strong an argument merely *obiter*. If St. Peter ever was at Rome, it must have been for the Jewish converts or *convertendi* exclusively, and on what do the earliest Fathers rest the fact of Peter's being at Rome? Do they appeal to any document? No; but to their own arbitrary and most improbable interpretation of the word

* *Mark* viii. 29. *Luke* ix. 20.—*Ed.*

Babylon in St. Peter's first epistle.* I am too deeply impressed with the general difficulty arising out of the strange eclipse of all historic documents, of all particular events, from the arrival of St. Paul at Rome as related by St. Luke, and the time when Justin Martyr begins to shed a scanty light, to press any particular instance of it. Yet, if Peter really did arrive at Rome, and was among those destroyed by Nero, it is strange that the Bishop and Church of Rome should have preserved no record of the particulars.

Ib. s. xv. p. 71.

But what shall we think of that decretal of Gregory the Third, who wrote to Bonifacе his legate in Germany, *quod illi, quorum uxores infirmitate aliqua morbida debitum reddere noluerunt, aliis poterant nubere.*

Supposing the *noluerunt* to mean *nequeunt*, or at least any state of mind and feeling that does not exclude moral attachment, I, as a Protestant, abominate this decree of Gregory III.; for I place the moral, social, and spiritual helps and comforts as the proper and essential ends of Christian marriage, and regard the begetting of children as a contingent consequence. But on the contrary tenet of the Romish Church, I do not see how Gregory could consistently decree otherwise.

Ib. s. iii. p. 82.

Nor that Origen taught the pains of hell not to have an eternal duration.

And yet there can be no doubt that Taylor himself held with Origen on this point. But *non licebat dogmatizare oppositum, quia determinatum fuerat.*

Ib. p. 84.

And except it be in the Apostles' Creed and articles of such nature, there is nothing which may with any color be called a consent, much less tradition universal.

It may be well to remember, whenever Taylor speaks of the Apostles' Creed, that Pearson's work on that Creed was not then published. Nothing is more suspicious than copies of creeds in the early Fathers; it was so notoriously the custom of the transcribers to make them square with those in use in their own time.

Ib. s. iv.

Such as makes no invasion upon their great reputation, which I desire should be preserved as sacred as it ought.

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* 1 *Pet.* v. 13.—*Ed.*

The vision of the mitre dawned on Taylor; and his recollection of Laud came to the assistance of the Fathers; of many of whom in his heart Taylor, I think, entertained a very mean opinion. How could such a man do otherwise? I could forgive them their nonsense and even their economical falsehoods; but their insatiable appetite for making heresies, and thus occasioning the neglect or destruction of so many valuable works, Origen's for instance, this I can not forgive or forget.

Ib. s. i. p. 88.

Of the incompetency of the Church, in its diffusive capacity, to be judge of controversies; and the impertinency of that pretence of the Spirit.

Now here begin my serious differences with Jeremy Taylor, which may be characterized in one sentence; ideas *versus* conceptions and images. I contend that the Church in the Christian sense, is an idea;—not therefore a chimera, or a fancy, but a real being and a most powerful reality. Suppose the present state of science in this country, with this only difference that the Royal and other scientific societies were not founded: might I not speak of a scientific public, and its influence on the community at large? Or should I be talking of a chimera, a shadow, or a non-entity? Or when we speak with honest pride of the public spirit of this country, as the power which supported the nation through the gigantic conflict with France, do we speak of nothing, because we can not say,—"It is in this place or in that catalogue of names?" At the same time I most readily admit that no rule can be grounded formally on the supposed assent of this ideal Church, the members of which are recorded only in the book of life at any one moment. In Taylor's use and application of the term Church, the visible Christendom, and in reply to the Romish divines, his arguments are irrefragable.

Ib. s. ii. p. 93.

So that if they read, study, pray, search records, and use all the means of art and industry in the pursuit of truth, it is not with a resolution to follow that which shall seem truth to them, but to confirm what before they did believe.

Alas, if Protestant and Papist were named by individuals answering or not answering to this description, what a vast accession would not the Pope's muster-roll receive! In the instance of the Council of Trent, the iniquity of the Emperor and the Kings of France and Spain consisted in their knowledge that the

assembly at Trent had no pretence to be a general Council, that is, a body representative of the Catholic or even of the Latin Church. It may be, and in fact it is, very questionable whether any Council, however large and fairly chosen, is not an absurdity except under the universal faith that the Holy Ghost miraculously dictates all the decrees: and this is irrational, where the same superseding Spirit does not afford evidence of its presence by producing unanimity. I know nothing, if I may so say, more ludicrous than the supposition of the Holy Ghost contenting himself with a majority, in questions respecting faith, or decrees binding men to inward belief, which again binds a Christian to outward profession. Matters of discipline and ceremony, having peace and temporal order for their objects, are proper enough for a Council; but these do not need any miraculous interference. Still if any Council is admitted in matters of doctrine, those who have appealed to it must abide by the determination of the majority, however they might prefer the opinion of the minority, just as in acts of Parliament.

Ib. s. xi. p. 98.

Of some causes of error in the exercise of reason, which are inculpate in themselves.

It is a lamentable misuse of the term, reason,—thus to call by that name the mere faculty of guessing and babbling. The making reason a faculty, instead of a light, and using the term as a mere synonyme of the understanding, and the consequent ignorance of the true nature of ideas, and that none but ideas are objects of faith—are the grounds of all Jeremy Taylor's important errors.

Ib.

But men may understand what they please, especially when they are to expound oracles.

If this sentence had occurred in Hume or Voltaire!

Ib. s. iii. p. 103.

And then if ever truth be afflicted, she shall also be destroyed.

Here and in many other passages of his other works Jeremy Taylor very unfairly states this argument of the anti-prelatic party. It was not that the Church of England was afflicted (the Puritans themselves had been much more afflicted by the prelates); but that having appealed to the decision of the sword,

the cause was determined against it. But in fact it is false that the Puritans ever did argue as Taylor represents them. Laud and his confederates had begun by incarcerating, scourging, and inhumanly mutilating their fellow Christians for not acceding to their fancies, and proceeded to goad and drive the King to levy or at least maintain war against his Parliament: and the Parliamentary party very naturally cited their defeat and the overthrow of the prelacy as a judgment on their blood-thirstiness, not as a proof of their error in questions of theology.

Ib. s. iv. p. 105.

All that I shall say, &c. *ad finem.*

An admirable paragraph. Taylor is never more himself, never appears greater, or wiser, than when he enters on this topic, namely, the many and various causes beside truth which occasion men to hold an opinion for truth

Ib. s. vii. p. 111.

Of such men as these it was said by St. Austin: *Cæteram turbam non intelligendi vivacitas, sed credendi simplicitas tutissimam facit.*

Such charity is indeed notable policy: salvation made easy for the benefit of obedient dupes.

Ib. s. ii. p. 119.

I deny not but certain and known idolatry, or any other sort of practical impiety, with its principiant doctrine, may be punished corporally, because it is no other but matter of fact.

In the Jewish theocracy, I admit; because the fact of idolatry was a crime, namely, *crimen læsæ majestatis*, an overt act subversive of the fundamental law of the state, and breaking asunder the *vinculum et copulam unitatis et cohæsionis.* But in making the position general, Taylor commits the *sophisma omissi essentialis;* he omits the essential of the predicate, namely, criminal;—not its being a fact rendering it punishable, but its being a criminal fact.

Ib. s. iii.

Oh that this great and good man, who saw and has expressed so large a portion of the truth,—(if by the Creed I might understand the true Apostles', that is, the Baptismal Creed, free from the additions of the first five centuries, I might indeed say the whole truth), had but brought it back to the great original end and purpose of historical Christianity, and of the Church visible, as its

exponent, not as a *hortus siccus* of past revelations,—but an ever enlarging inclosed *area* of the opportunity of individual conversion to, and reception of, the spirit of truth! Then, instead of using this one truth to inspire a despair of all truth, a reckless skepticism within, and a boundless compliance without, he would have directed the believer to seek for light where there was a certainty of finding it, as far as it was profitable for him, that is, as far as it actually was light for him. The visible Church would be a walled Academy, a pleasure garden in which the intrants having presented their *symbolum portæ*, or admission-contract, walk at large, each seeking private audience of the invisible teacher, —alone now, now in groups,—meditating or conversing,—gladly listening to some elder disciple, through whom (as ascertained by his intelligibility to me) I feel that the common Master is speaking to me,—or lovingly communing with a class-fellow, who, I have discovered, has received the same lesson from the inward teaching with myself,—while the only public concerns in which all, as a common weal, exercised control and vigilance over each, are order, peace, mutual courtesy and reverence, kindness, charity, love, and the fealty and devotion of all and each to the common Master and Benefactor!

Ib. s. viii. p. 124.

It is characteristic of the man and the age, Taylor's high-strained reverential epithets to the names of the Fathers, and as rare and naked mention of Luther, Melancthon, Calvin—the least of whom was not inferior to St. Augustin, and worth a brigade of the Cyprians, Firmilians, and the like. And observe, always *Saint* Cyprian!

Ib. s. xii. pp. 128–9.

Gibbon's enumeration of the causes, not miraculous, of the spread of Christianity during the first three centuries is far from complete. This, however, is not the greatest defect of this celebrated chapter. The proportions of importance are not truly assigned; nay, the most effective causes are only not omitted—mentioned, indeed, but *quasi in transitu*, not developed or distinctly brought out: for example, the zealous despotism of the Cæsars, with the consequent exclusion of men of all ranks from the great interests of the public weal, otherwise than as servile instruments; in short, the direct contrary of that state and character of men's minds, feelings, hopes and fancies, which elections,

Parliaments, Parliamentary reports, and newspapers produce in England ; and this extinction of patriotism aided by the melting down of states and nations in the one vast yet heterogeneous Empire ;—the number and variety of the parts acting only to make each insignificant in its own eyes, and yet sufficient to preclude all living interest in the peculiar institutions and religious forms of Rome ; which beginning in a petty district, had no less than the Greek Republics, its mythology and *θρησκεία* intimately connected with localities and local events. The mere habit of staring or laughing at nine religions must necessarily end in laughing at the tenth, that is, the religion of a man's own birthplace. The first of these causes, that is, the detachment of all love and hope from the things of the visible world, and from temporal objects not merely selfish, must have produced in thousands a tendency to, and a craving after, an internal religion, while the latter occasioned an absolute necessity of a mundane as opposed to a national or local religion. I am far from denying or doubting the influence of the excellence of the Christian faith in the propagation of the Christian Church or the power of its evidences ; but still I am persuaded that the necessity of some religion, and the untenable nature and obsolete superannuated character of all the others, occasioned the conversion of the largest though not the worthiest part of the new-made Christians. Here, though exploded in physics, we have recourse to the *horror vacui* as an efficient cause. This view of the subject can offend or startle those only who, in their passion for wonderment, virtually exclude the agency of Providence from any share in the realizing of its own benignant scheme ; as if the disposition of events by which the whole world of human history, from north and south, east and west, directed their march to one central point, the establishment of Christendom, were not the most stupendous of miracles ! It is a yet sadder consideration, that the same men who can find God's presence and agency only in sensuous miracles, wholly misconceive the characteristic purpose and proper objects of historic Christianity and of the outward and visible Church of which historic Christianity is the ground and the indispensable condition ; but this is a subject delicate and dangerous, at all events requiring a less scanty space than the margins of these honestly printed pages.

Ib. s. iv. p. 133.

The death of Ananias and Sapphira, and the blindness of Elymas the sorcerer, amount not to this, for they were miraculous inflictions.

One great difficulty respecting, not the historic truth (of which there can be no rational doubt), but the miraculous nature, of the sudden deaths of Ananias and Sapphira is derived from the measure which gave occasion to it, namely, the sale of their property by the new converts of Palestine, in order to establish that community of goods, which, according to a Rabbinical tradition, existed before the Deluge, and was to be restored by the children of Seth (one of the names which the Jewish Christians assumed) before the coming of the Son of Man. Now this was a very gross and carnal, not to say fanatical, misunderstanding of our Lord's words, and had the effect of reducing the Churches of the Circumcision to beggary, and of making them an unnecessary burthen on the new Churches in Greece and elsewhere. See Rhenferd as to this.

The fact of Elymas, however, concludes the miraculous nature of the deaths of Ananias and Sapphira, which, taken of themselves, would indeed have always been supposed, but could scarcely have been proved, the result of a miraculous or superhuman power. There are for me, I confess, great difficulties in this incident, especially when it is compared with our Lord's reply to the Apostles' proposal of calling down fire from heaven. *The Son of Man is not come to destroy*, &c. At all events it is a subject that demands and deserves deep consideration.

Ib. s. i. p. 141.

The religion of Jesus Christ is *the form of sound doctrine and wholesome words*, which is set down in Scripture indefinitely, actually conveyed to us by plain places, and separated as for the question of necessary or not necessary by the Symbol of the Apostles.

I can not refrain from again expressing my surprise at the frequency and the undoubting positiveness of this assertion in so great a scholar, so profound a Patrician, as Jeremy Taylor was. He appears *bona fide* to have believed the absurd fable of this Creed having been a picnic to which each of the twelve Apostles contributed his *symbolum*. Had Jeremy Taylor taken it for granted so completely and at so early an age, that he read without attending to the various passages in the Fathers and ecclesiastical historians, which show the gradual formation of this

Creed? It is certainly possible, and I see no other solution of the problem.

Ib. s. ix. p. 153.

Judge not, that ye be not judged. The dread of these words is, I fear, more influential on my spirit than either the duty of charity or my sense of Taylor's high merits, in enabling me to struggle against the strong inclination to pass the sentence of dishonesty on the reasoning in this paragraph. Had I met the passage in Richard Baxter or in Bishop Hall, it would have made no such unfavorable impression. But Taylor was so acute a logician, and had made himself so completely master of the subject, that it is hard to conceive him blind to sophistry so glaring. I am myself friendly to Infant Baptism, but for that reason feel more impatience of any unfairness in its defenders.

Ib. Ad. iii. and xiii. p. 178.

But then, that God is not as much before hand with Christian as with Jewish infants is a thing which can never be believed by them who understand that in the Gospel God opened all his treasures of mercies, and unsealed the fountain itself; whereas, before, he poured forth only rivulets of mercy and comfort.

This is mere sophistry; and I doubt whether Taylor himself believed it a sufficient reply to his own argument. There is no doubt that the primary purpose of Circumcision was to peculiarize the Jews by an indelible visible sign; and it was as necessary that Jewish infants should be known to be Jews as Jewish men. Then humanity and mere safety determined that the bloody rite should be performed in earliest infancy, as soon as the babe might be supposed to have gotten over the fever of his birth. This is clear; for women had no correspondent rite, but the same result was obtained by the various severe laws concerning their marriage with aliens and other actions.

Ib. p. 180.

And as those persons who could not be circumcised (I mean the females), yet were baptized, as is notorious in the Jews' books and story.

Yes, but by no command of God, but only their own fancies.

Ib. Ad. iv. p. 181.

Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, shall not enter therein: receive it as a little child receives it, that is, with innocence, and without any let or hindrance.

Is it not evident that Christ here converted negatives into posi-

tives? As a babe is without malice negatively, so you must be positively and by actuation, that is, full of love and meekness; as the babe is unresisting, so must you be docile, and so on.

Ib. Ad. v.

And yet, notwithstanding this terrible paragraph, Taylor believed that infants were not a whit the worse off for not being baptized. Strange contradiction! They are born in sin, and Baptism is the only way of deliverance, and yet it is not. For the infant is *de se* of the kingdom of heaven. Christ blessed them, not in order to make them so, but because they already were so. So that this argument seems more than all others demonstrative for the anabaptist, and to prove that Baptism derives all its force if it be celestial magic, or all its meaning if it be only a sacrament and symbol, from the presumption of actual sin in the person baptized.

Ib. Ad. xv. p. 186.

And he that hath without difference commanded that all nations should be baptized, hath without difference commanded all sorts of persons.

Even so our Lord commanded all men to repent, did he therefore include babes of a month old?* Yes, when they became capable of repentance. And even so babes are included in the general command of Baptism, that is, as soon as they are baptizable. But Baptism supposed both repentance and a promise; babes are not capable of either, and therefore not of Baptism. For the physical element was surely only the sign and seal of a promise by a counter-promise and covenant. The rite of Circumcision is wholly inapplicable; for there a covenant was between Abraham and God, not between God and the infant. "Do so and so to all your male children, and I will favor them. Mark them before the world as a peculiar and separate race, and I will then consider them as my chosen people." But Baptism is personal, and the baptized a subject not an object; not a thing, but

* Lightfoot and Wall use this strong argument for the lawfulness and implied duty of Infant Baptism in the Christian Church. It was the universal practice of the Jews to baptize the infant children of proselytes as well as their parents. Instead, therefore, of Christ's silence as to infants by name in his commission to baptize all nations being an argument that he meant to exclude them, it is a sign that he meant to include them. For it was natural that the precedent custom should prevail, unless it were expressly forbidden. The force of this, however, is limited to the ceremony; —its character and efficacy are not established by it.—*Ed.*

a person; that is, having reason, or actually and not merely potentially. Besides, Jeremy Taylor was too sound a student of Erasmus and Grotius not to know the danger of screwing up St. Paul's accommodations of Jewish rites, meant doubtless as inducements of rhetoric and innocent compliances with innocent and invincible prejudices, into articles of faith. The conclusions are always true; but all the arguments are not and were never intended to be reducible into syllogisms demonstrative.

Ib. Ad. xviii. p. 191.

But let us hear the answer. First, it is said, that Baptism and the Spirit signify the same thing; for by water is meant the effect of the Spirit.

By the 'effect,' the Anabaptist clearly means the *causa causans*, the 'act of the Spirit.' As well might Taylor say that a thought is not thinking, because it is the effect of thinking. Had Taylor been right, the water to be an apt sign ought to have been dirty water; for that would be the *res effecta*. But it is pure water, therefore *res agens*.

Ib. p. 192.

For it is certain and evident, that regeneration or new birth is here enjoined to all as of absolute and indispensable necessity.

Yet Taylor himself has denied it over and over again in his tracts on Original Sin; and how is it in harmony with the words of Christ—*Of such are the kingdom of heaven?* Are we not regenerated back to a state of spiritual infancy? Yet for such Anti-pædobaptists as hold the dogma of original guilt it is doubtless a fair argument; but Taylor ought not to have used it as certain and evident in itself, and not merely *ad hominem et per accidens*. As making a bow is in England the understood conventional mark or visible language of reverence, so in the East was Baptism the understood outward and visible mark of conversion and initiation. So much for the visible act: then for the particular meaning affixed to it by Christ. This was μετάνοια, an adoption of a new principle of action and consequent reform of conduct; a cleansing, but especially a cleansing away of the carnal film from the mind's eye. Hence the primitive Church called baptism φῶς, light, and the Eucharist ζωή, life. Baptism, therefore, was properly the sign, the *precursor*, or rather the first act, the *initium*, of that regeneration of which the whole spiritual life of a Christian is the complete process; the Eucharist

indicating the means, namely, the continued assimilation of and to the Divine Humanity. Hence the Eucharist was called the continuation of the Incarnation.

Ib.

And yet it does not follow that they should all be baptized of the Holy Ghost and with fire. But it is meant only that that glorious effect should be to them a sign of Christ's eminency above him; they should see from him a Baptism greater than that of John.

This is exactly of a piece with that gloss of the Socinians in evasion of St. Paul's words concerning Christ's emptying himself of the form of God, and becoming a servant, which all the world of Christians had interpreted of the Incarnation. But no! it only referred to the miracle of his transfiguration!

——— *credat Judæus Apella!*
Non ego.

St. John could not mean this, unless he denied the distinct personality of the Holy Ghost. For it was the Holy Ghost that then descended as the substitute of Christ; nor does St. Luke even hint that it was understood to be a Baptism, even if we suppose the *tongues of fire* to be any thing visual, and not as we say, Victory sate on his helmet like an eagle. The spirit of eloquence descended into them like a tongue of fire, and that they spoke different languages is, I conceive, nowhere said; but only that being rustic Galileans, they yet spake a dialect intelligible to all the Jews from the most different provinces. For it is clear they were all Jews, and, as Jews, had doubtless a *lingua communis* which all understood when spoken, though persons of education only could speak it. Even so a German boor understands, but yet can not talk in, High German, that is, in the language of his Bible and Hymn-book. So it is with the Scotch of Aberdeen with regard to pure English. In short Taylor's arguments press on the Anabaptists, only as far as the Anabaptists baptize at all; they are in fact attacks on Baptism; and it would only follow from them that, the Baptist is more rational than the Pædobaptist, but that the Quaker is more consistent than either. To pull off your hat is in Europe a mark of respect. What, if a parent in his last will should command his children and posterity to pull off their hats to their superiors,—and in course of time these children or descendants emigrated to China, or some place, where the same ceremony either meant nothing, or an insult.

Should we not laugh at them if they did not interpret the words into, Pay reverence to your superiors. Even so Baptism was the Jewish custom, and natural to those countries; but with us it would be a more significant rite if applied as penance for excess of zeal and acts of bigotry, especially as sprinkling.

Ib. p. 196.

But farther yet I demand, can infants receive Christ in the Eucharist?

Surely the wafer and the tea-spoonful of wine might be swallowed by an infant, as well as water be sprinkled upon him. But if the former is not the Eucharist because without faith and repentance, so can not the latter, it would seem, be Baptism. For they are declared equal adjuncts of both Sacraments. The argument therefore is a mere *petitio principii sub lite.*

Ib. Ad. ix. p. 197.

The promise of the Holy Ghost is made to all, to us and to our children: and if the Holy Ghost belongs to them, then Baptism belongs to them also.

If this be not rank enthusiasm I know not what is. The Spirit is promised to them, first, as protection and providence, and as internal operation when those faculties are developed, in and by which the Spirit co-operates. Can Taylor show an instance in Scripture in which the Holy Spirit is said to operate simply, and without the co-operation of the subject?

Ib. Ad. xix. p. 199.

And when the boys in the street sang Hosanna to the Son of David, our blessed Lord said that if they had held their peace, the stones of the street would have cried out Hosanna.

By the same argument I could defend the sprinkling of mules and asses with holy water, as is done yearly at Rome on St. Antony's day, I believe. For they are capable of health and sickness, of restiveness and of good temper, and these are all emanations from their Creator. Besides in the great form of Baptism the words are not ἐν ὀνόματι, but εἰς τὸ ὄνομα, and many learned men have shown that they may mean 'into the power or influence' of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. But spiritual influences suppose capability in act of receiving them; and we must either pretend to believe that the soul of the babe, that is, his consciousness, is acted on without his consciousness, or that the instrumental cause is antecedent by years to its effect, which would be a conjunction disjunctive with a vengeance. Again,

Baptism is nothing except as followed by the Spirit; but it is irrational to say, that the Spirit acts on the mere potentialities of an infant. For wherein is the Spirit, as used in scripture in appropriation to Christians, different from God's universal providence and goodness, but that the latter like the sun may shine on the wicked and on the good, on the passive and on those who by exercise increase its effect; whereas the former always implies a co-operant subject, that is, a developed reason. When God gave his Spirit miraculously to the young child, Daniel, he at the same time miraculously hastened the development of his understanding.

Ib. Ad. xxviii. p. 205.

But we see that although Christ required faith of them who came to be healed, yet when any were brought, or came in behalf of others, he only required faith of them who came, and their faith did benefit to others. * *

But this instance is so certain a reproof of this objection of theirs, which is their principal, which is their all, that it is a wonder to me they should not all be convinced at the reading and observing of it.

So far from certainty, I find no strength at all in this reproof. Doubtless Christ at a believer's request might heal his child's or his servant's bodily sickness; for this was an act of power, requiring only an object. But is it anywhere said, that at a believer's request he gave the Spirit and the graces of faith to an unbeliever without any mental act, or moral co-operation of the latter? This would have been a proof indeed; but Taylor's instance is a mere *ad aliud*.

Ib. Ad. xxxi. p. 207.

And although there are some effects of the Holy Spirit which require natural capacities to be their foundation; yet those are the ἐνεργήματα or powers of working: but the χαρίσματα, and the inheritance and the title to the promises require nothing on our part, but that we can receive them.

The Bishop flutters about and about, but never fairly answers the question, What does Baptism do? The Baptist says it attests forgiveness of sins, as the reward of faith and repentance. This is intelligible; but as to the χαρίσματα—the children of believers, if so taught and educated, are surely entitled to the promises; and what analogy is there in this to any one act of power and gift of powers mentioned as χαρίσματα, when the word is really used in contra-distinction from ἐνεργήματα? Baptism is spoken of many times by St. Paul properly as well as metaphorically, and in the former sense it is never described as a χάρισμα on a

passive recipient, while in the latter sense it always respects an *ἐνέργημα* of the Spirit of God, and a *συνέργημα* in the spirit of the recipient. All that Taylor can make out is, that Baptism effects a potentiality in a potentiality, or a chalking of chalk to make white white.

Ib. p. 210.

And if it be questioned by wise men whether the want of it do not occasion their eternal loss, and it is not questioned whether Baptism does them any hurt or no, then certainly to baptize them is the surer way without all peradventure.

Now this is the strongest argument of all against Infant Baptism, and that which alone weighed at one time with me, namely, that it supposes and most certainly encourages a belief concerning a God, the most blasphemous and intolerable; and no human wit can express this more forcibly and affectingly than Taylor himself has done in his Letter to a Lady on Original Sin. It is too plain to be denied that the belief of the strict necessity of Infant Baptism, and the absolute universality of the practice did not commence till the dogma of original guilt had begun to despotize in the Church: while that remained uncertain and sporadic, Infant Baptism was so too; some did it, many did not. But as soon as Original Sin n the sense of actual guilt became the popular creed, then all did it.*

Ib. s. xvi. p. 224.

And although they have done violence to all philosophy and the reason of man, and undone and cancelled the principles of two or three sciences, to bring in this article; yet they have a divine revelation, whose literal and grammatical sense, if that sense were intended, would warrant them to do violence to all the sciences in the circle. And indeed that Transubstantiation is openly and violently against natural reason is no argument to make them disbelieve it, who believe the mystery of the Trinity in all those niceties of explication which are in the School (and which now-a-days pass for

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* The Author's views of Baptism are stated more fully and methodically in the Aids to Reflection; but even that statement is imperfect, and consequently open to objection, as was frequently admitted by Mr. C. himself. The Editor is unable to say what precise spiritual efficacy the Author ultimately ascribed to Infant Baptism; but he was certainly an advocate for the practice, and appeared as sponsor at the font for more than one of his friends' children. See his Letter to a Godchild, printed, for this purpose, at the end of this volume; his Sonnet on his Baptismal Birthday (Poet. Works, p. 326.) in the tenth line of which, in many copies, there was a misprint of 'heart' for 'front;' and the Table Talk, p. 410.—*Ed.*

the doctrine of the Church), with as much violence to the principles of natural and supernatural philosophy as can be imagined to be in the point of Transubstantiation.

This is one of the many passages in Taylor's works which lead me to think that his private opinions were favorable to Socinianism. Observe, to the views of Socinus, not to modern Unitarianism, as taught by Priestley and Belsham. And doubtless Socinianism would much more easily bear a doubt, whether the difference between it and the orthodox faith was not more in words than in the things meant, than the Arian hypothesis. A mere conceptualist, at least, might plausibly ask whether either party. the Athanasian or the Socinian, had a sufficiently distinct conception of what the one meant by the hypostatical union of the Divine Logos with the man Jesus; or the other of his plenary, total, perpetual, and continuous inspiration, to have any well-grounded assurance, that they do not mean the same thing.

Moreover, no one knew better than Jeremy Taylor that this apparent soar of the hooded falcon, faith, to the very empyrean of bibliolatry amounted in fact to a truism of which the following syllogism is a fair illustration. All stones are men: all men think: *ergo*, all stones think. The *major* is taken for granted, the *minor* no one denies; and then the conclusion is good logic, though a very foolish untruth. Or, if an oval were demonstrated by Euclid to be a circle, it would be a circle; and if it were a demonstrable circle, it would be a circle, though the straight lines drawable from the centre to the circumference are unequal. If we were quite certain that an omniscient Being, incapable of deceiving, or being deceived, had assured us that $5 \times 5 = 6 \times 3$, and that the two sides of a certain triangle were together less than the third, then we should be warranted in setting at naught the science of arithmetic and geometry. On another occasion, as when it was the good Bishop's object to expose the impudent assertions of the Romish Church since the eleventh century, he would have been the first to have replied by a counter syllogism.

If we are quite certain that any writing pretending to divine origin contains gross contradictions to demonstrable truths *in eodem genere*, or commands that outrage the clearest principles of right and wrong; then we may be equally certain that the pretence is a blasphemous falsehood, inasmuch as the compatibility of a document with the conclusions of self-evident reason,

and with the laws of conscience, is a condition *à priori* of any evidence adequate to the proof of its having been revealed by God.

This principle is clearly laid down both by Moses and by St. Paul. If a man pretended to be a prophet, he was to predict some definite event that should take place at some definite time, at no unreasonable distance: and if it were not fulfilled, he was to be punished as an impostor. But if he accompanied his prophecy with any doctrine subversive of the exclusive Deity and adorability of the one God of heaven and earth, or any seduction to a breach of God's commandments, he was to be put to death at once, all other proof of his guilt and imposture being superfluous.* So St. Paul. If any man preach another Gospel, though he should work all miracles, though he had the appearance and evinced the superhuman powers of an angel from heaven—he was at once, in contempt of all imaginable sensuous miracles, to be holden accursed.†

Ib. s. xviii. p. 225.

And now for any danger to men's persons for suffering such a doctrine, this I shall say, that if they who do it are not formally guilty of idolatry, there is no danger that they whom they persuade to it, should be guilty. * * * When they believe it to be no idolatry, then their so believing it is sufficient security from that crime, which hath so great a tincture and residency in the will, that from thence only it hath its being criminal.

Will not this argument justify all idolaters? For surely they believe themselves worshipers either of the Supreme Being under a permitted form, or of some son of God (as Apollo) to whom he has delegated such and such powers. If this be the case, there is no such crime as idolatry: yet the second commandment expressly makes the worshiping of God in or before a visual image of him not only idolatry, but the most hateful species of it. Now do they not worship God in the visible form of bread, and prostrate themselves before pictures of the Trinity? Are we so mad as to suppose that the pious heathens thought the statue of Jupiter, Jove himself? No; and yet these heathens were idolaters. But there was no such being as Jupiter. No! Was there no King of Kings and Lord of Lords; and does the name of Jove instead of Jehovah (perhaps the same word too) make the difference? Were Marcus Antoninus and Epictetus idolaters?

* *Deut.* xiii. 1–5. xviii. 22.—*Ed.* † *Galat.* i. 8, 9.—*Ed.*

UNUM NECESSARIUM; OR THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF REPENTANCE.

1. The first great divines among the Reformers, Luther, Calvin, and their compeers and successors, had thrown the darkness of storms on an awful fact of human nature, which in itself had only the darkness of negations. What was certain, but incomprehensible, they rendered contradictory and absurd by a vain attempt at explication. It was a fundamental fact, and of course could not be comprehended; for to comprehend, and thence to explain, is the same as to perceive, and thence to point out, a something before the given fact, and standing to it in the relation of cause to effect. Thus they perverted original sin into hereditary guilt, and made God act in the spirit of the cruellest laws of jealous governments towards their enemies, upon the principle of treason in the blood. This was brought in to explain their own explanation of God's ways, and then too often God's alleged way in this case was adduced to justify the cruel state law of treason in the blood.

2. In process of time, good men and of active minds were shocked at this; but, instead of passing back to the incomprehensible fact, with a vault over the unhappy idol forged for its comprehension, they identified the two in name; and while in truth their arguments applied only to a false theory, they rejected the fact for the sake of the mis-solution, and fell into far worse errors. For the mistaken theorist had built upon a foundation, though but a superstructure of chaff and straw; but the opponents built on nothing. Aghast at the superstructure, these latter ran away from that which is the sole foundation of all human religion.

3. Then came the persecutions of the Arminians in Holland; then the struggle in England against the Arminian Laud and all his party—terrible persecutors in their turn of the Calvinists and systematic divines; then the Civil War and the persecutions of the Church by the Puritans in their turn; and just in this state of heated feelings did Taylor write these Works, which contain dogmas subversive of true Christian faith, namely, his *Unum Necessarium*, or Doctrine and Practice of Repentance, which reduces the cross of Christ to nothing, especially in the seventh chapter of the same, and the after-defences of it in his Letters on Original Sin to a Lady, and to the Bishop of Rochester; and the

Liberty of Prophesying, which, putting toleration on a false ground, has left no ground at all for right or wrong in matters of Christian faith.

In the marginal notes, which I have written in these several treatises on Repentance, I appear to myself to have demonstrated that Taylor's system has no one advantage over the Lutheran in respect of God's attributes; that it is *bona fide* Pelagianism (though he denies it; for let him define that grace which Pelagius would not accept, because incompatible with free will and merit, and profess his belief in it thus defined, and every one of his arguments against absolute decrees tell against himself); and lastly, that its inevitable logical consequences are Socinianism and *quæ sequuntur*. In Tillotson the face of Arminianism looked out fuller, and Christianity is represented as a mere arbitrary contrivance of God, yet one without reason. Let not the surpassing eloquence of Taylor dazzle you, nor his scholastic retiary versatility of logic illaqueate your good sense! Above all do not dwell too much on the apparent absurdity or horror of the dogma he opposes, but examine what he puts in its place, and receive candidly the few hints which I have admarginated for your assistance, being in the love of truth and of Christ,

Your Brother.

I have omitted one remark, probably from over-fulness of intention to have inserted it. 1. The good man and eloquent expresses his conjectural belief that, if Adam had not fallen, Christ would still have been necessary, though not perhaps by Incarnation. Now, in the first place, this is only a play thought of himself, and Scotus, and perhaps two or three others in the Schools; no article of faith or of general presumption; consequently it has little serious effect even on the guessers themselves. In the next place, if it were granted, yet it would be a necessity wholly *ex parte Dei*, not at all *ex parte Hominis*:—for what does it amount to but this—that God having destined a creature for two states, the earthly rational, and the heavenly spiritual, and having chosen to give him, in the first instance, faculties sufficient only for the first state, must afterwards superinduce those sufficient for the second state, or else God would at once and the same time destine and not destine. This therefore is a mere fancy, a theory, but not a binding religion; no covenant.

2. But the Incarnation, even after the fall of Adam, he clearly makes to be specifically of no necessity. It was only not to take away peevishly the estate of grace from the poor innocent children, because of the father,—according to the good Bishop, a poor ignorant, who before he ate the apple of knowledge did not know what right and wrong was; and Christ's Incarnation would have been no more necessary then than it was before, according to Taylor's belief. Here again the Incarnation is wholly a contrivance *ex parte Dei*, and no way resulting from any default of man.

3. Consequently Taylor neither saw nor admitted any *à priori* necessity of the Incarnation from the nature of man, and which, being felt by man in his own nature, is itself the greatest of proofs for the admission of it, and the strongest predisposing cause of the admission of all proof positive. Not having this, he was to seek *ab extra* for proofs in facts, in historical evidence in the world of sense. The same causes produce the same effects. Hence Grotius, Taylor, and Baxter (then, as appears in his Life, in a state of uneasy doubt), were the first three writers of evidences of the Christian religion, such as have been since followed up by hundreds,—nine tenths of them Socinians or Semi-Socinians, and which, taking head and tail, I call the Grotio-Paleyan way.

4. Hence the good man was ever craving for some morsel out of the almsbasket of all external events, in order to prove to himself his own immortality; and, with grief and shame I tell it, became evidence and authority in Irish stories of ghosts, and apparitions, and witches. Let those who are astonished refer to Glanville on Witches, and they will be more astonished still.

The fact now stated at once explains and justifies my anxiety in detecting the errors of this great and excellent genius at their fountain-head,—the question of Original Sin: for how important must that error be which ended in bringing Bishop Jeremy Taylor forward as an examiner, judge, and witness in an Irish apparition case!

Ib. s. xxxviii. p. 278.

Although God exacts not an impossible law under eternal and insufferable pains, yet he imposes great holiness in unlimited and indefinite measures, with a design to give excellent proportions of reward answerable to the greatness of our endeavor. Hell is not the end of them that fail in the greatest measures of perfection; but great degrees of heaven shall be their

portion who do all that they can always, and offend in the fewest instances.

It is not to be denied that one if not more of the parables appears to sanction this, but the same parables would by consequence seem to favor a state of Purgatory. From John, Paul, and the philosophy of the doctrine, I should gather a different faith, and find a sanction for this too in one of the parables, namely, that of the laborer at the eleventh hour. Heaven, bliss, union with God through Christ, do not seem to me comparative terms, or conceptions susceptible of degree. But it is a difficult question. The first Fathers of the Reformation, and the early Fathers of the primitive Church, present different systems, and in a very different spirit.

Ib. pp. 324–328.

Descriptions of repentance taken from the Holy Scriptures.

This is a beautiful collection of texts. Still the pious but unconverted Jew (a Moses Mendelsohn, for instance) has a right to ask, What then did Christ teach or do, such and of such additional moment as to be rightfully entitled the founder of a new law, instead of being, like Isaiah and others, an enforcer and explainer of the old? If Christianity, or the *opus operans* of Redemption, was synchronous with the Fall of man, then the same answer must be returned to the passages here given from the Old Testament as to those from the New; namely, that Sanctification is the result of Redemption, not its efficient cause or previous condition. Assuredly μετανόησις and Sanctification differ only as the plant and the growth or growing of the plant. But the words of the Apostle (it will be said) are exhortative and dehortative. Doubtless! and so would be the words of a wise physician addressed to a convalescent. Would this prove that the patient's revalescence had been independent of the medicines given him? The texts are addressed to the free will, and therefore concerning possible objects of free will. No doubt! Should that process, the end and virtue of which is to free the will, destroy the free will? But I can not make it out to my understanding, how the two are compatible.—Answer; the spirit knows the things of the spirit. Here lies the sole true ground of Latitudinarianism, Arminian, or Socinian; and this is the sole and sufficient confutation; *spiritualia spiritus cognoscit.* Would

you understand with your ears instead of hearing with your understanding? Now, as the ears to the understanding, so is the understanding to the spirit. This Plato knew; and art thou a master in Israel, and knowest it not?

Ib. p. 330.

Who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of grace.

By this passage we must interpret the words "sin wilfully," in reference to an unpardonable sin, in the preceding sentence

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Of the moral capacity of sinful habits.

Ib. s. ii. p. 432.

Probably from the holiness of his own life, Taylor has but just fluttered about a bad habit, not fully described it. He has omitted, or rather described contradictorily, the case of those with whom the objections to sin are all strengthened, the dismal consequences more glaring and always present to them as an avenging fury, the sin loathed, detested, hated; and yet, spite of all this, nay, the more for all this, perpetrated. Both lust and intemperance would furnish too many instance of these most miserable victims.

Ib. s. xxxix. p. 456.

For every vicious habit being radicated in the will, and being a strong love, inclination and adhesion to sin, unless the natural being of this love be taken off, the enmity against God remains.

But the most important question is as to those vicious habits in which there is no love to sin, but only a dread and recoiling from intolerable pain, as in the case of the miserable drunkard! I trust that these epileptic agonies are rather the punishments than the augmenters of his guilt. The annihilation of the wicked is a fearful thought, yet it would solve many difficulties both in natural religion and in Scripture. And Taylor in his Arminian dread of Calvinism is always too shy of this "grace of God:" he never denies, yet never admits, it any separate operancy *per se*. And this, I fancy, is the true distinction of Arminianism and Calvinism in their moral effects. Arminianism is cruel to individuals, for fear of damaging the race by false hopes and improper

confidences; while Calvinism is horrible for the race, but full of consolation to the suffering individual.

The next section is, taken together, one of the many instances that confirm my opinion that Calvinism (Archbishop Leighton's for example) compared with Taylor's Arminianism, is as the lamb in the wolf's skin to the wolf in the lamb's skin: the one is cruel in the phrases, the other in the doctrine.

Ib. s. lvi. p. 469.

> But if a single act of contrition can not procure pardon of sins that are habitual, then a wicked man that returns not till it be too late to root out vicious habits, must despair of salvation. I answer, &c.

Would not Taylor's purposes have been sufficiently attained by pressing the contrast between attrition and contrition with faith, and the utter improbability that the latter (which alone can be efficient) shall be vouchsafed to a sinner who has continued in his sins in the flattery of a death-bed repentance; a blasphemy that seems too near that against the Holy Ghost? My objection to Taylor is, that he seems to reduce the death of Christ almost to a cipher; a contrivance rather to reconcile the attributes of God, than an act of infinite love to save sinners. But the truth is, that this is the peccant part of Arminianism, and Tillotson is yet more open than Taylor. Forbid me, common goodness, that I should think Tillotson conscious of Socinianism! but that his tenets involved it, I more than suspect. See his Discourses on Transubstantiation, and those near it in the same volume.

Ib. lxiv. p. 478.

> Now there is no peradventure, but new-converted persons, heathens newly giving up their names to Christ and being baptized, if they die in an hour, and were baptized half an hour after they believe in Christ, are heirs of salvation.

This granted, I should little doubt of confuting all the foregoing, as far as I object to it. I would rather be *durus pater infantum*, like Austin, than *durus pater ægrotantium*. Taylor considers all Christians who are so called.

Ib. s. lxvi. p. 481.

All this paragraph is as just as it is fine and lively, but far from confirming Taylor's doctrine. The case is as between one individual and a general rule. I know God's mercy and Christ's merits; but whether your heart has true faith in them I can not

know. *Be it unto thee according to thy faith,* said Christ: so should his ministers say. All these passages, however, are utterly irreconcilable with the Roman doctrine, that the priest's absolution is operant, and not simply declarative. As to the decisions of Paulinus and Asterius, it is to be feared that they had the mortmain bequests and compensations in view more than the words of St. Paul, or the manifest purposes of redemption by faith. Yea, Taylor himself has his *redime peccata eleemosynis.*

By-the-by, I know of few subjects that have been more handled and less rationally treated than this of alms-giving. Every thing a rich man purchases beyond absolute necessaries, ought to be purchased in the spirit of alms, that is, as the most truly beneficial way of dispersing that wealth, of which he is the steward, not owner.

Ib.

St. Paul taught us this secret, that sins are properly made habitual upon the stock of impunity. *Sin taking occasion by the law wrought in me all concupiscence; ἀφορμὴν λαβοῦσα,* 'apprehending impunity,' *διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς,* 'by occasion of the commandment,' that is, so expressed and established as it was; because in the commandment forbidding to lust or covet, there was no penalty annexed or threatened in the sanction or in the explication. Murder was death, and so was adultery and rebellion. Theft was punishad severely too; and so other things in their proportion; but the desires God left under a bare restraint, and affixed no penalty in the law. Now sin, that is, men that had a mind to sin, taking occasion hence, &c.

This is a very ingenious and very plausible exposition of St. Paul's words; but surely, surely, it is not the right one. I find both the meaning and the truth of the Apostle's words in the vividness and consequently attractive and ad- (or in-) sorbent power given to an image or thought by the sense of its danger, by the consciousness of its being forbidden,—which, in an unregenerate and unassisted will, struggling with, or even exciting, the ever-ready inclination of corrupted nature, produces a perplexity and confusion which again increase the person's susceptibility of the soliciting image or fancy so intensified. Guilt and despair add a stimulus and sting to lust. See Iago in Shakspeare.

Ib. s. xi. p. 500.

It was not well with thee when thou didst first enter into the suburbs of hell by single actions of sin, &c.

Aye! this is excellent indeed, and worthy of a guardian angel of the Church. When Jeremy Taylor escapes from the Monono-

mian Romaism, which netted him in his too eager recoil from the Antinomian boar, brought forth and foddered (as he imagined) in Calvin's stye; when from this wiry net he escapes into the devotional and the dietetic, as into a green meadow-land, with springs, and rivulets, and sheltering groves, where he leads his flock like a shepherd;—then it is that he is most himself,—then only he is all himself, the whole Jeremy Taylor; or if there be one other subject graced by the same total heautophany, it is in the pouring forth of his profound common sense on the ways and weaknesses of men and conflicting sects, as for instance, in the admirable birth, parentage, growth, and consummation of a religious controversy in his Dissuasive from Popery.

Ib. s. xiii. p. 502.

Let every old man that repents of the sins of his evil life be very diligent in the search of the particulars; that by drawing them into a heap, and spreading them before his eyes, he may be mightily ashamed at their number and burthen.

I dare not condemn, but I am doubtful of this as a universal rule. If there be a true hatred of sin, the precious time and the spiritual *nisus* will, I think, be more profitably employed in enkindling meditation on holiness, and thirstings after the mind of Christ.

Ib. ss. xxxi.–xxxv. pp. 517, 518.

Scarce a word in all this but for form's sake concerning the merits and sacrifice of the Incarnate God! Surely Luther would not have given this advice to a dying penitent, but have directed him rather to employ his little time in agony of prayer to Christ, or in earnest meditations on the astounding mystery of his death. In Taylor man is to do every thing.

Vol. IX. s. xi. p. 5.

For God was so exasperated with mankind, that being angry he would still continue that punishment even to the lesser sins and sinners, which he only had first threatened to Adam; and so Adam brought it upon them.

And such a phrase as this used by a man in a refutation of Original Sin, on the ground of its incompatibility with God's attributes! "Exasperated" with those whom Taylor declares to have been innocent and most unfortunate, the two things that most conciliate love and pity!

Ib. p. 6.

If the sequel of the paragraph, comparing God to David in one

of his worst actions, be not blasphemy, the reason is that the good man meant it not as such. *In facto est, sed non in agente.*

Ib. ss. xvi. xvii. pp. 8, 9.

For the further explication of which it is observable that the word 'sinner' and 'sin' in Scripture is used for any person, that hath a fault or a legal impurity, a debt, a vitiosity, defect or imposition, &c.

These facts, instead of explaining away Original Sin, are unintelligible, nay, absurd and immoral, except as shadows, types, and symbols of it, and of the Redemption from it. Observe, too, that Taylor never dares explain what he means by "Adam was mortal of himself and we are mortal from him:" he did not dare affirm that soul and body are alike material and perishable, even as the lute and the potentiality of music in the lute. And yet if he believed the contrary, then, in his construction of the doctrine of Original Sin, what has Christ done? St. John died in the same sense as Abel died: and in the sense of the Church of England neither died, but only slept in the Lord.

This same system forced Taylor into the same error which Warburton afterwards dressed up with such trappings and trammels of erudition, in direct contempt of the plain meaning of the Church's article; and he takes it for granted, in many places, that the Jews under Moses knew only of temporal life and the death of the body. Lastly, he greatly degrades the mind of man by causelessly representing death as an evil in itself, which, if it be considered as a crisis, or phenomenal change, incident to a progressive being, ought as little to be thought so, as the casting of the caterpillar's skin to make room for the wings of the butterfly. It is the unveiling of the Psyche. I do not affirm this as an article of Christian faith; but I say that no candid writer ought to hide himself in double meanings. Either he should have used the term 'death' (*ex Adamo*) as loss of body, or as change of mode of being and of its circumstances; and again this latter as either evil for all, or as evil or good according to the moral habits of each individual.

Observe, however, once for all, that I do not pretend to account for Original Sin. I declare it to be an unaccountable fact. How can we explain a *species*, when we are wholly in the dark as to the *genus*? Now guilt itself, as well as all other immediate facts of free will, is absolutely inexplicable; of course original guilt. If we will perversely confound the intelligible with the

sensible world, misapply the logic appropriate to *phænomena* and the categories, or forms, which are empty except as substantialized in facts of experience, in order to use them as the Procrustes' bed of faith respecting *noumena:* if in short, we will strive to understand that of which we can only know ὅτι ἐστὶ, we may and must make as wild work with reason, will, conscience, guilt, and virtue, as with Original Sin and Redemption. On every subject first ask, Is it among the αἰσθητὰ, or the νούμενὰ?

Ib. s. xxiii. p. 12.

It could not make us heirs of damnation. This I shall the less need to insist upon, because, of itself, it seems so horrid to impute to the goodness and justice of God to be author of so great calamity to innocents, &c.

Never was there a more hazardous way of reasoning, or rather of placing human ignorance in the judgment-seat over God's wisdom. The whole might be closely parodied in support of Atheism: rather, this is but a paraphrase of the old atheistic arguments. Either God could not, or would not, prevent the moral and physical evils of the universe, including the everlasting anguish of myriads of millions: therefore he is either not all-powerful or not all-good: but a being deficient in power or goodness is not God:—*Ergo, &c.*

Ib. s. xxv. p. 13.

I deny not but all persons naturally are so, that they can not arrive at heaven; but unless some other principle be put into them, or some great grace done for them, must forever stand separate from seeing the face of God.

But this is but accidentally occasioned by the sin of Adam. Just so might I say, that without the great grace of air done for them no living beings could live. If it mean more, pray where was the grace in creating a being, who without an especial grace must pass into utter misery? If Taylor reply; but the grace was added in Christ: why so say the Calvinists. According to Taylor there is no fall of man; but only an act and punishment of a man, which punishment consisted in his living in the kitchen garden, instead of the flower garden and orchard: and Cain was as likely to have murdered Abel before, as after, the eating of the forbidden fruit. But the very name of the fruit confutes Taylor. Adam altered his nature by it. Cain did not. What Adam did, I doubt not, we all do. Time is not with things of spirit.

Ib. s. xxvii. p. 14.

Is hell so easy a pain, or are the souls of children of so cheap, so contemptible a price, that God should so easily throw them into hell?

This is an argument against the *sine qua non* of Baptism, not against Original Sin.

Ib. s. lxvii. p. 49.

Origen said enough to be mistaken in the question. Ἡ ἀρὰ τῇ Ἀδὰμ κοινὴ πάντων ἐστί. Καὶ τὰ κατὰ τῆς γυναικὸς, οὐκ ἔστι καθ' ἧς οὐ λέγεται. 'Adam's curse is common to all. And there is not a woman on earth, to whom may not be said those things which were spoken to this woman.'

Origen's words ought to have prevented all mistake, for he plainly enough overthrows the phantom of hereditary guilt; and as to guilt from a corruption of nature, it is just such guilt as the carnivorous appetites of a weaned lion, or the instinct of a brood of ducklings to run to water. What then is it? It is an evil, and therefore seated in the will; common to all men, the beginning of which no man can determine in himself or in others. How comes this? It is a mystery, as the will itself. Deeds are in time and space, therefore have a beginning. Pure action, that is, the will, is a *noumenon*, and irreferable to time. Thus Origen calls it neither hereditary nor original, but universal sin. The curse of Adam is common to all men, because what Adam did, we all do: and thus of Eve. You may substitute any woman in her place, and the same words apply. This is the true solution of this unfortunate question. The πρῶτον ψεῦδος is in the dividing the will from the acts of the will. The will is *ego-agens*.

Ib. s. lxxxii. p. 52.

This paragraph, though very characteristic of the Author, is fitter for a comedy than for a grave discourse. It puts one in mind of the play—"More sacks in the mill! Heap, boys, heap!"

Ib. s. lxxxiv. p. 56.

Præposterum est (said Paulus the lawyer) *ante nos locupletes dici quam acquisiverimus.* We can not be said to lose what we never had; and our fathers' goods were not to descend upon us, unless they were his at his death.

Take away from me the knowledge that he was my father, dear Bishop, and this will be true. But as it stands, the whole is, "says Paulus the Lawyer;" and, "Well said, Lawyer!" say I.

Ib. p. 57.

Which, though it was natural, yet from Adam it began to be a curse;

just as the motion of a serpent upon his belly, which was concreated with him, yet upon this story was changed into a malediction and an evil adjunct.

How? I should really like to understand this.

Ib. ch. vii. p. 73, *in initio*.

In this most eloquent treatise we may detect sundry logical lapses, sometimes in the statement, sometimes in the instances, and once or twice in the conclusions. But the main and pervading error lies in the treatment of the subject *in genere* by the forms and rules of conceptual logic; which deriving all its material from the senses, and borrowing its forms from the sense (αἴσθησις καθαρὰ) or intuitive faculty, is necessarily inapplicable to spiritual mysteries, the very definition or contra-distinguishing character of which is that they transcend the sense, and therefore the understanding, the faculty, as Archbishop Leighton and Immanuel Kant excellently define it, which judges according to sense. In the Aids to Reflection,* I have shown that the proper function of the understanding or mediate faculty is to collect individual or sensible concretes into kinds and sorts (*genera et species*) by means of their common characters (*notæ communes*); and to fix and distinguish these conceptions (that is, generalized perceptions) by words. Words are the only immediate objects of the understanding. Spiritual verities, or truths of reason *respective ad realia*, and herein distinguished from the merely formal, or so-called universal truths, are differenced from the conceptions of the understanding by the immediatcy of the knowledge, and from the immediate truths of sense,—that is, from both pure and mixed intuitions,—by not being sensible, that is, not representable by figure, measurement or weight; nor connected with any affection of our sensibility, such as color, taste, odors, and the like. And such knowledges we, when we speak correctly, name ideas.

Now, Original Sin, that is, sin that has its origin in itself, or in the will of the sinner, but yet in a state or condition of the will not peculiar to the individual agent, but common to the human race, is an idea: and one diagnostic or contra-distinguishing mark appertaining to all ideas, is, that they are not adequately expressible by words. An idea can only be expressed (more correctly suggested) by two contradictory positions; as, for exam-

* I. pp. 247–252.—*Ed.*

ple : the soul is all in every part ;—nature is a sphere, the centre of which is everywhere, and its circumference nowhere, and the like.

Hence many of Bishop Taylor's objections, grounded on his expositions of the doctrine, prove nothing more than that the doctrine concerns an idea. But besides this, Taylor everywhere assumes the consequences of Original Sin as superinduced on a pre-existing nature, in no essential respect differing from our present nature ;—for instance, on a material body, with its inherent appetites and its passivity to material agents ;—in short, on an animal nature in man. But this very nature, as the antagonist of the spirit or supernatural principle in man, is in fact the Original Sin,—the product of the will indivisible from the act producing it ; just as in pure geometry the mental construction is indivisible from the constructive act of the intuitive faculty. Original Sin, as the product, is a fact concerning which we know by the light of the idea itself, that it must originate in a self-determination of a will. That which we do not know is how it originates, and this we can not explain : first, from the necessity of the subject, namely, the will ; and secondly, because it is an idea, and all ideas are inconceivable. It is an idea, because it is not a conception.

Ib. s. ii. pp. 74, 75.

And they are injurious to Christ, who think that from Adam we might have inherited immortality. Christ was the giver and preacher of it ; *he brought life and immortality to light through the gospel.* It is a singular benefit given by God to mankind through Jesus Christ.

And none inherit it but those who are born of Christ ; *ergo*, bad men and infidels are not immortal. Immortality is one thing, a happy immortality another. St. Paul meant the latter : Taylor either the former, or his words have no meaning at all ; for no man ever thought or dreamed that we inherited heaven from Adam, but that as sons of Adam, that is, as men, we have souls that do not perish with the body. I often suspect that Taylor, in *abditis fidei* ἐσωτερικῆς, inclined to the belief that there is no other immortality but heaven, and that hell is a *pœna damni negativa, haud privativa.* I own myself strongly inclined to it ;—but so many texts against it ! I am confident that the doctrine would be a far stronger motive than the present ; for no man will believe eternal misery of himself, but millions would

admit, that if they did not amend their lives they would be undeserving of living forever.

Ib. s. vi. p. 77

ἵνα μὴ πλημμύρα τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν καταποντίσῃ λογισμὸν εἰς τὸν τῆς ἁμαρτίας βυθόν.

"Lest the tumultuous crowd throw the reason within us over bridge into the gulf of sin." What a vivid figure! It is enough to make any man set to work to read Chrysostom.

Ib.

——*peccantes mente sub una.*

Note Prudentius's use of *mente sub una* for 'in one person.'

Ib p. 78

For even now we see, by a sad experience, that the afflicted and the miserable are not only apt to anger and envy, but have many more desires and more weaknesses, and consequently more aptnesses to sin in many instances than those who are less troubled. And this is that which was said by Arnobius: *proni ad culpas, et ad libidinis varios appetitos vitio sumus infirmitatis ingenitæ.*

No. Arnobius never said so good and wise a thing in his lifetime. His quoted words have no such profound meaning.

Ib. s. vii. p. 78.

That which remained was a reasonable soul, fitted for the actions of life and reason, but not of any thing that was supernatural.

What Taylor calls reason I call understanding, and give the name reason to that which Taylor would have called spirit.

Ib. s. xii. p. 84.

And all that evil which is upon us, being not by any positive infliction, but by privative, or the taking away gifts, and blessings, and graces from us, which God, not having promised to give, was neither naturally, nor by covenant, obliged to give,—it is certain he could not be obliged to continue that to the sons of a sinning father, which to an innocent father he was not obliged to give.

Oh! certainly not, if hell were not attached to acts and omissions, which without these very graces it is morally impossible for men to avoid. Why will not Taylor speak out?

Ib. s. xiv. p. 85.

The doctrine of the ancient Fathers was that free will remained in us after the Fall.

Yea! as the locomotive faculty in a man in a strait waistcoat. Neither St. Augustine nor Calvin denied the remanence of the

will in the fallen spirit; but they, and Luther as well as they, objected to the flattering epithet 'free' will. In the only Scriptural sense, as concerning the unregenerate, it is implied in the word will, and in this sense, therefore, it is superfluous and tautologic; and, in any other sense, it is the fruit and final end of Redemption,—the glorious liberty of the Gospel.

Ib. s. xvi. p. 92.

For my part I believe this only as certain, that nature alone can not bring them to heaven, and that Adam left us in a state in which we could not hope for it.

This is likewise my belief, and that man must have had a Christ, even if Adam had continued in Paradise—if indeed the history of Adam be not a *mythos*; as, but for passages in St. Paul, we should most of us believe; the serpent speaking, the names of the trees, and so on; and the whole account of the creation in the first chapter of Genesis seems to me clearly to say:—"The literal fact you could not comprehend if it were related to you; but you may conceive of it as if it had taken place thus and thus."

Ib. s. l. p. 166.

That in some things our nature is cross to the divine commandment, is not always imputable to us, because our natures were before the commandment.

This is what I most complain of in Jeremy Taylor's ethics; namely, that he constantly refers us to the deeds or *phenomena* in time, the effluents from the source, or like the *species* of Epicurus; while the corrupt nature is declared guiltless and irresponsible; and this too on the pretext that it was prior in time to the commandment, and therefore not against it. But time is no more predicable of eternal reason than of will; but not of will; for if a will be at all, it must be *ens spirituale;* and this is the first negative definition of spiritual—whatever having true being is not contemplable in the forms of time and space. Now the necessary consequence of Taylor's scheme is a conscience-worrying, casuistical, monkish work-holiness. Deeply do I feel the difficulty and danger that besets the opposite scheme; and never would I preach it, except under such provisos as would render it perfectly compatible with the positions previously established by Taylor in this chapter, s. xliv. p. 158. 'Lastly; the regenerate not only hath received the Spirit of God, but is wholly led by him,' &c.

Ib.

If this Treatise of Repentance contain Bishop Taylor's habitual and final convictions, I am persuaded that in some form or other he believed in a Purgatory. In fact, dreams and apparitions may have been the pretexts, and the immense addition of power and wealth which the belief entailed on the priesthood, may have been their motives for patronizing it; but the efficient cause of its reception by the churches is to be found in the preceding Judaic legality and monk-moral of the Church, according to which the fewer only could hope for the peace of heaven as their next immediate state. The holiness that sufficed for this would evince itself (it was believed) by the power of working miracles.

Ib. s. lii. p. 208.

It shall not be pardoned in this world nor in the world to come; that is, neither to the Jews nor to the Gentiles. For *sæculum hoc*, this world, in Scripture, is the period of the Jews' synagogue, and *μέλλων αἰων*, the world to come, is taken for the Gospel, or the age of the Messias, frequently among the Jews.

This is, I think, a great and grievous mistake. The Rabbis of best name divide into two or three periods, the difference being wholly in the words; for the dividers by three meant the same as those by two. The first was the *dies expectationis*, or *hoc sæculum*, *ἐν τούτῳ καιρῷ*: the second *dies Messiæ*, the time of the Messiah, that is, the *millennium:* the third the *sæculum futurum*, or future state, which last was absolutely spiritual and celestial. But many Rabbis made the *dies Messiæ* part, that is, the consummation of this world, the conclusive Sabbath of the great week, in which they supposed the duration of the earth or world of the senses to be comprised; but all agreed that the *dies*, or thousand years, of the Messiah was a transitional state, during which the elect were gradually defecated of body, and ripened for the final or spiritual state. During the *millennium* the will of God will be done on earth, no less, though in a lower glory, than it will be done hereafter in heaven. Now it is to be carefully observed that the Jewish doctors or Rabbis (all such at least as remained unconverted) had no conception or belief of a suffering Messiah, or of a period after the birth of the Messiah, previous to the kingdom, and of course included in the time of expectation. The appearance of the Messiah and his assumption of the throne of David were to be contemporaneous. The Chris-

tian doctrine of a suffering Messiah, or of Christ as the high-priest and intercessor, has of course introduced a modification of the Jewish scheme. But though there is a seeming discrepance in different texts in the first three Gospels, yet the Lord's Prayer appears to determine the question in favor of the elder and present Rabbinical belief; that is, it does not date the *dies Messiæ*, or kingdom of the Lord, from his Incarnation, but from a second coming in power and glory, and hence we are taught to pray for it as an event yet future. Nay, our Lord himself repeatedly speaks of the Son of Man in the third person, as yet to come. Assuredly our Lord ascended the throne and became a King on his final departure from his disciples. But it was the throne of his Father, and he an invisible King, the sovereign Providence to whom all power was committed. And this celestial kingdom can not be identified with that under which the divine will will be done on earth as it is in heaven; that is, when on this earth the Church militant shall be one in holiness with the triumphant Church. The difficulties, I confess, are great; and for those who believe the first Gospel (and this in its present state) to have been composed by the Apostle Matthew, or at worst to be a literal and faithful translation from a Hebrew (Syro-Chaldaic) Gospel written by him, and who furthermore contend for its having been word by word dictated by an infallible Spirit, the necessary duty of reconciling the different passages in the first Gospel with each other, and with others in St. Luke's, is, *me saltem judice*, a most Herculean one. The most consistent and rational scheme is, I am persuaded, that which is adopted in the Apocalypse. The new creation, commencing with our Lord's resurrection, and measured as the creation of this world (*hujus sæculi*, τούτου αἰῶνος) was by the doctors of the Jewish church—namely, as a week—divided into two principal epochs,—the six sevenths or working days, during which the Gospel was gradually to be preached in all the world, and the number of the elect filled up, —and the seventh, the Sabbath of the Messiah, or kingdom of Christ on earth in a new Jerusalem. But as the Jewish doctors made the day (or one thousand years) of Messiah, a part, because the consummation, of this world, τούτου αἰῶνος, τούτου καιροῦ, so the first Christians reversely made the kingdom commence on the first (symbolical) day of the sacred week, the last or seventh day of which was to be the complete and glorious manifes-

tation of this kingdom. If any one contends that the kingdom of the Son of Man, and the re-descent of our Lord with his angels in the clouds, are to be interpreted spiritually, I have no objection; only you can not pretend that this was the interpretation of the disciples. It may be the right, but it was not the Apostolic belief.

Ib. s. 1. p. 257.

For this was giving them pardon, by virtue of those words of Christ, *Whose sins ye remit, they are remitted;* that is, if ye, who are the stewards of my family, shall admit any one to the kingdom of Christ on earth, they shall be admitted to the participation of Christ's kingdom in heaven; and what ye bind here shall be bound there; that is, if they be unworthy to partake of Christ here, they shall be accounted unworthy to partake of Christ hereafter.

Then without such a gift of reading the hearts of men, as priests do not now pretend to, this text means almost nothing. A wicked shall not, but a good man shall, be admitted to heaven; for if you have with good reason rejected any one here, I will reject him hereafter, amounts to no more than the rejection or admission of men according to their moral fitness or unfitness, the truth or unsoundness of their faith and repentance. I rather think that the promise, like the miraculous insight which it implies, was given to the Apostles and first disciples exclusively, and that it referred almost wholly to the admission of professed converts to the Church of Christ.

In fine. I have written but few marginal notes to this long treatise, for the whole is to my feeling and apprehension so Romish, so anti-Pauline, so unctionless, that it makes my very heart as dry as the desert sands, when I read it. Instead of partial animadversions, I prescribe the chapter on the Law and the Gospel, in Luther's Table Talk, as the general antidote.*

VINDICATION OF THE GLORY OF THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN THE QUESTION OF ORIGINAL SIN.

Ib. Obj. iv. p. 346.

But if Original Sin be not a sin properly, why are children baptized? And what benefit comes to them by Baptism? In answer, as much as they need, and are capable of.

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* With reference to all these notes on Original Sin, see Aids to Reflection, p. 268–290.—*Ed.*

The eloquent man has plucked just prickles enough out of the dogma of Original Sin to make a thick and ample crown of thorns for his opponents; and yet left enough to tear his own clothes off his back, and pierce through the leather jerkin of his closeliest wrought logic. In this answer to this objection he reminds me of the renowned squire, who first scratched out his eyes in a quickset hedge, and then leaped back and scratched them in again. So Jeremy Taylor first pulls out the very eyes of the doctrine, leaves it blind and blank, and then leaps back into it and scratches them in again, but with a most opulent squint that looks a hundred ways at once, and no one can tell which it really looks at.

Ib.

By Baptism children are made partakers of the Holy Ghost and of the grace of God; which I desire to be observed in opposition to the Pelagian heresy, who did suppose nature to be so perfect, that the grace of God was not necessary, and that by nature alone, they could go to heaven; which because I affirm to be impossible, and that Baptism is therefore necessary, because nature is insufficient and Baptism is the great channel of grace, &c.

What then of the poor heathens, that is, of five sixths of all mankind. Would more go to hell by nature alone? If so, where is God's justice in Taylor's plan more than in Calvin's.

Ib. Obj. v. p. 355.

Although I have shown the great excess and abundance of grace by Christ over the evil that did descend by Adam; yet the proportion and comparison lies in the main emanation of death from one, and life from the other.

Does Jeremy Taylor then believe that the sentence of death on Adam and his sons extended to the soul; that death was to be absolute cessation of being! Scarcely I hope. But if bodily only, where is the differenoe between *ante* and *post Christum?*

Ib. p. 356.

Not that God could be the author of a sin to any, but that he appointed the evil which is the consequent of sin, to be upon their heads who descended from the sinner.

Rare justice! and this too in a tract written to rescue God's justice from the Supra- and Sub-lapsarians! How quickly would Taylor have detected in an adversary the absurd realization contained in this and the following passages of the abstract notion, sin, from the sinner: as if sin were any thing but a man sinning,

or a man who has sinned! As well might a sin committed in Sirius or the planet Saturn justify the infliction of conflagration on the earth and hell-fire on all its rational inhabitants. Sin! the word sin! for abstracted from the sinner it is no more: and if not abstracted from him, it remains separate from all others.

Ib. p. 358.

The consequent of this discourse must needs at least be this; that it is impossible that the greatest part of mankind should be left in the eternal bonds of hell by Adam; for then quite contrary to the discourse of the Apostle, there had been abundance of sin, but a scarcity of grace.

And yet Jeremy Taylor will not be called a Pelagian. Why? Because without grace superadded by Christ no man could be saved: that is, all men must go to hell, and this not for any sin, but from a calamity, the consequences of another man's sin, of which they were even ignorant. God would not condemn them the sons of Adam for sin, but only inflicted on them an evil, the necessary effect of which was that they should all troop to the devil! And this is Jeremy Taylor's defence of God's justice! The truth is Taylor was a Pelagian, believed that without Christ thousands, Jews and heathens, lived wisely and holily, and went to heaven; but this he did not dare say out, probably not even to himself; and hence it is that he flounders backward and forward, now upping and now downing.

In truth, this eloquent Treatise may be compared to a statue of Janus, with one face fixed on certain opponents, full of life and force, a witty scorn on the lip, a brow at once bright and weighty with satisfying reason: the other looking at the something instead of that which had been confuted, maimed, noseless, and weather-bitten into a sort of visionary confusion and indistinctness.* It looks like this,—aye, and very like that—but how like it is, too, such another thing!

AN ANSWER TO A LETTER WRITTEN BY THE RIGHT REV. THE LORD BISHOP OF ROCHESTER, CONCERNING THE CHAPTER OF ORIGINAL SIN, IN THE "UNUM NECESSARIUM."

Ib. p. 367.

And they who are born eunuchs should be less infected by Adam's pollution, by having less of concupiscence in the great instance of desires.

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* Aids to Reflection, I. pp. 283, 284.—*Ed.*

The fact happens to be false: and then the vulgarity, most unworthy of our dear Jeremy Taylor, of taking the mode of the manifestation of the disobedience of the will to the reason, for the disobedience itself. St. James would have taught him that he who offendeth against one, offendeth against all; and that there is some truth in the Stoic paradox that all crimes are equal. Equal is indeed a false phrase; and therein consists the paradox, which in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred is the same as the falsehood. The truth is they are all the same in kind; but unequal in degree. They are all alike, though not equally, against the conscience.

Ib. p. 369.

So that there is no necessity of a third place; but it concludes only that in the state of separation from God's presence there is great variety of degrees and kinds of evil, and every one is not the extreme.

What is this? If hell be a state, and not a mere place, and a particular state, its meaning must in common sense be a state of the worst sort. If then there be a mere *pœna damni*, that is, the not being so blest as some others may be; this is a different state *in genere* from the *pœna sensus: ergo*, not hell; *ergo* rather a third state; or else heaven. For every angel must be in it, than whom another angel is happier; that is negatively damned, though positively very happy.

Ib. pp. 370–1.

Just so it is in infants: hell was not made for man, but for devils; and therefore it must be something besides mere nature that can bear any man thither: mere nature goes neither to heaven nor hell.

And how came the devils there? If it be hard to explain how Adam fell: how much more hard to solve how purely spiritual beings could fall? And nature! What? so much of nature and no kind of attempt at a definition of the word? Pray what is nature?

Ib. p. 371.

I do not say that we, by that sin (original) deserved that death, neither can death be properly a punishment of us, till we superadd some evil of our own; yet Adam's sin deserved it, so that it was justly left to fall upon us, we, as a consequent and punishment of his sin, being reduced to our natural portion.

How? What is this but flying to the old Supra-lapsarian blasphemy of a right of property in God over all his creatures,

and destroying that sacred distinction between person and thing which is the light and the life of all law human and divine? Mercy on us! Is not agony, is not the stone, is not blindness, is not ignorance, are not headstrong, inherent, innate, and connate passions driving us to sin when reason is least able to withhold us,—are not all these punishments, grievous punishments, and are they not inflicted on the innocent babe? Is not this the rennet infused into the *milk not mingled* of St. Peter ;* spotting the immaculate begotten, souring and curdling the innocence *without sin or malice?*† And if this be just, and compatible with God's goodness, why all this outcry against St. Austin and the Calvinists and the Lutherans, whose whole addition is a lame attempt to believe guilt, where they can not find it, in order to justify a punishment which they do find?

Ib. p. 379.

> But then for the evil of punishment, that may pass further than the action. If it passes upon the innocent, it is not a punishment to them, but an evil inflicted by right of dominion; but yet by reason of the relation of the afflicted to him that sinned, to him it is a punishment.

Here the snake peeps out, and now takes its tail into its mouth. Right of dominion! Nonsense! Things are not objects of right or wrong. Power of dominion I understand, and right of judgment I understand; but right of dominion can have no immediate, but only a relative, sense. I have a right of dominion over this estate, that is, relatively to all other persons. But if there be a *jus dominandi* over rational and free agents, then why blame Calvin? For all attributes are then merged in blind power: and God and fate are the same:

Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἠεροφοῖτις Ἐριννύς.

Strange Trinity! God, Necessity, and the Devil. But Taylor's scheme has far worse consequences than Calvin's: for it makes the whole scheme of Redemption a theatrical scenery. Just restore our bodies and corporeal passions to a perfect *equilibrium* and fortunate instinct, and, there being no guilt or defect in the soul, the Son of God, the Logos, and Supreme Reason, might have remained unincarnate, uncrucified. In short, Socinianism is as inevitable a deduction from Taylor's scheme as Deism or Atheism is from Socinianism.

* *Ante.* Vindication, &c., pp. 357–8. † Ibid.

In fine.

The whole of Taylor's confusion originated in this ;—first, that he and his adversaries confound original with hereditary sin ; but chiefly that neither he nor his adversaries had considered that guilt must be a *noumenon ;* but that our images, remembrances, and consciousnesses of our actions are *phænomena.* Now the *phænomenon* is in time, and an effect : but the *noumenon* is not in time any more than it is in space. The guilt has been before we are even conscious of the action ; therefore an original sin (that is, a sin universal and essential to man as man, and yet guilt, and yet choice, and yet amenable to punishment), may be at once true and yet in direct contradiction to all our reasonings derived from *phænomena*, that is, facts of time and space. But we ought not to apply the categories of appearance to the ὄντως ὄντα of the intelligible or causative world. This (I should say of Original Sin) is mystery ! We do not so properly believe it, as we know it. What is actual must be possible. But if we will confound actuals with reals, and apply the rules of the latter to cases of the former, we must blame ourselves for the clouds and darkness and storms of opposing winds, which the error will not fail to raise. By the same process an Atheist may demonstrate the contradictory nature of eternity, of a being at once infinite and of resistless causality, and yet intelligent. Jeremy Taylor additionally puzzled himself with Adam, instead of looking into the fact in himself.

How came it that Taylor did not apply the same process to the congeneric question of the freedom of the will ? In half a dozen syllogisms he must have gyved and handcuffed himself into blank necessity and mechanic motions. All hangs together. Deny Original Sin, and you will soon deny free will ;—then virtue and vice ;—and God becomes *Abracadabra ;* a sound, nothing else.

SECOND LETTER TO THE BISHOP OF ROCHESTER.

Ib. pp. 390–1.

To this it is answered as you see, there is a double guilt; a guilt of person, and of nature. That is taken away, this is not: for sacraments are given to persons, not to natures.

I need no other passage but this to convince me that Jeremy

Taylor, the angle in which the two *apices* of logic and rhetoric meet, consummate in both, was yet no metaphysician. Learning, fancy, discursive intellect, *tria juncta in uno*, and of each enough to have alone immortalized a man, he had; but yet οὐδεν μετὰ φύσιν. Images, conceptions, notions, such as leave him but one rival, Shakspeare, there were; but no ideas. Taylor was a Gassendist. O! that he had but meditated in the silence of his spirit on the mystery of an *I AM!* He would have seen that a person, *quoad* person, can have nothing common or generic; and that where this finds place, the person is corrupted by introsusception of a nature, which becomes evil thereby, and on this relation only is an evil nature. The nature itself, like all other works of God, is good, and so is the person in a yet higher sense of the word, good, like all offsprings of the Most High. But the combination is evil, and this not the work of God; and one of the main ends and results of the doctrine of Original Sin is to silence and confute the blasphemy that makes God the author of sin, without avoiding it by fleeing to the almost equal blasphemy against the conscience, that sin in the sense of guilt does not exist.

THE REAL PRESENCE AND SPIRITUAL OF CHRIST IN THE BLESSED SACRAMENT, PROVED AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSUBSTANTIATION.

Perhaps the most wonderful of all Taylor's works. He seems, if I may so say, to have transubstantiated his vast imagination and fancy into subtlety not to be evaded, acuteness to which nothing remains unpierceable, and indefatigable agility of argumentation. Add to these an exhaustive erudition, and that all these are employed in the service of reason and common sense; whereas in some of his Tracts he seems to wield all sorts of wisdom and wit in defence of all sorts of folly and stupidity. But these were *ad popellum*, and by virtue of the *falsitas dispensativa*, which he allowed himself.

Epist. dedicatory.

The question of transubstantiation.

I have no doubt that if the Pythagorean bond had successfully established itself, and become a powerful secular hierarchy, there would have been no lack of furious partisans to assert, yea, and

to damn and burn such as dared deny, that one was the same as two; two being two in the same sense as one is one; that consequently $2 + 2 = 2$ and $1 + 1 = 4$. But I should most vehemently doubt that this was the intention of Pythagoras, or the sense in which the mysterious dogma was understood by the thinking part of his disciples, who nevertheless were its professed believers. I should be prepared to find that the true import and purport of the article was no more than this;—that the one in order to its manifestation must appear in and as two; that the act of re-union was simultaneous with that of the self-production (in the geometrical use of the word 'produce,' as when a point produces, or evolves itself on each side into a bipolar line), and that the Triad is therefore the necessary form of the Monad.

Even so is the dispute concerning Transubstantiation. I can easily believe that a thousand monks and friars would pretend, as Taylor says, to 'disbelieve their eyes and ears, and defy their own reason,' and to receive the dogma in the sense, or rather in the nonsense, here ascribed to it by him, namely, that the phenomenal bread and wine were the phenomenal flesh and blood. But I likewise know that the respectable Roman Catholic theologians state the article free from a contradiction in terms at least; namely, that in the consecrated elements the *noumena* of the phenomenal bread and wine are the same with that which was the *noumenon* of the phenomenal flesh and blood of Christ when on earth.

Let M. represent a slab or plane of mahogany, and m its ordinary supporter or under-prop; and let S represent a slab or plane of silver, and s its supporter. Now to affirm that $M = S$ is a contradiction, or that $m = s$; but it is no contradiction to say, that on certain occasions (S having been removed) s is substituted for m, and that what was $\overset{M}{m}$, is by the command of the common master changed into $\overset{M}{s}$. It may be false in fact, but it is not a self-contradiction in the terms. The mode in which s subsists in $\overset{M}{s}$ may be nconceivable, but not more so than the mode in which m subsists in $\overset{M}{m}$, or that in which s subsisted in $\overset{S}{s}$.

I honestly confess that I should confine my grounds of opposi-

tion to the article thus stated to its unnecessariness, to the want of sufficient proofs from Scripture that I am bound to believe or trouble my head with it. I am sure that Bishop Bull, who really did believe the Trinity, without either Tritheism or Sabellianism, could not consistently have used the argument of Taylor or of Tillotson in proof of the absurdity of Transubstantiation.

Ib. p. cccxvi.

But for our dear afflicted mother, she is under the portion of a child in the state of discipline, her government indeed hindered, but her worshipings the same, the articles as true, and those of the church of Rome as false as ever.

O how much there is in these few words,—the sweet and comely sophistry, not of Taylor, but of human nature. Mother! child! state of discipline! government hindered! that is to say, in how many instances, scourgings hindered, dungeonings in dens foul as those of hell, mutilation of ears and noses, and flattering the King mad with assertions of his divine right to govern without a Parliament, hindered. The best apology for Laud, Sheldon, and their fellows will ever be that those whom they persecuted were as great persecutors as themselves, and much less excusable.

Ib. s. ii. p. 422.

In Synaxi Transubstantiationem sero definivit Ecclesia; diu satis erat credere, sive sub pane consecrato, sive quocunque modo adesse verum corpus Christi; so said the great Erasmus.

Verum corpus, that is, *res ipsissima*, or the thing in its actual self, opposed τῷ φαινομένῳ.

Ib. s. vi. p. 425.

Now that the spiritual is also a real presence, and that they are hugely consistent, is easily credible to them that believe the gifts of the Holy Ghost are real graces, and a spirit is a proper substance.

But how the body of Christ, as opposed to his Spirit and to his Godhead, can be taken spiritually, *hic labor, hoc opus est.* Plotinus says, καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἀσώματος; so we must say here, καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀσώματον.

Ib. s. vii. p. 426.

So we may say of the blessed Sacrament; Christ is more truly and really present in spiritual presence than in corporal; in the heavenly effect than in the natural being.

But the presence of Christ is not in question, but the presence of Christ's body and blood. Now that Christ effected much for

us by coming in the body, which could not or would not have been effected had he not assumed the body, we all, except Socinians, believe; but that his body effected it, other than as Christ in the body, where shall we find? how can we understand?

Ib. p. 427.

So when it is said, *Flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom of God*, that is, corruption shall not inherit; and in the resurrection, our bodies are said to be spiritual, that is, not in substance, but in effect and operation.

This is, in the first place, a wilful interpretation, and secondly, it is absurd; for what sort of flesh and blood would incorruptible flesh and blood be? As well might we speak of marble flesh and blood. But in Taylor's mind, as seen throughout, the logician was predominant over the philosopher, and the fancy outbustled the pure intuitive imagination. In the sense of St. Paul, as of Plato and all other dynamic philosophers, flesh and blood is *ipso facto* corruption, that is, the spirit of life in the mid or balancing state between fixation and reviviscence. *Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?* is a Hebraism for 'this death which the body is.' For matter itself is but *spiritus in coagulo*, and organized matter the *coagulum* in the act of being restored; it is then repotentiating. Stop its self-destruction as matter, and you stop its self-reproduction as a vital organ. In short, Taylor seems to fall into the very fault he reproves in Bellarmine, and with this additional evil, that his reasoning looks more like tricking or explaining away a mystery. For wherein does the Sacrament of the Eucharist differ from that of Baptism, nay, even of grace before meat, when performed fervently and in faith? Here too Christ is present in the hearts of the faithful by blessing and grace. I see at present no other way of interpreting the text so as not to make the Sacrament a mere arbitrary *memento*, but by an implied negative. In propriety, the word is confined to no portion of corporality in particular. "This (the bread and wine) are as truly my flesh and blood as the *phænomena* which you now behold and name as such."

Ib. s. ix. p. 429.

From this paragraph I conclude, though not without some perplexity, that by 'the body and blood verily and indeed taken,' we are not to understand body and blood in their limited sense, as contra-distinguished from the soul or Godhead of Christ, but as a *periphrasis* for Christ himself, or at least Christ's humanity.

Taylor, however, has misconstrued Phavorinus' meaning though not his words. *Spiritualia eterna quoad spiritum.* But this is the very depth of the purified Platonic philosophy.

Ib. s. x. p. 430.

But because the words do perfectly declare our sense, and are owned publicly in our doctrine and manner of speaking, it will be in vain to object against us those words of the Fathers, which use the same expressions: for if by virtue of those words 'really,' 'substantially,' 'corporally,' 'verily and indeed,' and 'Christ's body and blood,' the Fathers shall be supposed to speak for Transubstantiation, they may as well suppose it to be our doctrine too; for we use the same words, and therefore those authorities must signify nothing against us, unless these words can be proved in them to signify more than our sense of them does import; and by this truth, many, very many of their pretences are evacuated.

A sophism, dearest Jeremy. We use the words because these early Fathers used them, and have forced our own definitions on them. But should we have chosen these words to express our opinion by, if there had been no controversy on the subject? But the Fathers chose and selected these words as the most obvious and natural.

Ib. s. xi. p. 431.

It is much insisted upon that it be inquired whether, when we say we believe Christ's body to be really in the Sacrament, we mean 'that body, that flesh, that was born of the Virgin Mary, that was crucified, dead, and buried?' I answer, that I know none else that he had or hath: there is but one body of Christ natural and glorified.

This may be true, or at least intelligible, of Christ's humanity or personal identity as *νόητόν τι*, but applied to the phenomenal flesh and blood, it is nonsense. For if every atom of the human frame be changed by succession in eleven or twelve years, the body born of the Virgin could not be the body crucified, much less the body crucified be the body glorified, spiritual and incorruptible. I construe the words of Clement of Alexandria, quoted by Taylor below,* literally, and they perfectly express my opinion; namely, that Christ, both in the institution of the Eucharist and in the sixth chapter of John, spoke of his humanity as a *noumenon*, not of the specific flesh and blood which were its *phænomena* at the last supper and on the cross. But Jeremy

* *Dupliciter vero sanguis Christi et caro intelligitur, spiritualis illa atque divina, de qua ipse dixit, Caro mea vere est cibus, &c., vel caro et sanguis, quæ crucifixa est, et qui militis effusus est lancea.*—In Epist. Ephes. c. i.

Taylor was a semi-materialist, and though no man better managed the logic of substance and accidents, he seems to have formed no clear metaphysical notion of their actual meaning. Taken notionally, they are mere interchangeable relations, as in concentric circles the outmost circumference is the substance, the other circles its accidents; but if I begin with the second and exclude the first from my thoughts, then this is substance and the interior ones accidents, and so on; but taken really, we mean the complex action of co-agents on our senses, and accident as only an agent acting on us. Thus we say, the beer has turned sour; sour is the accident of the substance beer. But, in fact, a new agent, oxygen, has united itself with other agents in the joint composition, the essence of which new comer is to be sour: at all events, Taylor's construction is a mere assertion, meaning no more than 'in this sense only can I subscribe to the words of Bertram, Jerome, and Clement.'

If a reunion of the Lutheran and English Churches with the Roman were desirable and practicable, the best way, ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, would be that any remarkable number should offer union on a given profession of faith chiefly negative, as we protest against the authority of the Church in temporals; that the words agreed to by Beza and Espencæus, on the part of the Reformers and Romanists respectively, at Poissy, used with implicit faith, shall suffice. *Credimus in usu cœnæ Dominicæ vere, reipsa, substantialiter, seu in substantia, verum corpus et sanguinem Christi spirituali et ineffabili modo esse, exhiberi, sumi a fidelibus communicantibus.*

Ib. s. iii. p. 434.

The other Schoolman I am to reckon in this account, is Gabriel Biel.

Taylor should have informed the reader that Gabriel Biel is but the echo of Occam, and that both were ante-Lutheran Protestants in heart, and as far as they dared, in word likewise.

Ib. s. vi. p. 436.

So that if, according to the Casuists, especially of the Jesuits' order, it be lawful to follow the opinion of any one probable doctor, here we have five good men and true, besides Occam, Bassolis, and Mechior Camus, to acquit us from our search after this question in Scripture.

Taylor might have added Erasmus, who, in one of his letters, speaking of Oecolampadius's writings on the Eucharist, says, "*ut*

seduci posse videantur etiam electi," and adds, that he should have embraced his interpretations, "*nisi obstaret consensus Ecclesiæ;*" that is, Oecolampadius has convinced me, and I should avow my conviction, but for motives of personal prudence and regard for the public peace.

OF THE SIXTH CHAPTER OF ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL.

Ib. p. 436.

I can not but think that the same mysterious truth, whatever it be, is referred to in the Eucharist and in this chapter of St. John; and I wonder that Taylor, who makes the Eucharist a spiritual sumption of Christ, should object to it. A = C and B = C, therefore A = B.*

Ib. s. iv. p. 440.

The error on both sides, Roman and Protestant, originates in the confusion of sign or figure with symbol, which latter is always an essential part of that, of the whole of which it is the representative. Not seeing this, and therefore seeing no *medium* between the whole thing and the mere metaphor of the thing, the Romanists took the former or positive pole of the error, the Protestants the latter or negative pole. The Eucharist is a symbolic, or solemnizing and *totum in parte* acting of an act, which in a true member of Christ's body is supposed to be perpetual. Thus the husband and wife exercise the duties of their marriage contract of love, protection, obedience, and the like, all the year long, and yet solemnize it by a more deliberate and reflecting act of the same love on the anniversary of their marriage.

Ib. s. ix. pp. 447–8.

That which neither can feel or be felt, see or be seen, move or be moved, change or be changed, neither do or suffer corporally, can not certainly be eaten corporally; but so they affirm concerning the body of our blessed Lord; it can not do or suffer corporally in the Sacrament, therefore it can not be eaten corporally, any more than a man can chew a spirit, or eat a meditation, or swallow a syllogism into his belly.

Absurd as the doctrine of Transubstantiation may thus be made, yet Taylor here evidently confounds a spirit, *ens realissimum*, with a mere notion or *ens logicum*. On this ground of the spirituality of all powers *δυνάμεις*, it would not be difficult to evade many of Taylor's most plausible arguments. Enough,

* See Table Talk, VI. p. 317.—*Ed.*

however, and more than enough would be left in their full force.

Ib. p. 448.

Besides this, I say this corporal union of our bodies to the body of God incarnate, which these great and witty dreamers dream of, would make man to be God.

But yet not God, nor absolutely. *I am in my Father, even so ye are in me.*

Ib. s. xxii. p. 456.

By this time I hope I may conclude, that Transubstantiation is not taught by our blessed Lord in the sixth chapter of St. John: *Johannes de tertia et Eucharistica cœna nihil quidem scribit, eo quod cæteri tres Evangelistæ ante illum eam plene descripsissent.* They are the words of Stapleton and are good evidence against them.

I can not satisfy my mind with this reason, though the one commonly assigned both before and since Stapleton: and yet ignorant, when, why, and for whom John wrote his Gospel, I can not substitute a better or more probable one. That John believed the command of the Eucharist to have ceased with the destruction of the Jewish state, and the obligation of the cup of blessing among the Jews,—or that he wrote it for the Greeks, unacquainted with the Jewish custom,—would be not improbable, did we not know that the Eastern Church, that of Ephesus included, not only continued this Sacrament, but rivalled the Western Church in the superstition thereof.

Ib. s. i. p. 503.

Now I argue thus: if we eat Christ's natural body, we eat it either naturally or spiritually: if it be eaten only spiritually, then it is spiritually digested, &c.

What an absurdity in the word 'it' in this passage and throughout!

Vol. X. s. iii. p. 3.

The accidents, proper to a substance, are for the manifestation, a notice of the substance, not of themselves; for as the man feels, but the means by which he feels is the sensitive faculty, so that which is felt, is the substance, and the means by which it is felt is the accident.

This is the language of common sense, rightly so called, that is, truth without regard or reference to error; thus only differing from the language of genuine philosophy, which is truth intentionally guarded against error. But then in order to have supported it against an acute antagonist, Taylor must, I suspect,

have renounced his Gassendis and other Christian *Epicuri*. His antagonist would tell him; when a man strikes me with a stick, I feel the stick, and infer the man; but *pari ratione*, I feel the blow, and infer the stick; and this is tantamount to,—I feel, and by a mechanism of my thinking organ attribute causation to precedent or co-existent images; and this no less in states in which you call the images unreal, that is, in dreams, than when they are asserted by you to have an outward reality.

Ib. p. 4.

But when a man, by the ministry of the senses, is led into the apprehension of a wrong object, or the belief of a false proposition. then he is made to believe a lie, &c.

There are no means by which a man without chemical knowledge could distinguish two similarly shaped lumps, one of sugar and another of sugar of lead. Well! a lump of sugar of lead lies among other artefacts on the shelf of a collector; and with it a label, "Take care! this is not sugar, though it looks so, but crystallized oxide of lead, and it is a deadly poison." A man reads this label, and yet takes and swallows the lump. Would Taylor assert that the man was made to swallow a poison? Now this (would the Romanist say) is precisely the case of the consecrated elements, only putting food and antidote for poison; that is, as far as this argument of Jeremy Taylor is concerned.

Ib. p. 5.

Just upon this account it is, that St. John's argument had been just nothing in behalf of the whole religion: for that God was incarnate, that Jesus Christ did such miracles, that he was crucified, that he rose again, and ascended into heaven, that he preached these sermons, that he gave such commandments, he was made to believe by sounds, by shapes, by figures, by motions, by likenesses, and appearances, of all the proper accidents.

A Socinian might turn this argument with equal force at least, but I think with far greater, against the Incarnation. But it is a sophism, that actually did lead to Socinianism: for surely bread and wine are less disparate from flesh and blood, than a human body from the Omnipresent Spirit. The disciples would, according to Taylor, Tillotson, and the other Latitudinarian common sense divines, have been justified in answering: "All our senses tell us you are only a man: how should we believe you when you say the contrary? If we are not to believe all our senses, much less can we believe that we actually hear you."

And Taylor in my humble judgment gives a force and extension to the words of St. John, quoted before,—*That which was from the beginning, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have beheld, and our hands have handled of the word of life* (1 Ep. 1), —far greater than they either can, or were meant to, bear. It is beyond all doubt, that the words refer to, and were intended to confute, the heresy which was soon after a prominent doctrine of the Gnostics; namely, that the body of Christ was a phantom. To this St. John replies: I have myself had every proof to the contrary: first, the proof of the senses; secondly, Christ's own assurance. Now this was unanswerable by the Gnostics, without one or the other of two pretences; either that St. John and the other known and appointed Apostles and delegates of the Word were liars; or that the Epistle was spurious. The first was too intolerable: therefore they adopted the second. Observe, the heretics, whom St. John confutes, did not deny the actual presence of the Word with the appearance of a human body, much less the truth of the wonders performed by the Word in this superhuman and unearthly *vice-corpus*, or *quasi corpus:* least of all, would they assert either that the assurances of the Word were false in themselves, or that the sense of hearing might have been permitted to deceive the beloved Apostle (which would have been virtual falsehood and a subornation of falsehood) however liable to deception the senses might be generally, and as sole and primary proofs unsupported by antecedent grounds, *præcognitis vel preconcessis*. And that St. John never thought of advancing the senses to any such dignity and self-sufficiency as proofs, it would be easy to show from twenty passages of his Gospel. I say again and again, that I myself greatly prefer the general doctrine of our own Church respecting the Eucharist,—*rem credimus, modum nescimus*,—to either Tran- (or Con) -substantiation, on the one hand, or to the mere *signum memoriæ causa* of the Sacramentaries. But nevertheless, I think that the Protestant divines laid too much stress on the abjuration of the metaphysical part of the Roman article; as if, even with the admission of Transubstantiation, the adoration was not forbidden and made idolatrous by the second commandment.

Ib. s. vi. p. 9.

And yet no sense can be deceived in that which it always perceives alike: 'The touch can never be deceived.'

Every common juggler falsifies this assertion when he makes the pressure from a shilling seem the shilling itself. "Are you sure you feel it?" "Yes." "Then open your hand. Presto! 'Tis gone." From this I gather that neither Taylor nor Aristotle ever had the nightmare.

Ib. p. 10.

The purpose of which discourse is this: that no notices are more evident and more certain than the notices of sense; but if we conclude contrary to the true dictate of senses, the fault is in the understanding, collecting false conclusions from right premisses. It follows, therefore, that in the matter of the Eucharist we ought to judge that which our senses tell us.

Very unusually lax reasoning for Jeremy Taylor, whose logic is commonly legitimate even where his metaphysic is unsatisfactory. What Romanist ever asserted that a communicant's palate deceived him, when it reported the taste of bread or of wine in the elements?

Ib. s. i. p. 16.

When we discourse of mysteries of faith and articles of religion, it is certain that the greatest reason in the world, to which all other reasons must yield, is this—'God hath said it, therefore it is true.'

Doubtless: it is a syllogism demonstrative. All that God says is truth, is necessarily true. But God hath said this; *ergo*, &c. But how is the *minor* to be proved, that God hath said this? By reason? But it is against reason. By the senses? But it is against the senses.

Ib. s. xii. p. 27.

First; for Christ's body, his natural body, is changed into a spiritual body, and it is not now a natural body, but a spiritual, and therefore can not be now in the Sacrament after a natural manner, because it is so nowhere, and therefore not there; *It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.*

But mercy on me! was this said of the resurgent body of Jesus? a spiritual body, of which Jesus said it was not a spirit. If tangible by Thomas's fingers, why not by his teeth, that is, manducable?

Ib. s. xxviii. p. 44.

So that if there were a plain revelation of Transubstantiation, then this argument were good * * * when there are so many seeming impossibilities brought against the Holy Trinity. * * * * And therefore we have found difficulties, and shall forever, till, in this article, the Church returns to her ancient simplicity of expression.

Taylor should have said, it would have very greatly increased the difficulty of proving that it was really revealed, but supposing that certain, then doubtless it must be believed as far as nonsense can be believed, that is, negatively. From the Apostles' Creed it may be possible to deduce the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity; but assuredly it is not fully expressed therein: and what can Taylor mean by the Church returning to her first simplicity in this article? What less could she say if she taught the doctrine at all, than that the Word and the Spirit are spoken of everywhere in Scripture as individuals, each distinct from the other, and both from the Father: that of both all the divine attributes are predicated, except self-origination; that the Spirit is God, and the Word is God, and that they with the Father are the one God? And what more does she say now? But Taylor, like Swift, had a strong tendency to Sabellianism.

It is most dangerous, and, in its distant consequences, subversive of all Christianity to admit, as Taylor does, that the doctrine of the Trinity is at all against, or even above, human reason in any other sense, than as eternity and Deity itself are above it. In the former, as well as the latter, we can prove that so it must be, and form clear notions by negatives and oppositions.

Ib. s. xxix. p. 45.

Now concerning this, it is certain it implies a contradiction, that two bodies should be in one place, or possess the place of another, till that be cast forth.

So far from it that I believe the contrary; and it would puzzle Taylor to explain a thousand *phænomena* in chemistry on his certainty. But Taylor assumed matter to be wholly quantitative, which granted, his opinion would become certain.

Ib. s. xxxii. p. 49.

The door might be made to yield to his Creator as easily as water, which is fluid, be made firm under his feet; for consistence or lability are not essential to wood and water.

Here the common basis of water, ice, vapor, steam, *aqua crystallina*, and (possibly) water-gas is called water, and confounded with the species water, that is, the common base *plus* a given proportion of caloric. To the species water continuity and lability are essential.

Ib. p. 50.

The words in the text are *κεκλεισμένων τῶν θυρῶν* in the past tense, the

gates or doors having been shut; but that they were shut in the instant of Christ's entry, it says not: they might of course, if Christ had so pleased, have been insensibly opened, and shut in like manner again; and, if the words be observed, it will appear that St. John mentioned the shutting the doors in relation to the Apostles' fear, not to Christ's entering: he intended not (so far as appears) to declare a miracle.

Thank God! Here comes common sense.

Ib. ss. xvi.–xvii. pp. 71–73.

All most excellent; but O! that Taylor's stupendous wit, subtlety, acuteness, learning and inexhaustible copiousness of argumentation would but tell us what he himself, Dr. Jeremy Taylor, means by eating Christ's body by faith: his body, not his soul or Godhead. Eat a body by faith!

A DISSUASIVE FROM POPERY.

PART I.

Ib. s. ii. p. 137.

The sentence of the Fathers in the third general Council, that at Ephesus;—'that it should not be lawful for any man to publish or compose another faith or creed than that which was defined by the Nicene Council.'

Upon what ground then does the Church of England reconcile with this decree its reception of the so-called Athanasian creed?

Ib. s. iv. p. 145.

We consider that the doctrines upon which it (Purgatory) is pretended reasonable, are all dubious, and disputable at the very best. Such are * * * that the taking away the guilt of sins does not suppose the taking away the obligation to punishment; that is, that when a man's sin is pardoned, he may be punished without the guilt of that sin as justly as with it.

The taking away the guilt does not, however, imply of necessity the natural removal of the consequences of sin. And in this sense, I suppose, the subtler Romanists would defend this accursed doctrine. A man may have bitterly repented and thoroughly reformed the sin of drunkenness, and by this genuine *metanoia* and faith in Christ crucified have obtained forgiveness of the guilt, and yet continue to suffer a heavy punishment in a schirrous liver or incurable dyspepsy. But who authorized the Popes to extend this to the soul?

Ib. p. 153.

St. Ambrose saith that 'death is a haven of rest.'

Consider the strange and oftentimes awful dreams accompanying the presence of irritating matter in the lower abdomen, and the seeming appropriation of particular sorts of dream images and incidents to affections of particular organs and *viscera*. Do the material causes act positively, so that with the removal of the body by death the total cause is removed, and of course the effects? Or only negatively and indirectly, by lessening and suspending that continuous texture of organic sensation, which, by drawing outward the attention of the soul, sheathes her from her own state and its corresponding activities?—A fearful question which I too often agitate, and which agitates me even in my dreams, when most commonly I am in one of Swedenborg's hells, doubtful whether I am once more to be awaked, and thinking our dreams to be the true state of the soul disembodied when not united with Christ. On awaking from such dreams, I never fail to find some local pain, *circa* or *infra*-umbilical, with kidney affections, and at the base of the bladder.

PART II.—INTRODUCTION.

P. 227.

But yet because I will humor J. S. for this once; even here also 'The Dissuasive' relies upon a first and self-evident principle as any is in Christianity, and that is, *Quod primum verum.*

I am surprised to meet such an assertion in so acute a logician and so prudent an advocate as Jeremy Taylor. If the *quod primum verum* mean the first preaching or first institution of Christianity by its divine Founder, it is doubtless an evident inference from the assumed truth of Christianity, or, if you please, evidently implied therein; but surely the truth of the Christian system, composed of historical narrations, doctrines, precepts, and arguments, is no self-evident position, still less, if there be any tenable distinction between the words, a primary truth. How then can an inference from a particular, a variously provable and proof-requiring, position be itself a universal and self-evident one? But if *quod primum verum* means *quod prius verius*, this again is far from being of universal application, much less self-evident. Astrology was prior to astronomy; the Ptolemaic to the Newtonian scheme. It must therefore be confined to history: yet even thus, it is not for any practicable purpose necessarily or always true. Increase in other knowledge, physical,

anthropological, and psychological, may enable an historian of A.D. 1800 to give a much truer account of certain events and characters than the contemporary chroniclers had given, who lived in an age of ignorance and superstition. But confine the position within yet narrower bounds, namely, to Christian antiquity. In addition to all other objections, it has this great defect: that it takes for granted the very point in dispute, whether Christianity was an *opus simul et in toto perfectum*, or whether the great foundations only were laid by Christ while on earth, and by the Apostles, and the superstructure or progression of the work intrusted to the successors of the Apostles; and whether for that purpose Christ had not promised that his Spirit should be always with the Church. Now this growth of truth, not only in each individual Christian who is indeed a Christian, but likewise in the Church of Christ, from age to age, has been affirmed and defended by sundry Latitudinarian, Grotian, and Socinian divines even among Protestants: the contrary, therefore, and an inference from the supposition of the contrary, can never be pronounced self-evident or primary. Jeremy Taylor had nothing to do with these mock axioms, but to ridicule them, as in other instances he has so effectually done. It was sufficient and easy to show that, true or false, the position was utterly inapplicable to the facts of the Roman Church; that, instead of passing, like the science of the material heaven, from dim to clear, from guess to demonstration, from mischievous fancies to guiding, profitable and powerful truths, it had overbuilt the divinest truths by the silliest and not seldom wicked forgeries, usurpations, and superstitions. J. S.'s very notion of proving a mass of histories by simple logic, he would have found exposed to his hand with exquisite truth and humor by Lucian. 1810.

In the preceding note I think I took Taylor's words in too literal a sense; the remarks, however, on the common maxim, *In rebus fidei, quod prius verius*, seem to me just and valuable. 2 March, 1824.

Ib. p. 297.

When he talks of being infallible, if the notion be applied to his Church, then he means an infallibility antecedent, absolute, unconditionate, such as will not permit the Church ever to err.

Taylor himself was infected with the spirit of casuistry, by which saving faith is placed in the understanding, and the moral

act in the outward deed. How infinitely safer the true Lutheran doctrine: God can not be mocked; neither will truth, as a mere conviction of the understanding, save, nor error condemn;—to love truth sincerely is spiritually to have truth; and an error becomes a personal error, not by its aberration from logic or history, but so far as the causes of such error are in the heart, or may be traced back to some antecedent un-Christian wish or habit;—to watch over the secret movements of the heart, remembering ever how deceitful a thing it is, and that God can not be mocked, though we may easily dupe ourselves; these, as the ground-work with prayer, study of the Scriptures, and tenderness to all around us, as the consequents, are the Christian's rule, and supersede all books of casuistry, which latter serve only to harden our feelings and pollute the imagination. To judge from the Roman casuists, nay, I ought to say, from Taylor's own *Ductor Dubitantium*, one would suppose that a man's points of belief and smallest determinations of outward conduct,—however pure and charitable his intentions, and however holy or blameless the inward source of those intentions or convictions in his past or present state of moral being,—were like the performance of an electrical experiment, and would blow a man's salvation into atoms from a mere unconscious mistake in the arrangement and management of the apparatus. See Livy's account of Tullus Hostilius's unfortunate experiment with one of Numa's sacrificial ceremonies. The trick not being performed *secundum artem*, Jupiter enraged shot him dead.* Before God our deeds, which for him can have no value, gain acceptance in proportion as they are evolutions of our spiritual life. He beholds our deeds in our principles. For men our deeds have value as efficient causes, worth as symptoms. They infer our principles from our deeds. Now, as religion or the love of God can not subsist apart from charity or the love of our neighbor, our conduct must be conformable to both.

Ib. p. 305.

Only for their comfort this they might have also observed in that book,—that there is not half so much excuse for the Papists as there is for the

* *Ipsum regem tradunt, volventem commentarios Numæ, quum ibi occulta solennia sacrificia Jovi Elicio facta invenisset, operatum his sacris se abdidisse; sed non rite initum aut curatum id sacrum esse; nec solum nullam ei oblatam Cœlestium speciem, sed ira Jovis, sollicitati prava religione, fulmine ictum cum domo conflagrasse.* L. i. c. xxxi.—*Ed.*

Anabaptists; and yet it was but an excuse at the best, as appears in those full answers I have given to all their arguments, in the last edition of that book, among the polemical discourses in folio.

Nay, dear Bishop! but such an excuse, as compared with your after-attempt to evacuate it, resembles a coat of mail of your own forging, which you boil, in order to melt it away into invisibility. You only hide it by foam and bubbles, by wavelets and steam-clouds, of ebullient rhetoric: I speak of the Anabaptists as Anti-pædobaptists.

Ib. s. i. p. 337.

Henceforth I call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doth; but I have called you friends, for all things I have heard from the Father I have made known to you.

I never thought of this text before, but it seems to me a stronger passage in favor of Psilanthropism, or modern Socinianism,—a doctrine which of all heresies I deem the most fundamental and the worst (the impurities of madmen out of the question),—than I have ever seen, and far stronger than that concerning the day of judgment, which in its apparent sense is clearly high Arianism or teaching the super-angelical, yet infra-divine, nature of Christ. We must interpret it κατ' ἀναλογίαν πίστεως, not as *all things* absolutely, but as *all things* concerning your interests, *all things* that it behooves you to know. Else it would contradict Christ's words, *None knoweth the Father but the Son*, that is, truly and totally. For Christ does not promise in this life to give us the same degree of knowledge as he himself possessed, but only a *quantum sufficit* of the kind. This is clear by St. John's *all things*, which assuredly did not include either the discoveries of Newton or of Davy.—14 August, 1811.

Ib. s. iii. p. 348.

The Churches have troubled themselves with infinite variety of questions, and divided their precious unity, and destroyed charity, and instead of contending against the devil and all his crafty methods, they have contended against one another, and excommunicated one another, and anathematized and damned one another; and no man is the better after all, but most men very much the worse; and the Churches are in the world still divided about questions that commenced twelve or thirteen ages since, and they are like to be so forever, till Elias come, &c.

I remember no passages of the Fathers nearer to inspired Scripture than this and similar ones of Jeremy Taylor, in which, quitting the acute logician, he combines his heart with his head,

and utters general, and inclusive, and reconciling truths of charity and of common sense. All amounts but to this :—what is binding on all must be possible to all. But conformity of intellectual conclusions is not possible. Faith therefore can not reside totally in the understanding. But to do what we believe we ought to do is possible to all, therefore binding on all ; therefore the *unum necessarium* of Christian faith. Talk not of bad conscience ; it is like bad sense, that is, no sense ; and we all know that we may wilfully lie till we involuntarily believe the lie as truth ; but *causa causæ est causa vera causati.*

Ib. p. 347.

But if you mean the Catholic Church, then, if you mean her, an abstracted separate being from all particulars, you pursue a cloud, and fall in love with an idea and a child of fancy.

Here Taylor uses 'idea' as opposed to image or distinct phantasm ; and this is with few exceptions his general sense, and even the exceptions are only metaphors from the general sense, that is, images so faint, indefinite and fluctuating as to be almost no images, that is, ideas ; as we say of a very thin body, it is a ghost or spirit, the lowest degree of one kind being expressed by the opposite kind.

Ib. p. 380.

'Miracles' were, in the beginning of Christianity, a note of true believers : Christ told us so. And he also taught us that Anti-Christ should be revealed in lying signs and wonders, and commanded us, by that token, to take heed of them.

An excellent distinction between a note or mark by which a thing already proved may be known, and the proofs of the thing. Thus the poisonous qualities of the nightshade are established by the proper proofs, and the marks by which a plant may be known to be the nightshade, are the number, position, color, and so on, of its filaments, petals, and the rest.

Ib.

The 'spirit of prophecy' is also a pretty sure note of the true Church, and yet * * * I deny not but there have been some prophets in the Church of Rome ; Johannes de Rupe Scissa, Anselmus, Marsicanus, Robert Grosthead, Bishop of Lincoln, St. Hildegardis, Abbot Joachim, whose prophecies and pictures prophetical were published by Theophrastus Paracelsus, and John Adrasder, and by Paschalinus Regiselmus, at Venice, 1589 ; but (as Ahab said concerning Micaiah) these do not prophesy good concerning Rome, but evil, &c.

This paragraph is an exquisite specimen of grave and dignified irony, *telum quod cedere simulat retorquentis*. In contrast with this stands the paragraph on note 15 (p. 381), which is a coarse though not unmerited sneer, or, as a German would have expressed himself, 'an of-Jeremy-Taylor-unworthy, though a-not-of-the-Roman-Catholic-Papicolar-polemics-unmerited, sneer.'

Ib. p. 381.

— excepting only some Popes have been remarked by their own histories for funest and direful deaths.

In the adoption of this word 'funest' into the English language by *apocope* of the final *us*, Taylor is supported by 'honest' and 'modest;' but then the necessity of pronouncing fūnēst should have excluded it, the superlative final being an objection to all of them, though outweighed in the others. A common reader would pronounce it 'fūnēst,' and perhaps mistake it for 'funniest.'

Ib. p. 382.

— sacraments, *which to be seven*, is with them an article of faith.

The fastidious exclusion of this and similar idioms in modern writing occasions unnecessary embarrassment for the writer, both in narration and argumenting, and contributes to the monotony of our style.

Ib.

The Fathers and schoolmen differ greatly in the definition of a Sacrament.

Had it been in other respects advisable, it would, I think, have been theologically convenient, if our Reformers had contra-distinguished Baptism and the Lord's Supper by the term Mysteries, and allowed the name of Sacrament to Ordination, Confirmation, and Marriage.

Ib. s. iii. p. 388.

And he did so to the Jews * * * tradition was not relied upon; it was not trusted with any law of faith or manners.

This all the later Jews deny, affirming an oral communication from Moses to the Seventy, on as lame pretences as the Roman Catholics, and for the same vile purposes as reproved by Christ, who, if he had believed the story, would not have condemned traditions of men generally without exception, and would not have proved the immortality of the Patriarchs by a text which seems to have had no such primary intention, though it may

contain the deduction *potentialiter*. But Taylor's 1st and 7th arguments following are, the former weak and incorrect, the latter *dictum et vulgatum, sed non probatum, ne dicam improbatum*. Who doubts that all that is indispensable to the salvation of each and every one is contained in the New Testament? But is it not contained in the first chapter of St. John's Gospel? Is it not contained in the eleventh of the Acts, and in a score other separable portions? Necessary, indispensable, and the like, are multivocal terms. Dogs have survived (and without any noticeable injury) the excision of the spleen. Dare we conclude from this fact that the spleen is not necessary to the continuance of the canine race? What is not indispensable for even the majority of individual believers may be necessary for the Church. Instead, therefore, of these terms, put 'true,' 'important,' and 'constitutive,' that is, appertaining to the chain (*ad catenam auream*) of truths interdependent and rendered mutually intelligible, which constitute the system of the Christian religion, including not alone the faith and morals of individuals, but the *organismus* likewise of the Church, as a body spiritual, yet outward and historical; and this again not as an aggregate or sum total, like a corn-sheaf, but a unity. Let the question, I say, be thus re-stated, and then let the cause come to trial between the Romish and the Protestant divines.

N.B. As a running comment on all these marginal notes, let it be understood that I hold the far greater part—the only not all of what our great Author urges, to apply with irrefutable force against the doctrine and practice of the Romish Church, as it in fact exists, and no less against the Familists and *istius farinæ enthusiastas*. I contend only that he himself, in several assertions, lies open to attack from the supporters of a scheme of faith, as unlike either the Romish or the Fanatical, as Taylor's own, and which scheme, namely, the co-ordinate authority of the Word, the Spirit and the Church, I believe to be the true Apostolic and Catholic doctrine, and that to this scheme his objections do not apply. When I can bring myself to believe that from the mere perusal of the New Testament a man might have sketched out by anticipation the constitution, discipline, creeds, and sacramental ritual of the Episcopal Reformed Church of England, or that it is not a true and orthodox Church, because this is incredible; then I may perhaps be inclined to echo Chillingworth. As

I can not think that it detracts from a dial that in order to tell the time the sun must shine upon it; so neither does it detract from the Scriptures, that though the best and holiest they are yet Scripture, and require a pure heart and the consequent assistances of God's enlightening grace in order to understand them to edification.—1812.

I still agree with the preceding note, and add that Jeremy Taylor should have cited the Arians and Socinians on the other side. But the Romish Papal hierarchy can not for shame say, or only from want of shame can pretend to say, what a Catholic would be entitled to urge on the triple link of the Scripture, the Spirit, and the Church. 27 April, 1826.

Ib. s. vi. p. 392.

From this principle, as it is promoted by the Fanatics, they derive a wandering, unsettled, and a dissolute religion, &c.

The evils of the Fanatic persuasion here so powerfully, so exquisitely, stated and enforced by our all-eloquent Bishop, supply no proof or even presumption against the tenet of the Spirit rightly expressed. For catholicity is the distinctive mark, the *conditio sine qua non*, of a spiritual teaching; and if men that dream with their eyes open mistake for this the very contrary, that is, their own particular fancies, or perhaps sensations, who can help it?

Ib. s. vii. p. 394.

They affirm that the Scriptures are full, that they are a perfect rule, that they contain all things necessary to salvation; and from hence they confuted all heresies.

Yes, the heretics were so confuted, I grant; because these would not acknowledge any other authority but that of the Scriptures, and these too forged or corrupted by themselves; but by the Scriptures that remained unaltered the early Fathers of the Church both demonstrated the omissions and interpolations of the heretical canons and the false doctrines of the heresy itself. But so far from following the same rule to the members of the true Church, they made the applicability of this way of proof the criterion of a heretic.

Ib. p. 394.

'Which truly they then preached, but afterwards by the will of God delivered to us in the Scriptures, which was to be the pillar and ground to our faith.'

Lessing has shown this to be a false and even ungrammatical rendering of Irenæus's words. The *columen et fundamentum fidei*, are the Creed, or economy of salvation.

Ib. vii. p. 395. Extracts from Clement's *Stromata*.

It would require a volume to show the qualifications with which these *excerpta* must be read. There is no one source of error and endless controversy more fruitful than this custom of quoting detached sentences. I would pledge myself in the course of a single morning to bring an equal number of passages from the same (Ante-Nicene) Fathers in proof of the Roman Catholic theory. One palpable cheat in these transcripts is the neglect of appreciating the words, 'inspired,' *a* '*Spiritu dicta*,' and the like, in the Patristic use; as if the Fathers did not frequently apply the same terms to the discourses of the Bishops, their contemporaries, and to writings not canonical. It is wonderful how so acute and learned a man as Taylor could have read Tertullian, Irenæus and Clemens Alexandrinus, and not have seen that the passages are all against him so far as they all make the Scriptures subsidiary only to the Spirit in the Church and the Baptismal creed, the κανὼν πίστεως, *regula fidei*, or *œconomia salutis*.

Ib. p. 396.

—that the tradition ecclesiastical, that is, the whole doctrine taught by the Church of God, and preached to all men, is in the Scripture.

It is only by the whole context and purpose of the work, and this too interpreted by the known doctrine of the age, that the intent of the sentences here quoted can be determined, relatively to the point in question. But even as they stand here, they do not assert that the *Traditio Ecclesiastica* was grounded on, or had been deduced from, the Scriptures; nor that by Scripture Clemens meant principally the New Testament; and that the Scriptures contain the Tradition Ecclesiastical or Catholic Faith the Romish divines admit and contend.

Ib. p. 399. Extract from Origen.

As our Saviour imposed silence upon the Sadducees by the word of his doctrine, and faithfully convinced that false opinion which they thought to be truth; so also shall the followers of Christ do, by the examples of Scripture, by which according to sound doctrine every voice of Pharaoh ought to be silent.

Does not this prove too much; namely, that nothing exists in the New which does not likewise exist in the Old Testament?

One objection to Jeremy Taylor's argument here must, I think, strike every reflecting mind; namely, that in order to a fair and full view of the sentiments of the Fathers of the first four centuries, all they declare of the Church, and her powers and prerogatives, ought to have been likewise given. As soon as I receive any writing as inspired by the Spirit of Truth, of course I must believe it on its own authority. But how am I assured that it is an inspired work? Now do not these Fathers reply, By the Church? To the Church it belongs to declare what books are Holy Scriptures, and to interpret their right sense. Is not this the common doctrine among the Fathers? And how was the Church to judge? First, by the same spirit surviving in her; and secondly by the accordance of the Book itself with the canon of faith, that is the Baptismal Creed. And what was this? *Traditio Ecclesiastica.* As to myself, I agree with Taylor against the Romanists, that the Bible is for us the only rule of faith; but I do not adopt his mode of proving it. In the earliest period of Christianity the Scriptures of the New Testament and the Ecclesiastical Tradition were reciprocally tests of each other; but for the Christians of the second century the Scriptures were tried by the Ecclesiastical Tradition, while for us the order is reversed, and we must try the Ecclesiastical Tradition by the Scriptures. Therefore I do not expect to find the proofs of the supremacy of Scripture in the early Fathers, nor do we need their authority. Our proofs are stronger without it.

Ib. p. 403.

Which words I the rather remark, because this article of the consubstantiality of Christ with the Father is brought as an instance (by the Romanists) of the necessity of tradition, to make up the insufficiency of Scripture.

How shall I make this rhyme to Taylor's own assertion, in the last paragraph of sect. xix. of his Episcopacy Asserted,* in which

* "This also rests upon the practice apostolical and traditive interpretation of holy Church, and yet can not be denied that so it ought to be, by any man that would not have his Christendom suspected. To these I add the communion of women, the distinction of books apocryphal from canonical, that such books were written by such Evangelists and Apostles, the whole tradition of Scripture itself, the Apostles' Creed, &c. * * * These and divers others of greater consequence (which I dare not specify for fear of being misunderstood), rely but upon equal faith with this of Episcopacy," &c.—*Ed.*

he clearly refers to this very question as relying on tradition for its clearness? Jeremy Taylor was a true Father of the Church, and would furnish as fine a subject for a *concordantia discordantiarum* as St. Austin himself. For the exoteric and esoteric he was a very Pythagoras.

Ib. p. 406.

— for one or two of them say, Theophilus spake against Origen, for broaching fopperies of his own, and particularly, that Christ's flesh was consubstantial with the Godhead.

Origen doubtless meant the *caro noumenon*, and was quite right. But never was a great man so misunderstood as Origen.

Ib. p. 408. n.

Sed et alia, quæ absque auctoritate et testimoniis Scripturarum, quasi traditione Apostolica, sponte reperiunt atque contingunt, percutit gladius Dei.

"Those things which they make and find, as it were, by Apostolical tradition, without the authority and testimonies of Scripture, the word of God smites."

Is it clear that *Scripturarum* depends on *auctoritate?* It may well mean they who without the authority of the Church, or Scriptural testimony pretend to an Apostolical Tradition.

Ib. p. 411.

But lastly, if in the plain words of Scripture be contained all that is simply necessary to all, then it is clear, by Bellarmine's confession, that St. Austin affirmed that the plain places of Scripture are sufficient to all laics and all idiots, or private persons, and then it is very ill done to keep them from the knowledge and use of the Scriptures, which contain all their duty both of faith and good life; so it is very unnecessary to trouble them with any thing else, there being in the world no such treasure and repository of faith and manners, and that so plain, that it was intended for all men, and for all such men is sufficient. "Read the Holy Scriptures wherein you shall find some things to be holden, and some to be avoided."

And yet in the preface to his Apology for authorized and set forms of Liturgy,* Taylor regrets that the Church of England was not able to confine the laity to such selections of Holy Writ as are in her Liturgy. But Laud was then alive: and Taylor partook of his *trepidatiunculæ* towards the Church of Rome.

Ib. p. 412.

And all these are nothing else, but a full subscription to, and an excellent commentary upon, those words of St. Paul, *Let no man pretend to be wise above what is written.*

* S. xxvi.

Had St. Paul any thing beyond the Law and the Prophets in his mind?

Ib. p. 416.

St. Paul's way of teaching us to expound Scripture is, that he that prophesies should do it κατ' ἀναλογίαν πίστεως, according to the analogy of faith.

Yet in his Liberty of Prophesying* Taylor turns this way into mere ridicule. I love thee, Jeremy! but an arrant theological barrister that thou wast, though thy only fees were thy desires of doing good in *questionibus singulis*.

Ib. s. iii. p. 419.

Only, because we are sure there was some false dealing in the matter, and we know there might be much more than we have discovered, we have no reason to rely upon any tradition for any part of our faith, any more than we could do upon Scripture, if one book or chapter of it should be detected to be imposture.

What says Jeremy Taylor then to the story of the woman taken in adultery (*John*, c. viii. 3–11) which Chrysostom disdains to comment on? If true, how could it be omitted in so many, and these the most authentic copies? And if this for fear of scandal, why not others? And who does not know that falsehood may be effected as well by omissions as by interpolations? But if false,—then—but Taylor draws the consequence himself.

Ib. p. 427.

So that the tradition concerning the Scriptures being extrinsical to Scripture, is also extrinsical to the question: this tradition can not be an objection against the sufficiency of Scripture to salvation, but must go before this question. For no man inquires whether the Scriptures contain all things necessary to salvation, unless he believe that there are Scriptures, that these are they, and that they are the word of God. All this comes to us by tradition, that is, by universal undeniable testimony.

Very just, and yet this idle argument is the favorite, both shield and sword, of the Romanists: as if I should pretend to learn the Roman history from tradition, because by tradition I know such histories to have been written by Livy, Sallust, and Tacitus!

Ib. p. 435.

The more natural consequence is that their proposition is either mistaken or uncertain, or not an article of faith (which is rather to be hoped, lest we condemn all the Greek Churches as infidels or perverse heretics), or

* S. iv. 4.—*Ed.*

else that it can be derived from Scripture, which last is indeed the most probable, and pursuant to the doctrine of those wiser Latins who examined things by reason and not by prejudice.

It is remarkable that both Stillingfleet and Taylor favored the Greek opinion. But Bull's *Defensio Fidei Nicænæ* was not yet published. It is to me evident that if the Holy Ghost does not proceed through and from the Son as well as from the Father, then the Son is not the adequate substantial idea of the Father. But according to St. Paul, he is—*ergo*, &c. N.B. These "*ergos, &c.*" in legitimate syllogisms, where the *major* and *minor* have been conceded, are binding on all human beings, with the single anomaly of the Quakers. For with them nothing is more common than to admit both *major* and *minor*, and, when you add the inevitable consequence, to say, "Nay! I do not think so, Friend! Thou art worldly wise, Friend!" For example: *major*, it is agreed on both sides that we ought not to withhold from a man what he has a just right to: *minor*, property in land being the creature of law, a just right in respect of landed property is determined by the law of the land:—"agreed, such is the fact:" *ergo:* the clergyman has a just right to the tithe. "Nay, nay; this is vanity, and tithes an abomination of Judaism!"

Ib. s. v. p. 492.

And since that villain of a man, Pope Hildebrand, as Cardinal Beno relates in his Life, could, by shaking of his sleeve make sparks of fire fly from it.

If this was fact, was it an idiosyncrasy, as I have known those who by combing their hair can elicit sparks with a crackling as from a cat's back rubbed. It is very possible that the sleeve might be silk, tightened either on a very hairy arm, or else on woollen, and by shaking it might be meant stripping the silk suddenly off, which would doubtless produce flashes and sparks.

Vol. XI. s. x. p. 1.

As a general remark suggested indeed by this section, but applicable to very many parts of Taylor's controversial writings, both against the anti-Prelatic and the Romish divines, especially to those in which our incomparable Church-aspist attempts, not always successfully, to demonstrate the difference between the dogmas and discipline of the ancient Church, and those which the Romish doctors vindicate by them,—I would say once for all, that it was the fashion of the Arminian court divines of Taylor's

age, that is, of the High Church party, headed by Archbishop Laud, to extol, and (in my humble judgment) egregiously to overrate, the example and authority of the first four, nay, of the first six centuries; and at all events to take for granted the Evangelical and Apostolical character of the Church to the death of Athanasius. Now so far am I from conceding this, that before the first Council of Nicæa, I believe myself to find the seeds and seedlings of all the worst corruptions of the Latin Church of the thirteenth century, and not a few of these even before the close of the second. One pernicious error of the primitive Church was the conversion of the ethical ideas, indispensable to the science of morals and religion, into fixed practical laws and rules for all Christians, in all stages of spiritual growth, and under all circumstances; and with this the degradation of free and individual acts into corporate Church obligations. Another not less pernicious was the gradual concentration of the Church into a priesthood, and the consequent rendering of the reciprocal functions of love and redemption and counsel between Christian and Christian exclusively official, and between disparates, namely, the priest and the layman.

Ib. B. ii. s. ii. p. 58.

Often have I welcomed, and often have I wrestled with, the thought of writing an essay on the day of judgment. Are the passages in St. Peter's Epistle respecting the circumstances of the last day and the final conflagration, and even St. Paul's, to be regarded as apocalyptic and a part of the revelation by Christ, or are they, like the dogma of a personal Satan, accommodations of the current popular creed which they continued to believe?

Ib. s. iii. p. 105.

And therefore St. Paul left an excellent precept to the Church to avoid *profanas vocum novitates*, 'the profane newness of words;' that is, it is fit that the mysteries revealed in Scripture should be preached and taught in the words of the Scripture, and with that simplicity, openness, easiness, and candor, and not with new and unhallowed words, such as that of Transubstantiation.

Are not then Trinity, Tri-unity, *hypostasis*, *perichoresis*, *diphysis*, and others, excluded? Yet Waterland very ingeniously, nay more, very honestly and sensibly, shows the necessity of these terms *per accidens*. The *profanum* fell back on the heretics who had occasioned the necessity.

Ib. p. 106.

"The oblation of a cake was a figure of the Eucharistical bread which the Lord commanded to do in remembrance of his passion." These are Justin's words in that place.

Justin Martyr could have meant no more, and the Greek construction means no more, than that the cake we offer is the representative, substitute, and *fac-simile* of the bread which Christ broke and delivered.

I find no necessary absurdity in Transubstantiation. For substance is but a notion *thought on* to the aggregate of accidents—*hinzugedacht*—conceived, not perceived, and conceived always in universals, never in *concreto*. Therefore, X. Y. Z. being unknown quantities, Y. may be as well annexed by the choice of the mind as the imagined *substratum* as X. For we can not distinguish substance from substance any more than X. from X. The substrate or *causa invisibilis* may be the *noumenon* or actuality, *das Ding in sich*, of Christ's humanity, as well as the *Ding in sich* of which the sensation, bread, is the appearance. But then, on the other hand, there is not a word of sense possible to prove that it is really so; and from the not impossible to the real is a strange *ultra*-Rhodian leap. And it is opposite both to the simplicity of Evangelical meaning, and anomalous from the interpretation of all analogous phrases which all men expound as figures,—*I am the gate, I am the way, I am the vine*, and the like,—and to Christ's own declarations that his words were to be understood spiritually, that is, figuratively.

Ib. s. vi. p. 164.

However, if you will not commit downright idolatry, as some of their saints teach you, then you must be careful to observe these plain distinctions; and first be sure to remember that when you worship an image, you do it not materially but formally; not as it is of such a substance, but as it is a sign; next take care that you observe what sort of image it is, and then proportion your right kind to it, that you do not give *latria* to that where *hyperdulia* is only due; and be careful that if *dulia* only be due, that your worship be not *hyperdulical*, &c.

A masterly specimen of grave dignified irony. Indeed, Jeremy Taylor's Works would be of more service to an English barrister than those of Demosthenes, Æschines, and Cicero taken together.

Ib. s. vii. p. 168.

A man can not well understand an essence, and hath no idea of it in his mind, much less can a painter's pencil do it.

Noticeable, that this is the only instance I have met in any English classic before the Revolution of the word 'idea' used as synonymous with a mental image. Taylor himself has repeatedly placed the two in opposition; and even here I doubt whether he has done otherwise. I rather think he meant by the word 'idea' a notion under an indefinite and confused form, such as Kant calls a *schema* or vague outline, an imperfect embryo of a concrete, to the individuation of which the mind gives no conscious attention; just as when I say—"any thing," I may imagine a poker or a plate; but I pay no attention to its being this rather than that; and the very image itself is so wandering and unstable that at this moment it may be a dim shadow of the one, and in the next of some other thing. In this sense, idea is opposed to image in degree instead of kind; yet still contra-distinguished, as is evident by the sequel, "much less can a painter's pencil do it:" for were it an image, *individui et concreti*, then the painter's pencil could do it as well as his fancy or better.

A DISCOURSE OF CONFIRMATION.

Of all Taylor's works, the Discourse of Confirmation seems to me the least judicious; and yet that is not the right word either. I mean, however, that one is puzzled to know for what class of readers or auditors it was intended. He announces his subject as one of such lofty claims; he begins with positions taken on such high ground, no less than the superior dignity and spiritual importance of Confirmation above Baptism itself—whether considered as a sacramental rite and mystery distinct from Baptism, or as its completory and crowning part (the *finis coronans opus*)—that we are eager to hear the proof. But proofs differ in their value according to our previous valuation of authorities. What would pass for a very sufficient proof, because grounded on a reverend authority, with a Romanist, would be a mere fancy-medal and of no currency with a Bible Protestant. And yet for Protestants, and those too laymen (for we can hardly suppose that Taylor thought his Episcopal brethren in need of it), must this Discourse have been intended; and in this point of view, surely never did so wise a man adopt means so unsuitable to his end, or frame a discourse so inappropriate to his audience. The authori-

ties of the Fathers are, indeed, as strong and decisive in favor of the Bishop's position as the warmest advocate of Confirmation could wish; but this very circumstance was calculated to create a prejudice against the doctrine in the mind of a zealous Protestant, from the contrast in which the unequivocal and explicit declarations of the Fathers stand with the remote, arbitrary, and fine-drawn inferences from the few passages of the New Testament which can be forced into an implied sanction of a rite nowhere mentioned, and as a distinct and separate ministration, utterly, as I conceive, unknown in the Apostolic age. How much more rational and convincing (as to me it seems) would it have been to have shown, that when from various causes the practice of Infant Baptism became general in the Church, Confirmation or the acknowledgment *in propria persona* of the obligations that had been incurred by proxy was introduced; and needed no other justification than its own evident necessity, as substantiating the preceding form as to the intended effects of Baptism on the believer himself, and then to have shown the great uses and spiritual benefits of the institution. But this would not do. Such was the spirit of the age that nothing less than the assertion of a divine origin,—of a formal and positive institution by Christ himself, or by the Apostles in their Apostolic capacity as legislators for the universal Church in all ages, could serve; and accordingly Bishops, liturgies, tithes, monarchy, and what not, were *de jure divino*, with celestial patents, wrapped up in the womb of this or that text of Scripture to be exforcipated by the logico-obstetric skill of High Church doctors and ultra-loyal court chaplains.

THE EPISTLE DEDICATORY TO THE DUKE OF ORMONDE.

Ib. p. ccxvii.

This very poor church.

With the exception of Spain, the Church establishment in Ireland is now, I conceive, the richest in Europe; though by the most iniquitous measure of the Irish Parliament, most iniquitously permitted to acquire the force of law at the Union, the Irish Church was robbed of the tithes from all pasture lands. What occasioned so great a change in its favor since the time of Charles II.? 1810.

Ib. p. ccxviii.

And amidst these and very many more inconveniences it was greatly necessary that God should send us such a king.

Such a king! O sorrow and shame! Why, why, O Genius! didst thou suffer thy darling son to crush the fairest flower of thy garland beneath a mitre of Charles's putting on!

Ib. p. ccxix.

For besides that the great usefulness of this ministry will greatly endear the Episcopal order, to which (that I may use St. Hierom's words) "if there be not attributed a more than common power and authority, there will be as many schisms as priests," &c.

On this ground the Romish divines justify the Papacy. The fact of the Scottish Church is the sufficient answer to both. Episcopacy needs not rash assertions for its support.

Ib. p. ccxx.

For it is a sure rule in our religion, and is of an eternal truth, that "they who keep not the unity of the Church, have not the Spirit of God."

Contrast with this our xixth and xxth Articles on the Church. The Irish Roman Catholic Bishops, methinks, must have read this with delight. What an over-hasty simpleton that James II. was! Had he waited and caressed the Bishops, they would have taken the work off his hands.

Ib. p. 229. Introduction.

It has been my conviction that in respect of the theory of the Faith (though, God be praised! not in the practical result), the Papal and the Protestant communions are equi-distant from the true idea of the Gospel Institute, though erring from opposite directions. The Romanists sacrifice the Scripture to the Church, virtually annulling the former: the Protestants reversed this practically, and even in theory (see the above-mentioned Articles), annulling the latter. The consequence has been, as might have been predicted, the extinction of the Spirit (the indifference or *mesothesis*) in both considered as bodies: for I doubt not that numerous individuals in both Churches live in communion with the Spirit. Towards the close of the reign of our first James, and during the period from the accession of Charles I. to the restoration of his profligate son, there arose a party of divines, Arminians (and many of them Latitudinarians) in their creed, but devotees of the throne and the altar, soaring High Church-

men and ultra royalists. Much as I dislike their scheme of doctrine and detest their principles of government both in Church and State, I can not but allow that they formed a galaxy of learning and talent, and that among them the Church of England finds her stars of the first magnitude. Instead of regarding the Reformation established under Edward VI. as imperfect, they accused the Reformers, some of them openly, but all in their private opinions, of having gone too far; and while they were willing to keep down (and if they could not reduce him to a primacy of honor to keep out) the Pope, and to prune away the innovations in doctrine brought in under the Papal domination, they were zealous to restore the hierarchy, and to substitute the authority of the Fathers, Canonists and Councils of the first six or seven centuries, and the least Papistic of the later Doctors and Schoolmen, for the names of Luther, Melancthon, Bucer, Calvin and the systematic theologians who rejected all testimony but that of their Bible. As far as the principle, on which Archbishop Laud and his followers acted, went to re-actuate the idea of the Church, as a co-ordinate and living Power by right of Christ's institution and express promise, I go along with them; but I soon discover that by the Church they meant the Clergy, the hierarchy exclusively, and then I fly off from them in a tangent. For it is this very interpretation of the Church that, according to my conviction, constituted the first and fundamental apostasy; and I hold it for one of the greatest mistakes of our polemic divines in their controversies with the Romanists, that they trace all the corruptions of the Gospel faith to the Papacy. Meantime can we be surprised that our forefathers under the Stuarts were alarmed, and imagined that the Bishops and court preachers were marching in quick time with their faces towards Rome, when, to take one instance of a thousand, a great and famous divine, like Bishop Taylor, asserts the inferiority, in rank and efficacy, of Baptism to Confirmation, and grounds this assertion so strange to all Scriptural Protestants on a text of Cabasilas—a saying of Rupertus—a phrase of St. Denis—and a sentence of Saint Bernard in a Life of Saint Malachias!—for no Benedictine can be more liberal in his attribution of saintship than Jeremy Taylor, or more reverently observant of the beatifications and canonizations of the Old Lady of the scarlet petticoat.—P. S. If the reader need other illustrations, I refer him to Bishop Hackett's

Sermons on the Advent and Nativity, which might almost pass for the orations of a Franciscan brother, whose reading had been confined to the *Aurea Legenda*. It would be uncandid not to add that this indiscreet traffickery with Romish wares was in part owing to the immense reading of these divines.

Ib. s. i. p. 247. Acts viii. 14–17.

This is an argument indeed, and one that of itself would suffice to decide the question, if only it could be proved, or even made probable, that by the Holy Ghost in this place was meant that receiving of the Spirit to which Confirmation is by our Church declared to be the means and vehicle. But this I suspect can not be done. The whole passage to which sundry chapters in St. Paul's Epistles seems to supply the comment, inclines and almost compels me to understand by the Holy Ghost in this narrative the miraculous gifts, τὰς δυνάμεις, collectively. And in no other sense can I understand the sentence, *the Holy Ghost was not yet fallen upon any of them*. But the subject is beset with difficulties from the paucity of particular instances recorded by the inspired historian, and from the multitude and character of these instances found in the Fathers and Ecclesiastical historians.

Ib. s. ii. p. 254.

Still they are all δυνάμεις, exhibitable powers, faculties. Were it otherwise, what strange and fearful consequences would follow from the assertion, *the Holy Spirit was not yet fallen upon any of them*. That we misunderstand the gift of tongues, and that it did not mean the power of speaking foreign languages unlearnt, I am strongly persuaded. Yea, but this is not the question. If my heart bears me witness that I love my brother, that I love my merciful Saviour, and call Jesus Lord and the Anointed of God with joy of heart, I am encouraged by Scripture to infer that the Spirit abideth in me; besides that I know that of myself, and estranged from the Holy Spirit, I can not even think a thought acceptable before God. But how will this help me to believe that I received this Spirit through the Bishop's hands laid on my head at Confirmation: when perhaps I am distinctly conscious, that I loved my Saviour, freely forgave, nay, tenderly yearned for the weal of, them that hated me before my Confirmation,—when, indeed, I must have been the most uncharitable of men if I did not admit instances of the most exemplary faith, charity, and devotion in Christians who do not practise the imposition of

hands in their Churches. What! did those Christians, of whom St. Luke speaks, not love their brethren?

In fine.

I have had too frequent experience of professional divines, and how they identify themselves with the theological scheme to which they have been articled, and I understand too well the nature and the power, the effect and the consequences, of a wilful faith,—where the sensation of positiveness is substituted for the sense of certainty, and the stubborn clutch for quiet insight,—to wonder at any degree of hardihood in matters of belief. Therefore the instant and deep-toned affirmative to the question, "And do you actually believe the presence of the material water in the baptizing of infants or adults is essential to their salvation, so indispensably so that the omission of the water in the Baptism of an infant who should die the day after would exclude that infant from the kingdom of heaven, and whatever else is implied in the loss of salvation?"—I should not be surprised, I say, to hear this question answered with an emphatic, "Yes, Sir! I do actually believe this, for thus I find it written, and herein begins my right to the name of a Christian, that I have exchanged my reason for the Holy Scriptures: I acknowledge no reason but the Bible." But as this intrepid respondent, though he may dispense with reason, can not quite so easily free himself from the obligations of common sense and the canons of logic,—both of which demand consistency, and like consequences from like premisses *in rebus ejusdem generis*, in subjects of the same class,—I do find myself tempted to wonder, some small deal, at the unscrupulous substitution of a few drops of water sprinkled on the face for the Baptism, that is, immersion or dipping, of the whole person, even if the rivers or running waters had been thought non-essential. And yet where every word in any and in all the four narratives is so placed under the logical press as it is in this Discourse by Jeremy Taylor, and each and every incident pronounced exemplary, and for the purpose of being imitated, I should hold even this hazardous. But I must wonder a very great deal, and in downright earnest, at the contemptuous language which the same men employ in their controversies with the Romish Church, respecting the corporal presence in the consecrated bread and wine, and the efficacy of extreme unction. For my own part, the assertion that what is phenomenally bread and wine is sub-

stantially the Body and Blood of Christ, does not shock my common sense more than that a few drops of water sprinkled on the face should produce a momentous change, even a regeneration, in the soul; and does not outrage my moral feelings half as much.

P.S.—There is one error of very ill consequence to the reputation of the Christian community, which Taylor shares with the Romish divines, namely, the quoting of opinions, and even of rhetorical flights, from the writings of this and that individual, with 'Saint' prefixed to his name, as expressing the faith of the Church during the first five or six centuries. Whereas it would not, perhaps, be very difficult to convince an unprejudiced man and a sincere Christian of the impossibility that even the decrees of the General Councils should represent the Catholic faith, that is, the belief essential to, or necessarily consequent on, the faith in Christ common to all the elect.

NOTES ON THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS.

I KNOW of no book, the Bible excepted, as above all comparison, which I, according to my judgment and experience, could so safely recommend as teaching and enforcing the whole saving truth according to the mind that was in Christ Jesus, as the Pilgrim's Progress. It is, in my conviction, incomparably the best *Summa Theologiæ Evangelicæ* ever produced by a writer not miraculously inspired.

June 14, 1830.

It disappointed, nay surprised me, to find Robert Southey express himself so coldly respecting the style and diction of the Pilgrim's Progress. I can find nothing homely in it but a few phrases and single words. The conversation between Faithful and Talkative* is a model of unaffected dignity and rhythmical flow.

SOUTHEY'S LIFE OF BUNYAN.

P. xiv.

"We intended not," says Baxter, "to dig down the banks, or pull up the hedge, and lay all waste and common, when we desired the Prelates' tyranny

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* P. 98, &c. of the edition by Murray and Major, 1830.—*Ed.*

might cease." No; for the intention had been under the pretext of abating one tyranny to establish a far severer and more galling in its stead: in doing this the banks had been thrown down, and the hedge destroyed; and while the bestial herd who broke in rejoiced in the havoc, Baxter, and other such erring though good men, stood marvelling at the mischief, which never could have been effected, if they had not mainly assisted in it.

But the question is, would these 'erring good' men have been either willing or able to assist in this work, if the more erring Lauds and Sheldons had not run riot in the opposite direction? And as for the 'bestial herd,'—compare the whole body of Parliamentarians, all the fanatical sects included, with the royal and prelatical party in the reign of Charles II. These were, indeed, a bestial herd. See Baxter's unwilling and Burnet's honest description of the moral discipline throughout the realm under Cromwell.

Ib. p. xv.

They passed with equal facility from strict Puritanism to the utmost license of practical and theoretical impiety, as Antinomians or as Atheists, and from extreme profligacy to extreme superstition in any of its forms.

'They!' How many? and of these how many that would not have been in Bedlam, or fit for it, under some other form? A madman falls into love or religion, and then, forsooth! it is love or religion that drove him mad.

Ib. p. xxi.

In an evil hour were the doctrines of the Gospel sophisticated with questions which should have been left in the Schools for those who are unwise enough to employ themselves in excogitations of useless subtlety.

But what, at any rate, had Bunyan to do with the Schools? His perplexities clearly rose out of the operations of his own active but unarmed mind on the words of the Apostle. If any thing is to be arraigned, it must be the Bible in English, the reading of which is imposed (and, in my judgment, well and wisely imposed) as a duty on all who can read. Though Protestants, we are not ignorant of the occasional and partial evils of promiscuous Bible reading; but we see them vanish when we place them beside the good.

Ib. p. xxiv.

False notions of that corruption of our nature which it is almost as perilous to exaggerate as to dissemble.

I would have said "which it is almost as perilous to misunderstand as to deny."

Ib. p. xli. &c.

But the wickedness of the tinker has been greatly overcharged; and it is taking the language of self-accusation too literally, to pronounce of John Bunyan that he was at any time depraved. The worst of what he was in his worst days is to be expressed in a single word * * * he had been a blackguard, &c.

All this narrative, with the reflections on the facts, is admirable and worthy of Robert Southey: full of good sense and kind feeling—the wisdom of love.

Ib. p. lxi.

But the Sectaries had kept their countrymen from it (the Common Prayer-Book), while they had the power, and Bunyan himself in his sphere labored to dissuade them from it.

Surely the fault lay in the want, or in the feeble and inconsistent manner, of determining and supporting the proper powers of the Church. In fact, the Prelates and leading divines of the Church were not only at variance with each other, but each with himself. One party, the more faithful and less modified disciples of the first Reformers, were afraid of bringing any thing into even a semblance of a co-ordination with the Scriptures; and, with the *terriculum* of Popery ever before their eyes, timidly and sparingly allowed to the Church any even subordinate power beyond that of interpreting the Scriptures; that is, of finding the ordinances of the Church implicitly contained in the ordinances of the inspired writers. But as they did not assume infallibility in their interpretations, it amounted to nothing for the consciences of such men as Bunyan and a thousand others. The opposite party, Laud, Taylor, and the rest, with a sufficient dislike of the Pope (that is, at Rome) and of the grosser theological corruptions of the Romish Church, yet in their hearts as much averse to the sentiments and proceedings of Luther, Calvin, John Knox, Zuinglius, and their fellows, and proudly conscious of their superior learning, sought to maintain their ordinances by appeals to the Fathers, to the recorded traditions and doctrine of the Catholic priesthood during the first five or six centuries, and contended for so much that virtually the Scriptures were subordinated to the Church, which yet they did not dare distinctly to say out. The result was that the Anti-Prelatists answered them in the gross by setting at naught their foundation, that is, the worth, authority, and value of the Fathers. So much for their variance with

each other. But each vindicator of our established Liturgy and Discipline was divided in himself: he minced this out of fear of being charged with Popery, and that he dared not affirm for fear of being charged with disloyalty to the King as the head of the Church. The distinction between the Church of which the King is the rightful head, and the Church which hath no head but Christ, never occurred either to them or to their antagonists, and as little did they succeed in appropriating to Scripture what belonged to Scripture, and to the Church what belonged to the Church. All things in which the temporal is concerned may be reduced to a pentad, namely, prothesis, thesis, antithesis, mesothesis and synthesis. So here—

	Prothesis.	
	The Word = Christ.	
Thesis.	Mesothesis.	Antithesis.
The Scripture.	The Spirit.	The Church.
	Synthesis.	
	The Preacher.*	

Ib. p. lxiii.

"But there are two ways of obeying," he observed; "the one to do that which I in my conscience do believe that I am bound to do, actively; and where I can not obey actively, there I am willing to lie down, and to suffer what they shall do unto me."

Genuine Christianity worthy of John and Paul!

Ib. p. lxv.

I am not conscious of any warping power that could have acted for so very long a period; but from sixteen to now, sixty years of age, I have retained the very same convictions respecting the Stuarts and their adherents. Even to Lord Clarendon I never could quite reconcile myself.

How often the pen becomes the tongue of a systematic dream, —a somniloquist! The sunshine, that is, the comparative power, the distinct contra-distinguishing judgment of realities as other than mere thoughts, is suspended. During this state of continuous, not single-mindedness, but one-side-mindedness, writing is manual somnambulism; the somnial magic superinduced on, without suspending, the active powers of the mind.

Ib. p. lxxix.

"They that will have heaven, they must run for it, because the devil, the

* See *ante*.—*Ed.*

law, sin, death, and hell, follow them. There is never a poor soul that is going to heaven, but the devil, the law, sin, death, and hell make after that soul. *The devil, your adversary, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour.* And I will assure you the devil is nimble; he can run apace; he is light of foot; he hath overtaken many; he hath turned up their heels, and hath given them an everlasting fall. Also the law! that can shoot a great way: have a care thou keep out of the reach of those great guns the Ten Commandments! Hell also hath a wide mouth," &c.

It is the fashion of the day to call every man, who in his writings or discourses gives a prominence to the doctrines on which, beyond all others, the first Reformers separated from the Romish communion, a Calvinist. Bunyan may have been one, but I have met with nothing in his writings (except his Anti-pædobaptism, to which too he assigns no saving importance) that is not much more characteristically Lutheran; for instance, this passage is the very echo of the chapter on the Law and Gospel, in Luther's Table Talk.

It would be interesting, and I doubt not, instructive, to know the distinction in Bunyan's mind between the devil and hell.

Ib. p. xcvii.

Bunyan concludes with something like a promise of a third part. There appeared one after his death, and it has had the fortune to be included in many editions of the original work.

It is remarkable that Southey should not have seen, or having seen, have forgotten to notice, that this third part is evidently written by some Romish priest or missionary in disguise.

LIFE OF BUNYAN.*

The early part of his life was an open course of wickedness.

Southey, in the Life prefixed to his edition of the Pilgrim's Progress, has, in a manner worthy of his head and heart, reduced this oft-repeated charge to its proper value. Bunyan was never, in our received sense of the word, wicked. He was chaste, sober, honest; but he was a bitter blackguard; that is, damned his own and his neighbor's eyes on slight or no occasion, and was fond of a row. In this our excellent Laureate has performed an important service to morality. For the transmutation of actual reprobates into saints is doubtless possible; but like the many recorded facts of corporeal alchemy, it is not supported by modern experiments.

* Prefixed to an edition of the Pilgrim's Progress, by R. Edwards, 1820.—*Ed.*

THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS.

Part i. p. 11.

A I walked through the wilderness of this world.

That in the Apocalypse the wilderness is the symbol of the world, or rather of the worldly life, Bunyan discovered by the instinct of a similar genius. The whole Jewish history, indeed, in all its details is so admirably adapted to, and suggestive of, symbolical use, as to justify the belief that the spiritual application, the interior and permanent sense, was in the original intention of the inspiring Spirit, though it might not have been present, as an object of distinct consciousness, to the inspired writers.

Ib.

—where was a den.

The jail. Mr. Bunyan wrote this precious book in Bedford jail, where he was confined on account of his religion. The following anecdote is related of him. A Quaker came to the jail, and thus addressed him: "Friend Bunyan, the Lord sent me to seek for thee, and I have been through several counties in search of thee, and now I am glad I have found thee." To which Mr. Bunyan replied, "Friend, thou dost not speak the truth in saying the Lord sent thee to seek me; for the Lord well knows that I have been in this jail for some years; and if he had sent thee, he would have sent thee here directly."—*Note in Edwards.*

This is a valuable anecdote, for it proves, what might have been concluded *à priori*, that Bunyan was a man of too much genius to be a fanatic. No two qualities are more contrary than genius and fanaticism. Enthusiasm, indeed, ὁ θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν, is almost a synonyme of genius; the moral life in the intellectual light, the will in the reason; and without it, says Seneca, nothing truly great was ever achieved by man.

Ib. p. 12.

And not being able longer to contain, he brake out with a lamentable cry, saying, "What shall I do?"

Reader, was this ever your case? Did you ever see your sins, and feel the burden of them, so as to cry out in the anguish of your soul, What must I do to be saved? If not, you will look on this precious book as a romance or history, which no way concerns you; you can no more understand the meaning of it than if it were wrote in an unknown tongue, for you are yet carnal, dead in your sins, lying in the arms of the wicked one in false security. But this book is spiritual; it can only be understood by spiritually quickened souls who have experienced that salvation in the heart, which begins with a sight of sin, a sense of sin, a fear of destruction and dread

of damnation. Such and such only commence Pilgrims from the City of Destruction to the heavenly kingdom.—*Note in Edwards.*

Most true. It is one thing to perceive and acknowledge this and that particular deed to be sinful, that is, contrary to the law of reason or the commandment of God in Scripture, and another thing to feel sin within us independent of particular actions, except as the common ground of them. And it is this latter without which no man can become a Christian.

Ib. p. 39.

Now whereas thou sawest that as soon as the first began to sweep, the dust did so fly about that the room by him could not be cleansed, but that thou wast almost choked therewith; this is to show thee, that the Law, instead of cleansing the heart (by its working) from sin, doth revive, put strength into, and increase it in the soul, even as it doth discover and forbid it; for it doth not give power to subdue.

See Luther's Table Talk. The chapters in that work named "Law and Gospel," contain the very marrow of divinity. Still, however, there remains much to be done on this subject; namely, to show how the discovery of sin by the Law tends to strengthen the sin; and why it must necessarily have this effect, the mode of its action on the appetites and impetites through the imagination and understanding; and to exemplify all this in our actual experience.

Ib. p. 40.

Then I saw that one came to Passion, and brought him a bag of treasure, and poured it down at his feet; the which he took up, and rejoiced therein, and withal laughed Patience to scorn; but I beheld but a while, and he had lavished all away, and had nothing left him but rags.

One of the not many instances of faulty allegory in the Pilgrim's Progress; that is, it is no allegory. The beholding "but awhile," and the change into "nothing but rags," is not legitimately imaginable. A longer time and more interlinks are requisite. It is a hybrid compost of usual images and generalized words, like the Nile-born nondescript, with a head or tail of organized flesh, and a lump of semi-mud for the body. Yet, perhaps, these very defects are practically excellencies in relation to the intended readers of The Pilgrim's Progress.

Ib. p. 43.

The Interpreter answered, "This is Christ, who continually, with the oil of his grace, maintains the work already begun in the heart; by the means of which, notwithstanding what the Devil can do, the souls of his people

prove gracious still. And in that thou sawest that the man stood behind the wall to maintain the fire, this is to teach thee, that it is hard for the tempted to see how this work of grace is maintained in the soul."

This is beautiful: yet I can not but think it would have been still more appropriate, if the water-pourer had been a Mr. Legality, a prudentialist offering his calculation of consequences as the moral antidote to guilt and crime; and if the oil-instillator, out of sight and from within, had represented the corrupt nature of man, that is, the spiritual will corrupted by taking up a nature into itself.

Ib.

What, then, has the sinner who is the subject of grace no hand in keeping up the work of grace in the heart? No! It is plain Mr. Bunyan was not an Arminian.—*Note in Edwards.*

If by metaphysics we mean those truths of the pure reason which always transcend, and not seldom appear to contradict, the understanding, or (in the words of the great Apostle) spiritual verities which can only be spiritually discerned—and this is the true and legitimate meaning of metaphysics, *ηετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ* —then I affirm, that this very controversy between the Arminians and the Calvinists, in which both are partially right in what they affirm, and both wholly wrong in what they deny, is a proof that without metaphysics there can be no light of faith.

Ib. p. 45.

I left off to watch and be sober; I laid the reins upon the neck of my lusts.

This single paragraph proves, in opposition to the assertion in the preceding note in Edwards, that in Bunyan's judgment there must be at least a negative co-operation of the will of man with the divine grace, an energy of non-resistance to the workings of the Holy Spirit. But the error of the Calvinists is, that they divide the regenerate will in man from the will of God, instead of including it.

Ib. p. 49.

So I saw in my dream, that just as Christian came up with the Cross, his burden loosed from off his shoulders, and fell from off his back, and began to tumble; and so continued to do, till it came to the mouth of the sepulchre, where it fell in, and I saw it no more.

We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding (or discernment of reason) *that we may know*

him that is true, and we are in him that is true, even in his son Jesus Christ. This is the true God and eternal life. Little children, keep yourselves from idols. 1 John, v. 20, 21. Alas! how many Protestants make a mental idol of the Cross, scarcely less injurious to the true faith in the Son of God than the wooden crosses and crucifixes of the Romanists!—and this, because they have not been taught that Jesus was both the Christ and the great symbol of Christ. Strange, that we can explain spiritually, what to take up the cross of Christ, to be crucified with Christ, means;—yet never ask what the Crucifixion itself signifies, but rest satisfied in the historic image. That one declaration of the Apostle, that by wilful sin we *crucify the Son of God afresh*, might have roused us to nobler thoughts.

Ib. p. 52.

And besides, say they, if we get into the way, what matters which way we get in? If we are in, we are in. Thou art but in the way, who, as we perceive, came in at the gate: and we are also in the way, that came tumbling over the wall: wherein now is thy condition better than ours?

The allegory is clearly defective inasmuch as 'the way' represents two diverse meanings;—1. the outward profession of Christianity, and 2. the inward and spiritual grace. But it would be very difficult to mend it. 1830.

In this instance (and it is, I believe, the only one in the work,) the allegory degenerates into a sort of pun, that is, in the two senses of the word 'way,' and thus supplies Formal and Hypocrite with an argument which Christian can not fairly answer, or rather one to which Bunyan could not make his Christian return the proper answer without contradicting the allegoric image. For the obvious and only proper answer is: No! you are not in the same 'way' with me, though you are walking on the same 'road.' But it has a worse defect, namely, that it leaves the reader uncertain as to what the writer precisely meant, or wished to be understood, by the allegory. Did Bunyan refer to the Quakers as rejecting the outward Sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper? If so, it is the only unspiritual passage in the whole beautiful allegory, the only trait of sectarian narrow-mindedness, and, in Bunyan's own language, of legality. But I do not think that this was Bunyan's intention. I rather suppose that he refers to the Arminians and other Pelagians, who rely on the coincidence of their actions with the Gospel precepts for their

salvation, whatever the ground or root of their conduct may be; who place, in short, the saving virtue in the stream, with little or no reference to the source. But it is the faith acting in our poor imperfect deeds that alone saves us; and even this faith is not ours, but the faith of the Son of God in us. *I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.* Gal. ii. 20. Illustrate this by a simile. Laboring under chronic *bronchitis*, I am told to inhale chlorine as a specific remedy; but I can do this only by dissolving a saturated solution of the gas in warm water, and then breathing the vapor. Now what the aqueous vapor or steam is to the chlorine, that our deeds, our outward life, *βίος*, is to faith.

Ib. p. 55.

And the other took directly up the way to Destruction, which led him into a wide field, full of dark mountains, where he stumbled and fell, and rose no more.

This requires a comment. A wide field full of mountains and of dark mountains, where Hypocrite stumbled and fell! The images here are unusually obscure.

Ib. p. 70.

They showed him Moses' rod, the hammer and nail with which Jael slew Sisera.

I question whether it would be possible to instance more strikingly the power of a predominant idea (that true mental kaleidoscope with richly colored glass) on every object brought before the eye of the mind through its medium, than this conjunction of Moses' rod with the hammer of the treacherous assassin Jael, and similar encomiastic references to the same detestable murder, by Bunyan, and men like Bunyan, good, pious, purely-affectioned disciples of the meek and holy Jesus; yet the erroneous preconception that whatever is uttered by a Scripture personage is, in fact, uttered by the infallible Spirit of God, makes Deborahs of them all. But what besides ought we to infer from this and similar facts? Surely, that the faith in the heart overpowers and renders innocent the errors of the understanding and the delusions of the imagination, and that sincerely pious men purchase, by inconsistency, exemption from the practical consequences of particular errors.

Ib. p. 76.

All this is true, and much more which thou hast left out, &c.

This is the best way; to own Satan's charges, if they be true: yea to exaggerate them also, to exalt the riches of the grace of Christ above all, in pardoning all of them freely.—*Note in Edwards.*

That is, to say what we do not believe to be true! *Will ye speak wickedly for God, and talk deceitfully for him?* said righteous Job.

Ib. p. 83.

One thing I would not let slip: I took notice that now poor Christian was so confounded, that he did not know his own voice; and thus I perceived it: just when he was come over against the mouth of the burning pit, one of the wicked ones got behind him, and stepped up softly to him, and whisperingly suggested many grievous blasphemies to him, which he verily thought had proceeded from his own mind.

There is a very beautiful letter of Archbishop Leighton's to a lady under a similar distemperature of the imagination.* In fact, it can scarcely not happen under any weakness and consequent irritability of the nerves to persons continually occupied with spiritual self-examination. No part of the pastoral duties requires more discretion, a greater practical psychological science In this, as in what not? Luther is the great model; ever reminding the individual that not he, but Christ, is to redeem him; and that the way to be redeemed is to think with will, mind, and affections on Christ, and not on himself. I am a sin-laden being, and Christ has promised to loose the whole burden if I but entirely trust in him. To torment myself with the detail of the noisome contents of the fardel will but make it stick the closer first to my imagination and then to my unwilling will.

Ib.

For that he perceived God was with them, though in that dark and dismal state; and why not, thought he, with me, though by reason of the impediment that attends this place, I can not perceive it? But it may be asked, Why doth the Lord suffer his children to walk in such darkness? It is for his glory: it tries their faith in him, and excites prayer to him: but his love abates not in the least towards them, since he lovingly inquires after them, *Who is there among you that feareth the Lord and walketh in darkness, and hath no light?* Then he gives most precious advice to them: *Let him trust in the Lord,* and *stay himself upon his God.*

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* The second of two 'Letters written to persons under trouble of mind.' —*Ed.*

Yes! even in the sincerest believers, being men of reflecting and inquiring minds, there will sometimes come a wintry season, when the vital sap of faith retires to the root, that is, to atheism of the will. *But though he slay me, yet will I cling to him.*

Ib. p. 85.

And as for the other (Pope), though he be yet alive, he is, by reason of age, and also of the many shrewd brushes that he met with in his younger days, grown so crazy and stiff in his joints, that he can now do little more than sit in his cave's mouth, grinning at pilgrims as they go by, and biting his nails because he can not come at them.

O that Blanco White would write in Spanish the progress of a pilgrim from the Pope's cave to the Evangelist's wicket-gate and the Interpreter's house! 1830.

Ib. p. 104.

And let us assure ourselves that, at the day of doom, men shall be judged according to their fruit. It will not be said then, 'Did you believe?' but 'Were you doers or talkers only?' and accordingly shall be judged.

All the doctors of the Sorbonne could not have better stated the Gospel *medium* between Pelagianism and Antinomian-Solifidianism, more properly named Sterilifidianism. It is, indeed, faith alone that saves us; but it is such a faith as can not be alone. Purity and beneficence are the *epidermis*, faith and love the *cutis vera* of Christianity. Morality is the outward cloth, faith the lining; both together form the wedding-garment given to the true believer in Christ, even his own garment of righteousness, which, like the loaves and fishes, he mysteriously multiplies. The images of the sun in the earthly dew-drops are unsubstantial phantoms; but God's thoughts are things: the images of God, of the Sun of Righteousness, in the spiritual dew-drops are substances, imperishable substances.

Ib. p. 154.

Fine-spun speculations and curious reasonings lead men from simple truth and implicit faith into many dangerous and destructive errors. The Word records many instances of such for our caution. Be warned to study simplicity and godly sincerity.—*Note in Edwards on Doubting Castle.*

And pray what does implicit faith lead men into? Transubstantiation and all the abominations of priest-worship. And where is the Scriptural authority for this implicit faith? Assuredly not in St. John, who tells us that Christ's life is and manifests itself in us as the light of man; that he came to bring

light as well as immortality. Assuredly not in St. Paul, who declares all faith imperfect and perilous without insight and understanding; who prays for us that we may comprehend the deep things even of God himself. For the Spirit discerned, and the Spirit by which we discern, are both God; the Spirit of truth through and in Christ from the Father.

Mournful are the errors into which the zealous but unlearned preachers among the dissenting Calvinists have fallen respecting absolute election, and discriminative, yet reasonless, grace;—fearful this divorcement of the Holy Will, the one only Absolute Good, that, eternally affirming itself as the I AM, eternally generateth the Word, the Absolute Being, the Supreme Reason, the Being of all Truth, the Truth of all Being:—fearful the divorcement from the reason; fearful the doctrine which maketh God a power of darkness, instead of the God of light, the Father of the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world! This we know and this we are taught by the holy Apostle Paul; that without will there is no ground or base of sin; that without the law this ground or base can not become sin (hence we do not impute sin to the wolf or the tiger, as being without or below the law); but that with the law cometh light into the will; and by this light the will becometh a free, and therefore a responsible will. Yea! the law is itself light, and the divine light becomes law by its relation and opposition to the darkness; the will of God revealed in its opposition to the dark and alien will of the fallen Spirit. This freedom, then, is the free gift of God; but does it therefore cease to be freedom? All the sophistry of the Predestinarians rests on the false notion of eternity as a sort of time antecedent to time. It is timeless, present with and in all times. There is an excellent discourse of the great Hooker's affixed with two or three others to his Ecclesiastical Polity, on the final perseverance of Saints;* but yet I am very desirous to meet with some judicious experimental treatise, in which the doctrine, with the Scriptures on which it is grounded, is set forth more at large; as likewise the rules by which it may be applied to the purposes of support and comfort, without danger of causing presumption, and without diminishing the dread of sin. Above all, I am anxious to see the subject treated with as little

* Sermon of the certainty and perpetuity of faith in the elect. Vol. iii. p. 583, Keale's edit.—*Ed.*

reference as possible to the divine predestination and foresight; the argument from the latter being a mere identical proposition followed by an assertion of God's prescience. Those who will persevere, will persevere, and God foresees; and as to the proof from predestination, that is, that he who predestines the end necessarily predestines the adequate means, I can more readily imagine logical consequences adverse to the sense of responsibility than Christian consequences, such as an individual may apply for his own edification. And I am persuaded that the doctrine does not need these supports, according, I mean, to the ordinary notion of predestination. The predestinative force of a free agent's own will in certain absolute acts, determinations, or elections, and in respect of which acts it is one either with the divine or the devilish will; and if the former, the conclusions to be drawn from God's goodness, faithfulness, and spiritual presence; these supply grounds of argument of a very different character, especially where the mind has been prepared by an insight into the error and hollowness of the antithesis between liberty and necessity.

Ib. p. 178.

But how contrary to this is the walk and conduct of some who profess to be pilgrims, and yet can wilfully and deliberately go upon the Devil's ground, and indulge themselves in carnal pleasures and sinful diversions. *Note in Edwards on the Enchanted Ground.*

But what pleasures are carnal,—what are sinful diversions,—so I mean as that I may be able to determine what are not? Show us the criterion, the general principle; at least explain whether each individual case is to be decided for the individual by his own experience of the effects of the pleasure or the diversion, in dulling or distracting his religious feelings; or can a list, a complete list, of all such pleasures be made beforehand?

PART III.

In initio.

I strongly suspect that this third part, which ought not to have been thus conjoined with Bunyan's work, was written by a Roman Catholic priest, for the very purpose of counteracting the doctrine of faith so strongly enforced in the genuine Progress.

Ib. p. 443, in Edwards.

Against all which evils fasting is the proper remedy.

It would have been well if the writer had explained exactly what he meant by the fasting here so strongly recommended; during what period of time abstinence from food is to continue, and so on. The effects, I imagine, must in good measure depend on the health of the individual. In some constitutions, fasting so disorders the stomach as to produce the very contrary of good;—confusion of mind, loose imaginations against the man's own will, and the like.

In fine.

One of the most influential arguments, one of those the force of which I feel even more than I see, for the divinity of the New Testament, and with especial weight in the writings of John and Paul, is the unspeakable difference between them and all other the earliest extant writings of the Christian Church, even those of the same age (as, for example, the Epistle of Barnabas) or of the next following,—a difference that transcends all degree, and is truly a difference in kind. Nay, the catalogue of the works written by the Reformers and in the two centuries after the Reformation, contain many, many volumes far superior in Christian light and unction to the best of the Fathers. How poor and unevangelic is Hermas in comparison with our Pilgrim's Progress!

NOTES ON SELECT DISCOURSES BY JOHN SMITH.*

It would make a delightful and instructive essay, to draw up a critical and (where possible) biographical account of the Latitudinarian party at Cambridge, from the close of the reign of James I. to the latter half of Charles II. The greater number were Platonists, so called at least, and such they believed themselves to be, but more truly Plotinists. Thus Cudworth, Dr. Jackson (chaplain of Charles I., and vicar of Newcastle-on-Tyne), Henry More, this John Smith, and some others. Taylor was a Gassendist, or *inter Epicureos evangelizantes*, and, as far as I know, he is the only exception. They were all alike admirers of Grotius, which in Jeremy Taylor was consistent with the tone of his philosophy. The whole party, however, and a more amiable never existed, were scared and disgusted into this

* Of Queen's College, Cambridge. 1660.

by the catachrestic language and skeleton half-truths of the systematic divines of the Synod of Dort on the one hand, and by the sickly broodings of the Pietists and Solomon's-Song preachers on the other. What they all wanted was a pre-inquisition into the mind, as part organ, part constituent, of all knowledge, an examination of the scales, weights, and measures themselves abstracted from the objects to be weighed or measured by them; in short, a transcendental æsthetic, logic, and noetic. Lord Herbert was at the entrance of, nay, already some paces within, the shaft and adit of the mine, but he turned abruptly back, and the honor of establishing a complete προπαιδεία of philosophy was reserved for Immanuel Kant, a century or more afterwards.

From the confounding of Plotinism with Platonism, the Latitudinarian divines fell into the mistake of finding in the Greek philosophy many anticipations of the Christian Faith, which in fact were but its echoes. The inference is as perilous as inevitable, namely, that even the mysteries of Christianity needed no revelation, having been previously discovered and set forth by unaided reason.

The argument from the mere universality of the belief, appears to me far stronger in favor of a surviving soul and a state after death, than for the existence of the Supreme Being. In the former, it is one doctrine in the Englishman and in the Hottentot; the differences are accidents not affecting the subject, otherwise than as different seals would affect the same wax, though Molly, the maid, used her thimble, and Lady *Virtuosa* an *intaglio* of the most exquisite workmanship. Far otherwise in the latter. *Mumbo Jumbo*, or the *cercocheronychous Nick-Senior*, or whatever score or score thousand invisible huge men fear and fancy engender in the brain of ignorance to be hatched by the nightmare of defenceless and self-conscious weakness,—these are not the same as, but are *toto genere* diverse from, the *una et unica substantia* of Spinosa, or the World-God of the Stoics. And each of these again is as diverse from the living Lord God, the creator of heaven and earth. Nay, this equivoque on God is as mischievous as it is illogical: it is the sword and buckler of Deism.

OF THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD.

Besides, when we review our own immortal souls and their dependency upon some Almighty mind, we know that we neither did nor could produce ourselves, and withal know that all that power which lies within the compass of ourselves will serve for no other purpose than to apply several pre-existent things one to another, from whence all generations and mutations arise, which are nothing else but the events of different applications and complications of bodies that were existent before; and therefore that which produced that substantial life and mind by which we know ourselves, must be something much more mighty than we are, and can be no less indeed than omnipotent, and must also be the first architect and δημιουργὸς of all other beings, and the perpetual supporter of them.

A Rhodian leap! Where our knowledge of a cause is derived from our knowledge of the effect, which is falsely (I think) here supposed, nothing can be logically, that is, apodeictically, inferred, but the adequacy of the former to the latter. The mistake, common to Smith, with a hundred other writers, arises out of an equivocal use of the word 'know.' In the scientific sense, as implying insight, and which ought to be the sense of the word in this place, we might be more truly said to know the soul by God, than to know God by the soul.

So the Sibyl was noted by Heraclitus as *μαινομένῳ στόματι γελαστὰ καὶ ἀκαλλώπιστα φθεγγομένη*, 'as one speaking ridiculous and unseemly speeches with her furious mouth.'

This fragment is misquoted and misunderstood: for *γελαστὰ* it should be *ἀμυριστὰ* unperfumed, inornate lays, not redolent of art.—Render it thus:

——— Not hers
To win the sense by words of rhetoric,
Lip-blossoms breathing perishable sweets;
But by the power of the informing Word
Roll sounding onward through a thousand years
Her deep prophetic bodements.

Στόματι μαινομένῳ is with ecstatic mouth.

If the ascetic virtues, or disciplinary exercises, derived from the schools of philosophy (Pythagorean, Platonic, and Stoic) were carried to an extreme in the middle ages, it is most certain that

they are at present in a far more grievous disproportion underrated and neglected. The *regula maxima* of the ancient ἄσκησις was to conquer the body by abstracting the attention from it. Our maxim is to conciliate the body by attending to it, and counteracting or precluding one set of sensations by another, the servile dependence of the mind on the body remaining the same. Instead of the due subservience of the body to the mind (the favorite language of our Sidneys and Miltons) we hear nothing at present but of health, good digestion, pleasurable state of general feeling, and the like.

NOTES ON LUTHER'S TABLE TALK.*

I CAN NOT meditate too often, too deeply, or too devotionally on the personeity of God, and his personality in the Word, Υἱῷ τῷ μονογενεῖ, and thence on the individuity of the responsible creature ;—that it is a perfection which, not indeed in my intellect, but yet in my habit of feeling, I have too much confounded with that *complexus* of visual images, cycles or customs of sensations, and fellow-travelling circumstances (as the ship to the mariner), which make up our empirical self : thence to bring myself to apprehend livelily the exceeding mercifulness and love of the act of the Son of God, in descending to seek after the prodigal children, and to house with them in the sty. Likewise by the relation of my own understanding to the light of reason, and (the most important of all the truths that have been vouchsafed to me) ! to the will which is the reason,—will in the form of reason —I can form a sufficient gleam of the possibility of the subsistence of the human soul in Jesus to the Eternal Word, and how it might perfect itself so as to merit glorification and abiding union with the Divinity ; and how this gave a humanity to our Lord's righteousness no less than to his sufferings. Doubtless, as God, as the absolute Alterity of the Absolute, he could not suf-

* *Doctoris Martini Lutheri Colloquia Mensalia :* or Dr. Martin Luther's Divine Discourses at his Table, &c. Collected first together by Dr. Antonius Lauterbach, and afterwards disposed into certain common-places by John Aurifaber, Doctor in Divinity. Translated by Capt. Henry Bell. *Folio.* London, 1652.

fer; but that he could not lay aside the absolute, and by union with the creaturely become affectible, and a second, but spiritual Adam, and so as afterwards to be partaker of the absolute in the Absolute, even as the Absolute had partaken of passion (τοῦ πάσχειν) and infirmity in it, that is, the finite and fallen creature;—this can be asserted only by one who (unconsciously perhaps), has accustomed himself to think of God as a thing,—having a necessity of constitution, that wills, or rather tends and inclines to this or that, because it is this or that, not as being that, which is that which it wills to be. Such a necessity is truly compulsion; nor is it in the least altered in its nature by being assumed to be eternal, in virtue of an endless remotion or retrusion of the constituent cause, which being manifested by the understanding becomes a foreseen despair of a cause.—Sunday, 11th February, 1826.

One argument strikes me in favor of the tenet of Apostolic succession, in the ordination of Bishops and Presbyters, as taught by the Church of Rome, and by the larger part of the earlier divines of the Church of England, which I have not seen in any of the books on this subject; namely, that in strict analogy with other parts of Christian history, the miracle itself contained a check upon the inconvenient consequences necessarily attached to all miracles, as miracles, narrowing the possible claims to any rights not provable at the bar of universal reason and experience. Every man among the Sectaries, however ignorant, may justify himself in scattering stones and fire-squibs by an alleged unction of the Spirit. The miracle becomes perpetual, still beginning, never ending. Now on the Church doctrine, the original miracle provides for the future recurrence to the ordinary and calculable laws of the human understanding and moral sense; instead of leaving every man a judge of his own gifts, and of his right to act publicly on that judgment. The initiative alone is supernatural; but all beginning is necessarily miraculous, that is, hath either no antecedent, or one ἑτέρου γενοῦς, which therefore is not its, but merely an, antecedent,—or an incausative alien coincident in time; as if, for instance, Jack's shout were followed by a flash of lightning, which should strike and precipitate the ball on St. Paul's cathedral. This would be a miracle as long as no causative *nexus* was conceivable between the antecedent, the noise of the shout, and the consequent, the atmospheric discharge.

The Epistle Dedicatory.

But this will be your glory and inexpugnable, if you cleave in truth and practice to God's holy service, worship and religion: that religion and faith of the Lord Jesus Christ, which is pure and undefiled before God even the Father, which is to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep yourselves unspotted from the world.—*James* i. 27.

Few mis-translations (unless indeed the word used by the translator of St. James meant differently from its present meaning) have led astray more than this rendering of θρησκεία (outward or ceremonial worship, *cultus*, divine service) by the English *religion*. St. James sublimely says: What the *ceremonies* of the law were to morality, *that* morality itself is to the faith in Christ, that is, its outward symbol, not the substance itself.

Chap. i. pp. 1, 2.

That the Bible is the word of God (said Luther) the same I prove as followeth:—All things that have been and now are in the world; also how it now goeth and standeth in the world, the same was written altogether particularly at the beginning, in the first book of Moses concerning the creation. And even as God made and created it, even so it was, even so it is, and even so doth it stand to this present day. And although King Alexander the Great, the kingdom of Egypt, the Empire of Babel, the Persian, Grecian and Roman monarchs; the Emperors Julius and Augustus most fiercely did rage and swell against this Book, utterly to suppress and destroy the same; yet notwithstanding they could prevail nothing, they are all gone and vanished; but this Book from time to time hath remained, and will remain unremoved in full and ample manner as it was written at the first.

A proof worthy of the manly mind of Luther, and compared with which the Grotian pretended demonstrations, from Grotius himself to Paley, are mischievous underminings of the Faith, pleadings fitter for an Old Bailey thieves' counsellor than for a Christian divine. The true evidence of the Bible is the Bible,—of Christianity the living fact of Christianity itself, as the manifest *archeus* or predominant of the life of the planet.

Ib. p. 4.

The art of the School divines (said Luther) with their speculations in the Holy Scriptures, are merely vain and human cogitations, spun out of their own natural wit and understanding. They talk much of the union of the will and understanding, but all is mere fantasy and fondness. The right and true speculation (said Luther) is this, Believe in Christ; do what thou oughtest to do in thy vocation, &c. This is the only practice in divinity. Also, *Mystica Theologia Dionysii* is a mere fable, and a lie, like to Plato's fables. *Omnia sunt non ens, et omnia sunt ens;* all is something, and all is nothing, and so he leaveth all hanging in frivolous and idle sort.

Still, however, *du theure Mann Gottes, mein verehrter Luther!* reason, will, understanding are words, to which real entities correspond; and we may in a sound and good sense say that reason is the ray, the projected disk or image, from the Sun of Righteousness, an echo from the Eternal Word—*the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world;* and that when the will placeth itself in a right line with the reason, there ariseth the spirit through which the will of God floweth into and actuates the will of man, so that it willeth the things of God, and the understanding is enlivened, and thenceforward useth the materials supplied to it by the senses symbolically; that is, with an insight into the true substance thereof.

Ib. p. 9.

The Pope usurpeth and taketh to himself the power to expound and to construe the Scriptures according to his pleasure. What he saith, must stand and be spoken as from heaven. Therefore let us love and preciously value the divine word, that thereby we may be able to resist the Devil and his swarm.

As often as I use in prayer the 16th verse of the 71st Psalm (in our Prayer-book version), my thoughts especially revert to the subject of the right appreciation of the Scriptures, and in what sense the Bible may be called the word of God, and how and under what conditions the unity of the Spirit is translucent through the letter, which, read as the letter merely, is the word of this and that pious but fallible and imperfect man. Alas for the superstition, where the words themselves are made to be the Spirit! O might I live but to utter all my meditations on this most concerning point!

Ib. p. 12.

Bullinger said once in my hearing (said Luther) that he was earnest against the Anabaptists, as contemners of God's word, and also against those which attributed too much to the literal word, for (said he) such do sin against God and his almighty power; as the Jews did in naming the ark, God. But (said he), whoso holdeth a mean between both, the same is taught what is the right use of the word and sacraments.

Whereupon (said Luther) I answered him and said; Bullinger, you err, you know neither yourself, nor what you hold; I mark well your tricks and fallacies: Zuinglius and Œcolampadius likewise proceeded too far in the ungodly meaning: but when Brentius withstood them, they then lessened their opinions, alleging, they did not reject the literal word, but only condemned certain gross abuses. By this your error you cut in sunder and separate the word and the spirit, &c.

In my present state of mind, and with what light I now enjoy,—(may God increase it, and cleanse it from the dark mist into the *lumen siccum* of sincere knowledge!)—I can not persuade myself that this vehemence of our dear man of God against Bullinger, Zuinglius and Œcolampadius on this point could have had other origin, than his misconception of what they intended. But Luther spoke often (I like him and love him all the better therefor) in his moods and according to the mood. Was not that a different mood, in which he called St. James's Epistle a 'Jack-Straw poppet;' and even in this work selects one verse as the best in the whole letter,—evidently meaning the only verse of any great value? Besides he accustomed himself to use the term, 'the word,' in a very wide sense when the narrower would have cramped him. When he was on the point of rejecting the Apocalypse, then 'the word' meant the spirit of the Scriptures collectively.

Ib. p. 21.

I (said Luther) do not hold that children are without faith when they are baptized; for inasmuch as they are brought to Christ by his command, and that the Church prayeth for them; therefore, without all doubt, faith is given unto them, although with our natural sense and reason we neither see nor understand it.

Nay, but dear honored Luther! is this fair? If Christ or Scripture had said in one place, *Believe, and thou mayest be baptized;* and in another place, *Baptize infants;* then we might perhaps be allowed to reconcile the two seemingly jarring texts, by such words as "faith is given to them, although, &c." But when no such text, as the latter, is to be found, nor any one instance as a substitute, then your conclusion seems arbitrary.

Ib. p. 25.

This argument (said Luther) concludeth so much as nothing; for, although they had been angels from heaven, yet that troubleth me nothing at all; we are now dealing about God's word, and with the truth of the Gospel, that is a matter of far greater weight to have the same kept and preserved pure and clear; therefore we (said Luther) neither care nor trouble ourselves for, and about, the greatness of Saint Peter and the other Apostles, or how many and great miracles they wrought: the thing which we strive for is, that the truth of the Holy Gospel may stand; for God regardeth not men's reputations nor persons.

Oh, that the dear man Luther had but told us here what he meant by the term, Gospel! That St. Paul had seen even St.

Luke's, is but a conjecture, grounded on a conjectural interpretation of a single text, doubly equivocal; namely, that the Luke mentioned was the same with the Evangelist Luke; and that the *evangelium* signified a book; the latter, of itself improbable, derives its probability from the undoubtedly very strong probability of the former. If then not any book, much less the four books, now called the four Gospels, were meant by Paul, but the contents of those books, as far as they are veracious, and whatever else was known on equal authority at that time, though not contained in those books; if, in short, the whole sum of Christ's acts and discourses be what Paul meant by the Gospel; then the argument is circuitous, and returns to the first point,—What *is* the Gospel? Shall we believe you, and not rather the companions of Christ, the eye and ear witnesses of his doings and sayings? Now I should require strong inducements to make me believe that St. Paul had been guilty of such palpably false logic; and I therefore feel myself compelled to infer, that by the Gospel Paul intended the eternal truths known ideally from the beginning, and historically realized in the manifestation of the Word in Christ Jesus; and that he used the ideal immutable truth as the canon and criterion of the oral traditions. For example, a Greek mathematician, standing in the same relation of time and country to Euclid as that in which St. Paul stood to Jesus Christ, might have exclaimed in the same spirit: "What do you talk to me of this, that, and the other intimate acquaintance of Euclid's? My object is to convey the sublime system of geometry which he realized, and by that must I decide." "I," says St. Paul, "have been taught by the spirit of Christ, a teaching susceptible of no addition, and for which no personal anecdotes, however reverendly attested, can be a substitute." But dearest Luther was a translator; he could not, must not, see this.

Ib. p. 32.

That God's word, and the Christian Church, is preserved against the raging of the world.

The Papists have lost the cause; with God's word they are not able to resist or withstand us. * * * *The kings of the earth stand up, and the rulers take counsel together*, &c. God will deal well enough with these angry gentlemen, and will give them but small thanks for their labor, in going about to suppress his word and servants; he hath sat in counsel above these five thousand five hundred years, hath ruled and made laws. Good Sirs! be not so choleric; go further from the wall, lest you knock

your pates against it. *Kiss the Son lest he be angry*, &c. That is, take hold on Christ, or the Devil will take hold on you, &c.

The second Psalm (said Luther) is a proud Psalm against those fellows. It begins mild and simply, but it endeth stately and rattling. * * * I have now angered the Pope about his images of idolatry. O! how the sow raiseth her bristles! * * The Lord saith: *Ego suscitabo vos in novissimo die:* and then he will call and say: ho! Martin Luther, Philip Melancthon, Justus Jonas, John Calvin, &c. Arise, come up, * * * Well on (said Luther), let us be of good comfort.

A delicious paragraph. How our fine preachers would turn up their Tom-tit beaks and flirt with their tails at it! But this is the way in which the man of life, the man of power, sets the dry bones in motion.

Chap. ii. p. 37.

This is the thanks that God hath for his grace, for creating, for redeeming, sanctifying, nourishing, and for preserving us: such a seed, fruit, and godly child is the world. O, woe be to it!

Too true.

Ib. p. 54.

That out of the best comes the worst.

Out of the Patriarchs and holy Fathers came the Jews that crucified Christ; out of the Apostles came Judas the traitor; out of the city Alexandria (where a fair illustrious and famous school was, and from whence proceeded many upright and godly learned men), came Arius and Origenes.

Poor Origen! Surely Luther was put to it for an instance, and had never read the works of that very best of the old Fathers, and eminently upright and godly learned man.

Ib.

The sparrows are the least birds, and yet they are very hurtful, and have the best nourishment.

Ergo digni sunt omni persecutione. Poor little Philip Sparrows! Luther did not know that they more than earn their good wages by destroying grubs and other small vermin.

Ib. p. 61.

He that without danger will know God, and will speculate of him, let him look first into the manger, that is, let him begin below, and let him first learn to know the Son of the Virgin Mary, born at Bethlehem, that lies and sucks in his mother's bosom; or let one look upon him hanging on the Cross. * * But take good heed in any case of high climbing cogitations, to clamber up to heaven without this ladder, namely, the Lord Christ in his humanity.

To know God as God (τὸν Ζῆνα, the living God) we must as-

sume his personality: otherwise what were it but an ether, a gravitation?—but to assume his personality, we must begin with his humanity, and this is impossible but in history; for man is an historical—not an eternal being. *Ergo.* Christianity is of necessity historical and not philosophical only.

Ib. p. 62.

What is that to thee? said Christ to Peter. *Follow thou me*—me, follow me, and not thy questions, or cogitations.

Lord! keep us looking to, and humbly following, thee!

Chap. vi. p. 103.

The philosophers and learned heathen (said Luther) have described God, that he is as a circle, the point whereof in the midst is everywhere; but the circumference, which on the outside goeth round about, is nowhere: herewith they would show that God is all, and yet is nothing.

What a huge difference the absence of a blank space, which is nothing, or next to nothing, may make! The words here should have been printed, "God is all, and yet is no thing;" For what does 'thing' mean? Itself, that is, the *ing*, or inclosure, that which is contained within an outline, or circumscribed. So likewise to *think* is to inclose, to determine, confine and define. To think an infinite is a contradiction in terms equal to a boundless bound. So in German *Ding*, *denken;* in Latin *res*, *reor*.

Chap. vii. p. 113.

Helvidius alleged the mother of Christ was not a virgin; so that according to his wicked allegation, Christ was born in original sin.

O, what a tangle of impure whimsies has this notion of an immaculate conception, an Ebionite tradition, as I think, brought into the Christian Church! I have sometimes suspected that the Apostle John had a particular view to this point, in the first half of the first chapter of his Gospel. Not that I suppose our present Matthew then in existence, or that, if John had seen the Gospel according to Luke, the *Christopædia* had been already prefixed to it. But the rumor might have been whispered about, and as the purport was to give a psilanthropic explanation and solution of the phrases, Son of God and Son of Man,—so Saint John met it by the true solution, namely, the eternal Filiation of the Word.

Ib. p. 120. Of Christ's riding into Jerusalem.

But I hold (said Luther) that Christ himself did not mention that prophecy of Zechariah, but rather, that the Apostles and Evangelists did use it for a witness.

Worth remembering for the purpose of applying it to the text in which our Lord is represented in the first (or Matthew's) Gospel, and by that alone, as citing Daniel by name. It was this text that so sorely, but I think very unnecessarily, perplexed and gravelled Bentley, who was too profound a scholar and too acute a critic to admit the genuineness of the whole of that book.

Ib.

The Prophets (said Luther) did set, speak, and preach of the second coming of Christ in manner as we now do.

I regret that Mr. Irving should have blended such extravagancies and presumptuous prophesyings with his support and vindication of the Millennium, and the return of Jesus in his corporeal individuality,—because these have furnished divines in general, both Churchmen and Dissenting, with a pretext for treating his doctrine with silent contempt. Had he followed the example of his own Ben Ezra, and argued temperately and learnedly, the controversy must have forced the momentous question on our Clergy:—Are Christians bound to believe whatever an Apostle believed,—and in the same way and sense? I think Saint Paul himself lived to doubt the solidity of his own literal interpretation of our Lord's words.

The whole passage in which our Lord describes his coming is so evidently, and so intentionally expressed in the diction and images of the Prophets, that nothing but the carnal literality common to the Jews at that time and most strongly marked in the disciples, who were among the least educated of their countrymen, could have prevented the symbolic import and character of the words from being seen. The whole Gospel and the Epistles of John, are a virtual confutation of this reigning error—and no less is the Apocalypse whether written by, or under the authority of, the Evangelist.

The unhappy effect which St. Paul's (may I not say) incautious language respecting Christ's return produced on the Thessalonians, led him to reflect on the subject, and he instantly in the second epistle to them qualified the doctrine, and never afterwards resumed it; but on the contrary, in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, c. 15, substitutes the doctrine of immortality in a celestial state and a spiritual body. On the nature of our Lord's future epiphany or phenomenal person, I am not ashamed to ac-

knowledge, that my views approach very nearly to those of Emanuel Swedenborg.

Ib. p. 121.

Doctor Jacob Schenck never preacheth out of his book, but I do (said Luther), though not of necessity, but I do it for example's sake to others.

As many notes, *memoranda*, cues of connection and transition as the preacher may find expedient or serviceable to him; well and good. But to read in a manuscript book, as our Clergy now do, is not to preach at all. Preach out of a book, if you must; but do not read in it, or even from it. A read sermon of twenty minutes will seem longer to the hearers than a free discourse of an hour.

Ib.

My simple opinion is (said Luther) and I do believe that Christ for us descended into hell, to the end he might break and destroy the same, as in Psalm xvi. and Acts ii. is showed and proved.

Could Luther have been ignorant, that this clause was not inserted into the Apostle's Creed till the sixth century after Christ? I believe the original intention of the clause was no more than *vere mortuus est*—in contradiction to the hypothesis of a trance or state of suspended animation.

Chap. vii. p. 122.

When Christ (said Luther) forbiddeth to spread abroad or to make known his works of wonder; there he speaketh as being sent from the Father, and doth well and right therein in forbidding them, to the end that thereby he might leave us an example, not to seek our own praise and honor in that wherein we do good; but we ought to seek only and alone the honor of God.

Not satisfactory. Doubtless, the command was in connection with the silence enjoined respecting his Messiahship.

Chap. viii. p. 147.

Doctor Hennage said to Luther, Sir, where you say that the Holy Spirit is the certainty in the word towards God, that is, that a man is certain of his own mind and opinion; then it must needs follow that all sects have the Holy Ghost, for they will needs be most certain of their doctrine and religion.

Luther might have answered, "positive, you mean, not certain."

Chap. ix. p. 160.

But who hath power to forgive or to detain sins? Answer; the Apostles

and all Church servants, and (in case of necessity) every Christian. Christ giveth them not power over money, wealth, kingdoms, &c.; but over sins and the consciences of human creatures, over the power of the Devil, and the throat of Hell.

Few passages in the Sacred Writings have occasioned so much mischief, abject slavishness, bloated pride, tyrannous usurpation, bloody persecution, with kings even against their will the drudges, false soul-destroying quiet of conscience, as this text, *John* xx. 23, misinterpreted. It is really a tremendous proof of what the misunderstanding of a few words can do. That even Luther partook of the delusion, this paragraph gives proof. But that a delusion it is; that the commission given to the Seventy whom Christ sent out to proclaim and offer the kingdom of God, and afterwards to the Apostles, refers either to the power of making rules and ordinances in the Church, or otherwise to the gifts of miraculous healing, which our Lord at that time conferred on them; and that *per figuram causæ pro effecto*, 'sins' here mean diseases, seems to me more than probable. At all events, the text surely does not mean that the salvation of a repentant and believing Christian depends upon the will of a priest in absolution.

Ib. p. 161.

And again, they are able to absolve and make a human creature free and loose from all his sins, if in case he repenteth and believeth in Christ; and on the contrary, they are able to detain all his sins, if he doth not repent and believeth not in Christ.

In like manner if he sincerely repent and believe, his sins are forgiven, whether the minister absolve him or not. Now if $M + 5 = 5$, and $5 - M = 5$, $M = 0$. If he be impenitent and unbelieving, his sins are detained, no doubt, whether the minister do or do not detain them.

Ib. p. 163.

Adam was created of God in such sort righteous, as that he became of a righteous an unrighteous person; as Paul himself argueth, and withal instructeth himself, where he saith, The law is not given for a righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient.

This follows from the very definition or idea of righteousness; —it is itself the law;—*πᾶς γὰρ δίκαιος αὐτονόμος.*

Ib.

The Scripture saith, God maketh the ungodly righteous; there he calleth

us all, one with another, despairing and wicked wretches; for what will an ungodly creature not dare to accomplish, if he may but have occasion, place, and opportunity?

That is with a lust within correspondent to the temptation from without.

A Christian's conscience, methinks, ought to be a *Janus bifrons*,—a Gospel-face retrospective, and smiling through penitent tears on the sins of the past, and a Moses-face looking forward in frown and menace, frightening the harlot will into a holy abortion of sins conceived but not yet born, perchance not yet quickened. The fanatic Antinomian reverses this; for the past he requires all the horrors of remorse and despair, till the moment of assurance; thenceforward, he may do what he likes, for he can not sin.

Ib. p. 165.

All natural inclinations (said Luther) are either against or without God; therefore none are good. We see that no man is so honest as to marry a wife, only thereby to have children, to love and to bring them up in the fear of God.

This is a very weak instance. If a man had been commanded to marry by God, being so formed as that no sensual delight accompanied, and refused to do so, unless this appetite and gratification were added,—then indeed!

Chap. x. pp. 168–9.

Ah Lord God (said Luther) why should we any way boast of our free-will, as if it were able to do any thing in divine and spiritual matters were they never so small? * * * I confess that mankind hath a free-will, but it is to milk kine, to build houses, &c., and no further: for so long as a man sitteth well and in safety, and sticketh in no want, so long he thinketh he hath a free-will which is able to do something; but, when want and need appeareth, that there is neither to eat nor to drink, neither money nor provision, where is then the free-will? It is utterly lost, and can not stand when it cometh to the pinch. But faith only standeth fast and sure, and seeketh Christ.

Luther confounds free-will with efficient power, which neither does nor can exist save where the finite will is one with the absolute Will. That Luther was practically on the right side in this famous controversy, and that he was driving at the truth, I see abundant reason to believe. But it is no less evident that he saw it in a mist, or rather as a mist with dissolving outline; and as he saw the thing as a mist, so he ever and anon mistakes a

mist for the thing. But Erasmus and Saavedra were equally indistinct; and shallow and unsubstantial to boot. In fact, till the appearance of Kant's *Kritiques* of the pure and of the practical Reason the problem had never been accurately or adequately stated, much less solved.—26 June, 1826.

Ib. p. 174.

Loving friends (said Luther) our doctrine that free-will is dead and nothing at all is grounded powerfully in Holy Scripture.

It is of vital importance for a theological student to understand clearly the utter diversity of the Lutheran, which is likewise the Calvinistic, denial of free-will in the unregenerate, and the doctrine of the modern Necessitarians and (*proh pudor!*) of the later Calvinists, which denies the proper existence of will altogether. The former is sound, Scriptural, compatible with the divine justice, a new, yea, a mighty motive to morality, and, finally, the dictate of common sense grounded on common experience. The latter the very contrary of all these.

Chap. xii. p. 187.

This is now (said Luther), the first instruction concerning the law; namely, that the same must be used to hinder the ungodly from their wicked and mischievous intentions. For the Devil, who is an Abbot and a Prince of this world, driveth and allureth people to work all manner of sin and wickedness; for which cause God hath ordained magistrates, elders, schoolmasters, laws, and statutes, to the end, if they can not do more, yet at least, that they may bind the claws of the Devil, and to hinder him from raging and swelling so powerfully (in those which are his) according to his will and pleasure.

And (said Luther), although thou hadst not committed this or that sin, yet nevertheless, thou art an ungodly creature, &c., but what is done can not be undone, he that hath stolen, let him henceforward steal no more.

Secondly, we use the law spiritually, which is done in this manner; that it maketh the transgressions greater, as Saint Paul saith; that is, that it may reveal and discover to people their sins, blindness, misery, and ungodly doings wherein they were conceived and born; namely, that they are ignorant of God, and are his enemies, and therefore have justly deserved death, hell, God's judgments, his everlasting wrath and indignation. Saint Paul, (said Luther), expoundeth such spiritual offices and works of the law with many words.—*Rom.* vii.

Nothing can be more sound or more philosophic than the contents of these two paragraphs. They afford a sufficient answer to the pretence of the Romanists and Arminians, that by the law St. Paul meant only the ceremonial law.

Ib. p. 189.

And if Moses had not cashiered and put himself out of his office, and had not taken it away with these words (where he saith, *The Lord thy God will raise up unto thee another prophet out of thy brethren; Him shalt thou hear.* (Deut. xviii.) who then at any time would or could have believed the Gospel, and forsaken Moses?

If I could be persuaded that this passage (*Deut.* xviii. 15–19) primarily referred to Christ, and that Christ, not Joshua and his successors, was the prophet here promised; I must either become a Unitarian psilanthrophist, and join Priestley and Belsham,—or abandon to the Jews their own Messiah as yet to come, and cling to the religion of John and Paul, without further reference to Moses than to Lycurgus, Solon and Numa; all of whom in their different spheres no less prepared the way for the coming of the Lord, *the desire of the nations.*

Ib. p. 190.

It is therefore most evident (said Luther), that the law can but only help us to know our sins, and to make us afraid of death. Now sins and death are such things as belong to the world, and which are therein.

Both in Paul and Luther (names which I can never separate), —not indeed peculiar to those, for it is the same in the Psalms, Ezekiel, and throughout the Scriptures, but which I feel most in Paul and Luther,—there is one fearful blank, the wisdom or necessity of which I do not doubt, yet can not help groping and straining after like one that stares in the dark; and this is Death. The law makes us afraid of death. What is death?—an unhappy life? Who does not feel the insufficiency of this answer? What analogy does immortal suffering bear to the only death which is known to us?

Since I wrote the above, God has, I humbly trust, given me a clearer light as to the true nature of the *death* so often mentioned in the Scriptures.

Ib.

It is (said Luther), a very hard matter: yea, an impossible thing for thy human strength, whosoever thou art (without God's assistance that (at such a time when Moses setteth upon thee with this law, and fearfully affrighteth thee, accuseth and condemneth thee, threateneth thee with God's wrath and death) thou shouldest as then be of such a mind: namely, as if no law nor sin had ever been at any time:—I say, it is in a manner a thing impossible, that a human creature should carry himself in such a sort, when he is and feeleth himself assaulted with trials and temptations, and when the con-

science hath to do with God, as then to think no otherwise, than that from everlasting nothing hath been, but only and alone Christ, altogether grace and deliverance.

Yea, verily, Amen and Amen! For this short heroic paragraph contains the sum and substance, the height and the depth of all true philosophy. Most assuredly right difficult it is for us, while we are yet in the narrow chamber of death, with our faces to the dusky falsifying looking-glass that covers the scant end-side of the blind passage from floor to ceiling,—right difficult for us, so wedged between its walls that we can not turn round, nor have other escape possible but by walking backward, to understand that all we behold or have any memory of having ever beholden, yea, our very selves as seen by us, are but shadows, and when the forms that we loved vanish, impossible not to feel as if they were real.

Ib. p. 197.

Nothing that is good proceedeth out of the works of law, except grace be present: for what we are forced to do, the same goeth not from the heart, neither is acceptable.

A law supposes a law-giver, and implies an actuator and executor, and consequently rewards and punishments publicly announced and distinctly assigned to the deeds enjoined or forbidden; and correlatively in the subjects of the law, there are supposed, first, assurance of the being, the power, the veracity and seeingness of the law-giver, in whom I here comprise the legislative, judicial and executive functions; and secondly, self-interest, desire, hope, and fear. Now from this view, it is evident that the deeds or works of the Law are themselves null and dead, deriving their whole significance from their attachment or alligation to the rewards and punishments, even as this diversely shaped and ink-colored paper has its value wholly from the words or meanings, which have been arbitrarily connected therewith; or as a ladder, or flight of stairs, of a provision-loft, or treasury. If the architect or master of the house had chosen to place the store-room or treasury on the ground floor, the ladder or steps would have been useless. The life is divided between the rewards and punishments on the one hand, and the hope and fear on the other; namely, the active life or excitancy belongs to the former, the passive life or excitability to the latter. Call the former the afficients, the latter the affections, the deeds being

merely the signs or impresses of the former, as the seal, on the latter as the wax. Equally evident is it, that the affections are wholly formed by the deeds, which are themselves but the lifeless unsubstantial shapes of the actual forms (*formæ formantes*), namely, the rewards and punishments. Now contrast with this the process of the Gospel. There the affections are formed in the first instance, not by any reference to works or deeds, but by an unmerited rescue from death, liberation from slavish task-work; by faith, gratitude, love, and affectionate contemplation of the exceeding goodness and loveliness of the Saviour, Redeemer, Benefactor: from the affections flow the deeds, or rather the affections overflow in the deeds, and the rewards are but a continuance and continued increase of the free grace in the state of the soul and in the growth and gradual perfecting of that state, which are themselves gifts of the same free grace, and one with the rewards; for in the kingdom of Christ which is the realm of love and inter-community, the joy and grace of each regenerated spirit becomes double, and thereby augments the joys and the graces of the others, and the joys and graces of all unite in each; —Christ, the head, and by his spirit the bond, or unitive *copula* of all, being the spiritual sun whose entire image is reflected in every individual of the myriads of dew-drops. While under the Law, the all was but an aggregate of subjects, each striving after a reward for himself,—not as included in and resulting from the state,—but as the stipulated wages of the task-work, as a loaf of bread may be the pay or bounty promised for the hewing of wood or the breaking of stones!

Ib.

He (said Luther), that will dispute with the Devil, &c.

Queries.

I. Abstractedly from, and independently of, all sensible substances, and the bodies, wills, faculties, and affections of men, has the Devil, or would the Devil have, a personal self-subsistence? Does he, or can he, exist as a conscious individual agent or person? Should the answer to this query be in the negative: then—

II. Do there exist finite and personal beings, whether with composite and decomponible bodies, that is, embodied, or with simple and indecomponible bodies (which is all that can be

meant by disembodied as applied to finite creatures), so eminently wicked, or wicked and mischievous in so peculiar a kind, as to constitute a distinct *genus* of beings under the name of devils ?

III. Is this second *hypothesis* compatible with the acts and functions attributed to the Devil in Scripture ? O ! to have had these three questions put by Melancthon to Luther, and to have heard his reply !

Ib. p. 200.

If (said Luther) God should give unto us a strong and an unwavering faith, then we should be proud, yea also, we should at last contemn Him. Again, if he should give us the right knowledge of the law, then we should be dismayed and faint-hearted, we should not know which way to wind ourselves.

The main reason is, because in this instance, the change in the relation constitutes the difference of the things. A. considered as acting *ab extra* on the selfish fears and desires of men is the Law : the same A. acting *ab intra* as a new nature infused by grace, as the mind of Christ prompting to all obedience, is the Gospel. Yet what Luther says is likewise very true. Could we reduce the great spiritual truths or ideas of our faith to comprehensible conceptions, or (for the thing itself is impossible) fancy we had done so, we should inevitably be 'proud vain asses.'

Ib. p. 203.

And as to know his works and actions, is not yet rightly to know the Gospel (for thereby we know not as yet that he hath overcome sin, death and the Devil) ; even so likewise, it is not as yet to know the Gospel, when we know such doctrine and commandments, but when the voice soundeth, which saith, Christ is thine own with life, with doctrine, with works, death, resurrection, and with all that he hath, doth and may do.

Most true.

Ib. p. 205.

The ancient Fathers said: *Distingue tempora et concordabis Scripturas ;* distinguish the times then may we easily reconcile the Scriptures together.

Yea ! and not only so, but we shall reconcile truths, that seem to repeal this or that passage of Scripture, with the Scriptures. For Christ is with his Church even to the end.

Ib.

I verily believe (said Luther), it (the abolition of the Law) vexed to the heart the beloved St. Paul himself before his conversion.

How dearly Martin Luther loved St. Paul! How dearly would St. Paul have loved Martin Luther! And how impossible, that either should not have done so!

Ib.

In this case, touching the distinguishing the Law from the Gospel, we must utterly expel all human and natural wisdom, reason, and understanding.

All reason is above nature. Therefore by reason in Luther, or rather in his translator, you must understand the reasoning faculty:—that is, the logical intellect, or the intellectual understanding. For the understanding is in all respects a medial and mediate faculty, and has therefore two extremities or poles, the sensual, in which form it is St. Paul's *φρόνημα σαρκὸς*; and the intellectual pole, or the hemisphere (as it were) turned towards the reason. Now the reason (*lux idealis seu spiritualis*) shines down into the understanding, which recognizes the light, *id est*, *lumen a luce spirituali quasi alienigenum aliquid*, which it can only comprehend or describe to itself by attributes opposite to its own essential properties. Now these latter being contingency, and (for though the immediate objects of the understanding are *genera et species*, still they are particular *genera et species*) particularity, it distinguishes the formal light (*lumen*) (not the substantial light, *lux*) of reason by the attributes of the necessary and the universal; and by irradiation of this *lumen* or *shine* the understanding becomes a conclusive or logical faculty. As such it is *Λόγος ἀνθρώπικος*.

Ib. 206.

When Satan saith in thy heart, God will not pardon thy sins, nor be gracious unto thee, I pray (said Luther) how wilt thou then, as a poor sinner, raise up and comfort thyself, especially when other signs of God's wrath besides do beat upon thee, as sickness, poverty, &c. And that thy heart beginneth to preach and say, Behold, here thou livest in sickness, thou art poor and forsaken of every one, &c.

Oh! how true, how affectingly true is this! And when too Satan, the tempter, becomes Satan the accuser, saying in thy heart:—"This sickness is the consequence of sin, or sinful infirmity, and thou hast brought thyself into a fearful dilemma; thou canst not hope for salvation as long as thou continuest in any sinful practice, and yet thou canst not abandon thy daily dose of this or that poison without suicide. For the sin of thy soul

has become the necessity of thy body, daily tormenting thee, without yielding thee any the least pleasurable sensation, but goading thee on by terror without hope. Under such evidence of God's wrath how canst thou expect to be saved?" Well may the heart cry out, "Who shall deliver me from the *body of this death*,—from this death that lives and tyrannizes in my body?" But the Gospel answers—"there is a redemption from the body promised; only cling to Christ. Call on him continually with all thy heart, and all thy soul, to give thee strength, and be strong in thy weakness; and what Christ doth not see good to relieve thee from, suffer in hope. It may be better for thee to be kept humble and in self-abasement. The thorn in the flesh may remain and yet the grace of God through Christ prove sufficient for thee. Only cling to Christ, and do thy best. In all love and well-doing gird thyself up to improve and use aright what remains free in thee, and if thou dost aught aright, say and thankfully believe that Christ has done it for thee." O what a miserable despairing wretch should I become, if I believed the doctrines of Bishop Jeremy Taylor in his Treatise on Repentance, or those I heard preached by Dr. ———; if I gave up the faith, that the life of Christ would precipitate the remaining dregs of sin in the crisis of death, and that I shall rise in purer capacity of Christ; blind to be irradiated by his light, empty to be possessed by his fulness, naked of merit to be clothed with his righteousness!

Ib. p. 267.

The nobility, the gentry, citizens, and farmers, &c., are now become so haughty and ungodly, that they regard no ministers nor preachers; and (said Luther) if we were not holpen somewhat by great princes and persons, we could not long subsist: therefore Isaiah saith well, *And kings shall be their nurses, &c.*

Corpulent nurses too often, that overlay the babe; distempered nurses, that convey poison in their milk!

Chap. xiii. p. 208.

Philip Melancthon said to Luther, The opinion of St. Austin of justification (as it seemeth) was more pertinent, fit and convenient when he disputed not, than it was when he used to speak and dispute; for thus he saith, We ought to censure and hold that we are justified by faith, that is by our regeneration, or by being made new creatures. Now if it be so, then we are not justified only by faith, but by all the gifts and virtues of God given unto us. Now what is your opinion, Sir? Do you hold that a man is justified by this regeneration, as is St. Austin's opinion?

Luther answered and said, I hold this, and am certain, that the true meaning of the Gospel and of the Apostle is, that we are justified before God *gratis*, for nothing, only by God's mere mercy, wherewith and by reason whereof, he imputeth righteousness unto us in Christ.

True; but is it more than a dispute about words? Is not the regeneration likewise *gratis*, only by God's mere mercy? We, according to the necessity of our imperfect understandings, must divide and distinguish. But surely justification and sanctification are one act of God, and only different perspectives of redemption by and through and for Christ. They are one and the same plant, justification the root, sanctification the flower; and (may I not venture to add?) transubstantiation into Christ the celestial fruit.

Ib. pp. 210, 211. Melancthon's sixth reply.

Sir! you say Paul was justified, that is, was received to everlasting life, only for mercy's sake. Against which, I say, if the piece-meal or partial cause, namely our obedience, followeth not; then we are not saved, according to these words, *Woe is me if I preach not the Gospel.* 1 Cor. ix.

Luther's answer.

No piecing or partial cause (said Luther) approacheth thereunto: for faith is powerful continually without ceasing; otherwise, it is no faith. Therefore what the works are, or of what value, the same they are through the honor and power of faith, which undeniably is the sun or sunbeam of this shining.

This is indeed a difficult question; and one, I am disposed to think, which can receive its solution only by the idea, or the act and fact of justification by faith self-reflected. But, humanly considered, this position of Luther's provokes the mind to ask, is there no receptivity of faith, considered as a free gift of God, prerequisite in the individual! Does faith commence by generating the receptivity of itself? If so, there is no difference either in kind or in degree between the receivers and the rejecters of the word, at the moment preceding this reception or rejection; and a stone is a subject as capable of faith as a man. How can obedience exist, where disobedience was not possible? Surely two or three texts from St. Paul, detached from the total *organismus* of his reasoning, ought not to outweigh the plain fact, that the contrary position is implied in, or is an immediate consequent of, our Lord's own invitations and assurances. Everywhere a something is attributed to the will.*

* N. B. I should not have written the above note in my present state of light;—not that I find it false, but that it may have the effect of falsehood by not going deep enough. July, 1829.

Chap. xiii. p. 211.

To conclude, a faithful person is a new creature, a new tree. Therefore all these speeches, which in the law are usual, belong not to this case; as to say *A faithful* person must do good works. Neither were it rightly spoken, to say the sun shall shine: a good tree shall bring forth good fruit, &c. For the sun *shall* not shine, but it doth shine by nature unbidden, it is thereunto created.

This important paragraph is obscure by the translator's ignorance of the true import of the German *soll*, which does not answer to our *shall;* but rather to our *ought*, that is, *should* do this or that,—is under an obligation to do it.

Ib. p. 213.

And I, my loving Brentius, to the end I may better understand this case, do use to think in this manner, namely, as if in my heart were no quality or virtue at all, which is called faith, and love (as the Sophists do speak and dream thereof), but I set all on Christ, and say, my *formalis justitia*, that is, my sure, my constant and complete righteousness (in which is no want nor failing, but is, as before God it ought to be) is Christ my Lord and Saviour.

Aye! this, this is indeed to the purpose. In this doctrine my soul can find rest. I hope to be saved by faith, not by my faith, but by the faith of Christ in me.

Ib. p. 214.

The Scripture nameth the faithful a people of God's saints. But here one may say; the sins which daily we commit, do offend and anger God; how then can we be holy? *Answer.* A mother's love to her child is much stronger than are the excrements and scurf thereof. Even so God's love towards us is far stronger than our filthiness and uncleanness.

Yea, one may say again, we sin without ceasing, and where sin is, there the holy Spirit is not: therefore we are not holy, because the holy Spirit is not in us, who maketh holy. *Answer.* (John xvi. 14.) Now where Christ is, there is the holy Spirit. The text saith plainly, *The holy Ghost shall glorify me*, &c. Now Christ is in the faithful (although they have and feel sins, do confess the same, and with sorrow of heart do complain thereover); therefore sins do not separate Christ from those that believe.

All in this page is true, and necessary to be preached. But O! what need is there of holy prudence to preach it aright, that is, at right times to the right ears! Now this is when the doctrine is necessary and thence comfortable; but where it is not necessary, but only very comfortable, in such cases it would be a narcotic poison, killing the soul by infusing a stupor or counterfeit peace of conscience. Where there are no sinkings of self-abase-

ment, no griping sense of sin and worthlessness, but perhaps the contrary, reckless confidence and self-valuing for good qualities supposed an overbalance for the sins,—there it is not necessary. In short, these are not the truths, that can be preached *ευκαίρως ἀκαίρως, in season and out of season.*

In declining life, or at any time in the hour of sincere humiliation, these truths may be applied in reference to past sins collectively; but a Christian must not, a true however infirm Christian will not, can not, administer them to himself immediately after sinning; least of all immediately before. We ought fervently to pray thus:—"Most holy and most merciful God! by the grace of thy holy Spirit make these promises profitable to me, to preserve me from despairing of thy forgiveness through Christ my Saviour! But O! save me from presumptuously perverting them into a pillow for a stupefied conscience! Give me grace so to contrast my sin with thy transcendent goodness and long-suffering love, as to hate it with an unfeigned hatred for its own exceeding sinfulness.

Ib. pp. 219–20.

Faith is, and consisteth in, a person's understanding, but hope consisteth in the will. * * Faith inditeth, distinguisheth and teacheth, and it is the knowledge and acknowledgment. * * Faith fighteth against error and heresies, it proveth, censureth, and judgeth the spirits and doctrines. * * Faith in divinity is the wisdom and providence, and belongeth to the doctrine. * * Faith is the *dialectica*, for it is altogether wit and wisdom.

Luther in his Postills discourseth far better and more genially of faith than in these paragraphs. Unfortunately, the Germans have but one word for faith and belief—*Glaube*, and what Luther here says, is spoken of belief. Of faith he speaks in the next article but one.

Ib. p. 226.

That regeneration only maketh God's children.

The article of our justification before God (said Luther) is, as it useth to be with a son which is born an heir of all his father's goods, and cometh not thereunto by deserts.

I will here record my experience. Ever when I meet with the doctrine of regeneration and faith and free grace simply announced—"So it is!"—then I believe; my heart leaps forth to welcome it. But as soon as an explanation or reason is added, such explanations, namely, and reasonings as I have anywhere

met with, then my heart leaps back again, recoils, and I exclaim, Nay! Nay! but not so. 25th of September, 1819.

Ib. p. 227.

Doctor Carlestad (said Luther) argueth thus: True it is that faith justifieth, but faith is a work of the first commandment; therefore it justifieth as a work. Moreover, all that the Law commandeth, the same is a work of the Law. Now faith is commanded, therefore faith is a work of the Law. Again, what God will have the same is commanded: God will have faith, therefore faith is commanded.

St. Paul (said Luther) speaketh in such sort of the law, that he separateth it from the promise, which is far another thing than the law. The law is terrestrial, but the promise is celestial. God giveth the law to the end we may thereby be roused up and made pliant; for the commandments do go and proceed against the proud and haughty, which contemn God's gifts; now a gift or present can not be a commandment.

Therefore we must answer according to this rule, *Verba sunt accipienda secundum subjectam materiam.* * * St. Paul calleth that the work of the law, which is done and acted through the knowledge of the law by a constrained will without the holy Spirit; so that the same is a work of the law, which the law earnestly requireth and strictly will have done; it is not a voluntary work, but a forced work of the rod.

And wherein did Carlestad and Luther differ? Not at all, or essentially and irreconcilably, according as the feeling of Carlestad was. If he meant the particular deed, the latter; if the total act, the agent included, then the former.

Chap. xiv. p. 230.

The love towards the neighbor (said Luther) must be like a pure chaste love between bride and bridegroom, where all faults are connived at, covered and borne with, and only the virtues regarded.

In how many little escapes and corner-holes does the sensibility, the fineness (that of which refinement is but a counterfeit, at best but a reflex), the geniality of nature appear in this *son of thunder!* O for a Luther in the present age! Why, Charles!* with the very handcuffs of his prejudices he would knock out the brains (nay, that is impossible, but) he would split the skulls of our *Cristo-galli*, translate the word as you like:—French Christians, or coxcombs!

Ib. pp. 231–2.

Let Witzell know (said Luther), that David's wars and battles, which he fought, were more pleasing to God than the fastings and prayings of the

* Charles Lamb.—*Ed.*

best, of the honestest, and of the holiest monks and friars; much more than the works of our new ridiculous and superstitious friars.

A cordial, rich, and juicy speech, such as shaped itself into, and lived anew in, the Gustavus Adolphuses.

Chap. xv. pp. 293–4.

God most certainly heareth them that pray in faith, and granteth when and how he pleaseth, and knoweth most profitable for them. We must also know, that when our prayers tend to the sanctifying of his name, and to the increase and honor of his kingdom (also that we pray according to his will), then most certainly he heareth. But when we pray contrary to these points, then we are not heard; for God doth nothing against his Name, his kingdom, and his will.

Then (saith the understanding, τὸ φρόνημα σαρκὸς) what doth prayer effect? If A — prayer = B., and A + prayer = B., prayer = 0. The attempt to answer this argument by admitting its invalidity relatively to God, but asserting the efficacy of prayer relatively to the pray-er or precant himself, is merely staving off the objection a single step. For this effect on the devout soul is produced by an act of God. The true answer is, prayer is an idea, and *ens spirituale*, out of the cognizance of the understanding.

The spiritual mind receives the answer in the contemplation of the idea, life as *deitas diffusa*. We can set the life in efficient motion, but not contrary to the form or type. The errors and false theories of great men sometimes, perhaps most often, arise out of true ideas falsified by degenerating into conceptions; or the mind excited to action by an inworking idea, the understanding works in the same direction according to its kind, and produces a counterfeit, in which the mind rests.

This I believe to be the case with the scheme of emanation in Plotinus. God is made a first and consequently a comparative intensity, and matter the last; the whole thence finite; and thence its conceivability. But we must admit a gradation of intensities in reality.

Chap. xvi. p. 247.

When governors and rulers are enemies to God's word, then our duty is to depart, to sell and forsake all we have, to fly from one place to another, as Christ commandeth; we must make and prepare no uproars nor tumults by reason of the Gospel, but we must suffer all things.

Right. But then it must be the lawful rulers; those in whom the sovereign or supreme power is lodged by the known laws and

constitution of the country. Where the laws and constitutional liberties of the nation are trampled on, the subjects do not lose, and are not in conscience bound to forego, their right of resistance, because they are Christians, or because it happens to be a matter of religion, in which their rights are violated. And this was Luther's opinion. Whether, if a Popish Czar shall act as our James II. acted, the Russian Greekists would be justified in doing with him what the English Protestants justifiably did with regard to James, is a knot which I shall not attempt to cut; though I guess the Russians would, by cutting their Czar's throat.

Ib.

But no man will do this, except he be so sure of his doctrine and religion, as that, although I myself should play the fool, and should recant and deny this my doctrine and religion (which God forbid), he notwithstanding therefore would not yield, but say, "If Luther, or an angel from heaven, should teach otherwise, *Let him be accursed.*"

Well and nobly said, thou rare black swan! This, this is the Church. Where this is found, there is the Church of Christ, though but twenty in the whole congregation; and were twenty such in two hundred different places, the Church would be entire in each. Without this no Church.

Ib. p. 248.

And he sent for one of his chiefest privy counsellors, named Lord John *Von Minkwitz*, and said unto him: "You have heard my father say (running with him at tilt), that to sit upright on horseback maketh a good tilter. If therefore it be good and laudable in temporal tilting to sit upright; how much more is it praiseworthy in God's cause to sit, to stand, and to go uprightly and just!"

Princely. So Shakspeare would have made a Prince Elector talk. The metaphor is so grandly in character.

Chap. xvii. p. 249.

Signa sunt subinde facta minora; res autem et facta subinde creverunt.

A valuable remark. As the substance waxed, that is, became more evident, the ceremonial sign waned, till at length in the Eucharist the *signum* united itself with the *significatum*, and became consubstantial. The ceremonial sign, namely, the eating the bread and drinking the wine, became a symbol, that is, a solemn instance and exemplification of the class of mysterious acts, which we are, or as Christians should be, per-

forming daily and hourly in every social duty and recreation. This is indeed to re-create the man in and by Christ. Sublimely did the Fathers call the Eucharist the extension of the Incarnation: only I should have preferred the perpetuation and application of the Incarnation.

Ib.

A bare writing without a seal is of no force.

Metaphors are sorry logic, especially metaphors from human and those too conventional usages to the ordinances of eternal wisdom.

Ib. p. 250.

Luther said, "No. A Christian is wholly and altogether sanctified. * * We must take sure hold on Baptism by faith, as then we shall be, yea, already are, sanctified. In this sort David nameth himself holy."

A deep thought. Strong meat for men. It must not be offered for milk.

Chap. xxi. p. 276.

Then I will declare him openly to the Church, and in this manner I will say: "Loving friends, I declare unto you, how that N. N. hath been admonished: first, by myself in private, afterwards also by two chaplains. thirdly, by two aldermen and churchwardens, and those of the assembly: yet notwithstanding he will not desist from his sinful kind of life. Wherefore I earnestly desire you to assist and aid me, to kneel down with me, and let us pray against him, and deliver him over to the Devil."

Luther did not mean that this should be done all at once: but that a day should be appointed for the congregation to meet for joint consultation, according to the resolutions passed to choose and commission such and such persons to wait on the offender, and to exhort, persuade, and threaten him in the name of the congregation: then, if after due time allowed, this proved fruitless, to kneel down with the minister, &c. Surely, were it only feasible, nothing could be more desirable. But alas! it is not compatible with a Church national, the congregations of which are therefore not gathered nor elected, or with a Church established by law; for law and discipline are mutually destructive of each other, being the same as involuntary and voluntary penance.

Chap. xxii. p. 290.

Wicliffe and Huss opposed and assaulted the manner of life and conversation in Popedom. But I chiefly do oppose and resist their doctrine; I affirm roundly and plainly that they teach not aright. Thereto am I called.

I take the goose by the neck, and set the knife to the throat. When I can maintain that the Pope's doctrine is false (which I have proved and maintained), then I will easily prove and maintain that their manner of life is evil.

This is a remark of deep insight: *verum vere Lutheranum.*
Ib. p. 291.

Ambition and pride (said Luther) are the rankest poison in the Church when they are possessed by preachers. Zuinglius thereby was misled, who did what pleased himself * * * He wrote, "Ye honorable and good princes must pardon me, in that I give you not your titles; for the glass windows are as well illustrious as ye."

One might fancy, in the Vision-of-Mirza style, that all the angry, contemptuous, haughty expressions of good and zealous men, gallant staff-officers in the army of Christ, formed a rick of straw and stubble, which at the last day is to be divided into more or fewer hay-cocks, according to the number of kind and unfeignedly humble and charitable thoughts and speeches that had intervened, and that these were placed in a pile, leap-frog fashion, in the narrow road to the gate of paradise; and burst into flame as the zeal of the individual approached,—so that he must leap over and through them. Now I can not help thinking, that this dear man of God, heroic Luther, will find more opportunities of showing his agility, and reach the gate in a greater sweat and with more blisters *a parte post* than his brother hero, Zuinglius. I guess that the comments of the latter on the Prophets will be found almost sterile in these tiger-lilies and brimstone flowers of polemic rhetoric, compared with the controversy of the former with our Henry VIII., his replies to the Pope's Bulls, and the like.

By-the-by, the joke of the 'glass windows' is lost in the translation. The German for illustrious is *durchlauchtig*, that is, transparent or translucent.

Ib.

When we leave to God his name, his kingdom and will, then will he also give unto us our daily bread, and will remit our sins, and deliver us from the devil and all evil. Only his honor he will have to himself.

A brief but most excellent comment on the Lord's Prayer.
Ib. p. 297.

There was never any that understood the Old Testament so well as St. Paul, except only John the Baptist.

I can not conjecture what Luther had in his mind when he made this exception.

Chap. xxvii. p. 335.

I could wish (said Luther) that the Princes and States of the Empire would make an assembly, and hold a council and a union both in doctrine and ceremonies, so that every one might not break in and run on with such insolency and presumption according to his own brains, as already is begun, whereby many good hearts are offended.

Strange heart of man! Would Luther have given up the doctrine of justification by faith alone, had the majority of the Council decided in favor of the Arminian scheme? If not, by what right could he expect Oecolampadius or Zuinglius to recant their convictions respecting the Eucharist, or the Baptists theirs on Infant Baptism, to the same authority? In fact, the wish expressed in this passage must be considered as a mere flying thought shot out by the mood and feeling of the moment, a sort of conversational flying-fish that dropped as soon as the moisture of the fins had evaporated. The paragraph in p. 336, of what Councils ought to order, should be considered Luther's genuine opinion.

Ib. p. 337.

The council of Nice, held after the Apostles' time (said Luther), was the very best and purest; but soon after in the time of the Emperor Constantine, it was weakened by the Arians.

What Arius himself meant, I do not know: what the modern Arians teach, I utterly condemn; but that the great council of Ariminum was either Arian or heretical I could never discover, or descry any essential difference between its decisions and the Nicene; though I seem to find a serious difference of the pseudo-Athanasian Creed from both. If there be a difference between the Councils of Nicea and Ariminum, it perhaps consists in this;—that the Nicene was the more anxious to assert the equal Divinity in the Filial subordination; the Ariminian to maintain the Filial subordination in the equal Divinity. In both there are three self-subsistent and only one self-originated:—which is the substance of the idea of the Trinity, as faithfully worded as is compatible with the necessary inadequacy of words to the expression of ideas, that is, spiritual truths that can only be spiritually discerned.* 18th August, 1826.

* "Out of the number of 400, there were but 80 Arians at the utmost. The other 320 and more were really orthodox men, induced by artifices to

Chap. xxviii. p. 347.

God's word a Lord of all Lords.

Luther everywhere identifies the living Word of God with the written word, and rages against Bullinger, who contended that the latter is the word of God only as far as and for whom it is the vehicle of the former. To this Luther replies: "My voice, the vehicle of my words, does not cease to be my voice, because it is ignorantly or maliciously misunderstood." Yea! (might Bullinger have rejoined) the instance were applicable and the argument valid, if we were previously assured that all and every part of the Old and New Testament is the voice of the divine Word. But except by the Spirit, whence are we to ascertain this? Not from the books themselves; for not one of them makes the pretension for itself, and the two or three texts, which seem to assert it, refer only to the Law and the Prophets, and nowhere enumerate the books that were given by inspiration: and how obscure the history of the formation of the Canon, and how great the difference of opinion respecting its different parts, what scholar is ignorant?

Chap. xxix. p. 349.

Patres, quamquam sæpe errant, tamen venerandi propter testimonium fidei.

Although I learn from all this chapter, that Luther was no great Patrician (indeed he was better employed), yet I am nearly, if not wholly of his mind respecting the works of the Fathers. Those which appear to me of any great value are valuable chiefly for those articles of Christian Faith which are, as it were, *ante Christum* JESUM, namely, the Trinity, and the primal Incarnation spoken of by John i. 10. But in the main I should perhaps go even farther than Luther; for I can not conceive any thing more likely than that a young man of strong and active intellect, who has no fears, or suffers no fears of worldly prudence to cry, Halt! to him in his career of consequential logic, and who has been *innutritus et juratus* in the Grotio-Paleyan scheme of Christian evidence, and who has been taught by the men and books, which he has been bred up to regard as authority, to consider all inward experiences as fanatical delusions;—I say, I can

subscribe a Creed which they understood in a good sense, but which, being worded in general terms, was capable of being perverted to a bad one." *Waterland, Vindication, &c.*, c. vi.—*Ed.*

scarcely conceive such a young man to make a serious study of the Fathers of the first four or five centuries without becoming either a Romanist or a Deist. Let him only read Petavius and the different Patristic and Ecclesiastico-historical tracts of Semler, and have no better philosophy than that of Locke, no better theology than that of Arminius and Bishop Jeremy Taylor, and I should tremble for his belief. Yet why tremble for a belief which is the very antipode of faith? Better for such a man to precipitate himself on to the utmost goal: for then perhaps he may in the repose of intellectual activity feel the nothingness of his prize, or the wretchedness of it; and then perhaps the inward yearning after a religion may make him ask:—"Have I not mistaken the road at the outset? Am I sure that the Reformers, Luther and the rest collectively, were fanatics?"

Ib. p. 351.

Take no care what ye shall eat. As though that commandment did not hinder the carping and caring for the daily bread.

For 'caring,' read, 'anxiety!' *Sit tibi curæ, non autem solicitudini, panis quotidianus.*

Ib. p. 351.

Even so it was with Ambrose: he wrote indeed well and purely, was more serious in writing than Austin, who was amiable and mild. * * * Fulgentius is the best poet, and far above Horace both with sentences, fair speeches and good actions; he is well worthy to be ranked and numbered with and among the poets.

Der Teufel! Surely the epithets should be reversed. Austin's mildness—the *durus pater infantum!* And the *super*-Horatian effulgence of Master Foolgentius! O Swan! thy critical cygnets are but goslings.

N.B. I have, however, since I wrote the above, heard Mr. J. Hookham Frere speak highly of Fulgentius.

Ib. p. 352.

For the Fathers were but men, and to speak the truth, their reputes and authorities did undervalue and suppress the books and writings of the sacred Apostles of Christ.

We doubtless find in the writings of the Fathers of the second century, and still more strongly in those of the third, passages concerning the Scriptures that seem to say the same as we Protestants now do. But then we find the very same phrases used of writings not Apostolic, or with no other difference than what the

greater name of the authors would naturally produce ; just as a Platonist would speak of Speusippus's books, were they extant, compared with those of later teachers of Platonism ;—'He was Plato's nephew—had seen Plato—was his appointed successor, &c.' But in inspiration the early Christians, as far as I can judge, made no generic difference, let Lardner say what he will. Can he disprove that it was declared heretical by the Church in the second century to believe the written words of a dead Apostle in opposition to the words of a living Bishop, seeing that the same spirit which guided the Apostles dwells in and guides the Bishops of the Church? This at least is certain, that the later the age of the writer, the stronger the expression of comparative superiority of the Scriptures ; the earlier, on the other hand, the more we hear of the *Symbolum*, the *Regula Fidei*, the Creed.

Chap. xxxii. p. 362.

The history of the Prophet Jonas is so great that it is almost incredible ; yea, it soundeth more strange than any of the poets' fables, and (said Luther) if it stood not in the Bible, I should take it for a lie.

It is quite wonderful that Luther, who could see so plainly that the book of Judith was an allegoric poem, should have been blind to the book of Jonas being an apologue, in which Jonah means the Israelitish nation.

Ib. p. 364.

For they entered into the garden about the hour at noonday, and having appetites to eat, she took delight in the apple ; then about two of the clock, according to our account, was the fall.

Milton has adopted this notion in the Paradise Lost—not improbably from this book.

Ib. p. 365.

David made a Psalm of two-and-twenty parts, in each of which are eight verses, and yet in all is but one kind of meaning, namely, he will only say, Thy law or word is good.

I have conjectured that the 119th Psalm might have been a form of ordination, in which a series of candidates made their prayers and profession in the open Temple before they went to the several synagogues in the country.

Ib.

But (said Luther) I say, he did well and right thereon: for the office of a magistrate is to punish the guilty and wicked malefactors. He made a

vow, indeed, not to punish him, but that is to be understood, so long as David lived.

O Luther! Luther! ask your own heart if this is not Jesuit morality.

Chap. xxxiii. p. 367.

I believe (said Luther) the words of our Christian belief were in such sort ordained by the Apostles, who were together, and made this sweet *Symbolum* so briefly and comfortable.

It is difficult not to regret that Luther had so superficial a knowledge of Ecclesiastical antiquities: for example, his belief in this fable of the Creed having been a *picnic* contribution of the twelve Apostles, each giving a sentence. Whereas nothing is more certain than that it was the gradual product of three or four centuries.

Chap. xxxiv. p. 369.

An angel (said Luther) is a spiritual creature created by God without a body for the service of Christendom, especially in the office of the Church.

What did Luther mean by a body? For to me the word seemeth capable of two senses, universal and special:—first, a form indicating to A. B. C. &c., the existence and finiteness of some one other being *demonstrative* as *hic*, and *disjunctive* as *hic et non ille;* and in this sense God alone can be without body: secondly, that which is not merely *hic distinctive*, but *divisive:* yea, a product divisible from the producent as a snake from its skin, a precipitate and death of living power; and in this sense the body is proper to mortality, and to be denied of spirits made perfect as well as of the spirits that never fell from perfection, and perhaps of those who fell below mortality, namely, the devils.

But I am inclined to hold that the Devil has no one body, nay, no body of his own; but ceaselessly usurps or counterfeits bodies; for he is an everlasting liar, yea, the lie which is the colored shadow of the substance that intercepts the truth.

Ib. p. 370.

The devils are in woods, in waters, in wildernesses, and in dark pooly places, ready to hurt and prejudice people, &c.

"The angel's like a flea,
The devil is a bore;—"
No matter for that! quoth S. T. C.
I love him the better therefore.

Yes! heroic Swan, I love thee even when thou gabblest like a goose; for thy geese helped to save the Capitol.

Ib. p. 371.

I do verily believe (said Luther) that the day of judgment draweth near, and that the angels prepare themselves for the fight and combat, and that within the space of a few hundred years they will strike down both Turk and Pope into the bottomless pit of hell.

Yea! two or three more such angels as thyself, Martin Luther, and thy prediction would be, or perhaps would now have been, accomplished.

Chap. xxxv. p. 388.

Cogitations of the understanding do produce no melancholy, but the cogitations of the will cause sadness; as, when one is grieved at a thing, or when one doth sigh and complain, there are melancholy and sad cogitations, but the understanding is not melancholy.

Even in Luther's lowest imbecilities what gleams of vigorous good sense! Had he understood the nature and symptoms of indigestion together with the detail of subjective seeing and hearing, and the existence of mid-states of the brain between sleeping and waking, Luther would have been a greater philosopher; but would he have been so great a hero? I doubt it. Praised be God whose mercy is over all his works; who bringeth good out of evil, and manifesteth his wisdom even in the follies of his servants, his strength in their weakness!

Ib. p. 389.

Whoso prayeth a Psalm shall be made thoroughly warm.

Expertus credo. 19th Aug. 1826.

I have learnt to interpret for myself the imprecating verses of the Psalms of my inward and spiritual enemies, the old Adam and all his corrupt menials; and thus I am no longer, as I used to be, stopped or scandalized by such passages as vindictive and anti-Christian.

Ib.

The Devil (said Luther) oftentimes objected and argued against me the whole cause which, through God's grace, I lead. He objecteth also against Christ. But better it were that the Temple brake in pieces than that Christ should therein remain obscure and hid.

Sublime!

Ib.

In Job are two chapters concerning *Behemoth* the whale, that by reason

of him no man is in safety. * * These are colored words and figures whereby the Devil is signified and showed.

A slight mistake of brother Martin's. The *Behemoth* of Job is beyond a doubt neither whale nor devil, but, I think, the hippopotamus; who is indeed as ugly as the devil, and will occasionally play the devil among the rice-grounds; but though in this respect a devil of a fellow, yet on the whole he is too honest a a monster to be a fellow of devils. *Vindiciæ Behemoticæ.*

Chap. xxxvi. p. 390.

Of Witchcraft.

It often presses on my mind as a weighty argument in proof of at least a negative inspiration, an especial restraining grace, in the composition of the Canonical books, that though the writers individually did (the greater number at least) most probably believe in the objective reality of witchcraft, yet no such direct assertions as these of Luther's, which would with the vast majority of Christians have raised it into an article of faith, are to be found in either Testament. That the *Ob* and *Oboth* of Moses are no authorities for this absurd superstition, has been unanswerably shown by Webster.*

Chap. xxxvii. p. 398.

To conclude (said Luther), I never yet knew a troubled and perplexed man, that was right in his own wits.

A sound observation of great practical utility. Edward Irving should be aware of this in dealing with conscience-troubled (but in fact fancy-vexed) women.

Ib.

It was not a thorn in the flesh touching the unchaste love he bore towards Tecla, as the Papists dream.

I should like to know how high this strange legend can be traced. The other tradition that St. Paul was subject to epileptic fits, has a less legendary character. The phrase *thorn in the flesh* is scarcely reconcilable with Luther's hypothesis, otherwise than as doubts of the objectivity of his vision, and of his after-revelations may have been consequences of the disease, whatever that might be.

Ib. p. 399.

Our Lord God doth like a printer, who setteth the letters backwards; we

* The displaying of supposed Witchcraft, &c. London, *folio*. 1677.—*Ed.*

see and feel well his setting, but we shall see the print yonder in the life to come.

A beautiful simile. Add that even in this world the lives, especially the autobiographies, of eminent servants of Christ, are like the looking-glass or mirror, which, reversing the types, renders them legible to us.

Ib. p. 403.

Indignus sum, sed dignus fui—creari a Deo, &c. Although I am unworthy, yet nevertheless *I have been* worthy, *in that I am* created of God, &c.

The translation does not give the true sense of the Latin. It should be *was* and *to be*. The *dignus fui* has here the sense of *dignum me habuit Deus*. See Herbert's little poem in the Temple,—

Sweetest Saviour, if my soul
Were but worth the having,
Quickly should I then control
Any thought of waving;
But when all my care and pains
Can not give the name of gains
To thy wretch so full of stains,
What delight or hope remains?

Ib. p. 404.

The chiefest physic for that disease (but very hard and difficult it is to be done) is, that they firmly hold such cogitations not to be theirs, but that most sure and certain they come of the Devil.

More and more I understand the immense difference between the Faith-article of *the Devil* (*τοῦ Πονηροῦ*) and the superstitious fancy of devils: *animus objectivus dominationem in τὸν Εἰμὶ affectans; οὗτος τὸ μέγα ὄργανον Διαβόλου ὑπάρχει.*

Chap. xliv. p. 431.

I truly advise all those (said Luther), who earnestly do affect the honor of Christ and the Gospel, that they would be enemies to Erasmus Roterodamus, for he is a devaster of religion. Do but read only his dialogue *De Peregrinatione*, where you will see how he derideth and flouteth the whole religion, and at last concludeth out of single abominations, that he rejecteth religion, &c.

Religion here means the vows and habits of the religious or those bound to a particular life;—the monks, friars, nuns, in short, the regulars in contradistinction from the laity and the secular Clergy.

Ib. p. 432.

Erasmus can do nothing but cavil and flout, he can not confute. If (said Luther) I were a Papist, so could I easily overcome and beat him. For although he flouteth the Pope with his ceremonies, yet he neither hath confuted nor overcome him; no enemy is beaten nor overcome with mocking, jeering, and flouting.

Most true; but it is an excellent pioneer and an excellent *corps de reserve*, cavalry for pursuit, and for clearing the field of battle, and in the first use Luther was greatly obliged to Erasmus. But such utter unlikes can not but end in dislikes, and so it proved between Erasmus and Luther. Erasmus, might the Protestants say, wished no good to the Church of Rome, and still less to our party: it was with him *Rot her and Dam us!*

Chap. xlviii. p. 442.

David's example is full of offences, that so holy a man, chosen of God, should fall into such great abominable sins and blasphemies; whenas before he was very fortunate and happy, of whom all the bordering kingdoms were afraid, for God was with him.

If any part of the Old Testament be typical, the whole life and character of David, from his birth to his death, are eminently so. And accordingly the history of David and his Psalms, which form a most interesting part of his history, occupies as large a portion of the Old Testament as all the others. The type is two-fold—now of the Messiah, now of the Church, and of the Church in all its relations, persecuted, victorious, backsliding, penitent. N.B. I do not find David charged with any vices, though with heavy crimes. So it is with the Church. Vices destroy its essence.

Ib.

The same was a strange kind of offence (said Luther) that the world was offended at him who raised the dead, who made the blind to see, and the deaf to hear, &c.

Our Lord alluded to the verse that immediately follows and completes his quotations from Isaiah.* I, Jehovah, will come and do this. That he implicitly declared himself the Jehovah, the Word,—this was the offence.

Chap. xlix. p. 443.

God wills, may one say, that we should serve him free-willingly, but he that serveth God out of fear of punishment of hell, or out of a hope and

* Isaiah xxxv. 4, lxi. 1.—*Ed.* Luke iv. 18, 19.

love of recompense, the same serveth and honoreth God not freely; therefore such a one serveth God not uprightly nor truly. *Answer.* This argument (said Luther) is Stoical, &c.

A truly wise paragraph. Pity it was not expounded. God will accept our imperfections, where their face is turned toward him, on the road to the glorious liberty of the Gospel.

Chap. l. p. 446.

It is the highest grace and gift of God to have an honest, a God-fearing, housewifely consort, &c. But God thrusteth many into the state of matrimony before they be aware and rightly bethink themselves.

The state of matrimony (said Luther) is the chiefest state in the world after religion, &c.

Alas! alas! this is the misery of it, that so many wed and so few are Christianly married! But even in this the analogy of matrimony to the religion of Christ holds good: for even such is the proportion of nominal to actual Christians;—all *christened*, how few baptized! But in true matrimony it is beautiful to consider, how peculiarly the marriage state harmonizes with the doctrine of justification by free grace through faith alone. The little quarrels, the imperfections on both sides, the occasional frailties, yield to the one thought,—there is love at the bottom. If sickness or other sorer calamity visit me, how would the love then blaze forth! The faults are all there, but they are not imprinted. The prickles, the acrid rind, the bitterness or sourness, are transformed into the ripe fruit, and the foreknowledge of this gives the name and virtue of the ripe fruit to the fruit yet green on the bough.

Ib. p. 447.

The causers and founders of matrimony are chiefly God's commandments, &c. It is a state instituted by God himself, visited by Christ in person, and presented with a glorious present: for God said, *It is not good that the man should be alone:* therefore the wife should be a help to the husband, to the end that human generations may be increased, and children nurtured to God's honor, and to the profit of people and countries; also to keep our bodies in sanctification.

(Add) and in mutual reverence, our spirits in a state of love and tenderness; and our imaginations pure and tranquil.

In a word, matrimony not only preserveth human generations so that the same remain continually, but it preserveth the generations human.

Ib. p. 450.

In the synod at Leipzig the lawyers concluded that secret contractors should be punished with banishment and be disinherited. Whereupon (said Luther) I sent them word that I would not allow thereof, it were too gross a proceeding, &c. But nevertheless I hold it fitting, that those which in such sort do secretly contract themselves ought sharply to be reproved, yea, also in some measure severely punished.

What a sweet union of prudence and kind nature! Scold them sharply, and perhaps let them smart awhile for their indiscretion and disobedience; and then kiss and make it up, remembering that young folks will be young folks, and that love has its own law and logic.

Chap. lix. p. 481.

The presumption and boldness of the sophists and School-divines is a very ungodly thing, which some of the Fathers also approved of and extolled; namely, of spiritual significations in the Holy Scripture, whereby she is pitifully tattered and torn in pieces. It is an apish work in such sort to juggle with Holy Scripture: it is no otherwise than if I should discourse of physic in this manner: the fever is a sickness, rhubarb is the physic. The fever signifieth the sins—rhubarb is Jesus Christ, &c.

Who seeth not here (said Luther) that such significations are mere juggling tricks? *Even so* and after the same manner are they deceived that say, Children ought to be baptized again, because they had not faith.

For the life of me, I can not find the 'even so' in this sentence. The watchman cries, 'half-past three o'clock.' Even so, and after the same manner, the great Cham of Tartary has a carbuncle on his nose.

Chap. lx. p. 483.

George in the Greek tongue, is called a *builder*, that buildeth countries and people with justice and righteousness, &c.

A mistake for a tiller or boor, from *Bauer*, *bauen*. The latter hath two senses, to build and to bring into cultivation.

Chap. lxx. p. 503.

I am now advertised (said Luther) that a new astrologer is risen, who presumeth to prove that the earth moveth and goeth about, not the firmament, the sun and moon, nor the stars; like as when one who sitteth in a coach or in a ship and is moved, thinketh he sitteth still and resteth, but the earth and the trees go, run, and move themselves. Therefore thus it goeth, when we give up ourselves to our own foolish fancies and conceits. This fool will turn the whole art of astronomy upside-down, but the Scripture showeth and teacheth him another lesson, when Joshua commanded the sun to stand still, and not the earth.

There is a similar, but still more intolerant and contemptuous anathema of the Copernican system in Sir Thomas Brown, almost two centuries later than Luther.

Though the problem is of no difficult solution for reflecting minds, yet for the reading many it would be a serviceable work to bring together and exemplify the causes of the extreme and universal credulity that characterizes sundry periods of history (for example, from A.D. 1400 to A.D. 1650): and credulity involves lying and delusion—for by a seeming paradox liars are always credulous, though credulous persons are not always liars; although they most often are.

It would be worth while to make a collection of the judgments of eminent men in their generation respecting the Copernican or Pythagorean scheme. One writer (I forget the name) inveighs against it as Popery, and a Popish stratagem to reconcile the minds of men to Transubstantiation and the Mass. For if we may contradict the evidence of our senses in a matter of natural philosophy, *à fortiori*, or much more, may we be expected to do so in a matter of faith.

In my Noetic, or Doctrine and Discipline of Ideas = *logice*, *Organon*—I purpose to select some four, five or more instances of the sad effects of the absence of ideas in the use of words and in the understanding of truths, in the different departments of life; for example, the word *body*, in connection with resurrection-men, &c.—and the last instances, will (please God!) be the sad effects on the whole system of Christian divinity. I must remember Asgill's book.*

Religion necessarily, as to its main and proper doctrines, consists of ideas, that is, spiritual truths that can only be spiritually discerned, and to the expression of which words are necessarily inadequate, and must be used by accommodation. Hence the absolute indispensability of a Christian life, with its conflicts and inward experiences, which alone can make a man to answer to an opponent, who charges one doctrine as contradictory to another,—"Yes! it is a contradiction in terms; but neverthe-

* "An argument proving that, according to the covenant of eternal life, revealed in the Scriptures, man may be translated from hence, without passing through death, although the human nature of Christ himself could not be thus translated, till he had passed through death."—See *Table Talk*, p. 363, (Note).—*Ed.*

less so it is, and both are true, nay, parts of the same truth."—But alas! besides other evils there is this,—that the Gospel is preached in fragments, and what the hearer can recollect of the sum total of these is to be his Christian knowledge and belief. This is a grievous error. First, labor to enlighten the hearer as to the essence of the Christian dispensation, the grounding and pervading idea, and then set it forth in its manifold perspective, its various stages and modes of manifestation. In this as in almost all other qualities of a preacher of Christ, Luther after Paul and John is the great master. None saw more clearly than he, that the same proposition, which, addressed to a Christian in his first awakening out of the death of sin was a most wholesome, nay, a necessary, truth, would be a most condemnable Antinomian falsehood, if addressed to a secure Christian boasting and trusting in *his* faith—yes, in *his* own faith, instead of the faith of Christ communicated to him.

I can not utter how dear and precious to me are the contents of pages 197–199, to line 17, of this work, more particularly the section headed,—

How we ought to carry ourselves towards the Law's accusations.

Add to these the last two sections of p. 201,* the last touching St. Austin's opinion† especially. Likewise, the first half of p. 202.‡ But indeed the whole of the 12th chapter 'Of the Law and the Gospel' is of inestimable value to a serious and earnest minister of the Gospel. Here he may learn both the orthodox faith, and a holy prudence in the time and manner of preaching the same. July, 1829.

* We must preach the Law (said Luther) for the sakes of the evil and wicked, &c.

† The opinion of St. Austin is (said Luther) that the Law which through human strength, natural understanding and wisdom is fulfilled, justifieth not, &c.

‡ Whether we should preach only of God's grace and mercy or not. From "Philip Melancthon demanded of Luther"—to "yet we must press through, and not suffer ourselves to recoil."

NOTES ON THE LIFE OF ST. TERESA. 1812.*

PREF. Part i. p. 51. Letter of Father Avila to Mother Teresa de Jesu.

Persons ought to beseech our Lord not to conduct them by the way of seeing; but that the happy sight of him and of his saints be reserved for heaven; and that here he would conduct them in the plain, beaten road, &c. * * But if, during all this, the visions continue, and the soul reaps profit thereby, &c.

In what other language could a young woman check while she soothed her espoused lover, in his too eager demonstrations of his passion? And yet the art of the Roman priests,—to keep up the delusion as serviceable, yet keep off those forms of it most liable to detection, by medical commentary!

Life, Part i. chap. iv. p. 15.

But our Lord began to regale me so much by this way, that he vouchsafed me the favor to give me quiet prayer; and sometimes it came so far as to arrive at union; though I understood neither the one nor the other, nor how much they both deserve to be prized. But I believe it would have been a great deal of happiness for me to have understood them. True it is, that this union rested with me for so short a time, that perhaps it might arrive to be but as of an *Ave Maria;* yet I remained with so very great effects thereof, that, with not being then so much as twenty years old, methought I found the whole world under my feet.

Dreams, the soul herself forsaking;
Fearful raptures; childlike mirth.
Silent adorations, making
A blessed shadow of this earth!

Ib. chap. v. p. 24.

I received also the blessed Sacrament with many tears; though yet, in my opinion, they were not shed with that sense and grief, for only my having offended God, which might have served to save my soul; if the error into which I was brought by them who told me that some things were not mortal sins (which afterwards I saw plainly that they were), might not somewhat bestead me. * * * Methinks, that without doubt my soul might have run a hazard of not being saved, if I had died then.

Can we wonder that some poor hypochondriasts and epileptics have believed themselves possessed by, or rather to be the Devil

* The works of the Holy Mother St. Teresa of Jesus, Foundress of the Reformation of the Discalced Carmelites. Divided into two parts. Translated into English, MDCLXXV.—*Ed.*

himself, and so spoke in this imagined character, when this poor afflicted spotless innocent could be so pierced through with fanatic pre-conceptions, as to talk in this manner of her mortal sins, and their probable eternal punishment ;—and this, too, under the most fervent sense of God's love and mercy !

Ib. p. 43.

True it is, that I am both the most weak and the most wicked of any living.

What is the meaning of these words, that occur so often in the works of great saints ? Do they believe them literally ? Or is it a specific suspension of the comparing power and the memory, vouchsafed them as a gift of grace ?—a gift of telling a lie without breach of veracity—a gift of humility indemnifying pride.

Ib. chap. viii. p. 44.

I have not without cause been considering and reflecting upon this life of mine so long, for I discern well enough that nobody will have gust to look upon a thing so very wicked.

Again ! Can this first sentence be other than madness or a lie ?—For, observe, the question is not, whether Teresa was or was not positively very wicked ; but whether according to her own scale of virtue she was most and very wicked comparatively. See post chap. x. pp. 57–8.

That relatively to the command *Be ye perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect,* and before the eye of his own pure reason, the best of men may deem himself mere folly and imperfection, I can easily conceive ; but this is not the case in question. It is here a comparison of one man with all others of whom he has known or heard ;—*ergo*, a matter of experience ; and in this sense it is impossible, without loss of memory and judgment on the one hand, or of veracity and simplicity on the other. Besides, of what use is it ? To draw off our conscience from the relation between ourselves and the perfect ideal appointed for our imitation, to the vain comparison of one individual self with other men ! Will their sins lessen mine, though they were greater ? Does not every man stand or fall to his own Maker according to his own being ?

Ib p. 45.

I see not what one thing there is of so many as are to be found in the whole world, wherein there is need of a greater courage than to treat of committing treason against a king, and to know that he knows it well, and

yet never to go out of his presence. For howsoever it be very true that we are always in the presence of God: yet methinks that they who converse with him in prayer are in his presence after a more particular manner; for they are seeing then that he sees them; whereas others may, perhaps, remain some days in his presence, yet without remembering that he looks upon them.

A very pretty and sweet remark: truth in new feminine beauty!

In fine.

How incomparably educated was Teresa for a mystic saint, a mother of transports and fusions of spirit! 1. A woman;—2. Of rank, and reared delicately;—3. A Spanish lady;—4. With very pious parents and sisters;—5. Accustomed in early childhood to read "with most believing heart" all the legends of saints, martyrs, Spanish martyrs, who fought against the Moors;—6. In the habit of privately (without the knowledge of the superstitious Father) reading books of chivalry to her mother, and then all night to herself;—7. Then her Spanish sweet-hearting, doubtless in the true Oroondates style—and with perfect innocence, as far as appears; and this giving of audience to a dying swain through a grated window, on having received a lover's messages of flames and despair, with her aversion at fifteen or sixteen years of age to shut herself up forever in a strict nunnery, appear to have been those mortal sins of which she accuses herself, added, perhaps, to a few warm fancies of earthly love;—8. A frame of exquisite sensibility by nature, rendered more so by a burning fever, which no doubt had some effect upon her brain, as she was from that time subject to frequent fainting fits and *deliquia*;—9. Frightened at her Uncle's, by reading to him Dante's books of Hell and Judgment, she confesses that she at length resolved on nunhood because she thought it could not be much worse than Purgatory—and that purgatory here was a cheap expiation for Hell forever;—10. Combine these (and I have proceeded no farther than the eleventh page of her life) and think, how impossible it was, but that such a creature, so innocent, and of an imagination so heated, and so well peopled should often mistake the first not painful, and in such a frame, often pleasurable approaches to *deliquium* for divine raptures; and join the instincts of nature acting in the body of a mind unconscious of them, in the keenly sensitive body of a mind so loving and so innocent,

and what remains to be solved which the stupidity of most and the roguery of a few would not simply explain?—11. One source it is almost criminal to have forgotten, and which p. 12 of the first Part brought back to my recollection; I mean, the effects—so super-sensual that they may easily and most venially pass for supernatural, so very glorious to human nature that, though in truth they are humanity itself in the contra-distinguishing sense of that awful word, it is yet no wonder that, conscious of the sore weaknesses united in one person with this one nobler nature we attribute them to a divinity out of us (a mistake of the sensuous imagination in its misapplication of space and place, rather than a misnomer of the thing itself, for it is verily ὁ θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὁ οἰκεῖος θεός), the effects, I mean, of the moral force after conquest, the state of the whole being after the victorious struggle, in which the will has preserved its perfect freedom by a vehement energy of perfect obedience to the pure or practical reason, or conscience. Thence flows in upon and fills the soul *that peace which passeth understanding*, a state affronted and degraded by the name of pleasure, injured and misrepresented even by that of happiness, the very corner-stone of that morality which can not even in thought be distinguished from religion, and which seems to mean religion as long as the instinctive craving, dim and dark though it may be, of the moral sense after this unknown state (known only by the bitterness where it is not) shall remain in human nature! Under all forms of positive and philosophic religion, it has developed itself, too glorious an attribute of man to be confined to any name or sect; but which, it is but truth and historical fact to say, is more especially fostered and favored by Christianity; and its frequent appearance even under the most selfish and un-Christian forms of Christianity is a stronger evidence of the divinity of that religion, than all the miracles of Brahma and Veeshnou could afford, even though they were supported with tenfold the judicial evidence of the Gospel miracles.*

* In one of the volumes of this work used by the Editor for ascertaining the references, the following note is written by a former owner:

"Oct. 12, 1788. Begged of the Most Blessed Virgin Mary to take my salvation on herself, and obtain it for Saint Hyacinthe's sake; to whom she has promised to grant any thing, or never to refuse any thing begged for his sake."

It would be very interesting to know how far the feeling expressed in this artless effusion co-existed with a faith in the atonement and mediation of the one Lord Jesus Christ.—*Ed.*

NOTES ON BURNET'S LIFE OF BISHOP BEDELL.*—1810.

Pp. 12–14.

Here I must add a passage, concerning which I am in doubt whether it reflected more on the sincerity, or on the understanding of the English Ambassador. The breach between the Pope and the Republic was brought very near a crisis, &c.

These pages contain a weak and unhandsome attack on Wotton, who doubtless had discovered that the presentation of the Premonition previously to the reconciliation as publicly completed, but after it had been privately agreed on, between the Court of Rome and the Senate of Venice, would embarrass the latter: whereas, delivered as it was, it showed the King's and his minister's zeal for Protestantism, and yet supplied the Venetians with an answer not disrespectful to the king. Besides, what is there in Wotton's whole life (a man so disinterested, and who retired from all his embassies so poor) to justify the remotest suspicion of his insincerity? What can this word mean less or other than that Sir H. W. was either a crypt-Papist, or had received a bribe from the Romish party? Horrid accusations!—Burnet was notoriously rash and credulous; but I remember no other instance in which his zeal for the Reformation joined with his credulity has misled him into so gross a calumny. It is not to be believed, that Bedell gave any authority to such an aspersion of his old and faithful friend and patron, further than that he had related the fact, and that he and the minister differed in opinion as to the prudence of the measure recommended. How laxly too the story is narrated! The exact date of the recommendation by Father Paul and the divines should have been given;—then the date of the public annunciation of the reconciliation between the Pope and Venetian Republic; and lastly the day on which Wotton did present the book;—for even this Burnet leaves uncertain.

P. 26.

It is true he never returned and changed his religion himself, but his son came from Spain into Ireland, when Bedell was promoted to the Bishopric of Kilmore there, and told him, that his father commanded him to thank him for the pains he was at in writing it. He said, it was almost always

* London, 1685.

lying open before him, and that he had heard him say, "He was resolved to save one." And it seems he instructed his son in the true religion, for he declared himself a Protestant on his coming over.

Southey has given me a bad character of this son of the unhappy convert to the Romish Church. He became, it seems, a spy on the Roman Catholics, availing himself of his father's character among them, a crime which would indeed render his testimony null and more than null; it would be a presumption of the contrary. It is clear from his letters to Bedell that the convert was a very weak man. I owe to him, however, a complete confirmation of my old persuasion concerning Bishop Hall, whom from my first perusal of his works I have always considered as one of the blots (alas! there are too many) of the biography of the Church of England; a self-conceited, coarse-minded, persecuting, vulgar priest, and (by way of *anti-climax*) one of the first corrupters of and epigrammatizers of our English prose style. It is not true, that Sir Thomas Brown was the prototype of Dr. Johnson, who imitated him only as far as Sir T. B. resembles the majority of his predecessors; that is, in the pedantic preference of Latin derivations to Saxon words of the very same force. In the balance and construction of his periods Dr. Johnson has followed Hall, as any intelligent reader will discover by an attentive comparison.

P. 158.

Yea, will some man say, "But that which marreth all is the opinion of merit and satisfaction." Indeed that is the School doctrine, but the conscience enlightened to know itself, will easily act that part of the Publican, *who smote his breast, and said, God be merciful to me a sinner.*

Alas! so far from this being the case with ninety-nine out of one hundred in Spain, Italy, Sicily, and Roman Catholic Germany, it is the Gospel tenets that are the true School doctrine, that is confined to books and closets of the learned among them.

P. 161.

And the like may be conceived here, since, especially, the idolatry practised under the obedience of mystical Babylon is rather in false and will-worship of the true God, and rather commended as profitable than enjoined as absolutely necessary, and the corruptions there maintained are rather in a superfluous addition than retraction in any thing necessary to salvation.

This good man's charity jarring with his love and tender recollections of Father Paul, Fulgentio, and the Venetian divines, has led him to a far, far too palliative statement of Roman idolatry.

Not what the Pope has yet ventured to thunder forth from his Anti-Sinai, but what he and his satellites, the Regulars, enforce to the preclusion of all true worship, in the actual practice, life-long, of an immense majority in Spain, Italy, Bavaria, Austria, &c., &c.—this must determine the point. What they are themselves,—not what they would persuade Protestants is their essentials or Faith,—this is the main thing.

P. 164.

I answer, under correction of better judgments, they have the ministry of reconciliation by the communion which is given at their Ordination, being the same which our Saviour left in his Church:—*whose sins ye remit, they are remitted, whose sins ye retain, they are retained.*

Could Bishop Bedell believe that the mere will of a priest could have any effect on the everlasting weal or woe of a Christian! Even to the immediate disciples and Apostles could the text (if indeed it have reference to sins in our sense at all) mean more than this,—Whenever you discover, by the spirit of knowledge which I will send unto you, repentance and faith, you shall declare remission of sins; and the sins shall be remitted;—and where the contrary exists, your declaration of exclusion from bliss shall be fulfilled? Did Christ say, that true repentance and actual faith would not save a soul, unless the priest's verbal remission was superadded?

In fine.

If it were in my power I would have this book printed in a convenient form, and distributed through every house, at least, through every village and parish throughout the kingdom. A volume of thought and of moral feelings, the offspring of thought, crowd upon me, as I review the different parts of this admirable man's life and creed. Only compare his conduct to James Wadsworth (probably some ancestral relative of my honored friend, William Wordsworth: for the same name in Yorkshire, from whence his father came, is pronounced Wadsworth) with that of the far, far too highly rated, Bishop Hall; his letter to Hall tenderly blaming his (Hall's) bitterness to an old friend mistaken, and then his letter to that friend defending Hall! What a picture of goodness! I confess, in all Ecclesiastical History I have read of no man so spotless, though of hundreds in which the biographers have painted them as masters of perfection: but the moral tact soon feels the truth.

NOTES ON BAXTER'S LIFE OF HIMSELF.—1820.*

Among the grounds for recommending the perusal of our elder writers, Hooker—Taylor—Baxter—in short almost any of the folios composed from Edward VI. to Charles II. I note :—

1. The overcoming the habit of deriving your whole pleasure passively from the book itself, which can only be effected by excitement of curiosity or of some passion. Force yourself to reflect on what you read paragraph by paragraph, and in a short time you will derive your pleasure, an ample portion of it, at least, from the activity of your own mind. All else is picture sunshine.

2. The conquest of party and sectarian prejudices, when you have on the same table before you the works of a Hammond and a Baxter, and reflect how many and momentous their points of agreement, how few and almost childish the differences, which estranged and irritated these good men. Let us but imagine what their blessed spirits now feel at the retrospect of their earthly frailties, and can we do other than strive to feel as they now feel, not as they once felt? So will it be with the disputes between good men of the present day; and if you have no other reason to doubt your opponent's goodness than the point in dispute, think of Baxter and Hammond, of Milton and Taylor, and let it be no reason at all.

3. It will secure you from the idolatry of the present times and fashions, and create the noblest kind of imaginative power in your soul, that of living in past ages; wholly devoid of which power, a man can neither anticipate the future, nor even live a truly human life, a life of reason in the present.

4. In this particular work we may derive a most instructive lesson, that in certain points, as of religion in relation to law, the *medio tutissimus ibis* is inapplicable. There is no *medium* possible; and all the attempts, as those of Baxter, though no more required than "I believe in God through Christ," prove only the mildness of the proposer's temper, but as a rule would be equal to nothing, at least exclude only the two or three

* *Relliquiæ Baxterianæ:* or Mr. Richard Baxter's Narrative of the most memorable passages of his life and times. Published from his manuscript, by Matthew Sylvester.—London, *folio.* 1699.

in a century that make it a matter of religion to declare themselves Atheists, or else be just as fruitful a rule for a persecutor as the most complete set of articles that could be framed by a Spanish Inquisition. For to 'believe,' must mean to believe aright—and 'God' must mean the true God—and 'Christ' the Christ in the sense and with the attributes understood by Christians who are truly Christians. An established Church with a Liturgy is a sufficient solution of the problem *de jure magistratus*. Articles of faith are in this point of view superfluous; for is it not too absurd for a man to hesitate at subscribing his name to doctrines which yet in the more awful duty of prayer and profession he dares affirm before his Maker! They are therefore in this sense merely superfluous;—not worth re-enacting, had they ever been done away with;—not worth removing now that they exist.

5. The characteristic contradistinction between the speculative reasoners of the age before the Revolution, and those since, is this:—the former cultivated metaphysics, without, or neglecting empirical psychology—the latter cultivate a mechanical psychology to the neglect and contempt of metaphysics. Both therefore are almost equi-distant from pure philosophy. Hence the belief in ghosts, witches, sensible replies to prayer, and the like, in Baxter and in a hundred others. See also Luther's Table Talk.

6. The earlier part of this volume is interesting as materials for medical history. The state of medical science in the reign of Charles I. was almost incredibly low.

The saddest error of the theologians of this age is, ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, the disposition to urge the histories of the miraculous actions and incidents, in and by which Christ attested his Messiahship to the Jewish eye-witnesses, in fulfilment of prophecies, which the Jewish Church had previously understood and interpreted as marks of the Messiah, before they have shown what and how excellent the religion itself is including the miracles as for us an harmonious part of the internal or self-evidence of the religion. Alas! and even when our divines do proceed to the religion itself as to a something which no man could be expected to receive except by a compulsion of the senses, which by force of logic only is propagated from the eye-witnesses to the readers of the narratives in 1820—(which logic, namely, that the evi-

dence of a miracle is not diminished by lapse of ages, though this includes loss of documents and the like; which logic, I say, whether it be legitimate or not, God forbid that the truth of Christianity should depend on the decision!)—even when our divines do proceed to the religion itself, on what do they chiefly dwell? On the doctrines peculiar to the religion? No! these on the contrary are either evaded or explained away into metaphors, or resigned in despair to the next world where faith is to be swallowed up in certainty.

But the worst product of this epidemic error is, the fashion of either denying or undervaluing the evidence of a future state and the survival of individual consciousness, derived from the conscience, and the holy instinct of the whole human race. Dreadful is this:—for the main force of the reasoning by which this skepticism is vindicated consists in reducing all legitimate conviction to objective proof: whereas in the very essence of religion and even of morality the evidence, and the preparation for its reception, must be subjective;—*Blessed are they that have not seen and yet believe.* And dreadful it appears to me especially, who in the impossibility of not looking forward to consciousness after the dissolution of the body (*corpus phænomenon*), have through life found it (next to divine grace) the strongest and indeed only efficient support against the still-recurring temptation of adopting, nay, wishing the truth of Spinoza's notion, that the survival of consciousness is the highest prize and consequence of the highest virtue, and that of all below this mark the lot after death is self-oblivion and the cessation of individual being. Indeed, how a Separatist or one of any other sect of Calvinists, who confines Redemption to the comparatively small number of the elect, can reject this opinion, and yet not run mad at the horrid thought of an innumerable multitude of imperishable self-conscious spirits everlastingly excluded from God, is to me inconceivable.

Deeply am I persuaded of Luther's position, that no man can worthily estimate, or feel in the depth of his being, the Incarnation and Crucifixion of the Son of God who is a stranger to the terror of immortality as ingenerate in man, while it is yet unquelled by the faith in God as the Almighty Father.

Book i. Part i. p. 2.

But though my conscience would trouble me when I sinned, yet divers

sins I was addicted to, and oft committed against my conscience; which for the warning of others I will confess here to my shame.

1. I was much addicted when I feared correction to lie, that I might scape.

2. I was much addicted to the excessive gluttonous eating of apples and pears, &c.

3. To this end, and to concur with naughty boys that gloried in evil, I have often gone into other men's orchards, and stolen their fruit, when I had enough at home, &c.

There is a childlike simplicity in this account of his sins of his childhood which is very pleasing.

Ib. pp. 5, 6.

And the use that God made of books, above ministers, to the benefit of my soul made me somewhat excessively in love with good books; so that I thought I had never enough, but scraped up as great a treasure of them as I could. * * * It made the world seem to me as a carcase that had neither life nor loveliness; and it destroyed those ambitious desires after literate fame which were the sin of my childhood. * * * And for the mathematics, I was an utter stranger to them, and never could find in my heart to divert any studies that way. But in order to the knowledge of divinity, my inclination was most to logic and metaphysics, with that part of physics which treateth of the soul, contenting myself at first with a slighter study of the rest: and there had my labor and delight.

What a picture of myself!

Ib. p. 22.

In the storm of this temptation I questioned awhile whether I were indeed a Christian or an Infidel, and whether faith could consist with such doubts as I was conscious of.

One of the instances of the evils arising from the equivoque between faith and intellectual satisfaction or insight. The root of faith is in the will. Faith is an oak that may be a pollard, and yet live.

Ib.

The being and attributes of God were so clear to me, that he was to my intellect what the sun is to my eye, by which I see itself and all things.

Even so with me;—but, whether God was existentially as well as essentially intelligent, this was for a long time a sore combat between the speculative and the moral man.

Ib. p. 23.

Mere Deism, which is the most plausible competitor with Christianity, is

so turned out of almost all the whole world, as if Nature made its own confession, that without a Mediator it can not come to God.

Excellent.

Ib.

All these assistances were at hand before I came to the immediate evidences of credibility in the sacred oracles themselves.

This is as it should be ; that is, the evidence *à priori*, securing the rational probability ; and then the historical proofs of its reality. Pity that Baxter's chapters in *The Saints' Rest* should have been one and the earliest occasion of the inversion of this process, the fruit of which is the Grotio-Paleyan religion, or *minimum* of faith ; the maxim being, *quanto minus tanto melius*.

Ib. p. 24.

And once all the ignorant rout were raging mad against me for preaching the doctrine of Original Sin to them, and telling them that infants, before regeneration, had so much guilt and corruption as made them loathsome in the eyes of God.

No wonder ;—because the babe would perish without the mother's milk, is it therefore loathsome to the mother ? Surely the little ones that Christ embraced had not been baptized. And yet *of such is the Kingdom of Heaven*.

Ib. p. 25.

Some thought that the King should not at all be displeased and provoked, and that they were not bound to do any other justice, or attempt any other reformation but what they could procure the King to be willing to. And these said, when you have displeased and provoked him to the utmost, he will be your King still. * * * The more you offend him, the less you can trust him; and when mutual confidence is gone, a war is beginning. * * * And if you conquer him, what the better are you? He will still be King. You can but force him to an agreement; and how quickly will he have power and advantage to violate that which he is forced to, and to be avenged on you all for the displeasure you have done him! He is ignorant of the advantages of a King that can not foresee this.

This paragraph goes to make out a case in justification of the Regicides which Baxter would have found it difficult to answer. Certainly a more complete exposure of the inconsistency of Baxter's own party can not be. For observe, that in case of an agreement with Charles all those classes, which afterwards formed the main strength of the Parliament and ultimately decided the contest in its favor, would have been politically inert, with little influence and no actual power,—I mean the Yeomanry, and

the Citizens of London: while a vast majority of the Nobles and landed Gentry, who sooner or later must have become the majority in Parliament, went over to the King at once. Add to these the whole systematized force of the High Church Clergy and all the rude ignorant vulgar in high and low life, who detested every attempt at moral reform,—and it is obvious that the King could not want opportunities to retract and undo all that he had conceded under compulsion. But that neither the will was wanting, nor his conscience at all in the way, his own advocate Clarendon and others have supplied damning proofs.

Ib. p. 27.

And though Parliaments may draw up Bills for repealing laws, yet hath the King his negative voice, and without his consent they can not do it; which though they acknowledge, yet did they too easily admit of petitions against the Episcopacy and Liturgy, and connived at all the clamors and papers which were against them.

How so? If they admitted the King's right to deny, they must admit the subject's right to entreat.

Ib.

Had they endeavored the ejection of lay-chancellors, and the reducing of the dioceses to a narrower compass, or the setting up of a subordinate discipline, and only the correcting and reforming of the Liturgy, perhaps it might have been borne more patiently.

Did Baxter find it so himself—and when too he had the formal and recorded promise of Charles II. for it?

Ib.

But when the same men (Ussher, Williams, Morton, &c.) saw that greater things were aimed at, and episcopacy itself in danger, or *their grandeur and riches at least*, most of them turned against the Parliament.

This, and in this place, is unworthy of Baxter. Even he, good man, could not wholly escape the jaundice of party.

Ib. p. 34.

They said to this;—that as all the courts of justice do execute their sentences in the King's name, and this by his own law, and therefore by his authority, so much more might his Parliament do.

A very sound argument is here disguised in a false analogy, an inapplicable precedent, and a sophistical form. Courts of justice administer the total of the supreme power retrospectively, involved in the name of the most dignified part. But here a part, as a part, acts as the whole, where the whole is absolutely requisite,—

that is, in passing laws; and again as B. and C. usurp a power belonging to A. by the determination of A. B. and C. The only valid argument is, that Charles had by acts of his own ceased to be a lawful King.

Ib. p. 40.

And that the authority and person of the King were inviolable, out of the reach of just accusation, judgment, or execution by law; as having no superior, and so no judge.

But according to Grotius, a king waging war against the lawful copartners of the *summa potestas* ceases to be their king, and if conquered forfeits to them his former share. And surely if Charles had been victor, he would have taken the Parliament's share to himself. If it had been the Parliament, and not a mere faction with the army, that tried and beheaded Charles, I do not see how any one could doubt the lawfulness of the act, except upon very technical grounds.

Ib. p. 41.

For if once legislation, the chief act of government, be denied to any part of government at all, and affirmed to belong to the people as such, who are no governors, all government will hereby be overthrown.

Here Baxter falls short of the subject, and does not see the full consequents of his own prior, most judicious, positions. Legislation in its high and most proper sense belongs to God only. A people declares that such and such they hold to be laws, that is, God's will.

Ib. p. 47.

In Cornwall, Sir Richard Grenvill, having taken many soldiers of the Earl of Essex's army, sentenced about a dozen to be hanged. When they had hanged two or three, the rope broke which should have hanged the next. And they sent for new ropes so oft to hang him, and all of them still broke, that they durst go no farther, but saved all the rest.

The soldiers, doubtless, contrived this from the aversion natural to Englishmen of killing an enemy in cold blood; and because they foresaw that there would be Tit for Tat.

Ib. p. 59.

It is easy to see from Baxter's own account, that his party ruined their own cause and that of the kingdom by their tenets concerning the right and duty of the civil magistrate to use the sword against such as were not of the same religion with themselves.

Ib. p. 62.

They seem not to me to have answered satisfactorily to the main argument fetched from the Apostle's own government, with which Saravia had inclined me to some Episcopacy before: though miracles and infallibility were Apostolical temporary privileges, yet Church government is an ordinary thing to be continued. And therefore as the Apostles had successors as they were preachers, I see not but that they must have successors as Church governors.

Was not Peter's sentence against Ananias an act of Church government? Therefore though Church government is an ordinary thing in some form or other, it does not follow that one particular form is an ordinary thing. For the time being the Apostles, as heads of the Church, did what they thought best; but whatever was binding on the Church universal and in all times they delivered as commands from Christ. Now no other command was delivered but that all things should conduce to order and edification.

Ib. p. 66.

And therefore how they could refuse to receive the King, till he consented to take the Covenant, I know not, unless the taking of the Covenant had been a condition on which he was to receive his crown by the laws or fundamental institutions of the kingdom, which none pretendeth. Nor know I by what power they can add any thing to the Coronation Oath or Covenant, which by his ancestors was to be taken, without his own consent.

And pray, how and by whom were the Coronation Oaths first imposed? The Scottish nation in 1650 had the same right to make a bargain with the claimant of their throne as their ancestors had. It is strange that Baxter should not have seen that his objections would apply to our *Magna Charta*. So he talks of the "fundamental constitutions," just as if these had been aboriginal or rather *sans* origin, and not as indeed they were extorted and bargained for by the people. But throughout it is plain that Baxter repeated, but never appropriated, the distinction between the King as the executive power, and as the individual functionary. What obligation lay on the Scottish Parliament and Church to consult the man Charles Stuart's personal likes and dislikes? The Oath was to be taken by him as their King. Doubtless, he equally disliked the whole Protestant interest; and if the Tories and Church of England Jacobites of a later day had recalled James II., would Baxter have thought them culpable for imposing on him an Oath to preserve the Protestant

Church of England and to inflict severe penalties on his own Church-fellows?

Ib. p. 71.

And some men thought it a very hard question, whether they should rather wish the continuance of a usurper that will do good, or the restoration of a rightful governor whose followers will do hurt.

And who shall dare unconditionally condemn those who judged the former to be the better alternative? Especially those who did not adopt Baxter's notion of a *jus divinum* personal and hereditary in the individual, whose father had broken the compact on which the claim rested.

Ib. p. 75.

One Mrs. Dyer, a chief person of the Sect, did first bring forth a monster, which had the parts of almost all sorts of living creatures, some parts like man, but most ugly and misplaced, and some like beasts, birds and fishes, having horns, fins and claws; and at the birth of it the bed shook, and the women present fell a vomiting, and were fain to go forth of the room.

This babe of Mrs. Dyer's is no bad emblem of Richard Baxter's own credulity. It is almost an argument on his side, that nothing he believed is more strange and inexplicable than his own belief of them.

Ib. p. 76.

The third sect were the Ranters. These also made it their business, as the former, to set up the light of nature under the name of Christ in men, and to dishonor and cry down the Church, &c.

But why does Baxter everywhere assert the identity of the new light with the light of nature? Or what does he mean exclusively by the latter? The source must be the same in all lights as far as it is light.

Ib. p. 77.

And that was the fourth sect, the Quakers; who were but the Ranters turned from horrid profaneness and blasphemy to a life of extreme austerity on the other side.

Observe the *but*.

Ib.

Their doctrine is to be seen in Jacob Behmen's books by him that hath nothing else to do, than to bestow a great deal of time to understand him that was not willing to be easily understood, and to know that his bombasted words do signify nothing more than before was easily known by common familiar terms.

This is not in all its parts true. It is true that the first principles of Behmen are to be found in the writings of the Neo-Platonists after Plotinus, and (but mixed with gross impieties) in Paracelsus;—but it is not true that they are easily known, and still less so that they are communicable in common familiar terms. But least of all is it true that there is nothing original in Behmen.

Ib.

The chiefest of these in England are Dr. Pordage and his family.

It is curious that Lessing in the Review, which he, Nicolai, and Mendelssohn conducted under the form of Letters to a wounded Officer, joins the name of Pordage with that of Behmen. Was Pordage's work translated into German?

Ib. p. 79.

Also the Socinians made some increase by the ministry of one Mr. Biddle, sometimes schoolmaster in Gloucester; who wrote against the Godhead of the Holy Ghost, and afterwards of Christ; whose followers inclined much to mere Deism.

For the Socinians till Biddle retained much of the Christian religion, for example, Redemption by the Cross, and the omnipresence of Christ as to this planet even as the Romanists with their Saints. Luther's obstinate adherence to the ubiquity of the Body of Christ and his or rather its real presence in and with the bread was a sad furtherance to the advocates of Popish idolatry and hierolatry.

Ib. p. 80.

Many a time have I been brought very low, and received the sentence of death in myself, when my poor, honest, praying neighbors have met, and upon their fasting and earnest prayers I have been recovered. Once when I had continued weak three weeks, and was unable to go abroad, the very day that they prayed for me, being Good Friday, I recovered, and was able to preach, and administer the Sacrament the next Lord's Day, and was better after it, &c.

Strange that the common manuals of school logic should not have secured Baxter from the repeated blunder of *Cum hoc, ergo, propter hoc:* but still more strange that his piety should not have revolted against degrading prayer into medical quackery.

Before the Revolution of 1688, metaphysics ruled without experimental psychology, and in these curious paragraphs of Baxter we see the effect: since the Revolution experimental psychology

without metaphysics has in like manner prevailed, and we now feel the result. In like manner from Plotinus to Proclus, that is, from A.D. 250 to A.D. 450, philosophy was set up as a substitute for religion: during the dark ages religion superseded philosophy, and the consequences are equally instructive. The great maxim of legislation, intellectual or political, is *Subordinate, not exclude.* Nature in her ascent leaves nothing behind, but at each step subordinates and glorifies:—mass, crystal, organ, sensation, sentience, reflection.

Ib. p. 82.

Another time, as I sat in my study, the weight of my greatest folio books brake down three or four of the highest shelves, when I sat close under them, and they fell down every side me, and not one of them hit me, save one upon the arm; whereas the place, the weight, the greatness of the books was such, and my head just under them, that it was a wonder they had not beaten out my brains, &c.

Μέγα βιβλίον μέγα κακόν.

Ib. p. 84.

For all the pains that my infirmities ever brought upon me were never half so grievous an affliction to me, as the unavoidable loss of my time, which they occasioned. I could not bear, through the weakness of my stomach, to rise before seven o'clock in the morning, &c.

Alas! in how many respects does my lot resemble Baxter's; but how much less have my bodily evils been; and yet how very much greater an impediment have I suffered them to be! But verily Baxter's labors seem miracles of supporting grace. Ought I not therefore to retract the note p. 80? I waver.

Ib. p. 87.

For my part, I bless God, who gave me even under a Usurper, whom I opposed, such liberty and advantage to preach his Gospel with success, which I can not have under a King to whom I have sworn and performed true subjection and obedience; yea, which no age since the Gospel came into this land did before possess, as far as I can learn from history. Sure I am that when it became a matter of reputation and honor to be godly, it abundantly furthered the successes of the ministry. Yea, and I shall add this much more for the sake of posterity, that as much as I have said and written against licentiousness in religion, and for the magistrate's power in it, and though I think that land most happy, whose rulers use their authority for Christ as well as for the civil peace; yet in comparison of the rest of the world, I shall think that land happy that hath but bare liberty to be as good as they are willing to be; and if countenance and maintenance be but added to liberty, and tolerated errors and sects be but forced to keep the

peace, and not to oppose the substantials of Christianity, I shall not hereafter much fear such toleration, nor despair that truth will bear down adversaries.

What a valuable and citable paragraph! Likewise it is a happy instance of the force of a cherished prejudice in an honest mind—practically yielding to the truth, but yet with a speculative, "Though I still think, &c."

Ib. p. 128.

Among truths certain in themselves, all are not equally certain unto me; and even of the mysteries of the Gospel I must needs say, with Mr. Richard Hooker, that whatever some may pretend, the subjective certainty can not go beyond the objective evidence. * * * Therefore I do more of late than ever discern the necessity of a methodical procedure in maintaining the doctrine of Christianity. * * * My certainty that I am a man is before my certainty that there is a God. * * * My certainty that there is a God is greater than my certainty that he requireth love and holiness of his creature, &c.

There is a confusion in this paragraph, which asks more than a marginal note to disentangle. Briefly, the process of acquirement is confounded with the order of the truths when acquired. A tinder spark gives light to an Argand's lamp: is it therefore more luminous?

Ib. p. 129.

And when I have studied hard to understand some abstruse admired book, as *de Scientia Dei, de Providentia circa malum, de Decretis, de Prædeterminatione, de Libertate creaturæ*, &c. I have but attained the knowledge of human imperfection, and to see that the author is but a man as well as I.

On these points I have come to a resting-place. Let such articles, as are either to be recognized as facts, for example, sin or evil having its origination in a will; and the reality of a responsible and (in whatever sense freedom is presupposed in responsibility) of a free will in man;—or acknowledged as laws, for example, the unconditional bindingness of the practical reason;—or to be freely affirmed as necessary through their moral interest, their indispensableness to our spiritual humanity, for example, the personeity, holiness, and moral government and providence of God;—let these be vindicated from absurdity, from self-contradiction, and contradiction to the pure reason, and restored to simple incomprehensibility. He who seeks for more, knows not what he is talking of; he who will not seek even this is either indifferent to the truth of what he professes to believe, or he mis-

takes a general determination not to disbelieve for a positive and especial faith, which is only our faith as far as we can assign a reason for it. O! how impossible it is to move an inch to the right or the left in any point of spiritual and moral concernment, without seeing the damage caused by the confusion of reason with the understanding.

Ib. p. 181.

My soul is much more afflicted with the thoughts of the miserable world, and more drawn out in desire of their conversion than heretofore. I was wont to look but little further than England in my prayers, as not considering the state of the rest of the world;—or if I prayed for the conversion of the Jews, that was almost all. But now as I better understand the care of the world, and the method of the Lord's Prayer, so there is nothing in the world that lieth so heavy on my heart, as the thought of the miserable nations of the earth.

I dare not condemn myself for the languid or dormant state of my feelings respecting the Mohammedan and heathen nations; yet know not in what degree to condemn. The less culpable grounds of this languor are, first, my utter ignorance of God's purposes with respect to the Heathens; and second, the strong conviction, I have that the conversion of a single province of Christendom to true practical Christianity would do more toward the conversion of Heathendom than an army of Missionaries. Romanism and despotic government in the larger part of Christendom, and the prevalence of Epicurean principles in the remainder;—these do indeed lie heavy on my heart.

Ib. p. 135.

Therefore I confess I give but halting credit to most histories that are written not only against the Albigenses and Waldenses, but against most of the ancient heretics, who have left us none of their own writings, in which they speak for themselves; and I heartily lament that the historical writings of the ancient schismatics and heretics, as they were called, perished, and that partiality suffered them not to survive, that we might have had more light in the Church affairs of those times, and been better able to judge between the Fathers and them.

It is greatly to the credit of Baxter that he has here anticipated those merits which so long after gave deserved celebrity to the name and writings of Beausobre and Lardner, and still more recently in this respect of Eichhorn, Paulus and other Neologists.

Ib. p. 136.

And therefore having myself now written this history of myself, notwithstanding my protestation that I have not in any thing wilfully gone against

the truth, I expect no more credit from the reader than the self-evidencing light of the matter, with concurrent rational advantages from persons, and things, and other witnesses, shall constrain him to.

I may not unfrequently doubt Baxter's memory, or even his competence, in consequence of his particular modes of thinking; but I could almost as soon doubt the Gospel verity as his veracity.

Book i. Part ii. p. 139.

The following book of this Work is interesting and most instructive as an instance of Syncretism, and its Epicurean *clinamen*, even when it has been undertaken from the purest and most laudable motives, and from impulses the most Christian, and yet its utter failure in its object, that of tending to a common centre. The experience of eighteen centuries seems to prove that there is no practicable *medium* between a Church comprehensive (which is the only meaning of a Catholic Church visible) in which A. in the North or East is allowed to advance officially no doctrine different from what is allowed to B. in the South or West;—and a co-existence of independent Churches, in none of which any further unity is required but that between the minister and his congregation, while this again is secured by the election and continuance of the former depending wholly on the will of the latter.

Perhaps the best state possible, though not the best possible state, is where both are found, the one established by maintenance, the other by permission; in short that which we now enjoy. In such a state no minister of the former can have a right to complain, for it was at his own option to have taken the latter; *et volenti nulla fit injuria*. For an individual to demand the freedom of the independent single Church when he receives £500 a-year for submitting to the necessary restrictions of the Church General, is impudence and Mammonolatry to boot.

Ib. p. 141.

They (the Erastians) misunderstood and injured their brethren, supposing and affirming them to claim as from God a coercive power over the bodies or purses of men, and so setting up *imperium in imperio;* whereas all temperate Christians (at least except Papists) confess that the Church hath no power of force, but only to manage God's word unto men's consciences.

But are not the receivers as bad as the thief? Is it not a poor evasion to say:—"It is true I send you to a dungeon there to rot, because you do not think as I do concerning some point of faith;

—but this only as a civil officer. As a divine I only tenderly entreat and persuade you !" Can there be fouler hypocrisy in the Spanish Inquisition than this ?

Ib. p. 142.

That hereby they (the Diocesan party) altered the ancient species of Presbyters, to whose office the spiritual government of their proper folks as truly belonged, as the power of preaching and worshiping God did.

I could never rightly understand this objection of Richard Baxter's. What power not possessed by the Rector of a parish, would he have wished a parochial Bishop to have exerted ? What could have been given by the Legislature to the latter which might not be given to the former ? In short Baxter's plan seems to do away Archbishops—*κοινοὶ ἐπίσκοποι*—but for the rest to name our present Rectors and Vicars Bishops. I can not see what is gained by his plan. The true difficulty is that Church discipline is attached to an Establishment by this world's law, not to the form itself established : and his objections from paragraph 5 to paragraph 10 relate to particular abuses, not to Episcopacy itself.

Ib. p. 143.

But above all I disliked that most of them (the Independents) made the people by majority of votes to be Church governors in excommunications, absolutions, &c., which Christ hath made an act of office ; and so they governed their governors and themselves.

Is not this the case with the Houses of Legislature ? The members taken individually are subjects ; collectively governors.

Ib. p. 177.

The extraordinary gifts of the Apostles, and the privilege of being eye and ear witnesses to Christ, were abilities which they had for the infallible discharge of their function, but they were not the ground of their power and authority to govern the Church. * * * *Potestas clavium* was committed to them only, not to the Seventy.

I wish for a proof, that all the Apostles had any extraordinary gifts which none of the LXX. had. Nay as an Episcopalian of the Church of England, I hold it an unsafe and imprudent concession, tending to weaken the governing right of the Bishops. But I fear that as the law and right of patronage in England now are, the question had better not be stirred ; lest it should be found that the true power of the keys is not, as with the Papists, in hands to which it is doubtful whether Christ committed them

exclusively; but in hands to which it is certain that Christ did not commit them at all.

Ib. p. 179.

It followeth not a mere Bishop may have a multitude of Churches, because an Archbishop may, who hath many Bishops under him.

What then does Baxter quarrel about? That our Bishops take a humbler title than they have a right to claim;—that being in fact Archbishops, they are for the most part content to be styled as one of the brethren!

Ib. p. 185.

I say again, No Church, no Christ; for no body, no head; and if no Christ then, there is no Christ now.

Baxter here forgets his own mystical regenerated Church. If he mean this, it is nothing to the argument in question; if not, then he must assert the monstrous absurdity of, No un-regenerate Church, no Christ.

Ib. p. 188.

Or if they would not yield to this at all, we might have communion with them as Christians, without acknowledging them for Pastors.

Observe the inconsistency of Baxter. No Pastor, no Church; no Church, no Christ; and yet he will receive them as Christians: much to his honor as a Christian, but not much to his credit as a logician.

Ib. p. 189.

We are agreed that as some discovery of consent on both parts (the pastors and people) is necessary to the being of the members of a political particular Church: so that the most express declaration of that consent is the most plain and satisfactory dealing, and most obliging, and likest to attain the ends.

In our Churches, especially in good livings, there is such an overflowing fulness of consent on the part of the Pastor as supplies that of the people altogether; nay, to nullify their declared dissent.

Ib. p. 194.

By the establishment of what is contained in these twelve propositions or articles following, the Churches in these nations may have a holy communion, peace and concord, without any wrong to the consciences or liberties of Presbyterians, Congregational, Episcopal, or any other Christians.

Painfully instructive are these proposals from so wise and peaceable a divine as Baxter. How mighty must be the force

of an old prejudice when so generally acute a logician was blinded by it to such palpable inconsistencies! On what ground of right could a magistrate inflict a penalty, whereby to compel a man to hear what he might believe dangerous to his soul, on which the right of burning the refractory individual might not be defended as well?

Ib. p. 198.

To which ends * * I think that this is all that should be required of any Church or member ordinarily to be professed: In general I do believe all that is contained in the sacred canonical Scriptures, and particularly I believe all explicitly contained in the ancient Creed, &c.

To a man of sense, but unstudied in the context of human nature, and from having confined his reading to the writers of the present and the last generation unused to live in former ages, it must seem strange that Baxter should not have seen that this test is either all or nothing. And the Creed! Is it certain that the so-called Apostles' Creed was more than the mere catechism of the Catechumens? Was it the Baptismal Creed of the Eastern or Western Church, especially the former? The only test really necessary, in my opinion, is an established Liturgy.

Ib. p. 201.

As reverend Bishop Ussher hath manifested that the Western Creed, now called the Apostles' (wanting two or three clauses that now are in it) was not only before the Nicene Creed, but of much further antiquity, that no beginning of it below the Apostles' days can be found.

Remove these two or three clauses, and doubtless the substance of the remainder must have been little short of the Apostolic age. But so is one at least of the writings of Clement. The great question is: Was this the Baptismal Symbol, the *Regula Fidei*, which it was forbidden to put in writing;—or was it not the Christian A. B. C. of the *Catechumeni* previously to their Baptismal initiation into the higher mysteries, to *the strong meat* which was not for *babes*?*

Ib. p. 203.

Not so much for my own sake as others; lest it should offend the Parliament, and open the mouths of our adversaries, that we can not ourselves agree in fundamentals; and lest it prove an occasion for others to sue for a universal toleration.

That this apprehension so constantly haunted, so powerfully

* See Hooker E. P. V. xviii. 3. Vol. ii. p. 80. Keble.—*Ed.*

actuated, even the mild and really tolerant Baxter, is a strong proof of my old opinion,—that the dogma of the right and duty of the civil magistrate to restrain and punish religious avowals by him deemed heretical, universal among the Presbyterians and Parliamentary Churchmen, joined with the persecuting spirit of the Presbyterians,—was the main cause of Cromwell's despair and consequent unfaithfulness concerning a Parliamentary Commonwealth.

Ib. p. 222.

I tried, when I was last with you, to revive your reason by proposing to you the infallibility of the common senses of all the world; and I could not prevail though you had nothing to answer that was not against common sense. And it is impossible any thing controverted can be brought nearer you, or made plainer than to be brought to your eyes and taste and feeling; and not yours only, but all men's else. Sense goes before faith. Faith is no faith but upon supposition of sense and understanding: if therefore common sense be fallible, faith must needs be so.

This is one of those two-edged arguments, which not indeed began, but began to be fashionable, just before and after the Restoration. I was half converted to Transubstantiation by Tillotson's common senses against it; seeing clearly that the same grounds *totidem verbis et syllabis* would serve the Socinian against all the mysteries of Christianity. If the Roman Catholics had pretended that the phenomenal bread and wine were changed into the phenomenal flesh and blood, this objection would have been legitimate and irresistible; but as it is, it is mere sensual babble. The whole of Popery lies in the assumption of a Church, as a numerical unit, infallible in the highest degree, inasmuch as both which is Scripture, and what Scripture teaches, is infallible by derivation only from an infallible decision of the Church. Fairly undermine or blow up this: and all the remaining peculiar tenets of Romanism fall with it, or stand by their own rights as opinions of individual Doctors.

An antagonist of a complex bad system,—a system, however, notwithstanding—and such is Popery,—should take heed above all things not to disperse himself. Let him keep to the sticking place. But the majority of our Protestant polemics seem to have taken for granted that they could not attack Romanism in too many places, or on too many points;—forgetting that in some they will be less strong than in others, and that if in any one or

two they are repelled from the assault, the feeling of this will extend itself over the whole. Besides, what is the use of alleging thirteen reasons for a witness's not appearing in Court, when the first is that the man had died since his *subpœnâ?* It is as if a party employed to root up a tree were to set one or two at that work, while others were hacking the branches, and others sawing the trunk at different heights from the ground.

N.B. The point of attack suggested above in disputes with the Romanists is of special expediency in the present day: because a number of pious and reasonable Roman Catholics are not aware of the dependency of their other tenets on this of the infallibility of their Church decisions, as they call them, but are themselves shaken and disposed to explain it away. This once fixed, the Scriptures rise uppermost, and the man is already a Protestant, rather a genuine Catholic, though his opinions should remain nearer to the Roman than the Reformed Church.

Ib.

But methinks yet I should have hope of reviving your charity. You can not be a Papist indeed, but you must believe that out of their Church (that is out of the Pope's dominions) there is no salvation; and consequently no justification and charity, or saving grace. And is it possible you can so easily believe your religious father to be in hell; your prudent, pious mother to be void of the love of God, and in a state of damnation, &c.

This argument *ad affectum* is beautifully and forcibly stated; but yet defective by the omission of the point;—not for unbelief or misbelief of any article of faith, but simply for not being a member of this particular part of the Church of Christ. For it is possible that a Christian might agree in all the articles of faith with those of the Roman doctors against those of the Reformation, and yet if he did not acknowledge the Pope as Christ's vicar, and held salvation possible in any other Church, he is himself excluded from salvation! Without this great distinction Lady Ann Lindsey might have replied to Baxter:—"So might a Pagan orator have said to a convert from Paganism in the first ages of Christianity; so indeed the advocates of the old religion did argue. What! can you bear to believe that Numa, Camillus, Fabricius, the Scipios, the Catos, that Cicero, Seneca, that Titus and the Antonini, are in the flames of Hell, the accursed objects of the divine hatred? Now, whatever you dare hope of these as heathens, we dare hope of you as heretics."

Ib. p. 224.

But this is not the worst. You consequently anathematize all Papists by your sentence: for heresies by your own sentence cut off men from heaven: but Popery is a bundle of heresies: therefore it cuts off men from heaven. The *minor* I prove, &c.

This introduction of syllogistic form in a letter to a young Lady is whimsically characteristic.

Ib. p. 225.

You say, the Scripture admits of no private interpretation. But you abuse yourself and the text with a false interpretation of it in these words. An interpretation is called private either as to the subject person, or as to the interpreter. You take the text to speak of the latter, when the context plainly showeth you that it speaks of the former. The Apostle directing them to understand the prophecies of the Old Testament, gives them this caution;—that none of these Scriptures that are spoken of Christ the public person must be interpreted as spoken of David or other private person only, of whom they were mentioned but as types of Christ, &c.

It is strange that this sound and irrefragable argument has not been enforced by the Church divines in their controversies with the modern Unitarians, as Capp, Belsham, and others, who refer all the prophetic texts of the Old Testament to historical personages of their time, exclusively of all double sense.

Ib. p. 226.

As to what you say of Apostles still placed in the Church:—when any show us an immediate mission by their communion, and by miracles, *tongues*, and a spirit of revelation and infallibility prove themselves Apostles, we shall believe them.

This is another of those two-edged arguments which Baxter and Jeremy Taylor imported from Grotius, and which have since become the universal fashion among Protestants. I fear, however, that it will do us more hurt by exposing a weak part to the learned Infidels than service in our combat with the Romanists. I venture to assert most unequivocally that the New Testament contains not the least proof of the *linguipotence* of the Apostles, but the clearest proofs of the contrary: and I doubt whether we have even as decisive a victory over the Romanists in our Middletonian, Farmerian, and Douglasian dispute concerning the miracles of the first two centuries, and their assumed contrast *in genere* with those of the Apostles and the Apostolic age, as we have in most other of our Protestant controversies.

N.B. These opinions of Middleton and his more cautious fol-

lowers are no part of our real Church doctrine. This passion for law Court evidence began with Grotius.

Ib. p. 246.

We conceived there needs no more to be said for justifying the imposition of the ceremonies by law established than what is contained in the beginning of this Section. * * * Inasmuch as lawful authority hath already determined the ceremonies in question to be decent and orderly, and to serve to edification: and consequently to be agreeable to the general rules of the Word.

To a self-convinced and disinterested lover of the Church of England, it gives an indescribable horror to observe the frequency with which the Prelatic party after the Restoration appeal to the laws, as of equal authority with the express words of Scripture ;—as if the laws, by them appealed to, were other than the vindictive determinations of their own furious partisans ;—as if the same appeals might not have been made by Bonner and Gardiner under Philip and Mary ! Why should I speak of the inhuman sophism that, because it is silly in my neighbor to break his egg at the broad end when the Squire and the Vicar have declared their predilection for the narrow end, therefore it is right for the Squire and the Vicar to hang and quarter him for his silliness :—for it comes to that.

Ib. p. 248.

To you it is indifferent before your imposition: and therefore you may without any regret of your own consciences forbear the imposition, or persuade the law-makers to forbear it. But to many of those that dissent from you, they are sinful, &c.

But what is all this, good worthy Baxter, but saying and unsaying ? If they are not indifferent, why did you previously concede them to be such ? In short, nothing can be more pitiably weak than the conduct of the Presbyterian party from the first capture of Charles I. Common sense required, either a bold denial that the Church had power in ceremonies more than in doctrines, or that the Parliament was the Church, since it is the Parliament that enacts all these things ;—or if they admitted the authority lawful and the ceremonies only, in their mind, inexpedient, good God ! can self-will more plainly put on the cracked mask of tender conscience than by refusal of obedience ? What intolerable presumption, to disqualify as ungodly and reduce to null the majority of the country, who preferred the Liturgy, in

order to force the long-winded vanities of bustling God-orators on those who would fain hear prayers, not spouting !

Ib. p. 249.

The great controversies between the hypocrite and the true Christian, whether we should be serious in the practice of the religion which we commonly profess, hath troubled England more than any other ;—none being more hated and divided as Puritans than those that will make religion their business, &c.

Had not the Governors had bitter proofs that there are other and more cruel vices than swearing and careless living ;—and that these were predominant chiefly among such as made their religion their business ?

Ib.

And whereas you speak of opening a gap to Sectaries for private conventicles, and the evil consequents to the state, we only desire you to avoid also the cherishing of ignorance and profaneness, and *suppress all Sectaries*, and spare not, in a way that will not suppress the means of knowledge and godliness.

The present company, that is, our own dear selves, always excepted.

Ib. p. 250.

Otherwise the poor undone Churches of Christ will no more believe you in such professions than we believed that those men intended the King's just power and greatness, who took away his life.

Or who, like Baxter, joined the armies that were showering cannon-balls and bullets around his inviolable person ! Whenever by reading the Prelatical writings and histories, I have had an over-dose of anti-Prelatism in my feelings, I then correct it by dipping into the works of the Presbyterians, and their fellows, and so bring myself to more charitable thoughts respecting the Prelatists, and fully subscribe to Milton's assertion, that "Presbyter was but Old Priest writ large."

Ib. p. 254.

The apocryphal matter of your lessons in Tobit, Judith, Bel and the Dragon, &c., is scarce agreeable to the word of God.

Does not Jude refer to an apocryphal book ?

Ib.

Our experience unresistibly convinceth us that a continued prayer doth more to help most of the people, and carry on their desires, than turning almost every petition into a distinct prayer ; and making prefaces and conclusions to be near half the prayers.

This now is the very point I most admire in our excellent Liturgy. To any particular petition offered to the Omniscient, there may be a sinking of faith, a sense of its superfluity; but to the lifting up of the soul to the Invisible and there fixing it on his attributes, there can be no scruple.

Ib. p. 257.

The not abating of the impositions is the carting off of many hundreds of your brethren out of the ministry, and of many thousand Christians out of your communion; but the abating of the impositions will so offend you as to silence or excommunicate none of you at all. For example, we think it a sin to subscribe, or swear canonical obedience, or use the transient image of the Cross in Baptism, and therefore these must cast us out, &c.

As long as independent single Churches, or voluntarily synodical were forbidden and punishable by penal law, this argument remained irrefragable. The imposition of such trifles under such fearful threats was the very bitterness of spiritual pride and vindictiveness;—after the law passed by which things became as they now are, it was a mere question of expediency for the National Church to determine in relation to its own comparative interests. If the Church chose unluckily, the injury has been to itself alone.

It seems strange that such men as Baxter should not see that the use of the ring, the surplice, and the like, are indifferent according to his own confession, yea, mere trifles, in comparison with the peace of the Church; but that it it is no trifle, that men should refuse obedience to lawful authority in matters indifferent, and prefer the sin of schism to offending their taste and fancy. The Church did not, upon the whole, contend for a trifle, nor for an indifferent matter, but for a principle on which all order in society must depend. Still this is true only, provided the Church enacts no ordinances that are not necessary or at least plainly conducive to order or (generally) to the ends for which it is a Church. Besides, the point which the King had required them to consider was not what ordinances it was right to obey, but what it was expedient to enact or not to enact.

Ib. p. 269.

That the Pastors of the respective parishes may be allowed not only publicly to preach, but personally to catechize or otherwise instruct the several families, admitting none to the Lord's Table that have not personally owned their Baptismal covenant by a credible profession of faith and obedience; and to admonish and exhort the scandalous, in order to their repentance; to hear the witnesses and the accused party, and to appoint fit times and

places for these things, and to deny such persons the communion of the Church in the holy Eucharist, that remain impenitent, or that wilfully refuse to come to their Pastors to be instructed, or to answer such probable accusations; and to continue such exclusion of them till they have made a credible profession of repentance, and then to receive them again to the communion of the Church;—provided there be place for due appeals to superior power.

Suppose only such men Pastors as are now most improperly, whether as boast or as sneer, called Evangelical, what an insufferable tyranny would this introduce! Who would not rather live in Algiers? This alone would make this minute history of the ecclesiastic factions invaluable, that it must convince all sober lovers of independence and moral self-government, how dearly we ought to prize our present Church Establishment with all its faults.

Ib. p. 272.

Therefore we humbly crave that your Majesty will here declare, that it is your Majesty's pleasure that none be punished or troubled for not using the Book of Common Prayer, till it be effectually reformed by divines of both persuasions equally deputed thereunto.

The dispensing power of the Crown not only acknowledged, but earnestly invoked! Cruel as the conduct of Laud and that of Sheldon to the Dissentients was, yet God's justice stands clear towards them; for they demanded that from others, which they themselves would not grant. They were to be allowed at their own fancies to denounce the ring in marriage, and yet empowered to endungeon, through the magistrate, the honest and peaceable Quaker for rejecting the outward ceremony of water in Baptism, as seducing men to take it as a substitute for the spiritual reality;—though the Quakers, no less than themselves, appealed to Scripture authority—the Baptist's own contrast of Christ's with the water Baptism.

Ib. p. 273.

We are sure that kneeling in any adoration at all, in any worship, on any Lord's Day in the year, or any week day between Easter and Pentecost, was not only disused, but forbidden by General Councils, &c.—and therefore that kneeling in the act of receiving is a novelty contrary to the decrees and practice of the Church for many hundred years after the Apostles.

Was not this because kneeling was the agreed sign of sorrow and personal contrition, which was not to be introduced into the

public worship on the great day and the solemn seasons of the Church's joy and thanksgiving? If so, Baxter's appeal to this usage is a gross sophism, a mere pun.

Ib. p. 308.

Baxter's Exceptions to the Common Prayer Book.

1. Order requireth that we begin with reverent prayer to God for his acceptance and assistance, which is not done.

Enunciation of God's invitations, and promises in God's own words, as in the Common Prayer Book, much better.

2. That the Creed and Decalogue containing the faith, in which we profess to assemble for God's worship, and the law which we have broken by our sins, should go before the confession and Absolution; or at least before the praises of the Church; which they do not.

Might have deserved consideration, if the people or the larger number consisted of uninstructed *catechumeni*, or mere candidates for Church-membership. But the object being, not the first teaching of the Creed and Decalogue, but the lively reimpressing of the same, it is much better as it is.

3. The Confession omitteth not only original sin, but all actual sin as specified by the particular commandments violated, and almost all the aggravations of those sins. * * * Whereas confession, being the expression of repentance, should be more particular, as repentance itself should be.

Grounded on one of the grand errors of the whole Dissenting party, namely, the confusion of public common prayer, praise, and instruction, with domestic and even with private devotion. Our Confession is a perfect model for Christian communities.

4. When we have craved help for God's prayers, before we come to them, we abruptly put in the petition for speedy deliverance—(*O God, make speed to save us: O Lord, make haste to help us*), without any intimation of the danger that we desire deliverance from, and without any other petition conjoined.

5. It is disorderly in the manner, to sing the Scripture in a plain tune after the manner of reading.

6. (*The Lord be with you. And with thy spirit*), being petitions for divine assistance, come in abruptly in the midst or near the end of morning prayer: And (*Let us pray*) is adjoined when we were before in prayer.

Mouse-like squeak and nibble.

7. (*Lord have mercy upon us: Christ have mercy upon us: Lord have mercy upon us*), seemeth an affected tautology without any special cause or order here; and the Lord's Prayer is annexed that was before recited, and

yet the next words are again but a repetition of the aforesaid oft-repeated general (*O Lord, show thy mercy upon us*).

Still worse. The spirit in which this and similar complaints originated has turned the prayers of Dissenting ministers into irreverent preachments, forgetting that tautology in words and thoughts implies no tautology in the music of the heart to which the words are, as it were, set, and that it is the heart that lifts itself up to God. Our words and thoughts are but parts of the enginery which remains with ourselves; and logic, the rustling dry leaves of the lifeless reflex faculty, does not merit even the name of a pulley or lever of devotion.

8. The prayer for the King (*O Lord, save the King*), is without any order put between the aforesaid petition and another general request only for audience. (*And mercifully hear us when we call upon thee.*)

A trifle, but just.

9. The second Collect is intituled (*For Peace*), and hath not a word in it of petition for peace, but only *for defence in assaults of enemies*, and that we *may not fear their power*. And the prefaces (*in knowledge of whom standeth, &c.* and *whose service, &c.*) have no more evident respect to a petition for peace than to any other. And the prayer itself comes in disorderly, while many prayers or petitions are omitted, which according both to the method of the Lord's Prayer, and the nature of the things, should go before.

10. The third Collect intituled (*For Grace*) is disorderly, &c. * * * And thus the main parts of prayer, according to the rule of the Lord's Prayer and our common necessities, are omitted.

Not wholly unfounded: but the objection proceeds on an arbitrary and (I think) false assumption, that the Lord's Prayer was universally prescriptive in form and arrangement.

12. The Litany * * omitteth very many particulars, * * and it is exceeding disorderly, following no just rules of method. Having begged pardon of our sins, and deprecated vengeance, it proceedeth to evil in general, and some few sins in particular, and thence to a more particular enumeration of judgments; and thence to a recitation of the parts of that work of our redemption, and thence to the deprecation of judgments again, and thence to prayers for the King and magistrates, and then for all nations, and then for love and obedience, &c.

The very points here objected to as faults I should have selected as excellencies. For do not the duties and temptations occur in real life even so intermingled? The imperfection of thought much more of language, so singly successive, allows no better representation of the close neighborhood, nay the co-inher-

ence of duty in duty, desire in desire. Every want of the heart pointing Godward is a chiliagon that touches at a thousand points. From these remarks I except the last paragraph of s. 12,

(As to the prayer for Bishops and Curates and the position of the General Thanksgiving, &c.)

which are defects so palpable and so easily removed, that nothing but antipathy to the objectors could have retained them.

13. The like defectiveness and disorder is in the Communion Collects for the day. * * * There is no more reason why it should be appropriate to that day than another, or rather be a common petition for all days, &c.

I do not see how these supposed improprieties, for want of appropriateness to the day, could be avoided without risk of the far greater evil of too great appropriation to particular Saints and days as in Popery. I am so far a Puritan that I think nothing would have been lost, if Christmas day and Good Friday had been the only week days made holy days, and Easter the only Lord's day especially distinguished. I should also have added Whitsunday; but that it has become unmeaning since our Clergy have, as I grieve to think, become generally Arminian, and interpreting the descent of the Spirit as the gift of miracles and of miraculous infallibility by inspiration have rendered it of course of little or no application to Christians at present. Yet how can Arminians pray our Church prayers collectively on any day? Answer. See a *boa constrictor* with an ox or deer. What they do swallow, proves so astounding a dilatability of gullet, that it would be unconscionable strictness to complain of the horns, antlers, or other indigestible non-essentials being suffered to rot off at the confines, ἔρκος ὀδόντων. But to write seriously on so serious a subject, it is mournful to reflect that the influence of the systematic theology then in fashion with the anti-Prelatic divines, whether Episcopalians or Presbyterians, had quenched all fineness of mind, all flow of heart, all grandeur of imagination in them; while the victorious party, the Prelatic Arminians, enriched as they were with all learning and highly gifted with taste and judgment, had emptied revelation of all the doctrines that can properly be said to have been revealed, and thus equally caused the extinction of the imagination, and quenched the life in the light by withholding the appropriate fuel and the supporters of the sacred flame. So that, between both parties, our transcendent

Liturgy remains like an ancient Greek temple, a monumental proof of the architectural genius of an age long departed, when there were giants in the land.

Ib. p. 337.

As I was proceeding, Bishop Morley interrupted me according to his manner, with vehemency crying out * * The Bishop interrupted me again * * I attempted to speak, and still he interrupted me * * Bishop Morley went on, talking louder than I, &c.

The Bishops appear to have behaved insolently enough. Safe in their knowledge of Charles's inclinations, they laughed in their sleeves at his commission. Their best answer would have been to have pressed the anti-impositionists with their utter forgetfulness of the possible, nay, very probable differences of opinion between the ministers and their congregations. A vain minister might disgust a sober congregation with his *extempore* prayers, or his open contempt of their kneeling at the Sacrament, and the like. Yet by what right if he acts only as an individual? And then what an endless source of disputes and preferences of this minister or of that!

Ib. p. 341.

The paper offered by Bishop Cosins.

1. That the question may be put to the managers of the division, Whether there be any thing in the doctrine, or discipline, or the Common Prayer, or ceremonies, contrary to the word of God; and if they can make any such appear; let them be satisfied.

2. If not, let them propose what they desire in point of expediency, and acknowledge it to be no more.

This was proposed, doubtless, by one of your sensible men; it is so plain, so plausible, shallow, *nihili, nauci, pili, flocci-cal.* Why, the very phrase "contrary to the word of God" would take a month to define, and neither party agree at last. One party says:—The Church has power from God's word to order all matters of order so as shall appear to them to conduce to decency and edification: but ceremonies respect the orderly performance of divine service: *ergo*, the Church has power to ordain ceremonies: but the Cross in baptizing is a ceremony; *ergo*, the Church has power to prescribe the crossing in Baptism. What is rightfully ordered can not be rightfully withstood:—but the crossing, &c., is rightfully ordered:—*ergo*, the crossing can not be rightfully omitted. To this, how easily would the other party reply;—

1. That a small number of Bishops could not be called the Church :—2. That no one Church had power or pretence from God's word to prescribe concerning mere matters of outward decency and convenience to other Churches or assemblies of Christian people :—3. That the blending an unnecessary and suspicious, if not superstitious, motion of the hand with a necessary and essential act doth in no wise respect order or propriety :—Lastly, that to forbid a man to obey a direct command of God because he will not join with it an admitted mere tradition of men, is contrary to common sense, no less than to God's word, expressly and by breach of charity, which is the great end and purpose of God's word. Besides; might not the Pope and his shavelings have made the same proposition to the Reformers in the reign of Edward VI., in respect to the greater part of the idle superfluities which were rejected by the Reformers, only as idle and superfluous, and for that reason contrary to the spirit of the Gospel, though few, if any, were in the direct teeth of a positive prohibition? Above all, an honest policy dictates that the end in view being fully determined, as here for instance, the preclusion of disturbance and indecorum in Christian assemblies, every addition to means, already adequate to the securing of that end, tends to frustrate the end, and is therefore evidently excluded from the prerogatives of the Church (however that word may be interpreted), inasmuch as its power is confined to such ceremonies and regulations as conduce to order and general edification. In short it grieves me to think that the Heads of the most Apostolical Church in Christendom should have insisted on three or four trifles, the abolition of which could have given offence to none but such as from the baleful superstition that alone could attach importance to them effectually, it was charity to offend;—when all the rest of Baxter's objections might have been answered so triumphantly.

Ib. p. 343.

Answer to the foresaid paper.

8. That none may be a preacher, that dare not subscribe that there is nothing in the Common Prayer Book, the Book of Ordination. and the 39 Articles, that is contrary to the word of God.

I think this might have been left out as well as the other two articles mentioned by Baxter. For as by the words "contrary to the word of God" in Cosins's paper, it was not meant to declare

the Common Prayer Book free from all error, the sense must have been, that there is not any thing in it in such a way or degree contrary to God's word, as to oblige us to assign sin to those who have overlooked it, or who think the same compatible with God's word, or who, though individually disapproving the particular thing, yet regard that acquiescence as an allowed sacrifice of individual opinion to modesty, charity, and zeal for the peace of the Church. For observe that this eighth instance is additional to, and therefore not inclusive of, the preceding seven: otherwise it must have been placed as the first, or rather as the whole, the seven following being motives and instances in support and explanation of the point.

Ib. p. 368.

Let me mediate here between Baxter and the Bishops: Baxter had taken for granted that the King had a right to promise a revision of the Liturgy, Canons and regiment of the Church, and that the Bishops ought to have met him and his friends as diplomatists on even ground. The Bishops could not with discretion openly avow all they meant; and it would be bigotry to deny that the spirit of compromise had no indwelling in their feelings or intents. But nevertheless it is true that they thought more in the spirit of the English Constitution than Baxter and his friends.—"This," thought they, "is the law of the land, *quam nolumus mutari;* and it must be the King with and by the advice of his Parliament, that can authorize any part of his subjects to take the question of its repeal into consideration. Under other circumstances a King might bring the Bishops and the Heads of the Romish party together to plot against the law of the land. No! we would have no other secret Committees but of Parliamentary appointment. We are but so many individuals. It is in the Legislature that the congregations, the party most interested in this cause, meet collectively by their representatives."—Lastly, let it not be overlooked, that the root of the bitterness was common to both parties,—namely, the conviction of the vital importance of uniformity;—and this admitted, surely an undoubted majority in favor of what is already law must decide whose uniformity it is to be.

Ib. p. 368.

We must needs believe that when your Majesty took our consent to a Liturgy to be a foundation that would infer our concord, you meant not

that we should have no concord but by consenting to this Liturgy without any considerable alteration.

This is forcible reasoning, but which the Bishops could fairly leave for the King to answer;—the contract tacit or expressed, being between him and the anti-Prelatic Presbytero-Episcopalian party, to which neither the Bishops nor the Legislature had acceded or assented. If Baxter and Calamy were so little imbued with the spirit of the Constitution as to consider Charles II. as the breath of their nostrils, and this dread sovereign Breath in its passage gave a snort or a snuffle, or having led them to expect a snuffle surprised them with a snort, let the reproach be shared between the Breath's fetid conscience and the nostrils' nasoductility. The traitors to the liberty of their country who were swarming and intriguing for favor at Breda when they should have been at their post in Parliament or in the Lobby preparing terms and conditions!—Had all the ministers that were afterwards ejected and the Presbyterian party generally exerted themselves, heart and soul, with Monk's soldiers, and in collecting those whom Monk had displaced, and, instead of carrying on treasons against the Government *de facto* by mendicant negotiations with Charles, had taken open measures to confer the sceptre on him as the Scotch did,—whose stern and truly loyal conduct has been most unjustly condemned,—the schism in the Church might have been prevented and the Revolution of 1688 superseded.

N.B. In the above I speak of the Bishops as men interested in a litigated estate. God forbid, I should seek to justify them as Christians.

Ib. p. 369.

Quære. Whether in the 20th Article these words are not inserted:—*Habet Ecclesia auctoritatem in controversiis fidei.*

Strange, that the evident antithesis between power in respect of ceremonies, and authority in points of faith, should have been overlooked!

Ib.

Some have published, That there is a proper sacrifice in the Lord's Supper, to exhibit Christ's death in the *post-fact*, as there was a sacrifice to prefigure it in the Old Law in the *ante-fact*, and therefore that we have a true altar, and not only metaphorically so called.

Doubtless a gross error, yet pardonable, for to errors nearly as gross it was opposed.

Ib.

Some have maintained that the Lord's Day is kept merely by ecclesiastical constitution, and that the day is changeable.

Where shall we find the proof of the contrary?—at least, if the position had been worded thus: The moral and spiritual obligation of keeping the Lord's Day is grounded on its manifest necessity, and the evidence of its benignant effects in connection with those conditions of the world of which even in Christianized countries there is no reason to expect a change, and is therefore commanded by implication in the New Testament, so clearly and by so immediate a consequence, as to be no less binding on the conscience than an explicit command. A., having lawful authority, expressly commands me to go to London from Bristol. There is at present but one safe road: this therefore is commanded by A.; and would be so, even though A. had spoken of another road which at that time was open.

Ib. p. 370.

Some have broached out of Socinus a most uncomfortable and desperate doctrine, that late repentance, that is, upon the last bed of sickness, is unfruitful, at least to reconcile the penitent to God.

This no doubt refers to Jeremy Taylor's work on Repentance, and is but too faithful a description of its character.

Ib. p. 373.

A little after the King was beheaded, Mr. Atkins met this priest in London, and going into a tavern with him, said to him in his familiar way, "What business have you here? I warrant you come about some roguery or other." Whereupon the priest told it him as a great secret, that there were thirty of them here in London, who, by instructions from Cardinal Mazarine, did take care of such affairs, and had sat in council, and debated the question, whether the King should be put to death or not;—and that it was carried in the affirmative, and there were but two voices for the negative, which was his own, and another's; and that for his part, he could not concur with them, as foreseeing what misery this would bring upon his country. Mr. Atkins stood to the truth of this, but thought it a violation of the laws of friendship to name the man.

Richard Baxter was too thoroughly good for any experience to make him worldly wise; else, how could he have been simple enough to suppose, that Mazarine would leave such a question to be voted *pro* and *con*, and decided by thirty emissaries in London! And, how could he have reconciled Mazarine's having any share in Charles's death with his own masterly account, pp. 98,

99, 100 ? Even Cromwell, though he might have prevented, could not have effected, the sentence. The regicidal judges were not his creatures. Consult the Life of Col. Hutchinson upon this.

Ib. p. 374.

Since this, Dr. Peter Moulin hath, in his Answer to *Philanax Anglicus*, declared that he is ready to prove, when authority will call him to it, that the King's death, and the change of the Government, was first proposed both to the Sorbonne, and to the Pope with his Conclave, and consented to and concluded for by both.

The Pope in his Conclave had about the same influence in Charles's fate as the Pope's eye in a leg of mutton. The letter intercepted by Cromwell was Charles's death-warrant. Charles knew his power; and Cromwell and Ireton knew it likewise, and knew that it was the power of a man who was within a yard's length of a talisman, only not within an arm's length, but which in that state of the public mind, could he but have once grasped it, would have enabled him to blow up Presbyterian and Independent both. If ever a lawless act was defensible on the principle of self-preservation, the murder of Charles might be defended. I suspect that the fatal delay in the publication of the *Icon Basilike* is susceptible of no other satisfactory explanation. In short, it is absurd to burthen this act on Cromwell and his party, in any special sense. The guilt, if guilt it was, was consummated at the gates of Hull; that is, the first moment that Charles was treated as an individual, man against man. Whatever right Hampden had to defend his life against the King in battle, Cromwell and Ireton had in yet more imminent danger against the King's plotting. Milton's reasoning on this point is unanswerable; and what a wretched hand does Baxter make of it!

Ib. p. 375.

But if the laws of the land appoint the nobles, as next the King, to assist him in doing right, and withhold him from doing wrong, then be they licensed by man's law, and so not prohibited by God's, to interpose themselves for the safety of equity and innocency, and by all lawful and needful means to procure the Prince to be reformed, but in no case deprived, where the sceptre is inherited! So far Bishop Bilson.

Excellent! O, by all means preserve for him the benefit of his rightful heir-loom, the regal sceptre; only lay it about his

shoulders, till he promises to handle it, as he ought! But what if he breaks his promise and your head? or what if he will not promise? How much honester would it be to say, that extreme cases are *ipso nomine* not generalizable,—therefore not the subjects of a law, which is the conclusion *per genus singuli in genere inclusi*. Every extreme case must be judged by and for itself under all the peculiar circumstances. Now as these are not foreknowable, the case itself can not be predeterminable. Harmodius and Aristogiton did not justify Brutus and Cassius; but neither do Brutus and Cassius criminate Harmodius and Aristogiton. The rule applies till an extreme case occurs; and how can this be proved? I answer, the only proof is success and good event; for these afford the best presumption, first, of the extremity, and secondly, of its remediable nature—the two elements of the justification. To every individual it is forbidden. He who attempts it, therefore, must do so on the presumption that the will of the nation is in his will; whether he is mad or in his senses, the event can alone determine.

Ib. p. 398.

The governing power and obligation over the flock is essential to the office of a Pastor or Presbyter as instituted by Christ.

There is, ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, one flaw in Baxter's plea for his Presbyterian form of Church government, that he uses a metaphor, which, inasmuch as it is but a metaphor, agrees with the thing meant in some points only, as if it were commensurate *in toto*, and virtually identical. Thus, the Presbyter is a shepherd as far as the watchfulness, tenderness, and care, are to be the same in both; but it does not follow that the Presbyter has the same sole power and exclusive right of guidance; and for this reason,—that his flock are not sheep, but men; not of a natural, generic, or even constant inferiority of judgment; but Christians, co-heirs of the promises, and therein of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and of the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. How then can they be excluded from a share in Church government? The words of Christ, if they may be transferred from their immediate application to the Jewish Synagogue, suppose the contrary;—and that highest act of government, the election of the officers and ministers of the Church, was confessedly exercised by the congregations including the Presbyters and Arch-presbyter or

Bishop, in the primitive Church. The question, therefore, is :— Is a national Church, established by law, compatible with Christianity ? If so, as Baxter held, the representatives (King, Lords, and Commons) are or may be representatives of the whole people as Christians as well as civil subjects ;—and their voice will then be the voice of the Church, which every individual, as an individual, themselves as individuals, and, *à fortiori*, the officers and administrators appointed by them, are bound to obey at the risk of excommunication, against which there would be no appeal, but to the heavenly Cæsar, the Lord and Head of the universal Church. But whether as the accredited representatives and plenipotentiaries of the national Church, they can avail themselves of their conjoint but distinct character, as temporal legislators, to superadd corporal or civil penalties to the spiritual sentence in points peculiar to Christianity, as heretical opinions, Church ceremonies, and the like, thus destroying *discipline*, even as wood is destroyed by combination with fire ;—this is a new and difficult question, which yet Baxter and the Presbyterian divines, and the Puritans of that age in general, not only answered affirmatively, but most zealously, not to say furiously, affirmed with anathemas to the asserters of the negative, and spiritual threats to the magistrates neglecting to interpose the temporal sword. In this respect the present Dissenters have the advantage over their earlier predecessors ; but on the other hand they utterly evacuate the Scriptural commands against schism ; take away all sense and significance from the article respecting the Catholic Church ; and in consequence degrade the discipline itself into mere club-regulations or the by-laws of different lodges ; —that very discipline, the capability of exercising which in its own specific nature without superinduction of a destructive and transmutual opposite, is the fairest and firmest support of their cause. 20th October, 1829.

Ib. p. 401.

That sententially it must be done by the Pastor or Governor of that particular Church, which the person is to be admitted into, or cast out of.

This most arbitrary appropriation of the words of Christ, and of the Apostles, John and Paul, by the Clergy to themselves exclusively, is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος, the fatal error which has practically excluded Church discipline from among Protestants in all

free countries. That it is retained, and an efficient power, among the Quakers, and only in that Sect, who act collectively as a Church,—who not only have no proper Clergy, but will not allow a division of majority and minority, nor a temporary president,—seems to supply an unanswerable confirmation of this my assertion, and a strong presumption for the validity of my argument. The Wesleyan Methodists have, I know, a discipline, and the power is in their consistory,—a general conclave of priests cardinal since the death of Pope Wesley. But what divisions and secessions this has given rise to; what discontents and heart-burnings it still occasions in their laboring inferior ministers, and in the classes, is no less notorious, and may authorize a belief, that as the Sect increases, it will be less and less effective; nay, that it has decreased; and after all, what is it compared with the discipline of the Quakers?—Baxter's inconsistency on this subject would be inexplicable, did we not know his zealotry against Harrington, the Deists and the Mystics;—so that, like an electrified pith-ball, he is forever attracted towards their tenets concerning the pretended perfecting of spiritual sentences by the civil magistrate, but he touches only to fly off again. "Toleration! dainty word for soul-murder! God grant that my eye may never see a toleration!" he exclaims in his book against Harrington's Oceana.

Ib. p. 405.

As for the democratical conceit of them that say that the Parliament hath their governing power, as they are the people's representatives, and so have the members of the convocation, though those represented have no governing power themselves, it is so palpably self-contradicting, that I need not confute it.

Self-contradicting according to Baxter's sense of the words "represent" and "govern." But every rational adult has a governing power: namely, that of governing himself.

Ib. p. 412.

That though a subject ought to take an oath in the sense of his rulers who impose it, as far as he can understand it; yet a man that taketh an oath from a robber to save his life is not always bound to take it in the imposer's sense, if he take it not against the proper sense of the words.

This is a point on which I have never been able to satisfy myself.—The only safe conclusion I have been able to draw, being the folly, mischief, and immorality of all oaths but judicial ones,

—and those no farther excepted than as they are means of securing a deliberate consciousness of the presence of the Omniscient Judge. The inclination of my mind is at this moment, to the principle that an oath may deepen the guilt of an act sinful in itself, but can not be detached from the act; it being understood that a perfectly voluntary and self-imposed oath is itself a sin. The man who compels me to take an oath by putting a pistol to my ear has in my mind clearly forfeited all his right to be treated as a moral agent. Nay it seems to be a sin to act so as to induce him to suppose himself such. Contingent consequences must be excluded; but would, I am persuaded, weigh in favor of annulling on principle an oath sinfully extorted. But I hate casuistry so utterly that I could not without great violence to my feelings put the case in all its bearings. For example:—it is sinful to enlarge the power of wicked agents; but to allow them to have the power of binding the conscience of those, whom they have injured, is to enlarge the power, &c. Again: no oath can bind to the perpetration of a sin; but to transfer a sum of money from its rightful owner to a villain is a sin, &c. and twenty other such. But the robber may kill the next man! Possibly: but still more probably, many, who would be robbers if they could obtain their ends without murder, would resist the temptations if no extenuations of guilt were contemplated;—and one murder is more effective in rousing the public mind to preventive measures, and by the horror it strikes, is made more directly preventive of the tendency, than fifty civil robberies by contract.

Ib. p. 435.

That the minister be not bound to read the Liturgy himself, if another, by whomsoever, be procured to do it; so be it he preach not against it.

Wonderful, that so good and wise a man as Baxter should not have seen that in this the Church would have given up the best, perhaps the only efficient, preservative of her Faith. But for our blessed and truly Apostolic and Scriptural Liturgy, our churches' pews would long ago have been filled by Arians and Socinians, as too many of their desks and pulpits already are.

Part iii. p. 59.

As also to make us take such a poor suffering as this for a sign of true grace, instead of faith, hope, love, mortification, and a heavenly mind; and that the loss of one grain of love was worse than a long imprisonment.

Here Baxter confounds his own particular case, which very many would have coveted, with the sufferings of other prisoners on the same score ;—sufferings nominally the same, but with few, if any, of Baxter's almost flattering supports.

Ib. p. 60.

It would trouble the reader for me to reckon up the many diseases and dangers for these ten years past, in or from which God hath delivered me; though it be my duty not to forget to be thankful. Seven months together I was lame with a strange pain in one foot, twice delivered from a bloody flux ; a spurious cataract in my eye, with incessant webs and net-works before it, hath continued these eight years, * * * so that I have rarely one hour's or quarter of an hour's ease. Yet through God's mercy I was never one hour melancholy, &c.

The power of the soul, by its own act of will, is, I admit, great for any one occasion or for a definite time, yea, it is marvellous. But of such exertions and such an even frame of spirit, as Baxter's were, under such unremitting and almost unheard-of bodily derangements and pains as his, and during so long a life, I do not believe a human soul capable, unless substantiated and successively potentiated by an especial divine grace.

Ib. p. 65.

The reasons why I make no larger a profession necessary than the Creed and Scriptures, are, because if we depart from this old sufficient Catholic rule, we narrow the Church, and depart from the old Catholicism.

Why then any Creed ? This is the difficulty. If you put the Creed as in fact, and not by courtesy, Apostolic, and on a parity with Scripture, having, namely, its authority in itself, and a direct inspiration of the framers, inspired *ad id tempus et ad eam rem*, on what ground is this to be done, without admitting the binding power of tradition in the very sense of the term in which the Church of Rome uses it, and the Protestant Churches reject it ? That it is the sum total made by Apostolic contributions, each Apostle casting, as into a helmet, a several article as his σύμβολον, is the tradition ; and this is holden as a mere legendary tale by the great majority of learned divines. That it is simply the Creed of the Western Church is affirmed by many Protestant divines, and some of these divines of our Church. Its comparative simplicity these divines explain by the freedom from heresies enjoyed by the Western Church, when the Eastern Church had been long troubled therewith. Others, again, and not unplausibly, contend that it was the Creed of the Catechumens preparatory to the

Baptismal profession of faith, which other was a fuller comment on the union of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, into whose name (or power) they were baptized. That the Apostles' Creed received additions after the Apostolic age, seems almost certain; not to mention the perplexing circumstance that so many of the Latin Fathers, who give almost the words of the Apostolic Creed, declare it forbidden absolutely to write or by any material form to transmit the *Canon Fidei*, or *Symbolum* or *Regula Fidei*, the Creed κατ' ἐξοχήν, by analogy of which the question whether such a book was Scripture or not, was to be tried. With such doubts how can the Apostles' Creed be preferred to the Nicene by a consistent member of the Reformed Catholic Church?

Ib. p. 67.

They think while you (the Independents) seem to be for a stricter discipline than others, that your way or usual practice tendeth to extirpate godliness out of the land, by taking a very few that can talk more than the rest, and making them the Church, &c.

Had Baxter had as judicious advisers among his theological, as he had among his legal friends; and had he allowed them equal influence with him; he would not, I suspect, have written this irritating and too egometical paragraph. But Baxter would have disbelieved a prophet who had foretold that almost the whole orthodoxy of the Nonconformists would be retained and preserved by the Independent congregations in England, after the Presbyterian had almost without exception become, first, Arian, then Socinian, and finally Unitarian: that is, the *demi-semi-quaver* of Christianity, Arminianism being taken for the *semi-breve*.

Ib. p. 69.

After this I waited on him (Dr. John Owen) at London again, and he came once to me to my lodgings, when I was in town near him. And he told me that he received my chiding letter and perceived that I suspected his reality in the business; but he was so hearty in it that I should see that he really meant as he spoke, concluding in these words, "You shall see it, and my practice shall reproach your diffidence." * * * About a month after I went to him again, and he had done nothing, but was still hearty for the work. And to be short, I thus waited on him time after time, till my papers had been near a year and a quarter in his hand, and then I advised him to return them to me, which he did, with these words, "I am still a well-wisher to those mathematics;"—without any other words about them,

or ever giving me any more exception against them. And this was the issue of my third attempt for union with the Independents.

Dr. Owen was a man of no ordinary intellect. It would be interesting to have his conduct in this point, seemingly so strange, in some measure explained: The words "those mathematics" look like an innuendo, that Baxter's scheme of union, by which all the parties opposed to the Prelatic Church were to form a rival Church, was, like the mathematics, true indeed, but true only in the idea, that is, abstracted from the subject matter. Still there appears a very chilling want of open-heartedness on the part of Owen, produced perhaps by the somewhat overly and certainly most ungracious resentments of Baxter. It was odd at least to propose concord in the tone and on the alleged ground of an old grudge.

Ib.

I have been twenty-six years convinced that dichotomizing will not do it, but that the divine Trinity in Unity hath expressed itself in the whole frame of nature and morality. * * * But he, Mr. George Lawson, had not hit on the true method of the *vestigia Trinitatis*, &c.

Among Baxter's philosophical merits, we ought not to overlook, that the substitution of Trichotomy for the old and still general plan of Dichotomy in the method and disposition of Logic, which forms so prominent and substantial an excellence in Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason, of the Judgment, and the rest of his works, belongs originally to Richard Baxter, a century before Kant;—and this not as a hint, but as a fully evolved and systematically applied principle. Nay, more than this;—Baxter grounded it on an absolute idea presupposed in all intelligential acts: whereas Kant takes it only as a fact in which he seems to anticipate or suspect some yet deeper truth latent, and hereafter to be discovered.

On recollection, however, I am disposed to consider *this* alone as Baxter's peculiar claim. I have not indeed any distinct memory of Giordano Bruno's *Logice Venatrix Veritatis;* but doubtless the principle of Trichotomy is necessarily involved in the Polar Logic, which again is the same with the Pythagorean *Tetractys*, that is, the eternal fountain or source of nature; and this being sacred to contemplations of identity, and prior in order of thought to all division, is so far from interfering with Trichotomy as the universal form of division (more correctly of dis-

tinctive distribution in logic) that it implies it. *Prothesis* being by the very term anterior to *Thesis*, can be no part of it. Thus in

Prothesis

Thesis *Antithesis*

Synthesis

we have the Tetrad indeed in the intellectual and intuitive contemplation, but a Triad in discursive arrangement, and a Trinity in result.*

Ib. p. 144.

Seeing the great difficulties that lie in the way of increasing charities so as to meet the increase of population, or even so as to follow it, and the manifold desirableness of parish Churches, with the material dignity that in a right state of Christian order would attach to them, as compared with meeting-houses, chapels, and the like—all more or less *privati juris*, I have often felt disposed to wish that the large majestic Church, central to each given parish, might have been appropriated to Public Prayer, to the mysteries of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, and to the *quasi sacramenta*, Marriage, Penance, Confirmation, Ordination, and to the continued reading aloud, or occasional chanting, of the Scriptures during the intervals of the different Services, which ought to be so often performed as to suffice successively for the whole population; and that on the other hand the chapels and the like should be entirely devoted to teaching and expounding.

Ib. p. 153.

And I proved to him that Christianity was proved true many years before any of the New Testament was written, and that so it may be still proved by one that doubted of some words of the Scripture; and therefore the true order is, to try the truth of the Christian religion first, and the perfect verity of the Scriptures afterwards.

With more than Dominican virulence did Goeze, Head Pastor of the Lutheran Church at Hamburg, assail the celebrated Lessing for making and supporting the same position as the pious Baxter here advances.

This controversy with Goeze was in 1778, nearly a hundred years after Baxter's writing this.

* See Table Talk, p. 392.—*Ed.*

Ib. p. 155.

And within a few days Mr. Barnett riding the circuit was cast by his horse, and died in the very fall. And Sir John Medlicote and his brother, a few weeks after, lay both dead in his house together.

This interpreting of accidents and coincidences into judgments is a breach of charity and humility, only not universal among all sects and parties of this period, and common to the best and gentlest men in all; we should not therefore bring it in charge against any one in particular. But what excuse shall be made for the revival of this presumptuous encroachment on the divine prerogative in our days?

Ib. p. 180.

Near this time my book called A Key for Catholics, was to be reprinted. In the preface to the first impression I had mentioned with praise the Earl of Lauderdale. * * * I thought best to prefix an epistle to the Duke, in which I said not a word of him but truth. * * * But the indignation that men had against the Duke made some blame me, as keeping up the reputation of one whom multitudes thought very ill of; whereas I owned none of his faults, and did nothing that I could well avoid for the aforesaid reasons. Long after this he professed his kindness to me, and told me I should never want while he was able, and humbly entreated me to accept twenty guineas from him, which I did.

This would be a curious proof of the slow and imperfect intercourse of communication between Scotland and London, if Baxter had not been particularly informed of Lauderdale's horrible cruelties to the Scotch Covenanters:—and if Baxter did know them, he surely ran into a greater inconsistency to avoid the appearance of a less. And the twenty guineas! they must have smelt, I should think, of more than the earthly brimstone that might naturally enough have been expected in gold or silver, from his palm. I would as soon have plucked an ingot from the cleft of the Devil's hoof.

Ταῦτ' ἔλεγον περίθυμος· ἐγὼ γὰρ μίσει ἐν ἴσῳ
Λαυδέρδαλον ἔχω καὶ κερκοκερώννυχα Σατᾶν.

Ib. p. 181.

About that time I had finished a book called Catholic Thoughts; in which I undertake to prove that besides things unrevealed, known to none, and ambiguous words, there is no considerable difference between the Arminians and Calvinists, except some very tolerable difference in the point of perseverance.

What Arminians? what Calvinists?—It is possible that the

guarded language and positions of Arminius himself may be interpreted into a "very tolerable" compatibility with the principles of the milder Calvinists, such as Archbishop Leighton, that true Father of the Church of Christ. But I more than doubt the possibility of even approximating the principles of Bishop Jeremy Taylor to the fundamental doctrines of Leighton, much more to those of Cartwright, Twiss, or Owen.

Ib. p. 186.

Bishop Barlow told my friend that got my papers for him, that he could hear of nothing that we judged to be sin, but mere inconveniences. When as above seventeen years ago, we publicly endeavored to prove the sinfulness even of many of the old impositions.

Clearly an undeterminable controversy; inasmuch as there is no contra-definition possible of sin and inconvenience in religion: while the exact point, at which an inconvenience, becoming intolerable, passes into sin, must depend on the state and the degree of light, of the individual consciences to which it appears or becomes intolerable. Besides, a thing may not only be indifferent in itself, but may be declared such by Scripture, and on this indifference the Scripture may have rested a prohibition to Christians to judge each other on the point. If yet a Pope or Archbishop should force this on the consciences of others, for example, to eat or not to eat animal food, would he not sin in so doing? And does Scripture permit me to subscribe to an ordinance made in direct contempt of a command of Scripture? If it were said,—In all matters indifferent and so not sinful you must comply with lawful authority:—must I not reply, But you have yourself removed the indifferency by your injunction? Look in Popish countries for the hideous consequences of the unnatural doctrine—that the Priest may go to Hell for sinfully commanding, and his parishioners go with him for not obeying that command.

Ib. p. 191.

About this time died my dear friend Mr. Thomas Gouge, of whose life you may see a little in Mr. Clark's last book of Lives:—a wonder of sincere industry in works of charity. It would make a volume to recite at large the charity he used to his poor parishioners at Sepulchre's, before he was ejected and silenced for non-conformity, &c.

I can not express how much it grieves me, that our Clergy should still think it fit and expedient to defend the measures of the High Churchmen from Laud to Sheldon, and to speak of the

ejected ministers, Calamy, Baxter, Gouge, Howe, and others, as schismatics, factionists, fanatics, or Pharisees:—thus to flatter some half-dozen dead Bishops, wantonly depriving our present Church of the authority of perhaps the largest collective number of learned and zealous, discreet and holy, ministers that one age and one Church was ever blest with; and whose authority in every considerable point is in favor of our Church, and against the present Dissenters from it. And this seems the more impolitic, when it must be clear to every student of the history of these times, that the unmanly cruelties inflicted on Baxter and others were, as Bishops Ward, Stillingfleet, and others saw at the time, part of the Popish scheme of the Cabal, to trick the Bishops and dignified Clergy into rendering themselves and the established Church odious to the public by laws, the execution of which the King, the Duke, Arlington, and the Popish priests directed towards the very last man that the Bishops themselves (the great majority at least) would have molested.

Appendix ii. p. 37.

If I can prove that it hath been the universal practice of the Church *in nudum apertum caput manus imponere*, doth it follow that this is essential, and the contrary null?

How likewise can it be proved that the imposition of hands in Ordination did not stand on the same ground as the imposition of hands in sickness; that is, the miraculous gifts of the first preachers of the Gospel? All Protestants admit that the Church retained several forms so originated, after the cessation of the originating powers, which were the substance of these forms.

Ib.

If you think not only imposition to be essential, but also that nothing else is essential, or that all are true ministers that are ordained by a lawful Bishop per *manuum impositionem*, then do you egregiously *tibi ipsi imponere*.

Baxter, like most scholastic logicians, had a sneaking affection for puns. The cause is,—the necessity of attending to the primary sense of words, that is, the visual image or general relation expressed, and which remains common to all the after-senses, however widely or even incongruously differing from each other in other respects. For the same reason, schoolmasters are commonly punsters. "I have indorsed your Bill, Sir," said a pedagogue to a merchant, meaning he had flogged his son William.—

My old master the Rev. James Bowyer, the *Hercules furens* of the phlogistic sect, but else an incomparable teacher,—used to translate, *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*,—first reciting the Latin words, and observing that they were the fundamental article of the Peripatetic school,—"You must flog a boy, before you can make him understand;"—or, "You must lay it in at the tail before you can get it into the head."

Ib. p. 45.

Then, that the will must follow the practical intellect whether right or wrong,—that is no precept, but the nature of the soul in its acting, because that the will is *potentia cæca, non nata ad intelligendum, sed ad volendum vel nolendum intellectum.*

This is the main fault in Baxter's metaphysics, that he so often substantiates distinctions into dividuous self-subsistents. As here;—for a will not intelligent is no will.

Appendix iii. p. 55.

And for many ages no other ordinarily baptized but infants. If Christ had no Church then, where was his wisdom, his love, and his power? What was become of the glory of his redemption, and his Catholic Church, that was to continue to the end?

But the Antipædo-Baptists would deny any such consequences as applicable to them, who are to act according to the circumstances, in which God, who ordains his successive manifestations in due correspondence with other lights and states of things, has placed them. He does not exclude from the Church of Christ (say they) those whom we do not accept into the communion of our particular Society, any more than the House of Lords excludes Commoners from being Members of Parliament. And we do this because we think that such promiscuous admission would prolong an error which would be deadly to us, though not to you who interpret the Scriptures otherwise.

In fine.

There are two senses in which the words, 'Church of England,' may be used;—first, with reference to the idea of the Church as an estate of this Christian Realm, protesting against the Papal usurpation, comprising, first, the interests of a permanent learned class, that is, the Clergy;—secondly, those of the proper, that is, the infirm poor, from age or sickness;—and thirdly, the adequate proportional instruction of all in all classes by public prayer, recitation of the Scriptures, by expounding, preaching, catechizing,

and schooling, and last, not least, by the example and influence of a pastor and a schoolmaster placed as a germ of civilization and cultivation in every parish throughout the land. To this idea, the Reformed Church of England with its marriable and married Clergy would have approximated, if the revenues of the Church as they existed at the death of Henry VII., had been rightly transferred by his successor ;—transferred, I mean, from reservoirs, which had by degeneracy on the one hand, and progressive improvement on the other, fallen into ruin, and in which those revenues had stagnated into contagion or uselessness,—transferred from what had become public evils to their original and inherent purpose of public benefits, instead of being sacrilegiously alienated by a transfer to private proprietors. That this was impracticable, is historically true ; but no less true is it philosophically, that this impracticability, arising wholly from moral causes (namely, the loose manners and corrupt principles of a great majority in all classes during the dynasty of the Tudors), does not prevent this wholesale sacrilege, from deserving the character of the first and deadliest wound inflicted on the Constitution of the kingdom ; which term, in the body politic, as in bodies natural, expresses not only what is and has been evolved, but likewise whatever is potentially contained in the seminal principle of the particular body, and which would in its due time have appeared but for emasculation in its infancy. This, however, is the first sense of the words, Church of England.*

The second is the Church of England as now by law established, and by practice of the law actually existing. That in the first sense it is the object of my admiration and the earthly *ne plus ultra* of my religious aspirations, it were superfluous to say : but I may be allowed to express my conviction, that on our recurring to the same ends and objects (the restoration of a national and circulating property in counterpoise of individual possession, disposable and heritable) though in other forms and by other means perhaps, the decline or progress of this country depends. In the second sense of the words I can sincerely profess, that I love and honor the Church of England, comparatively, beyond any other Church established or unestablished now existing in Christendom ; and it is wholly in consequence of this deliberate and most affectionate filial preference, that I have read this work,

* See the Church and State, p. 51.—*Ed.*

and Calamy's historical writings, with so deep and so melancholy an interest. And I dare avow that I can not but regard as an ignorant bigot every man who (especially since the publicity and authentication of the contents of the Stuart Papers, Memoirs and Life of James II. &c.) can place the far later furious High Church compilations and stories of Walker and others in competition with the veracity and general verity of Baxter and Calamy; or can forget that the great body of Non-conformists to whom these great and good men belonged, were not dissenters from the established Church willingly, but an orthodox and numerous portion of the Church. Omitting then the wound received by religion generally under Henry VIII., and the shameless secularizations clandestinely effected during the reigns of Elizabeth and the first James, I am disposed to consider the three following as the grand evil epochs of our present Church. First, The introduction and after-predominance of Latitudinarianism under the name of Arminianism, and the spirit of a conjoint Romanism and Socinianism at the latter half or towards the close of the reign of James I. in the persons of Montague, Laud, and their confederates. Second, The ejection of the two thousand ministers after the Restoration, with the other violences in which the Churchmen made themselves the dupes of Charles, James, the Jesuits, and the French Court. (See the Stuart Papers *passim.*) It was this that gave consistence and enduring strength to Schism in this country, prevented the pacation of Ireland, and prepared for the separation of America at a far too early period for the true interest of either country. Third, The surrender by the Clergy of the right of taxing themselves, and the Jacobitical follies that combined with the former to put it in the power of the Whig party to deprive the Church of her Convocation,—a bitter disgrace and wrong, to which most unhappily the people were rendered indifferent by the increasing contrast of the sermons of the Clergy with the Articles and Homilies of the Church itself—but a wrong nevertheless which already has avenged, and will sooner or later be seen to avenge, itself on the State and the governing classes that continue this boast of a short-sighted policy; the same policy which in our own days would have funded the property of the Church, and, by converting the Clergy into salaried dependents on the Government *pro tempore*, have deprived the Establishment of its fairest honor, that of being neither enslaved to the

court, nor to the congregations; the same policy, alas! which even now pays and patronizes a Board of Agriculture to undermine all landed property by a succession of false, shallow, and inflammatory libels against tithes.

These are my weighed sentiments: and fervently desiring, as I do, the perpetuity and prosperity of the established Church, zealous for its rights and dignity, preferring its forms, believing its Articles of Faith, and holding its Book of Common Prayer and its translation of the Scriptures among my highest privileges as a Christian and an Englishman, I trust that I may both entertain and avow these sentiments without forfeiting any part of my claim to the name of a faithful member of the Church of England. June, 1820.

N.B. As to Warburton's Alliance of the Church and State, I object to the title (Alliance), and to the matter and mode of the reasoning. But the inter-dependence of the Church and the State appears to me a truth of the highest practical importance. Let but the temporal powers protect the subjects in their just rights as subjects merely: and I do not know of any one point in which the Church has the right or the necessity to call in the temporal power as its ally for any purpose exclusively ecclesiastic. The right of a firm to dissolve its partnership with any one partner, breach of contract having been proved, and publicly to announce the same, is common to all men as social beings.

I spoke above of "Romanism." But call it, if you like, Laudism, or Lambethism in temporalities and ceremonials, and of Socinianism in doctrine, that is, a retaining of the word but a rejecting or interpreting away of the sense and substance of the Scriptural Mysteries. This spirit has not indeed manifested itself in the article of the Trinity, since Waterland gave the death-blow to Arianism, and so left no alternative to the Clergy, but the actual divinity or mere humanity of our Lord; and the latter would be too impudent an avowal for a public reader of our Church Liturgy: but in the articles of original sin, the necessity of regeneration, the necessity of redemption in order to the possibility of regeneration, of justification by faith, and of prevenient and auxiliary grace,—all I can say with sincerity is, that our orthodoxy seems so far in an improving state, that I can hope for the time when Churchmen will use the term Arminianism to express a habit of belief opposed not to Calvinism, or the works of Calvin,

but to the Articles of our own Church, and to the doctrine in which all the first Reformers agreed.

Note—that by Latitudinarianism, I do not mean the particular tenets of the divines so called, such as Dr. H. More, Cudworth and their compeers, relative to toleration, comprehension, and the general belief that in the greater number of points then most controverted, the pious of all parties were far more nearly of the same mind than their own imperfections, and the imperfection of language allowed them to see: I mean the disposition to explain away the articles of the Church on the pretext of their inconsistency with right reason;—when in fact it was only an incongruity with a wrong understanding, the faculty which St. Paul calls *φρόνημα σαρκὸς*, the rules of which having been all abstracted from objects of sense (finite in time and space), are logically applicable to objects of the sense alone. This I have elsewhere called the spirit of Socinianism, which may work in many whose tenets are anti-Socinian.

Law is—*conclusio per regulam generis singulorum in genere isto inclusorum.* Now the extremes *et inclusa* are contradictory terms. Therefore extreme cases are not capable subjects of law *à priori*, but must proceed on knowledge of the past, and anticipation of the future, and the fulfilment of the anticipation is the proof, because the only possible determination, of the accuracy of the knowledge. In other words the agents may be condemned or honored according to their intentions, and the apparent source of their motives; so we honor Brutus, but the extreme case itself is tried by the event.

NOTES ON LEIGHTON.*

Surely if ever work not in the sacred Canon might suggest a belief of inspiration,—of something more than human,—this it is. When Mr. Elwyn made this assertion, I took it as the hyperbole of affection: but now I subscribe to it seriously, and blessed the hour that introduced me to the knowledge of the evangelical, apostolical Archbishop Leighton. April, 1814.

Next to the inspired Scriptures—yea, and as the vibration of

* Works of Leighton, 4 vols. 8 vo. London, 1819.—*Ed.*

that once-struck hour remaining on the air, stands Leighton's Commentary on the 1st Epistle of St. Peter.

Comment vol. i. p. 2.

—— their redemption and salvation by Christ Jesus; that inheritance of immortality bought by his blood for them, and the evidence and stability of their right and title to it.

By the blood of Christ I mean this. I contemplate the Christ, 1;—As *Christus agens*, the Jehovah Christ, the Word: 2;—As *Christus patiens*, the God Incarnate. In the former he is *relative ad intellectum humanum, lux lucifica, sol intelligibilis: relative ad existentiam humanam, anima animans, calor fovens.* In the latter he is *vita vivificans, principium spiritualis, id est, veræ reproductionis in vitam veram.* Now this principle, or *vis vitæ vitam vivificans*, considered *in forma passiva, assimilationem patiens*, at the same time that it excites the soul to the vital act of assimilating—this is the Blood of Christ, really present through faith to, and actually partaken by, the faithful. Of this the body is the continual product, that is, a good life—the merits of Christ acting on the soul, *redemptive.*

Ib. pp. 13–15.

Of their sanctification: *elect unto obedience, &c.*

That the doctrines asserted in this and the two or three following pages can not be denied or explained away, without removing (as the modern Unitarians), or (as the Arminians) unsettling and undermining, the foundations of the Faith, I am fully convinced; and equally so, that nothing is gained by the change, the very same logical consequences being deducible from the tenets of the Church Arminians;—scarcely more so, indeed, from those which they still hold in common with Luther, Zuinglius, Calvin, Knox, and Cranmer and the other Fathers of the Reformation in England, and which are therefore most unfairly entitled Calvinism—than from those which they have attempted to substitute in their place. Nay, the shock given to the moral sense by these consequences is, to my feelings, aggravated in the Arminian doctrine by the thin yet dishonest disguise. Meantime the consequences appear to me, in point of logic, legitimately concluded from the terms of the premisses. What shall we say then? Where lies the fault? In the original doctrines expressed in the premisses? God forbid. In the particular deductions,

logically considered? But these we have found legitimate. Where then? I answer in deducing any consequences by such a process, and according to such rules. The rules are alien and inapplicable; the process presumptuous, yea, preposterous. The error, *τὸ πρῶτον ψεῦδος*, lies in the false assumption of a logical deducibility at all, in this instance. First:—because the terms from which the conclusion must be drawn (*termini in majore præmissi, a quibus scientialiter et scientifice demonstrandum erat*) are accommodations and not scientific—that is, proper and adequate, not *per idem*, but *per quam maxime simile*, or rather *quam maxime dissimile:* Secondly:—because the truths in question are transcendent, and have their evidence, if any, in the ideas themselves, and for the reason; and do not and can not derive it from the conceptions of the understanding, which can not comprehend the truths, but is to be comprehended in and by them (*John* i. 5): Lastly, and chiefly;—because these truths, as they do not originate in the intellective faculty of man, so neither are they addressed primarily to our intellect; but are substantiated for us by their correspondence to the wants, cravings, and interests of the moral being, for which they were given, and without which they would be devoid of all meaning,—*vox et præterea nihil.* The only conclusions, therefore, that can be drawn from them, must be such as are implied in the origin and purpose of their revelation; and the legitimacy of all conclusions must be tried by their consistency with those moral interests, those spiritual necessities, which are the proper final cause of the truths and of our faith therein. For some of the faithful these truths have, I doubt not, an evidence of reason; but for the whole household of faith their certainty is in their working. Now it is this, by which, in all cases, we know and determine existence in the first instance. That which works in us or on us exists for us. The shapes and forms that follow the working as its results or products, whether the shapes cognizable by sense or the forms distinguished by the intellect, are after all but the particularizations of this working; its proper names, as it were, as John, James, Peter, in respect of human nature. They are all derived from the relations in which finite beings stand to each other; and are therefore heterogeneous and, except by accommodation, devoid of meaning and purpose when applied to the working in and by which God makes his existence known to us,

and (we may presume to say) especially exists for the soul in whom he thus works. On these grounds, therefore, I hold the doctrines of original sin, the redemption therefrom by the Cross of Christ, and change of heart as the consequent; without adopting the additions to the doctrines inferred by one set of divines, the modern Calvinists, or acknowledging the consequences burdened on the doctrines by their antagonists. Nor is this my faith fairly liable to any inconvenience, if only it be remembered that it is a spiritual working, of which I speak, and a spiritual knowledge,—not through the *medium* of image, the seeking after which is superstition; nor yet by any sensation, the watching for which is enthusiasm, and the conceit of its presence fanatical distemperature. "Do the will of the Father, and ye shall *know* it."

We must distinguish the life and the soul; though there is a certain sense in which the life may be called the soul; that is, the life is the soul of the body. But the soul is the life of the man, and Christ is the life of the soul. Now the spirit of man, the spirit subsistent, is deeper than both, not only deeper than the body and its life, but deeper than the soul; and the Spirit descendent and supersistent is higher than both. In the regenerated man the height and the depth become one—the Spirit communeth with the spirit—and the soul is the *inter-ens*, or *ens inter-medium* between the life and the spirit;—the *participium*,—not as a compound, however, but as a *medium indifferens*—in the same sense in which heat may be designated as the indifference between light and gravity. And what is the Reason?—The spirit in its presence to the understanding abstractedly from its presence in the will,—nay, in many, during the negation of the latter. The spirit present to man, but not appropriated by him, is the reason of man;—the reason in the process of its identification with the will is the spirit.

Ib. pp. 63–4.

Can we deny that it is unbelief of those things that causeth this neglect and forgetting of them? The discourse, the tongue of men and angels can not beget divine belief of the happiness to come; only He that gives it, gives faith likewise to apprehend it, and lay hold upon it, and upon our believing to be filled with joy in the hopes of it.

Most true, most true!

Ib. p. 68.

In spiritual trials that are the sharpest and most fiery of all, when the furnace is within a man, when God doth not only shut up his loving-kindness from its feeling, but seems to shut it up in hot displeasure, when he writes bitter things against it; yet then to depend upon him, and wait for his salvation, this is not only a true, but a strong and very refined faith indeed, and the more he smites, the more to cleave to him. * * * Though I saw, as it were, his hand lifted up to destroy me, yet from that same hand would I expect salvation.

Bless God, O my soul, for this sweet and strong comforter! It is the honey in the lion.

Ib. p. 75.

This natural men may discourse of, and that very knowingly, and give a kind of natural credit to it as to a history that may be true; but firmly to believe that there is divine truth in all these things, and to have a persuasion of it stronger than of the very things we see with our eyes; such an assent as this is the peculiar work of the Spirit of God, and is certainly saving faith.

Lord, I believe: help thou my unbelief! My reason acquiesces, and I believe enough to fear. O, grant me the belief that brings sweet hope!

Ib. p. 76.

Faith * * causes the soul to find all that is spoken of him in the word, and his beauty there represented, to be abundantly true, makes it really taste of his sweetness, and by that possesses the heart more strongly with his love, persuading it of the truth of those things, not by reasons and arguments, but by an inexpressible kind of evidence, that they only know that have it.

Either this is true, or religion is not religion; that is, it adds nothing to our human reason; *non religat*. Grant it, grant it me, O Lord!

Ib. pp. 104–5.

This sweet stream of their doctrine did, as the rivers, make its own banks fertile and pleasant as it ran by, and flowed still forward to after-ages, and by the confluence of more such prophecies grew greater as it went, till it fell in with the main current of the Gospel in the New Testament, both acted and preached by the great Prophet himself, whom they foretold to come, and recorded by his Apostles and Evangelists, and thus united into one river, clear as crystal. This doctrine of salvation in the Scriptures hath still refreshed the city of God, his Church under the Gospel, and still shall do so, till it empty itself into the ocean of eternity.

In the whole course of my studies I do not remember to have

read so beautiful an allegory as this; so various and detailed, and yet so just and natural.

Ib. p. 121.

There is a truth in it, that all sin arises from some kind of ignorance. * * * For were the true visage of sin seen at a full light, undressed and unpainted, it were impossible, while it so appeared, that any one soul could be in love with it, but would rather flee from it as hideous and abominable.

This is the only (defect, shall I say? No, but the only) omission I have felt in this divine Writer—for him we understand by feeling, experimentally—that he doth not notice the horrible tyranny of habit. What the Archbishop says, is most true of beginners in sin; but this is the foretaste of hell, to see and loathe the deformity of the wedded vice, and yet still to embrace and nourish it.

Ib. p. 122.

He calls those times wherein Christ was unknown to them, *the times of their ignorance*. Though the stars shine never so bright, and the moon with them in its full, yet they do not, altogether, make it day: still it is night till the sun appear.

How beautiful, and yet how simple, and as it were unconscious of its own beauty!

Ib. p. 124.

You were running to destruction in the way of sin, and there was a voice, together with the Gospel preaching to your ear, that spake into your heart, and called you back from that path of death to the way of holiness, which is the only way of life. He hath severed you from the mass of the profane world, and picked you out to be jewels for himself.

O, how divine! Surely, nothing less than the Spirit of Christ could have inspired such thoughts in such language. Other divines,—Donne and Jeremy Taylor for instance,—have converted their worldly gifts, and applied them to holy ends; but here the gifts themselves seem unearthly.

Ib. p. 138.

As in religion, so in the course and practice of men's lives, the stream of sin runs from one age to another, and every age makes it greater, adding somewhat to what it receives, as rivers grow in their course by the accession of brooks that fall into them; and every man when he is born, falls like a drop into this main current of corruption, and so is carried down it, and this by reason of its strength, and his own nature, which willingly dissolves into it, and runs along with it.

In this single period we have religion, the spirit,—philosophy, the soul,—and poetry, the body and drapery united;—Plato glorified by St. Paul; and yet coming as unostentatiously as any speech from an innocent girl of fifteen.

Ib. p. 158.

The chief point of obedience is believing; the proper obedience to truth is to give credit to it.

This is not quite so perspicuous and single-sensed as Archbishop Leighton's sentences in general are. This effect is occasioned by the omission of the word "this," or "divine," or the truth "in Christ." For truth in the ordinary and scientific sense is received by a spontaneous, rather than chosen by a voluntary, act; and the apprehension of the same (belief) supposes a position of congruity rather than an act of obedience. Far otherwise is it with the truth that is the object of Christian faith: and it is this truth of which Leighton is speaking. Belief indeed is a living part of this faith; but only as long as it is a living part. In other words, belief is implied in faith; but faith is not necessarily implied in belief. *The devils believe.*

Ib. p. 166.

Hence learn that true conversion is not so slight a work as we commonly account it. It is not the outward change of some bad customs, which gains the name of a reformed man in the ordinary dialect; it is new birth and being, and elsewhere called *a new creation. Though it be but a change in qualities*, yet it is such a one, and the qualities so far distant from what they before were, &c.

I dare not affirm that this is erroneously said; but it is one of the comparatively few passages that are of service as reminding me that it is not the Scripture that I am reading. Not the qualities merely, but the root of the qualities is trans-created. How else could it be a birth,—a creation?

Ib. p. 170.

This natural life is compared, even by natural men, to the vainest things, and scarce find they things light enough to express it vain; and as it is here called grass, so they compare the generations of men to the leaves of trees. * * * *Man that is born of a woman is of few days, and full of trouble. He cometh forth like a flower and is cut down.*—Job xiv. 1, 2.—Psalm xc. 12; xxxix. 4.

It is the fashion to decry scholastic distinctions as useless subtleties, or mere phantoms—*entia logica, vel etiam verbalia*

solum. And yet in order to secure a safe and Christian interpretation to these and numerous other passages of like phrase and import in the Old Testament, it is of highest concernment that we should distinguish the personeity or spirit, as the source and principle of personality, from the person itself as the particular product at any one period, and as that which can not be evolved or sustained but by the co-agency of the system and circumstances in which the individuals are placed. In this latter sense it is that *man* is used in the Psalms, in Job, and elsewhere—and the term made synonymous with flesh. That which constitutes the spirit in man, both for others and itself, is the real man; and to this the elements and elementary powers contribute its bulk (τὸ *videri et tangi*) wholly, and its phenomenal form in part, both as co-efficients, and as conditions. Now as these are under a law of vanity and incessant change,—τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ γινόμενα,—so must all be, to the production and continuance of which they are indispensable. On this hangs the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, as an essential part of the doctrine of immortality;—on this the Scriptural (and only true and philosophical) sense of the soul, *psyche* or life, as resulting from the continual assurgency of the spirit through the body;—and on this the begetting of a new life, a regenerate soul, by the descent of the divine Spirit on the spirit of man. When the spirit by sanctification is fitted for an incorruptible body, then shall it be raised into a world of incorruption, and a celestial body shall burgeon forth thereto, the germ of which had been implanted by the redeeming and creative Word in this world. Truly hath it been said of the elect:—They fall asleep in earth, but awake in heaven. So St. Paul expressly teaches: and as the passage (1 *Cor.* xv. 35–54) was written for the express purpose of rectifying the notions of the converts concerning the Resurrection, all other passages in the New Testament must be interpreted in harmony with it. But John, likewise,—describing the same great event, as subsequent to, and contra-distinguished from, the partial or millenary Resurrection—which (whether we are to understand the Apostle symbolically or literally) is to take place in the present world,—beholds *a new earth* and *a new heaven* as antecedent to, or coincident with, the appearance of the New Jerusalem,—that is, the state of glory, and the resurrection to life everlasting. The old earth and its

heaven had passed away from the face of Him on the throne, at the moment that it gave up the dead.—*Rev.* xx.–xxi.

Ib. pp. 174–5.

But the word of the Lord endureth forever.

And with respect to those learned men that apply the text to God, I remember not that this *abiding forever* is used to express God's eternity in himself.

No; nor is it here used for that purpose; but yet I can not doubt but that either the Word, Ὁ Λόγος ἐν ἀρχῇ, or the divine promises in and through the incarnate Word, with the gracious influences proceeding from him, are here meant—and not the written ῥήματα or Scriptures.

Ib. p. 194.

If any one's head or tongue should grow apace, and all the rest stand at a stay, it would certainly make him a monster; and they are no other that are knowing and discovering Christians, and grow daily in that, but not at all in holiness of heart and life, which is the proper growth of the children of God.

Father in heaven, have mercy on me! Christ, Lamb of God, have mercy on me! Save me, Lord, or I perish! Alas! I am perishing.

Ib. p. 200.

A well-furnished table may please a man, while he hath health and appetite; but offer it to him in the height of a fever, how unpleasant it would be then! Though never so richly decked, it is then not only useless, but hateful to him. But the kindness and love of God is then as seasonable and refreshing to him, as in health, and possibly more.

To the regenerate;—but to the conscious sinner a source of terrors insupportable.

Ib. p. 211.

These things hold likewise in the other stones of this building, chosen before time: all that should be of this building are foreordained in God's purpose, all written in that book beforehand, and then in due time they are chosen, by actual calling, according to that purpose, hewed out and severed by God's own hand from the quarry of corrupt nature;—dead stones in themselves, as the rest, but made living by his bringing them to Christ, and so made truly *precious*, and accounted precious by him that hath made them so.

Though this is not only true, but a most important truth, it would yet have been well to have obviated the apparent carnal consequences.

Ib. p. 216.

All sacrifice is not taken away; but it is changed from the offering of those things formerly in use, to spiritual sacrifices. Now these are every way preferable; they are easier and cheaper to us, and yet more precious and acceptable to God.

Still understand,—to the regenerate. To others, they are not only not easy and cheap, but unpurchasable and impossible too. O God, have mercy upon me!

Ib. p. 229.

Though I be beset on all hands, be accused by the Law, and mine own conscience, and by Satan, and have nothing to answer for myself; yet here I will stay, for I am sure in him there is salvation, and nowhere else.

"Here I *will* stay." But alas! the poor sinner has forfeited the powers of willing; miserable wishing is all he can command. O, the dreadful injury of an irreligious education! To be taught our prayers, and the awful truths of religion, in the same tone in which we are taught the Latin Grammar,—and too often inspiring the same sensations of weariness and disgust!

Vol. ii. p. 242.

And thus are reproaches mentioned amongst the sufferings of Christ in the Gospel, and not as the least: the railings and mockings that were darted at him, and fixed to the Cross, are mentioned more than the very nails that fixed him. And (*Heb.* xii. 2) the *shame* of the Cross, though he was above it, and despised it, yet that shame added much to the burden of it.

I understand Leighton thus: that though our Lord felt it not as *shame*, nor was wounded by the revilings of the people in the way of any correspondent resentment or sting, which yet we may be without blame, yet he suffered from the same as sin, and as an addition to the guilt of his persecutors, which could not but aggravate the burden which he had taken on himself, as being sin in its most devilish form.

Ib. p. 293.

This therefore is mainly to be studied, that the seat of humility be the heart. Although it will be seen in the carriage yet as little as it can * * *. And this I would recommend as a safe way: ever let thy thoughts concerning thyself be below what thou utterest; and what thou seest needful or fitting to say to thy own abasement, be not only content (which most are not) to be taken at thy word, and believed to be such by them that hear thee, but be desirous of it; and let that be the end of thy speech, to persuade them, and gain it of them, that they really take thee for as worthless a man as thou dost express thyself.

Alas! this is a most delicate and difficult subject: and the safest way, and the only safe general rule is the silence that accompanies the inward act of looking at the contrast in all that is of our own doing and impulse! So may praises be made their own antidote.

Vol. iii. p. 20. Serm. i.

They shall see God. What this is we can not tell you, nor can you conceive it: but walk heavenwards in purity, and long to be there, where you shall know what it means: *for you shall know him as he is.*

We say: "Now I see the full meaning, force and beauty of a passage,—we see them through the words." Is not Christ the Word—the substantial, consubstantial Word, ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρός,—not as our words, arbitrary; nor even as the words of Nature phenomenal merely? If even through the words a powerful and perspicuous author—(as in the next to inspired Commentary of Archbishop Leighton,—for whom God be praised!) —I identify myself with the excellent writer, and his thoughts become my thoughts: what must not the blessing be to be thus identified first with the Filial Word, and then with the Father in and through Him?

Ib. p. 63. Serm. v.

In this elementary world, light being (as we hear) the first visible, all things are seen by it, and it by itself. Thus is Christ, among spiritual things, in the elect world of his Church; all things are *made manifest by the light*, says the Apostle, *Eph.* v. 13, speaking of Christ as the following verse doth evidently testify. It is in his word that he shines, and makes it a directing and convincing light, to discover all things that concern his Church and himself, to be known by its own brightness. How impertinent then is that question so much tossed by the Romish Church, "How know you the Scriptures (say they) to be the word of God, without the testimony of the Church?" I would ask one of them again, How they can know that it is daylight, except some light a candle to let them see it? They are little versed in Scripture that know not that it is frequently called light; and they are senseless that know not that light is seen and known by itself. *If our Gospel be hid*, says the Apostle, *it is hid to them that perish:* the god of this world having blinded their minds against the light of the glorious Gospel, no wonder if such stand in need of a testimony. A blind man knows not that it is light at noonday, but by report: but to those that have eyes, light is seen by itself.

On the true test of the Scriptures. Oh! were it not for my manifold infirmities, whereby I am so all unlike the white-robed Leighton, I could almost conceit that my soul had been an ema-

nation from his! So many and so remarkable are the coincidences, and these in parts of his works that I could not have seen—and so uniform the congruity of the whole. As I read, I seem to myself to be only thinking my own thoughts over again, now in the same and now in a different order.

Ib. p. 68.

The Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews calls him (Christ) *ἀπαύγασμα, the brightness of his Father's glory, and the character of his person* (i. 3). And under these expressions lies that remarkable mystery of the Son's eternal relation to the Father, which is rather humbly to be adored, than boldly to be explained, either by God's perfect understanding of his own essence, or by any other notion.

Certainly not by a transfer of a notion, and this too a notion of a faculty itself but notional and limitary, to the Supreme Reality. But there are ideas which are of higher origin than the notions of the understanding, and by the irradiation of which the understanding itself becomes a human understanding. Of such *veritates verificæ* Leighton himself in other words speaks often. Surely, there must have been an intelligible propriety in the terms, *Logos*, Word, *Begotten before all creation*,—an adequate idea or *icon*, or the Evangelists and Apostolic penmen would not have adopted them. They did not invent the terms; but took them and used them as they were taken and applied by Philo and both the Greek and Oriental sages. Nay, the precise and orthodox, yet frequent, use of these terms by Philo, and by the Jewish authors of that traditional wisdom,—degraded in after-times, but which in its purest parts existed long before the Christian æra,—is the strongest extrinsic argument against the Arians, Socinians, and Unitarians, in proof that St. John must have meant to deceive his readers, if he did not use them in the known and received sense. To a Materialist indeed, or to those who deny all knowledges not resolvable into notices from the five senses, these terms as applied to spiritual beings must appear inexplicable or senseless. But so must spirit. To me, (why do I say to me?) to Bull, to Waterland, to Gregory Nazianzen, Basil, Athanasius, Augustine, the terms, Word and generation, have appeared admirably, yea, most awfully pregnant and appropriate; —but still as the language of those who know that they are placed with their backs to substances—and which therefore they can name only from the correspondent shadows—yet not (God

forbid!) as if the substances were the same as the shadows;—which yet Leighton supposed in this his censure,—for if he did not, he then censures himself and a number of his most beautiful passages. These, and two or three other sentences,—slips of human infirmity,—are useful in reminding me that Leighton's works are not inspired Scripture.

Postscript. On a second consideration of this passage, and a revisal of my marginal animadversion—yet how dare I apply such a word to a passage written by a minister of Christ so clearly under the especial light of the divine grace as was Archbishop Leighton?—I am inclined to think that Leighton confined his censure to the attempts to "explain" the Trinity,—and this by "notions,"—and not to the assertion of the adorable acts implied in the terms both of the Evangelists and Apostles, and of the Church before as well as after Christ's ascension; nor to the assent of the pure reason to the truths, and more than assent to, the affirmation of the ideas.

Ib. p. 73.

This fifth Sermon, excellent in parts, is yet on the whole the least excellent of Leighton's works,—and breathes less of either his own character as a man, or the character of his religious philosophy. The style too is in many places below Leighton's ordinary style—in some places even turbid, operose, and catechrestic; —for example,—"to trample on smilings with one foot and on frownings with the other."

Ib. p. 77, Serm. vi.

Leighton, I presume, was acquainted with the Hebrew language, but he does not appear to have studied it much. His observation on the *heart*, as used in the Old Testament, shows that he did not know that the ancient Hebrews supposed the heart to be the seat of intellect, and therefore used it exactly as we use the head.

Ib. p. 104, Serm. vii.

This seventh Sermon is admirable throughout, Leighton throughout. O what a contrast might be presented by publishing some discourse of some Court divine (South for instance), preached under the same state of affairs, and printing the two in columns!

Ib. p. 107, Serm. viii.

In all love three things are necessary; some goodness in the object, either

true and real, or apparent and seeming to be so; for the soul, be it ever so evil, can affect nothing but which it takes in some way to be good.

This assertion in these words has been so often made, from Plato's times to ours, that even wise men repeat it without perhaps much examination whether it be not equivocal—or rather (I suspect) true only in that sense in which it would amount to nothing—nothing to the purpose at least. This is to be regretted—for it is a mischievous equivoque, to make 'good' a synonyme of 'pleasant,' or even the *genus* of which pleasure is a *species*. It is a grievous mistake to say, that bad men seek pleasure because it is good. No! like children they call it good because it is pleasant. Even the useful must derive its meaning from the good, not *vice versa*.

Postscript. The lines in p. 107, noted by me, are one of a myriad instances to prove how rash it is to quote single sentences or assertions from the correctest writers, without collating them with the known system or express convictions of the author. It would be easy to cite fifty passages from Archbishop Leighton's works in direct contradiction to the sentence in question—which he had learnt in the schools when a lad, and afterwards had heard and met with so often that he was not aware that he had never sifted its real purport. This eighth Sermon is another most admirable discourse.

Ib. Serm. ix. p. 12.

The reasonable creature, it is true, hath more liberty in its actions, freely choosing one thing and rejecting another; yet it can not be denied, that in acting of that liberty, their choice and refusal *follow the sway of their nature and condition.

* I would fain substitute for 'follow,' the words, 'are most often determined, and always affected, by.' I do not deny that the will follows the nature; but then the nature itself is a will.

Ib.

As the angels and glorified souls (their nature being perfectly holy and unalterably such), they can not sin; they can delight in nothing but obeying and praising God, in the enjoyment of whom their happiness consisteth.

If angels be other than spirits made perfect, or, as Leighton writes, "glorified souls,"—the "unalterable by nature" seems to me rashly asserted.

Ib.

The mind, *φρόνημα*. Some render it the prudence or wisdom of the flesh.

Here you have it, the carnal mind; but the word signifies, indeed, an act of the mind, rather than either the faculty itself, or the habit of prudence in it, so as it discovers what is the frame of both those.

I doubt. *Φρόνημα* signifies an act: and so far I agree with Leighton. But *φρόνημα σαρκός* is 'the flesh' (that is, the natural man), in the act or habitude of minding—but those acts, taken collectively, are the faculty—the understanding.

How often have I found reason to regret, that Leighton had not clearly made out to himself the diversity of reason and the understanding!

Ib. Serm. xv. p. 196.

A narrow enthralled heart, fettered with the love of lower things, and cleaving to some particular sins, or but some one, and that secret, may keep foot awhile in the way of God's commandments, in some steps of them; but it must give up quickly, is not able to run on to the end of the goal.

One of the blessed privileges of the spiritual man (and such Leighton was), is a piercing insight into the diseases of which he himself is clear. *Ἐλέησον Κύριε*!

Ib. Serm. xvi. p. 204.

Know you not that the redeemed of Christ and He are one? They live one life, Christ lives in them, and if *any man hath not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his*, as the Apostle declares in this chapter. So then this we are plainly to tell you, and consider it; you that will not let go your sins to lay hold of Christ, have as yet no share in him.

But on the other side: the truth is, that when souls are once set upon this search, they commonly wind the notion too high, and subtilize too much in the dispute, and so entangle and perplex themselves, and drive themselves further off from that comfort that they are seeking after; such measures and marks they set to themselves for their rule and standard; and unless they find those without all controversy in themselves, they will not believe that they have an interest in Christ, and this blessed and safe estate in him.

To such I would only say, Are you in a willing league with any known sin? &c.

An admirable antidote for such as, too sober and sincere to pass off feverous sensations for spiritualities, have been perplexed by Wesley's assertions—that a certainty of having been elected is an indispensable mark of election. Whitfield's ultra-Calvinism is Gospel gentleness and Pauline sobriety compared with Wesley's Arminianism in the outset of his career. But the main and most noticeable difference between Leighton and the modern Metho-

dists is to be found in the uniform selfishness of the latter. Not "Do you wish to love God?" "Do you love your neighbor?" "Do you think, 'O how dear and lovely must Christ be!'"—but —"Are you certain that Christ has saved *you;* that he died for *you—you—you—yourself?*" on to the end of the chapter. This is Wesley's doctrine.

Lecture ix. vol. iv. p. 96.

For that this was his fixed purpose, Lucretius not only vows, but also boasts of it, and loads him (Epicurus) with ill-advised praises, for endeavoring through the whole course of his philosophy to free the minds of men from all the bonds and ties of religion.

But surely in this passage *religio* must be rendered superstition, the most effectual means for the removal of which Epicurus supposed himself to have found in the exclusion of the *gods many and lords many*, from their imagined agency in all the *phænomena* of nature and the events of history, substituting for these the belief in fixed laws, having in themselves their evidence and necessity. On this account, in this passage at least, Lucretius praises his master.

Ib. p. 105.

They always seemed to me to act a very ridiculous part, who contend, that the effect of the divine decree is absolutely irreconcilable with human liberty; because the natural and necessary liberty of a rational creature is to actor choose from a rational motive, or spontaneously, and of purpose: but who sees not, that, on the supposition of the most absolute decree, this liberty is not taken away, but rather established and confirmed? For the decree is, *that such an one shall make choice of, or do some particular thing freely. And whoever pretends to deny, that whatever is done or chosen, whether good or indifferent, is so done or chosen, or, at least, may be so, espouses an absurdity.*

I fear, I fear, that this is a sophism not worthy of Archbishop Leighton. It seems to me tantamount to saying—"I force that man to do so or so without my forcing him." But however that may be, the following sentences are more precious than diamonds. They are divine.

Ib. Lect. xi. p. 113.

For that this world, compounded of so many and such heterogeneous parts, should proceed, by way of natural and necessary emanation, from that one first, present, and most simple nature, nobody, I imagine, could believe, or in the least suspect * * *. But if he produced all these things freely, * * how much more consistent is it to believe, that this was done in time, than to imagine it was from eternity!

It is inconceivable how any thing can be created in time; and production is incompatible with interspace.

Ib. Lect. xv. p. 152.

The Platonists divide the world into two, the sensible and intellectual world * * *. According to this hypothesis, those parables and metaphors, which are often taken from natural things to illustrate such as are divine, will not be similitudes taken entirely at pleasure; but are often, in a great measure, founded in nature, and the things themselves.

I have asserted the same thing, and more fully shown wherein the difference consists of symbolic and metaphorical, in my first Lay Sermon; and the substantial correspondence of the genuine Platonic doctrine and logic with those of Lord Bacon, in my Essays on Method, in the Friend.*

Ib. Lect. xix. p. 201.

Even the philosophers give their testimony to this truth, and their sentiments on the subject are not altogether to be rejected; for they almost unanimously are agreed, that felicity, so far as it can be enjoyed in this life, consists solely, or at least principally, in virtue: but as to their assertion, that this virtue is perfect in a perfect life, it is rather expressing what were to be wished, than describing things as they are.

And why are the philosophers to be judged according to a different rule? On what ground can it be asserted that the Stoics believed in the actual existence of their God-like perfection in any individual? or that they meant more than this—"To no man can the name of the Wise be given in its absolute sense, who is not perfect even as his Father in heaven is perfect!"

Ib. Lect. xxi. p. 225.

In like manner, if we suppose God to be the first of all beings, we must, unavoidably, therefrom conclude his unity. As to the ineffable Trinity subsisting in this Unity, a mystery discovered only by the Sacred Scriptures, especially in the New Testament, where it is more clearly revealed than in the Old, let others boldly pry into it, if they please, while we receive it with our humble faith, and think it sufficient for us to admire and adore.

But surely it having been revealed to us, we may venture to say,—that a positive unity, so far from excluding, implies plurality, and that the Godhead is a fulness, πλήρωμα.

Ib. Lect. xxiv. p. 245.

Ask yourselves, therefore, *what you would be at*, and with what dispositions you come to this most sacred table?

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* *Statesman's Manual*, I. p. 453. Friend, II. pp. 442–448.—*Ed.*

In an age of colloquial idioms, when to write in a loose slang had become a mark of loyalty, this is the only L'Estrange vulgarism I have met with in Leighton.

Ib. Exhortation to the Students, p. 252.

Study to acquire such a philosophy as is not barren and babbling, but solid and true; not such a one as floats upon the surface of endless verbal controversies, but one that enters into the nature of things: for he spoke good sense that said, "The philosophy of the Greeks was a mere jargon, and noise of words."

If so, then so is all philosophy: for what system is there, the elements and outlines of which are not to be found in the Greek schools? Here Leighton followed too incautiously the Fathers.

NOTES ON SHERLOCK'S VINDICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.*

Sect. i. p. 3.

Some new philosophers will tell you that the notion of a spirit or an immaterial substance is a contradiction; for by substance they understand nothing but matter, and then an immaterial substance is immaterial matter, that is, matter and no matter, which is a contradiction; but yet this does not prove an immaterial substance to be a contradiction, unless they could first prove that there is no substance but matter; and that they can not conceive any other substance but matter, does not prove that there is no other.

CERTAINLY not: but if not only they, but Dr. Sherlock himself and all mankind, are incapable of attaching any sense to the term substance, but that of matter,—then for us it would be a contradiction or a groundless assertion. Thus: By 'substance' I do not mean the only notion we can attach to the word; but a somewhat, I know not what, may, for aught I know, not be contradictory to spirit! Why should we use the equivocal word, 'substance' (after all but an *ens logicum*), instead of the definite term 'self-subsistent?' We are equally conscious of mind, and of that which we call 'body;' and the only possible philosophical

* A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation of the Son of God, occasioned by the Brief Notes on the Creed of St. Athanasius, and the Brief History of the Unitarians, or Socinians, and containing an answer to both. By Wm. Sherlock, London. 8vo. 1690.

questions are these three :—1. Are they co-ordinate as agent and re-agent :—2. Or is the one subordinate to the other, as effect to cause, and which is the cause or ground, which the effect or product ;—3. Or are they co-ordinate, but not inter-dependent, that is, *per harmoniam præstabilitam.*

Ib. p. 4.

Now so far as we understand the nature of any being, we can certainly tell what is contrary and contradictious to its nature; as that accidents should subsist without *their subject*, &c.

That accidents should subsist (rather, exist) without a subject, may be a contradiction, but not that they exist without this or that subject. The words 'their subject' are a *petitio principii.*

Ib.

These and such like are the manifest absurdities and contradictions of Transubstantiation; and we know that they are so, because we know the nature of a body, &c.

Indeed ! Were I either Romanist or Unitarian, I should desire no better than the admission of body having an *esse* not in the *percipi*, and really subsisting (*αὐτὸ τὸ χρῆμα*), as the supporter of its accidents. At all events, the Romanist, declaring the accidents to be those ordinarily impressed on the senses (*τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ αἴσθητα*) by bread and wine, does at the same time declare the flesh and blood not to be the *φαινόμενα καὶ αἴσθητα* so called, but the *νούμενα καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα.* There is therefore no contradiction in the terms, however reasonless the doctrine may be, and however unnecessary the interpretation on which it is pretended. I confess, had I been in Luther's place, I would not have rested so much of my quarrel with the Papists on this point ; nor can I agree with our Arminian divines in their ridicule of Transubstantiation. The most rational doctrine is perhaps, for some purposes, at least, the *rem credimus, modum nescimus ;* next to that, the doctrine of the Sacramentaries, that it is *signum sub rei nomine*, as when we call a portrait of Caius, Caius. But of all the remainder, Impanation, Consubstantiation, and the like, I confess that I should prefer the Transubstantiation of the Pontifical doctors.

Ib. p. 6.

The proof of this comes to this one point, that we may have sufficient evidence of the being of a thing whose nature we can not conceive and comprehend : he who will not own this, contradicts the sense and experience of

mankind; and he who confesses this, and yet rejects the belief of that which he has good evidence for, merely because he can not conceive it, is a very absurd and senseless infidel.

Here again, though a zealous believer of the truth asserted, I must object to the Bishop's logic. None but the weakest men have objected to the Tri-unity merely because the *modus* is above their comprehension: for so is the influence of thought on muscular motion; so is life itself; so in short is every first truth of necessity; for to comprehend a thing, is to know its antecedent and consequent. But they affirm that it is against their reason. Besides, there seems an equivocation in the use of 'comprehend' and 'conceive' in the same meaning. When a man tells me, that his will can lift his arm, I conceive his meaning; though I do not comprehend the fact, I understand *him*. But the Socinians say:—"We do not understand *you*. We can not attach to the word 'God,' more than three possible meanings; either, 1. A person, or self-conscious being;—2. Or a thing;—3. Or a quality, property, or attribute. If you take the first, then you admit the contradiction; if either of the latter two, you have not three Persons and one God, but three persons having equal shares in one thing, or three with the same attributes, that is, three Gods." Sherlock does not meet this.

Let me repeat the difficulty, if possible, more clearly. The argument of the philosophic Unitarians, as Wissowatius, who, mistaken as they were, are not to be confounded with their degenerate successors, the Priestleyans and Belshamites, may be thus expressed: "By the term, God, we can only conceive you to suppose one or other of three meanings. 1. Either you understand by it a person, in the common sense of an intelligent or self-conscious being;—or, 2. a thing with its qualities and properties;—or, 3. certain powers and attributes, comprised under the word nature. If we suppose the first, the contradiction is manifest, and you yourselves admit it, and therefore forbid us to interpret your words. For if by God you mean Person, then three Persons and one God, would be the same as three Persons and one Person. If we take the second as your meaning, as an infinite thing is an absurdity, we have three finite Gods, like Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, who shared the universe between them. If the latter, we have three Persons with the same attributes;—and if a Person with infinite attributes be what we mean by

God, then we have either three Gods, or involve the contradiction above mentioned. It is unphilosophic, by admission of all philosophers, they add, to multiply causes beyond the necessity. Now, if there are three Persons of infinite and the same attributes, dismiss two, and you lose nothing but a numerical phantom."

The answer to this must commence by a denial of the premisses *in toto:* and this both Bull and Waterland have done most successfully. But I very much doubt, whether Sherlock on his principles could have evaded the Unitarian logic. In fact it is scarcely possible to acquit him altogether of a *quasi-Tritheism.*

Sect. ii. p. 13.

For like as we are compelled by the Christian verity to acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord:—

(That is, by especial revelation.)

So are we forbidden by the Catholic religion to say, There are three Gods, or three Lords.

That is, by the religion contained in, and given in accompaniment with, the universal reason, *the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world.*

Ib. p. 14.

This Creed (Athanasian) does not pretend to explain how there are three Persons, each of which is God, and yet but One God (of which more hereafter), but only asserts the thing, that thus it is, and thus it must be if we believe a Trinity in Unity; which should make all men, who would be thought neither Arians nor Socinians, more cautious how they express the least dislike of the Athanasian Creed, which must either argue, that they condemn it, before they understand it, or that they have some secret dislike to the doctrine of the Trinity.

The dislike commonly felt is not of the doctrine of the Trinity, but of the positive anathematic assertion of the everlasting perdition of all and of each who doubt the same;—an assertion deduced from Scripture only by a train of captious consequences, and equivocations. Thus, A.: "I honor and admire Caius for his great learning." B.: "The knowledge of the Sanscrit is an important article in Caius's learning." A.: "I have been often in his company, and have found no reason for believing this." B.: "O! then you deny his learning, are envious, and Caius's enemy." A.: "God forbid! I love and admire him. I know him for a transcendent linguist in the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and

modern European languages ;—and with or without the Sanscrit, I look up to him, and rely on his erudition in all cases, in which I am concerned. And it is this perfect trust, this unfeigned respect, that is the appointed criterion of Caius's friends and disciples, and not their full acquaintance with each and all particulars of his superiority." Thus, without Christ, or in any other power but that of Christ, or (subjectively) of faith in Christ, no man can be saved ; but does it follow, that no man can have Christian faith who is ignorant or erroneous as to any one point of Christian theology ? Will a soul be condemned to everlasting perdition for want of logical *acumen* in the perception of consequences ?—If he verily embrace Christ as his Redeemer, and unfeignedly feel in himself the necessity of redemption, he implicitly holds the Divinity of Christ, whatever from want or defect of logic may be his notion *explicite*.

Ib. p. 18.

But the whole three Persons are co-eternal, and co-equal.

And yet this we must acknowledge to be true, if we acknowledge all three Persons to be eternal, for in eternity there can be no *afore*, or *after other*.

It must, however, be considered as a serious defect in a Creed, if excluding subordination, without mentioning any particular form, it gives no hint of any other form in which it admits it. The only *minus* admitted by the Athanasian Creed is the inferiority of Christ's Humanity to the Divinity generally ; but both Scripture and the Nicene Creed teach a subordination of the Son to the Father, independent of the Incarnation of the Son. Now this is not inserted, and therefore the denial in the assertion *none is greater or less than another*, is universal, and a plain contradiction of Christ speaking of Himself as the co-eternal Son : *My Father is greater than I*. Speaking of himself as the co-eternal Son, I say ;—for how superfluous would it have been, a truism unworthy of our Lord, to have said in effect, that "a creature is less than God!" And, after all, Creeds assuredly are not to be imposed *ad libitum*—a new Creed, or at least a new form and choice of articles and expressions, at the pleasure of individuals. Now where is the authority of the Athanasian Creed ? In what consists its necessity ? If it be the same as the Nicene, why not be content with the Nicene ? If it differs, how dare

we retain both ?* If the Athanasian does not say more or different, but only differs by omission of a necessary article, then to impose it, is as absurd as to force a mutilated copy on one who has already the perfect original. Lastly, it is not enough that an abstract contains nothing which may not by a chain of consequences be deduced from the books of the Evangelists and Apostles, in order for it to be a Creed for the whole Christian Church. For a Creed is or ought to be a *syllepsis* of those primary fundamental truths that are, as it were, the starting-post, from which the Christian must commence his progression. The full-grown Christian needs no other Creed than the Scriptures themselves. Highly valuable is the Nicene Creed; but it has its chief value as an historical document, proving that the same texts in Scripture received the same interpretation, while the Greek was a living language, as now.

Sect. iii. p. 23.

If what he says is true: *He that errs in a question of faith, after having used reasonable diligence to be rightly informed, is in no fault at all;* how comes an atheist, or an infidel, a Turk, or a Jew, to be in any fault? Does our author think that no atheist or infidel, no unbelieving Jew or heathen, ever used reasonable diligence to be rightly informed? * * * If you say, he confines this to such points as have always been controverted in the Churches of God, I desire to know a reason why he thus confines it? For does not his reason equally extend to the Christian Faith itself, as to those points which have been controverted in Christian Churches?

And the Notary might ask in his turn: "Do you believe that the Christians either of the Greek or of the Western Church will be damned, according as the truth may be respecting the procession of the Holy Ghost? or that either the Sacramentary or the Lutheran? or again, the Consubstantiationist, or the Transubstantiationist? If not, why do you stop here? Whence this sudden palsy in the limbs of your charity? Again, does this eternal damnation of the individual depend on the supposed importance of the article denied? Or on the moral state of the individual, on the inward source of this denial? And lastly, who authorized either you, or the pseudo-Athanasius, to interpret Catholic faith by belief, arising out of the apparent predominance of the grounds for, over those against, the truth of the po-

* The third General Council, that at Ephesus in 431, decreed "that it should not be lawful for any man to publish or compose another Faith or Creed than that which was defined by the Nicene Council."—*Ed.*

sitions asserted; much more by belief as a mere passive acquiescence of the understanding? Were all damned who died during the period when *totus fere mundus factus est Arianus*, as one of the Fathers admits? Alas! alas! how long will it be ere Christians take the plain middle road between intolerance and indifference, by adopting the literal sense and Scriptural import of heresy, that is, wilful error, or belief originating in some perversion of the will; and of heretics (for such there are, nay, even orthodox heretics), that is, men wilfully unconscious of their own wilfulness, in their limpet-like adhesion to a favorite tenet?

Ib. p. 26.

All Christians must confess, that there is no other name given under heaven whereby men can be saved, but only the name of Christ.

Now this is a most awful question, on which depends whether Christ was more than Socrates; for to bring God from heaven to re-proclaim the Ten Commandments, is *too too* ridiculous. Need I say I incline to Sherlock? But yet I can not give to faith the meaning he does, though I give it all, and more than all, the power. But if that Name, as power, saved the Jewish Church before they knew the Name, as name, how much more now, if only the will be not guiltily averse? Any miracle does in kind as truly bring God from heaven as the Incarnation, which the Socinians wholly forget, as in other points. They receive without scruple what they have learned without examination, and then transfer to the first article which they do look into, all the difficulties that belong equally to the former: as the Simonidean doubts concerning God to the Trinity, and the like.

Ib. p. 27.

The Eclectic Neo-Platonists (Sallustius and others) justified their Polytheism on much the same pretext as is in fact involved in the language of this page; πολλοὶ μὲν, ἐν δὲ μιᾷ θεότητι. This indeed seems to me decisive in favor of Waterland's scheme against this of Sherlock's;—namely, that in the latter we find no sufficient reason why in the nature of things this intermutual consciousness might not be possessed by thirty instead of three. It seems a strange confounding ἑτέρων γενέων to answer, "True; but the latter only happens to be the fact!"—just as if we were speaking of the number of persons in the Privy Council.

Ib. p. 28.

Notes. By keeping this faith *whole and undefiled*, must be meant that a

man should believe and profess it without adding to it or taking from it. * * First, for adding. What if an honest plain man, because he is a Christian and a Protestant, should think it necessary to add this article to the Athanasian Creed;—*I believe the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be a divine, infallible and complete rule both for faith and manners.* I hope no Protestant would think a man damned for such addition; and if so, then this Creed of Athanasius is at least an unnecessary rule of faith.

Answer. That is to say, it is an addition to the Catholic Faith to own the Scriptures to be the rule of faith; as if it were an addition to the laws of England to own the original records of them in the Tower.

This Notary manages his cause most weakly, and Sherlock *fibs* him like a scientific pugilist. But he himself exposes weak parts, as in p. 27. The objection to the Athanasian Creed urged by better men than the Notary, yea, by divines not less orthodox than Sherlock himself, is this: not that this Creed adds to the Scriptures, but that it adds to the original *Symbolum Fidei*, the *Regula*, the *Canon*, by which, according to the greater number of the *ante*-Nicene Fathers, the books of the New Testament were themselves tried and determined to be Scripture. Now this *Symbolum* was to bring together all that must be believed, even by the babes in faith, or to what purpose was it made? Now, say they, the Nicene Creed is really nothing more than a verbal explication of the common Creed, but the clause in the Athanasian (*which faith*, &c.), however fairly deduced from Scripture, is not contained in the Creed, or selection of certain articles of Faith from the Scriptures, or not at least from those preachings and narrations, of which the New Testament Scriptures are the repository. Might not a Papist plead equally in support of the Creed of Pope Pius: "The new articles are deduced from Scripture; that is, in our opinion, and that most expressly in our Lord's several and solemn addresses to St. Peter." So again Sherlock's answer to this paragraph from the Notes is evasive,—for it is very possible, nay, it is, and has been the case, that a man may believe in the facts and doctrines contained in the New Testament, and yet not believe the Holy Scripture to be either divine, infallible, or complete.

Sect. iv. p. 50.

We know not what the substance of an infinite mind is, nor how such substances as have no parts or extension can touch each other, or be thus externally united; but we know the unity of a mind or spirit reaches as far as its self-consciousness does, for that is one spirit, which knows and feels it

self, and its own thoughts and motions, and if we mean this by *circumincession*, three persons thus intimate to each other are numerically one.

The question still returns; have these three infinite minds, at once self-conscious and conscious of each other's consciousness, always the very same thoughts? If so, this mutual consciousness is unmeaning, or derivative; and the three do not cease to be three because they are three sames. If not, then there is Tritheism evidently.

Ib. p. 64.

St. Paul tells us, 1 Cor. ii. 10, *That the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.* So that the Holy Spirit knows all that is in God, even his most deep and secret counsels, which is an argument that he is very intimate with him; but this is not all: it is the manner of knowing, which must prove this consciousness of which I speak: and that the Apostle adds in the next verse, that the Spirit of God knows all that is in God, just as the spirit of a man knows all that is in man: that is, not by external revelation or communication of this knowledge, but by self-consciousness, by an internal sensation, which is owing to an essential unity. *For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man which is in him; even so the things of God knoweth no man but the Spirit of God.*

It would be interesting, if it were feasible, to point out the epoch at which the text mode of arguing in polemic controversy became predominant; I mean by single texts without any modification by the context. I suspect that it commenced, or rather that it first became the fashion, under the Dort or systematic theologians, and during the so-called Quinquarticular Controversy. This quotation from St. Paul is a striking instance:—for St. Paul is speaking of the holy spirit of which true spiritual Christians are partakers, and by which or in which those Christians are enabled to search all things, even the deep things of God. No person is here spoken of, but reference is made to the philosophic principle, that can only act immediately, that is, interpenetratively, as two globules of quicksilver, and co-adunatively. Now, perceiving and knowing were considered as immediate acts relatively to the objects perceived and known:—*ergo*, the *principium sciendi* must be one (that is, homogeneous or consubstantial) with the *principium essendi quoad objectum cognitum*. In order therefore for a man to understand, or even to know of, God, he must have a god-like spirit communicated to him, wherewith, as with an inward eye, which is both eye and light, he sees the spiritual truths. Now I have no objection to his

calling this spirit a 'person,' if only the term 'person' be so understood as to permit of its being partaken of by all spiritual creatures, as light and the power of vision are partaken of by all seeing ones. But it is too evident that Sherlock supposes the Father, as Father, to possess a spirit, that is, an intellective Faculty, by which he knows the Spirit, that is, the third co-equal Person; and that this Spirit, the Person, has a spirit, that is, an intellective faculty, by which he knows the Father; and the *Logos* in like manner relatively to both. So too, the Father has a *logos* with which he distinguishes the *Logos*;—and the *Logos* has a *logos*, and so on: that is to say, there are three several though not severed triune Gods, each being the same position three times *realiter positum*, as three guineas from the same mint, supposing them to differ no more than they appear to us to differ;—but whether a difference wholly and exclusively numerical is a conceivable notion, except under the predicament of space and time; whether it be not absurd to affirm it, where interspace and interval can not be affirmed without absurdity—this is the question; or rather it is no question.

Ib. p. 68.

Nor do we divide the substance, but unite these three Persons in one numerical essence: for we know nothing of the unity of the mind, but self-consciousness, as I showed before; and therefore as the self-consciousness of every Person to itself makes them distinct Persons, so the mutual consciousness of all three divine Persons to each other makes them all but one infinite God: as far as consciousness reaches, so far the unity of a spirit extends, for we know no other unity of a mind or spirit, but consciousness

But this contradicts the preceding paragraph, in which the Father is self-conscious that he is the Father and not the Son, and the Son that he is not the Father, and that the Father is not he. Now how can the Son's being conscious that the Father is conscious that he is not the Son, constitute a numerical unity? And wherein can such a consciousness as that attributed to the Son differ from absolute certainty? Is not God conscious of every thought of man;—and would Sherlock allow me to deduce the unity of the divine consciousness with the human? Sherlock's is doubtless a very plain and intelligible account of three Gods in the most absolute intimacy with each other, so that they are all as one; but by no means of three persons that are one God.

I do not wonder that Waterland and the other followers of Bull were alarmed.

Ib. p. 72.

Even among men it is only knowledge that is power. Human power, and human knowledge as that signifies a knowledge how to do any thing, are commensurate; whatever human skill extends to, human power can effect: nay, every man can do what he knows how to do, if he has proper instruments and materials to do it with.

This proves that perfect knowledge supposes perfect power: and that they are one and the same. "If he have proper instruments:"—does not this show that the means are supposed co-present with the knowledge, not the same with it?

Ib.

For it is nothing but thought which moves our bodies, and all the members of them, which are the immediate instruments of all human force and power: excepting mechanical motions which do not depend upon our wills, such as the motion of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the concoction of our meat and the like. All voluntary motions are not only directed but caused by thought: and so indeed it must be, or there could be no motion in the world: for matter can not move itself, and therefore some mind must be the first mover, which makes it very plain, that infinite truth and wisdom is infinite and almighty power.

Even this, though not ill-conceived, is inaccurately expressed.

Ib. p. 81.

There is no contradiction that three infinite minds should be absolutely perfect in wisdom, goodness, justice and power; for these are perfections which may be in more than one, as three men may all know the same things, and be equally just and good: but three such minds can not be absolutely perfect without being mutually conscious to each other, as they are to themselves.

Will any man in his senses affirm, that my knowledge is increased by saying "all" three times following? Is it not mere repetition in time? If the Son has thoughts which the Father, as the Father, could not have but for his interpenetration of the Son's consciousness, then I can understand it; but then these are not three Absolutes, but three modes of perfection constituting one Absolute; and by what right Sherlock could call the one Father, more than the other, I can not see.

Ib. p. 88.

And yet if we consider these three divine Persons as containing each other in themselves, and essentially one by a mutual consciousness, this pretended contradiction vanishes: for then the Father is the one true God, be-

cause the Father has the Son and the Holy Spirit in himself: and the Son may be called the one true God, because the Son has the Father and the Holy Ghost in himself, &c.

Nay, this is to my understanding three Gods, and Sherlock seems to have brought in the material phantom of a thing or substance.

Ib. p. 97.

But if these three distinct Persons are not separated, but essentially united unto one, each of them may be God, and all three but one God: for if these three Persons,—each of whom, *μοναδικῶς*, as it is in the Creed, singly by himself, not separately from the other divine Persons, is God and Lord, are essentially united into one, there can be but one God and one Lord; and how each of these persons is God, and all of them but one God, by their mutual consciousness I have already explained.

—"That is,—if the three Persons are not three;"—so might the Arian answer, unless Sherlock had shown the difference of separate and distinct relatively to mind. For what other separation can be conceived in mind but distinction? Distinction may be joined with imperfection, as ignorance, or forgetfulness; and so it is in men:—and if this be called separation by a metaphor from bodies, then the conclusion would be that in the Supreme Mind there is distinction without imperfection; and then the question is, whence comes plurality of Persons? Can it be conceived other than as the result of imperfection, that is, finiteness?

Ib. p. 98.

Thus each Divine Person is God, and all of them but the same one God; as I explained it before.

O no! asserted it.

Ib. pp. 98–9.

This one supreme God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, a Trinity in Unity, three Persons and one God. Now Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, with all their divine attributes and perfections (excepting their personal properties, which the Schools call the *modi subsistendi*, that one is the Father, the other the Son, and the other the Holy Ghost, which can not be communicated to each other) are whole and entire in each Person by a mutual consciousness; each feels the other Person in himself, all their essential wisdom, power, goodness, justice, as he feels himself, and this makes them essentially one, as I have proved at large.

Will not the Arian object, "You admit the *modus subsistendi* to be a divine perfection, and you affirm that it is incommunicable. Does it not follow, therefore, that there are perfections which the

All-perfect does not possess ?" This would not apply to Bishop Bull or Waterland.

Sect. v. p. 102.

St. Austin in his sixth book of the Trinity takes notice of a common argument used by the orthodox fathers against the Arians, to prove the co-eternity of the Son with the Father, that if the Son be the Wisdom and Power of God, as St. Paul teaches (1 *Cor.* i.) and God was never without his Wisdom and Power, the Son must be co-eternal with the Father. * * * But this acute Father discovers a great inconvenience in this argument, for it forces us to say that the Father is not wise, but by that Wisdom which he begot, not being himself Wisdom as the Father : and then we must consider whether the Son himself, as he is God of God, and Light of Light, may be said to be Wisdom of Wisdom, if God the Father be not Wisdom, but only begets Wisdom.

The proper answer to Augustine is, that the Son and Holy Ghost are necessary and essential, not contingent : and that *his* argument has a still greater inconvenience, as shown in note p. 392.

Ib. pp. 110–113.

But what makes St. Gregory dispute thus nicely, and oppose the common and ordinary forms of speech ? Did he in good earnest believe that there is but one man in the world ? No, no ! he acknowledged as many men as we do ; a great multitude who had the same human nature, and that every one who had a human nature was an individual man, distinguished and divided from all other individuals of the same nature. What makes him so zealous then against saying, that Peter, James and John are three men ? Only this ; that he says man is the name of nature, and therefore to say there are three men is the same as to say, there are three human natures of a different kind ; for if there are three human natures, they must differ from each other, or they can not be three ; and so you deny Peter, James, and John to be *ὁμοούσιοι*, or of the same nature ; and for the same reason we must say that though the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, yet there are not three Gods, but *μία θεότης*, one Godhead and Divinity.

Sherlock struggles in vain, in my opinion at least, to clear these Fathers of egregious logomachy, whatever may have been the soundness of their faith, spite of the quibbles by which they endeavored to evince its rationality. The very change of the terms is suspicious. " Yes ! we might say three Gods" (it would be answered), " as we say and ought to say three men ; for man and humanity, *ἄνθρωπος* and *ἀνθρωπότης* are not the same terms ; —so if the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, there would be three Gods, though not *τρεῖς θεότητες*,—that is, three Godheads."

Ib. pp. 115–16.

Gregory Nyssen tells us that *θεὸς* is *θεατὴς* and *ἔφορος*, the inspector and governor of the world, that is, it is a name of energy, operation, and power; and if this virtue, energy, and operation be the very same in all the Persons of the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, then they are but one God, but one power and energy. * * * The Father does nothing by himself, nor the Son by himself, nor the Holy Ghost by himself; but the whole energy and operation of the Deity relating to creatures begins with the Father, passes to the Son, and from Father and Son to the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit does not act any thing separately; there are not three distinct operations, as there are three Persons, *ἀλλὰ μία τὶς γίνεται ἀγαθοῦ βουλήματος κίνησις καὶ διακόσμησις*;—but one motion and disposition of the good will, which passes through the whole Trinity from Father to Son, and to the Holy Ghost, and this is done *ἀχρόνως καὶ ἀδιαρέτως*, without any distance of time, or propagating the motion from one to the other, but by one thought, as it is in one numerical mind and spirit, and therefore, though they are three Persons, they are but one numerical power and energy.

But this is either Tritheism or Sabellianism; it is hard to say which. Either the *βούλημα* subsists in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost, and not merely passes through them, and then there would be three numerical *βουλήματα*, as well as three numerical Persons: *ergo*, *τρεῖς θεοὶ ἢ θεαταί* (according to Gregory Nyssen's shallow and disprovable etymology), which would be Tritheism: or *ἕν τι γίνεται βούλημα*, and then the Son and Holy Ghost are but terms of relation, which is Sabellianism. But in fact this Gregory and the others were Tritheists in the mode of their conception, though they did not wish to be so, and refused even to believe themselves such.

Gregory Nyssen, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus and Damascen were charged with "a kind of Tritheism" by Petavius and Dr. Cudworth, who, according to Sherlock, have "mistaken their meaning." See pp. 106–9, of this "Vindication."

Ib. p. 117.

For I leave any man to judge, whether this *μία κίνησις-βουλήματος*, this one single motion of will, which is in the same instant in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, can signify any thing else but a mutual consciousness, which makes them numerically one, and as intimate to each other, as every man is to himself, as I have already explained it.

Is not God conscious to all my thoughts, though I am not conscious of God's? Would Sherlock endure that I should infer: *ergo*, God is numerically one with me, though I am not numerically one with God? I have never seen, but greatly wish to

see, Waterland's controversial tracts against Sherlock. Again: according to Sherlock's conception, it would seem to follow that we ought to make a triad of triads, or an ennead.

1. Father—Son—Holy Ghost.
2. Son—Father—Holy Ghost.
3. Holy Ghost—Son—Father.

Else there is an x in the Father which is not in the Son, a y in the Son which is not in the Father, and a z in the Holy Ghost which is in neither: that is, each by himself is not total God.

Ib. p. 120.

But however he might be mistaken in his philosophy, he was not in his divinity; for he asserts a numerical unity of the divine nature, not a mere specific unity, which is nothing but a logical notion, nor a collective unity, which is nothing but a company who are naturally many: but a true subsisting numerical unity of nature; and if the difficulty of explaining this, and his zeal to defend it, forced him upon some unintelligible niceties, to prove that the same numerical human nature too is but one in all men, it is hard to charge him with teaching, that there are three independent and co-ordinate Gods, because we think he has not proved that Peter, James, and John, are but one man. This will make very foul work with the Fathers, if we charge them with all those erroneous conceits about the Trinity, which we can fancy in their inconvenient ways of explaining that venerable mystery, especially when they compare that mysterious unity with any natural unions.

So that after all this obscuration of the obscure, Sherlock ends by fairly throwing up his briefs, and yet calls out, "Not guilty! *Victoria!*" And what is this but to say: These Fathers did indeed involve Tritheism in their mode of defending the Tri-personality; but they were not Tritheists:—though it would be far more accurate to say, that they were Tritheists, but not so as to make any practical breach of the Unity;—as if, for instance, Peter, James, and John had three silver tickets, by showing one of which either or all three would have the same thing as if they had shown all three tickets, and *vice versa*, all three tickets could produce no more than each one; each corresponding to the whole.

Ib.

I am sure St. Gregory was so far from suspecting that he should be charged with Tritheism upon this account, that he fences against another charge of mixing and confounding the *Hypostases* or Persons, by denying any difference or diversity of nature, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δέχεσθαι τὴν κατὰ φύσιν

διαφορὰν, μίξιν τινα τῶν ὑποστάσεων καὶ ἀνακύκλησιν κατασκεύαζοντα, which argues that he thought he had so fully asserted the unity of the divine essence, that some might suspect he had left but one Person, as well as one nature in God.

This is just what I have said, p. 394. Whether Sabellianism or Tritheism, I observed, is hard to determine. Extremes meet.

Ib. p. 121.

Secondly, to this *homo-ousiotes* the Fathers added a numerical unity of the divine essence. This Petavius has proved at large by numerous testimonies, even from those very Fathers, whom he before accused for making God only collectively one, as three men are one man; such as Gregory Nyssen, St. Cyril, Maximus, Damascen; which is a demonstration, that however *he might mistake* their explication of it, from the unity of human nature, they were far enough from Tritheism, or one collective God.

This is most uncandid. Sherlock, even to be consistent with his own confession, § i. p. 120, ought to have said, "However he might mistake their *intention*, in consequence of their inconvenient and unphilosophical explication;" which mistake, in fact, consisted in taking them at their word.

Ib.

Petavius greatly commends Boethius's explication of this mystery, which is the very same he had before condemned in Gregory Nyssen, and those other Fathers:—That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one God, not three Gods: *hujus conjunctionis ratio est indifferentia:* that is, such a sameness of nature as admits of no difference or variety, or an exact *homo-ousiotes*, as he explains it. * * Those make a difference, who augment and diminish, as the Arians do; who distinguish the Trinity into different natures, as well as Persons, of different worth and excellency, and thus divide and multiply the Trinity into a plurality of Gods. *Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est. Præter alteritatem enim nec pluralitas quid sit intelligi potest.*

Then if so, what becomes of the Persons? Have the Persons attributes distinct from their nature;—or does not their common nature constitute their common attributes? *Principium enim, &c.*

Ib. p. 124.

That the Fathers universally acknowledged that the operation of the whole Trinity, *ad extra*, is but one, Petavius has proved beyond all contradiction; and hence they conclude the unity of the divine nature and essence; for every nature has a virtue and energy of its own; for nature is a principle of action, and if the energy and operation be but one, there can be but one nature; and if there be two distinct and divided operations, if either of them can act alone without the other, there must be two divided natures.

Then it was not the Son but the whole Trinity that was crucified: for surely this was an operation *ad extra*.

Ib. p. 126.

But to do St. Austin right, though he do not name this consciousness, yet he explains this Trinity in Unity by examples of mutual consciousness. I named one of his similitudes before, of the unity of our understanding, memory, and will, *which* are all conscious to each other; that we remember what we understand and will; we understand what we remember and will; and what we will we remember and understand; and therefore all these three faculties do penetrate and comprehend each other.

Which! The *man* is self-conscious alike when he remembers, wills, and understands; but in what sense is the generic term "memory" conscious to the generic word "will?" This is mere nonsense. Are memory, understanding, and volition persons,—self-subsistents? If not, what are they to the purpose? Who doubts that Jehovah is consciously powerful, consciously wise, consciously good; and that it is the same Jehovah, who in being omnipotent, is good and wise; in being wise, omnipotent and good; in being good, is wise and omnipotent? But what has all this to do with a distinction of Persons? Instead of one Tri-unity we might have a mille-unity. The fact is, that Sherlock, and (for aught I know) Gregory Nyssen, had not the clear idea of the Trinity, positively; but only a negative Arianism.

Ib. p. 127.

He proceeds to show that this unity is without all manner of confusion and mixture, * * for the mind that loves, is in the love. * * * And the knowledge of the mind which knows and loves itself, is in the mind, and in its love, because it loves itself, knowing, and knows itself loving: and thus also two are in each, for the mind which knows and loves itself, with its knowledge is in love, and with its love is in knowledge.

Then why do we make tri-personality in unity peculiar to God?

The doctrine of the Trinity (the foundation of all rational theology, no less than the pre-condition and ground of the rational possibility of the Christian Faith, that is, the Incarnation and Redemption), rests securely on the position,—that in man *omni actioni præit sua propria passio; Deus autem est actus purissimus sine ulla potentialitate.* As the tune produced between the breeze and Eolian harp is not a self-subsistent, so neither memory, nor understanding, nor even love in man: for he is a passive as well as active being: he is a patible agent. But in God this

is not so. Whatever is necessarily of him (God of God, Light of Light), is necessarily all act; therefore necessarily self-subsistent, though not necessarily self-originated. This then is the true mystery, because the true unique; that the Son of God has origination without passion, that is, without ceasing to be a pure act: while a created entity is, as far as it is merely creaturely and distinguishable from the Creator, a mere *passio* or recipient. This unicity we strive, not to *express*, for that is impossible; but to designate, by the nearest, though inadequate, analogy,—*Begotten.*

Ib. p. 133.

As for the Holy Ghost, whose nature is represented to be love, I do not indeed find in Scripture that it is anywhere said, that the Holy Ghost is that mutual love, wherewith Father and Son love each other: but this we know, that there is a mutual love between Father and Son: *the Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hands.*—John iii. 35. *And the Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things that himself doeth.*—John v. 20; and our Saviour himself tells us, *I love the Father.*—John xiv. 31. And I showed before, that love is a distinct act, *and therefore in God must be a person: for there are no accidents nor faculties in God.*

This most important, nay, fundamental truth, so familiar to the elder philosophy, and so strongly and distinctly enunciated by Philo Judæus, the senior and contemporary of the Evangelists, is to our modern divines darkness and a sound.

Sect. vi. pp. 147–8.

Yes; you'll say, that there should be three Persons, each of which is God, and yet but one God, is a contradiction: but what principle of natural reason does it contradict?

Surely never did argument vertiginate more! I had just acceded to Sherlock's exposition of the Trinity, as the Supreme Being, his reflex act of self-consciousness and his love, all forming one supreme mind; and now he tells me, that each is the whole Supreme Mind, and denies that three, each *per se* the whole God, are not the same as three Gods! I grant that division and separation are terms inapplicable, yet surely three distinct though undivided Gods, are three Gods. That the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are the one true God, I fully believe; but not Sherlock's exposition of the doctrine. Nay, I think it would have been far better to have worded the mystery thus:—The Father together with his Son and Spirit, is the one true God.

"Each *per se* God." This is the πρῶτον μέγα ψεῦδος of Sherlock's scheme. Each of the three is whole God, because neither is, or can be *per se;* the Father himself being *a se*, but not *per se.*

Ib. p. 149.

For it is demonstrable that if there be three Persons and one God, each Person must be God, and yet there can not be three distinct Gods, but one. For if each Person be not God, all three can not be God, unless the Godhead have Persons in it which are not God.

Three persons having the same nature are three persons;—and if to possess without limitation the divine nature, as opposed to the human, is what we mean by God. why then three such persons are three Gods, and will be thought so, till Gregory Nyssen can persuade us that John, James, and Peter, each possessing the human nature, are not three men. John is a man, James is a man, and Peter is a man: but they are not three men, but one man!

Ib. p. 150.

I affirm, that natural reason is not the rule and measure of expounding Scripture, no more than it is of expounding any other writing. The true and only way to interpret any writing, even the Scriptures themselves, is to examine the use and propriety of words and phrases, the connection, scope, and design of the text, its allusion to ancient customs and usages, or disputes. For there is no other good reason to be given for any exposition, but that the words signify so, and the circumstances of the place, and the apparent scope of the writer require it.

This and the following paragraph are excellent. *O si sic omnia!*

Ib. p. 153.

Reconcile men to the doctrine (of the Trinity), and the Scripture is plain without any farther comment. This I have now endeavored; and I believe our adversaries will talk more sparingly of absurdities and contradictions for the future, and they will lose the best argument they have against the orthodox expositions of Scripture.

Good doctor! you sadly over-rated both your own powers, and the docility of your adversaries. If so clear a head and so zealous a Trinitarian as Dr. Waterland could not digest your exposition, or acquit it of Tritheism, little hope is there of finding the Unitarians more persuadable.

Ib. p. 154.

Though Christ be God himself, yet if there be three Persons in the God-

head, the equality and sameness of nature does not destroy the subordination of Persons: a Son is equal to his Father by nature, but inferior to him as his Son: if the Father, as I have explained it, be original mind and wisdom, the Son a personal, subsisting, but reflex image of his Father's wisdom, though their eternal wisdom be equal and the same, yet the original is superior to the image, the Father to the Son.

But why? We men deem it so, because the image is but a shadow, and not equal to the original; but if it were the same in all perfections, how could that, which is exactly the same, be less? Again, God is all Being:—consequently there can nothing be added to the idea, except what implies a negation or diminution of it. If one and the same Being is equal to the Father, as touching his Godhead, but inferior as man; then it is $+ m - x$, which is not $= + m$. But of two men I may say, that they are equal to each other. A. $=$ + courage − wisdom. B. $=$ + wisdom − courage. Both wise and courageous; but A. inferior in wisdom, B. in courage. But God is all-perfect.

Ib. p. 156.

So born before all creatures, as πρωτότοκος also signifies, *that by him were all things created.*

All things were created by him, and for him, and he is before all things (which is the explication of πωρτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, *begotten before the whole creation*, and therefore no part of the creation himself).

This is quite right. Our version should here be corrected. Πρῶτο or πρότατον is here an intense comparative,—*infinitely before.*

Ib. p. 159.

That he *being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God*, &c.—Phil. ii. 8, 9.

I should be inclined to adopt an interpretation of the unusual phrase ἁρπαγμον somewhat different both from the Socinian and the Church version:—"who being in the form of God did not *think equality with God a thing to be seized with violence*, but made, &c."

Ib. p. 160.

Is a mere creature a fit lieutenant or representative of God in personal or prerogative acts of government and power? Must not every being be represented by one of his own kind, a man by a man, an angel by an angel, in such acts as are proper to their natures? and must not God then be represented by one who is God? Is any creature capable of the government of the world? Does not this require infinite wisdom and infinite power?

And can God communicate infinite wisdom and infinite power to a creature or a finite nature? That is, can a creature be made a true and essential God?

This is sound reasoning. It is to be regretted that Sherlock had not confined himself to logical comments on the Scripture, instead of attempting metaphysical solutions.

Ib. pp. 161–3.

I find little or nothing to *object to* in this exposition, from pp. 161–163 inclusively, of *Phil.* ii. 8, 9. And yet I seem to feel, as if a something that should have been prefixed, and to which all these considerations would have been excellent seconds, were missing. To explain the Cross by the necessity of sacrificial blood, and the sacrificial blood as a type and *ante*-delegate or pre-substitute of the Cross, is too like an *argumentum in circulo.*

Ib. p. 164.

And though Christ be the eternal Son of God, and the natural Lord and heir of all things, yet *God hath* in this *highly exalted him* and given *him a name which is above every name, that at* (or in ἐν) *the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven,* &c.—Phil. ii. 9, 10, 11.

Never was a sublime passage more debased than by this rendering of ἐν by *at*, instead of *in*;—*at* the *phœnomenon*, instead of *in* the *noumenon*. For such is the force of *nomen*, name, in this and similar passages, namely, *in vera et substantiali potestate Jesu:* that is, ἐν Λόγῳ καὶ διὰ Λόγου, the true *noumenon* or *ens intelligibile* of Christ. To bow at hearing the *cognomen* may become a universal, but it is still only a non-essential, consequence of the former.

But the debasement of the idea is not the worst evil of this false rendering;—it has afforded the pretext and authority for un-Christian intolerance.

Ib. p. 168.

The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the Son.—John v. 22. Should the Father judge the world he *must* judge as the maker and sovereign of the world, by the strict rules of righteousness and justice, and then how could any sinner be saved?

(Why? Is mercy incompatible with righteousness? How then can the Son be righteous?)

But he has committed judgment to the Son, as a mediatory king, who judges by the equity and chancery of the Gospel.

This article required exposition incomparably more than the

simple doctrine of the Trinity, plain and evident *simplici intuitu*, and rendered obscure only by diverting the mental vision by terms drawn from matter and multitude. In the Trinity all the *Hows?* may and should be answered by *Look!* just as a wise tutor would do in stating the fact of a double or treble motion, as of a ball rolling northward on the deck of a ship sailing south, while the earth is turning from west to east. And in like manner, that is, *per intuitum intellectualem*, must all the mysteries of faith be contemplated;—they are intelligible *per se*, not discursively and *per analogiam*. For the truths are unique, and may have shadows and types, but no analogies. At this moment I have no intuition, no intellectual diagram, of this article of the commission of all judgment to the Son, and therefore a multitude of plausible objections present themselves, which I can not solve—nor do I expect to solve them till by faith I see the thing itself.—Is not mercy an attribute of the Deity, as Deity, and not exclusively of the Person of the Son? And is not the authorizing another to judge by equity and mercy the same as judging so ourselves? If the Father can do the former, why not the latter?

Ib. p. 171.

And therefore now it is given him to have life in himself, as the Father hath life in himself, as the original fountain of all life, by whom the Son himself lives: all life is derived from God, either by eternal generation, or procession, or creation; and thus Christ hath life in himself also; to the new creation he is the fountain of life: *he quickeneth whom he will.*

The truths which hitherto had been metaphysical, then began to be historical. The Eternal was to be manifested in time. Hence Christ came with signs and wonders; that is, the absolute, or the anterior to cause and effect, manifested itself as a *phænomenon* in time, but with the predicates of eternity;—and this is the only possible definition of a miracle *in re ipsa*, and not merely *ad hominem*, or *ad ignorantiam*.

Ib. p. 177.

His next argument consists in applying such things to the divinity of our Saviour as belong to his humanity; *that he increased in wisdom*, &c.:—*that he knows not the day of judgment*;—which he evidently speaks of himself as man; as all the ancient Fathers confess. In St. Mark it is said, *But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels that are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.* St. Matthew does not mention the Son: *Of that day and hour knoweth no man, not the angels of heaven, but my Father only.*

How much more politic, as well as ingenuous, it had been to have acknowledged the difficulty of this text. So far from its being evident, the evidence would be on the Arian side, were it not that so many express texts determine us to the contrary.

Ib.

Which shows that the Son in St. Matthew is included in the *οὐδεὶς none*, or no man, and therefore concerns him only as a man: for the Father *includes the whole Trinity*, and therefore includes the Son, who seeth whatever his Father doth.

This is an *argumentum in circulo*, and *petitio rei sub lite*. Why is he called the Son in *antithesis* to the Father, if it meant, "no not the Christ, except in his character of the co-eternal Son, included in the Father?" If it "concerned him only as a man," why is he placed after the angels? Why called the *Son* simply, instead of the Son of Man, or the Messiah?

Ib.

Οὐδεὶς is not *οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων*, but, *no one:* as in John i. 18. *No one hath seen God at any time;* that is, he is by essence invisible.

This most difficult text I have not seen explained satisfactorily. I have thought that the ἄγγελοι must here be taken in the primary sense of the word, namely, as messengers, or missionary Prophets: Of this day knoweth no one, not the messengers or revealers of God's purposes now in heaven, no, not the Son, the greatest of Prophets,—that is, he in that character promised to declare all that in that character it was given to him to know.

Ib. p. 186.

When St. Paul calls the Father the One God, he expressly opposes it to the many gods of the heathens. *For though there be that are called gods, &c. but to us, there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him:* where the *one God* and *one Lord and Mediator* is opposed to the many gods and many lords or mediators which were worshiped by the heathens.

But surely the *one Lord* is as much distinguished from the *one God*, as both are contra-distinguished from the *gods many and lords many* of the heathens. Besides *the Father* is not the term used in that age in distinction from the gods that are no gods; but Ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων θεός.

Ib. p. 222.

The Word was with God; that is, it was not yet in the world, or not yet

made flesh, but with God.—*John* i. 1. So that to be *with God*, signifies nothing but not to be in the world.

The Word was with God.

Grotius does say, that this was opposed to the Word's being made flesh, and appearing in the world: but he was far enough from thinking that these words have only a negative sense: * * * for he tells us what the positive sense is, that with God is *παρὰ τῷ πατρί*, with the Father, * * and explains it by what Wisdom says, *Prov.* vii. 30. *Then I was by him*, &c. which he does not think a *prosopopœia*, but spoken of a subsisting person.

But even this is scarcely tenable even as Greek. Had this been St. John's meaning, surely he would have said, *ἐν θεῷ*, not *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, in the nearest proximity that is not confusion. But it is strange, that Sherlock should not have seen that Grotius had a hankering toward Socinianism, but, like a *shy cock*, and a man of the world, was always ready to unsay what he had said.

NOTES ON WATERLAND'S VINDICATION OF CHRIST'S DIVINITY.*

In initio.

It would be no easy matter to find a tolerably competent individual who more venerates the writings of Waterland than I do, and long have done. But still in how many pages do I not see reason to regret, that the total idea of the 4=3=1,—of the adorable Tetractys, eternally self-manifested in the Triad, Father, Son, and Spirit,—was never in its cloudless unity present to him. Hence both he and Bishop Bull too often treat it as a peculiarity of positive religion, which is to be cleared of all contradiction to reason, and then, thus negatively qualified, to be actually received by an act of the mere will; *sit pro ratione voluntas.* Now, on the other hand, I affirm, that the article of the Trinity is religion, is reason, and its universal *formula;* and that there neither is, nor can be, any religion, any reason, but what is, or is an expansion of the truth of the Trinity; in short, that all other pretended religions, pagan or *pseudo*-Christian (for example, Sabellian,

* A Vindication of Christ's Divinity: being a defence of some queries relating to Dr. Clarke's scheme of the Holy Trinity, &c. By Daniel Waterland. 2d edit. Cambridge, 1719.—*Ed.*

Arian, Socinian), are in themselves Atheism; though God forbid, that I should call or even think the men so denominated Atheists. I affirm a heresy often, but never dare denounce the holder a heretic.

On this ground only can it be made comprehensible, how any honest and commonly intelligent man can withstand the proofs and sound logic of Bull and Waterland, that they failed in the first place to present the idea itself of the great doctrine which they so ably advocated. Take myself, S. T. C. as a humble instance. I was never so befooled as to think that the author of the fourth Gospel, or that St. Paul, ever taught the Priestleyan Psilanthropism, or that Unitarianism (presumptuously, nay, absurdly so called), was the doctrine of the New Testament generally. But during the sixteen months of my aberration from the Catholic Faith, I presumed that the tenets of the divinity of Christ, the Redemption, and the like, were irrational, and that what was contradictory to reason could not have been revealed by the Supreme Reason. As soon as I discovered that these doctrines were not only consistent with reason, but themselves very reason, I returned at once to the literal interpretation of the Scriptures, and to the Faith.

As to Dr. Samuel Clarke, the fact is, every generation has its one or more over-rated men. Clarke was such in the reign of George I.; Dr. Johnson eminently so in that of George III.; Lord Byron being the star now in the ascendant.

In every religious and moral use of the word, God, taken absolutely, that is, not as a God, or the God, but as God, a relativity, a distinction in kind *ab omni quod non est Deus*, is so essentially implied, that it is a matter of perfect indifference, whether we assert a world without God, or make God the world. The one is as truly Atheism as the other. In fact, for all moral and practical purposes they are the same position differently expressed; for whether I say, God is the world, or the world is God, the inevitable conclusion, the sense and import is, that there is no other God than the world, that is, there is no other meaning to the term God. Whatever you may mean by, or choose to believe of, the world, that and that alone you mean by, and believe of, God. Now I very much question whether in any other sense Atheism, that is, speculative Atheism, is possible. For even in the Lucretian, the coarsest and crudest scheme of the Epicurean doctrine,

a hylozism, a potential life, is clearly implied, as also in the celebrated *lene clinamen* becoming actual. Desperadoes articulating breath into a blasphemy of nonsense, to which they themselves attach no connected meaning, and the wickedness of which is alone intelligible, there may be; but a La Place, or a La Grand, would, and with justice, resent and repel the imputation of a belief in chance, or of a denial of law, order, and self-balancing life and power in the world. Their error is, that they make them the proper and underived attributes of the world. It follows then, that Pantheism is equivalent to Atheism, and that there is no other Atheism actually existing, or speculatively conceivable, but Pantheism. Now I hold it demonstrable that a consistent Socinianism, following its own consequences, must come to Pantheism, and in ungodding the Saviour must deify cats and dogs, fleas and frogs. There is, there can be, no *medium* between the Catholic Faith of Trinal Unity, and Atheism disguised in the self-contradicting term, Pantheism; for every thing God, and no God, are identical positions.

Query i. p. 1.

The Word was God.—John i. 1. *I am the Lord, and there is none else; there is no God besides me.*—Is. xiv. 5, &c.

In all these texts the *was*, or *is*, ought to be rendered positively, or objectively, and not as a mere connective: *The Word Is God*, and saith, *I am the Lord; there is no God besides me*, the Supreme Being, *Deitas objectiva*. The Father saith, *I Am in that I am,—Deitas subjectiva*.

Ib. p. 2.

Whether all other beings, besides the one Supreme God, be not excluded by the texts of Isaiah (to which many more might be added), and consequently, whether Christ can be God at all, unless He be the same with the Supreme God?

The sum of your answer to this query is, that the texts cited from Isaiah, are spoken of one Person only, the Person of the Father, &c.

O most unhappy mistranslation of *Hypostasis* by Person! The Word is properly the only Person.

Ib. p. 3.

Now, upon your hypothesis, we must add; that even the Son of God himself, however divine he may be thought, is really no God at all in any just and proper sense. He is no more than a nominal God, and stands excluded with the rest. All worship of him, and reliance upon him, will be idolatry, as much as the worship of angels, or men, or of the gods of the heathen

would be. God the Father he is God, and he only, and *him only shalt thou serve*. This I take to be a clear consequence from your principles, and unavoidable.

Waterland's argument is absolutely unanswerable by a worshiper of Christ. The modern *ultra*-Socinian cuts the knot.

Query ii. p. 43.

And therefore he might as justly bear the style and title of *Lord God, God of Abraham*, &c. while he acted in that capacity, as he did that of *Mediator, Messiah, Son of the Father*, &c. after that he condescended to act in another, and to discover his personal relation.

And why, then, did not Dr. Waterland,—why did not his great predecessor in this glorious controversy, Bishop Bull,—contend for a revisal of our established version of the Bible, but especially of the New Testament? Either the unanimous belief and testimony of the first five or six centuries, grounded on the reiterated declarations of John and Paul, and the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, were erroneous, or at best doubtful;—and then why not wipe them off; why these references to them?—or else they were, as I believe, and both Bull and Waterland believed, the very truth; and then why continue the translation of the Hebrew into English at second-hand through the *medium* of the Septuagint? Have we not adopted the Hebrew word, Jehovah? Is not the Κύριος, or Lord, of the LXX. a Greek substitute, in countless instances, for the Hebrew Jehovah! Why not then restore the original word, and in the Old Testament religiously render Jehovah by Jehovah, and every text of the New Testament, referring to the Old, by the Hebrew word in the text referred to? Had this been done, Socinianism would have been scarcely possible in England.

Why was not this done?—I will tell you why. Because that great truth, in which are contained all treasures of all possible knowledge, was still opaque even to Bull and Waterland;—because the Idea itself—that *Idea Idearum*, the one substrative truth which is the form, manner, and involvent of all truths,—was never present to either of them in its entireness, unity, and transparency. They most ably vindicated the doctrine of the Trinity, negatively, against the charge of positive irrationality. With equal ability they showed the contradictions, nay, the absurdities, involved in the rejection of the same by a professed Christian. They demonstrated the utterly un-Scriptural and contra-

Scriptural nature of Arianism, and Sabellianism, and Socinianism. But the self-evidence of the great Truth, as a universal of the reason,—as the reason itself—as a light which revealed itself by its own essence as light—this they had not had vouchsafed to them.

Query xv. pp. 225–6.

The pretence is, that we equivocate in talking of eternal generation.

All generation is necessarily ἄναρχόν τι, without dividuous beginning, and herein contradistinguished from creation.

Ib. p. 226.

True, it is not the same with human generation.

Not the same *eodem modo*, certainly; but it is so essentially the same that the generation of the Son of God is the transcendent, which gives to human generation its right to be so called. It is in the most proper, that is, the fontal, sense of the term, generation.

Ib.

You have not proved that all generation implies beginning; and what is more, can not.

It would be difficult to disprove the contrary. Generation with a beginning is not generation, but creation. Hence we may see how necessary it is that in all important controversies we should predefine the terms negatively, that is, exclude and preclude all that is not meant by them; and then the positive meaning, that is, what is meant by them, will be the easy result,—the post-definition, which is at once the real definition and impletion, the circumference and the area.

Ib. pp. 227–8.

It is a usual thing with many (moralists may account for it), when they meet with a difficulty which they can not readily answer, immediately to conclude that the doctrine is false, and to run directly into the opposite persuasion;—not considering that they may meet with much more weighty objections there than before; or that they may have reason sufficient to maintain and believe many things in philosophy and divinity, though they can not answer every question which may be started, or every difficulty which may be raised against them.

O, if Bull and Waterland had been first philosophers, and then divines, instead of being first, manacled, or say articled clerks of a guild;—if the clear intuition of the truth had led them to the

Article, and not the Article to the defence of it as not having been proved to be false,—how different would have been the result! Now we only feel the inconsistency of Arianism, not the truth of the doctrine attacked. Arianism is confuted, and in such a manner, that I will not reject the Catholic Faith upon the Arian's grounds. It may, I allow, be still true. But that it is true, because the Arians have hitherto failed to prove its falsehood, is no logical conclusion. The Unitarian may have better luck; or if he fail, the Deist.

Query xvi. p. 234.

But God's *thoughts are not our thoughts.*

That is, as I would interpret the text;—the ideas in and by which God reveals himself to man are not the same with, and are not to be judged by, the conceptions which the human understanding generalizes from the notices of the senses, common to man and to irrational animals, dogs, elephants, beavers, and the like, endowed with the same senses. Therefore I regard this paragraph, p. 406, as a specimen of admirable special pleading *ad hominem* in the Court of eristic Logic; but I condemn it as a wilful resignation or temporary self-deposition of the reason. I will not suppose what my reason declares to be no position at all, and therefore an impossible sub-position.

Ib. p. 235.

Let us keep to the terms we began with; lest by the changing of words we make a change of ideas, and alter the very state of the question.

This misuse, or rather this *omnium-gatherum* expansion and consequent extenuation of the word, Idea and Ideas, may be regarded as a calamity inflicted by Mr. Locke on the reigns of William III., Queen Anne, and the first two Georges.

Ib. p. 237.

Sacrifice was one instance of worship required under the Law; and it is said;—*He that sacrificeth unto any God, save unto the Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed* (Exod. xxii. 20). Now suppose any person, considering with himself that only absolute and sovereign sacrifice was appropriated to God by this law, should have gone and sacrificed to other Gods, and have been convicted of it before the judges. The apology he must have made for it, I suppose, must have run thus: "Gentlemen, though I have sacrificed to other Gods, yet I hope you'll observe, that I did it not absolutely: I meant not any absolute or supreme sacrifice (which is all that Law forbids), but relative and inferior only. I regulated my intentions with all imaginable care, and my esteem with the most critical exactness. I considered the other

Gods, whom I sacrificed to, as inferior only and infinitely so; reserving all sovereign sacrifice to the supreme God of Israel." This, or the like apology must, I presume, have brought off the criminal with some applause for his acuteness, if your principles be true. Either you must allow this, or you must be content to say, that not only absolute supreme sacrifice (if there be any sense in that phrase), but all sacrifice was by the Law appropriate to God only, &c. &c.

How was it possible for an Arian to answer this? But it was impossible; and Arianism was extinguished by Waterland, but in order to the increase of Socinianism; and this, I doubt not, Waterland foresaw. He was too wise a man to suppose that the exposure of the folly and falsehood of one form of Infidelism would cure or prevent Infidelity. Enough, that he made it more bare-faced—I might say, bare-breeched; for modern Unitarianism is verily the *sans-culotterie* of religion.

Ib. p. 239.

You imagine that acts of religious worship are to derive their signification and quality from the intention and meaning of the worshipers: whereas the very reverse of it is the truth.

Truly excellent. Let the Church of England praise God for her Saints—a more glorious Calendar than Rome can show!

Ib. p. 251.

The sum then of the case is this: If the Son could be included as being uncreated, and very God; as Creator, Sustainer, Preserver of all things, and one with the Father; then he might be worshiped upon their (the Ante-Nicene Fathers') principles, but otherwise could not.

Everywhere in this invaluable writer I have to regret the absence of all distinct idea of the I Am as the proper attribute of the Father; and hence, the ignorance of the proper Jehovaism of the Son; and hence, that while we worship the Son together with the Father, we nevertheless pray to the Father only through the Son.

Query xvii.

And we may never be able perfectly to comprehend the relations of the three persons, *ad intra*, amongst themselves; the ineffable order and economy of the ever-blessed co-eternal Trinity.

"Comprehend!" No. For how can any spiritual truth be comprehended? Who can comprehend his own will; or his own personeity, that is, his I-ship (*Ichheit*); or his own mind, that is, his person; or his own life? But we can distinctly apprehend them. In strictness, the Idea, God, like all other ideas rightly so

called, and as contra-distinguished from conception, is not so properly above, as alien from, comprehension. It is like smelling a sound.

Query xviii. p. 269.

From what hath been observed, it may appear sufficiently that the divine Λόγος was our King and our God long before; that he had the same claim and title to religious worship that the Father himself had—*only not so distinctly revealed.*

Here I differ *toto orbe* from Waterland, and say with Luther and Zinzendorf, that before the Baptism of John the *Logos* alone had been distinctly revealed, and that first in Christ he declared himself a Son, namely, the co-eternal only-begotten Son, and thus revealed the Father. Indeed the want of the Idea of the 1=3 could alone have prevented Waterland from inferring this from his own query II. and the texts cited by him pp. 28–38. The Father can not be revealed except in and through the Son, his eternal *exegesis*. The contrary position is an absurdity. The Supreme Will, indeed, the Absolute Good, knoweth himself as the Father: but the act of self-affirmation, the I Am in that I Am, is not a manifestation *ad extra*, not an *exegesis*.

Ib. p. 274.

This point being settled, I might allow you that, in some sense, distinct worship commenced with the distinct title of Son or Redeemer: that is, our blessed Lord was then first worshiped, or commanded to be worshiped by us, under that distinct title or character; having before had no other title or character peculiar and proper to himself, but only what was common to the Father and him too.

Rather shall I say that the Son and the Spirit, the Word and the Wisdom, were alone worshiped, because alone revealed under the Law. See Proverbs i. ii.

The passage quoted from Bishop Bull is very plausible and very eloquent; but only *cum multis granis salis sumend.*

Query xix. p. 279.

That the Father, whose honor had been sufficiently secured under the Jewish dispensation, and could not but be so under the Christian also, &c.

Here again! This contradiction of Waterland to his own principles is continually recurring;—yea, and in one place he involves the very Tritheism, of which he was so victorious an antagonist, namely, that the Father is Jehovah, the Son Jehovah, and the Spirit Jehovah;—thus making Jehovah either a mere

synonyme of God—whereas he himself rightly renders it *Ὁ Ὤν*, which St. John everywhere, and St. Paul no less, makes the peculiar name of the Son, *μονογενὴς υἱὸς, ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρός*—; or he affirms the same absurdity, as if had said: The Father is the Son, and the Son is the Son, and the Holy Ghost is the Son, and yet there are not three Sons but one Son. N.B. *Ὁ ὢν* is the verbal noun of *ὅς ἐστι*, not of *ἐγώ εἰμί*. It is strange how little use has been made of that profound and most pregnant text, *John* i. 18!

Query xx. p. 302.

The *ὁμοούσιον* itself might have been spared, at least out of the Creeds, had not a fraudulent abuse of good words brought matters to that pass, that the Catholic Faith was in danger of being lost even under Catholic language.

Most assuredly the very 'disputable' rendering of *ὁμοούσιον* by consubstantial, or of one substance with, not only might have been spared, but should have been superseded. Why not—as is felt to be for the interest of science in all the physical sciences—retain the same term in all languages? Why not *usia* and homoüsial, as well as *hypostasis*, hypostatic, homogeneous, heterogeneous, and the like;—or as Baptism, Eucharist, Liturgy, Epiphany and the rest?

Query xxi. p. 303.

The Doctor's insinuating from the 300 texts, which style the Father God absolutely, or the one God, that the Son is not strictly and essentially God, not one God with the Father, is a strained and remote inference of his own.

Waterland has weakened his argument by seeming to admit that in all these 300 texts the Father, *distinctive*, is meant.

Ib. pp. 316–17.

The simplicity of God is another mystery. * * When we come to inquire whether all extension, or all plurality, diversity, composition of substance and accident, and the like, be consistent with it, then it is we discover how confused and inadequate our ideas are. * * To this head belongs that perplexing question (beset with difficulties on all sides), whether the divine substance be extended or no.

Surely, the far larger part of these assumed difficulties rests on a misapplication either of the senses to the sense, or of the sense to the understanding, or of the understanding to the reason;—in short, on an asking for images where only theorems can be, or

requiring theorems for thoughts, that is, conceptions or notions, or lastly, conceptions for ideas.

Query xxiii. p. 351.

But taking advantage of the ambiguity of the word *hypostasis*, sometimes used to signify substance, and sometimes person, you contrive a fallacy.

And why did not Waterland lift up his voice against this mischievous abuse of the term *hypostasis*, and the perversion of its Latin rendering, *substantia* as being equivalent to οὐσία? Why οὐσία should not have been rendered by *essentia*, I can not conceive. *Est* seems a contraction of *esset*, and *ens* of *essens*: ὤν, οὖσα, οὐσία = *essens, essentis, essentia.*

Ib. p. 354.

Let me desire you not to give so great a loose to your fancy in divine things: you seem to consider every thing under the notion of extension and sensible images.

Very true. The whole delusion of the Anti-Trinitarians arises out of this, that they apply the property of imaginable matter—in which A. is, that is, can only be imagined, by exclusion of B. as the universal predicate of all substantial being.

Ib. p. 357.

And our English Unitarians * * have been still refining upon the Socinian scheme, * * and have brought it still nearer to Sabellianism.

The Sabellian and the Unitarian seem to differ only in this:—that what the Sabellian calls union with, the Unitarian calls full inspiration by, the Divinity.

Ib. p. 359.

It is obvious, at first sight, that the true Arian or Semi-Arian scheme (which you would be thought to come up to at least) can never tolerably support itself without taking in the Catholic principle of a human soul to join with the Word.

Here comes one of the consequences of the Cartesian Dualism; as if σὰρξ, the living body, could be or exist without a soul, or a human living body without a human soul! Σὰρξ is not Greek for carrion, nor σῶμα for carcase.

Query xxiv. p. 371.

Necessary existence is an essential character, and belongs equally to Father and Son.

Subsistent in themselves are Father, Son, and Spirit: the Father only has origin in himself.

Query xxvi. p. 412.

The words *οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον* he construes thus: "not as eternally generated," as if he had read *γεννώμενον*, supplying *ἀϊδίως* by imagination. The sense and meaning of the word *γενόμενον*, signifying made, or created, is so fixed and certain in this author, &c.

This is but one in fifty instances in which the true Englishing of *γενόμενος*, *ἐγένετο*, &c. would have prevented all mistake. It is not *made*, but *became*. Thus here:—begotten eternally, and not as one that became; that is, as not having been before. The only-begotten Son never *became;* but all things *became* through him.

Ib. 412.

Et nos etiam Sermoni atque Rationi, itemque Virtuti, per quæ omnia molitum Deum ediximus, propriam substantiam Spiritum inscribimus; cui et Sermo insit prænuntianti, et Ratio adsit disponenti, et Virtus perficienti. Hunc ex Deo prolatum didicimus, et prolatione generatum, et idcirco Filium Dei et Deum dictum ex unitate substantiæ.—Tertull. Apol. c. 21.

How strange and crude the realism of the Christian Faith appears in Tertullian's rugged Latin!

Ib. p. 414.

He represents Tertullian as making the Son, in his highest capacity, ignorant of the day of judgment.

Of the true sense of the text, *Mark* xiii. 32, I still remain in doubt; but, though as zealous and steadfast a Homüosian as Bull and Waterland themselves, I am inclined to understand it of the Son in his highest capacity; but I would avoid the inferiorizing consequences by a stricter rendering of the *εἰ μὴ ὁ Πατήρ*. The *μόνον* of St. Matthew xxiv. 36, is here omitted. I think Waterland's a very unsatisfying solution of this text.

Ib. p. 415.

Exclamans quod se Deus reliquisset, &c. Habes ipsum exclamantem in passione, Deus meus, Deus meus, ut quid me dereliquisti? Sed hæc vox carnis et animæ, id est, hominis; nec Sermonis, nec Spiritus, &c.—Tertull. Adv. Prax. c. 26, c. 30.

The ignorance of the Fathers, and, Origen excepted, of the Ante-Nicene Fathers in particular, in all that respects Hebrew learning and the New Testament references to the Old Testament, is shown in this so early fantastic misinterpretation grounded on the fact of our Lord's reminding, and as it were giving out aloud to John and Mary the twenty-second Psalm, the prediction

of his present sufferings and after-glory. But the entire passage in Tertullian, though no proof of his Arianism, is full of proofs of his want of insight into the true sense of the Scripture texts. Indeed, without detracting from the inestimable services of the Fathers from Tertullian to Augustine respecting the fundamental article of the Christian Faith, yet commencing from the fifth century, I dare claim for the Reformed Church of England the honorable name of ἀρχασπιστὴς of Trinitarianism, and the foremost rank among the Churches, Roman or Protestant: the learned Romanist divines themselves admit this, and make a merit of the reluctance with which they nevertheless admit it, in respect of Bishop Bull.*

Ib. p. 421.

It seems to me that if there be not reasons of conscience obliging a good man to speak out, there are always reasons of prudence which should make a wise man hold his tongue.

True, and as happily expressed. To this, however, the honest Anti-Trinitarian must come at last: "Well, well, I admit that John and Paul thought differently; but this remains my opinion."

Query xxvii. p. 427.

Τὸν ἀληθινὸν καὶ ὄντως ὄντα Θεὸν, τὸν τοῦ Χριστοῦ πατέρα.—Athanas. Cont. Gent.

The just and literal rendering of the passage is this: 'The true God who in reality is such, namely, the Father of Christ.'

The passage admits of a somewhat different interpretation from this of Waterland's, and of equal, if not greater, force against the Arian notion: namely, taking τὸν ὄντως ὄντα distinctively from ὁ ὤν—the *Ens omnis entitatis, etiam suæ*, that is, the I Am

* *Y sino aki está el Doctor Jorge Bull Profesor de Teologia, y Presbitero de la Iglesia Anglicana, que murió Obispo de San David el año de* 1716, *cuyas obras teologico—escolasticas, en folio, nada deben á las mas alambicadas que se han estampado en Salamanca y en Coimbra; y como los puntos que por la mayor parte trató en ellas son sobre los misterios capitales de nuestra Santa Fé, conviene á saber, sobre el misterio de la Trinidad, y sobre el de la Divinidad de Cristo, en los cuales su Pseudaiglesia Anglicana no se desvia de la Catolica, en verdad, que los manejó con tanto nervio y con tanta delicadeza, que los teologos ortodojos mas escolastizados, como si dijéramos electrizados, hacen grande estimacion de dichas obras. Y aun en los dos Tratados que escribió acerca de la Justificacion, que es punto mas resvaladizo, en los principios que abrazó, no se separó de los teologos Catolicos; pero en algunas consecuencias que infirio, ya dió bastantemente á entender la mala leche que habia mamado.* Fray. Gerundio, ii. 7.—*Ed.*

the Father, in distinction from the *Ens Supremum*, the Son. It can not, however, be denied that in changing the *formula* of the *Tetractys* into the *Trias*, by merging the *Prothesis* in the *Thesis*, the Identity in the Ipseity, the Christian Fathers subjected their exposition to many inconveniences.

Ib. p. 432.

Οὐχ ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων ἔσται Θεὸς ὁ τῷ Μωσεῖ εἰπὼν αὐτὸν εἶναι Θεὸν Ἀβραὰμ, καὶ Θεὸν Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ Θεὸν Ἰακώβ.—Justin. Mart. Dial. p. 180.

The meaning is, that that divine Person, who called himself God, and was God, was not the Person of the Father, whose ordinary character is that of maker of all things, but another divine Person, namely, God the Son. * * It was Justin's business to show that there was a divine Person, one who was God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and was not the Father; and therefore there were two divine Persons.

At all events, it was a very incautious expression on the part of Justin, though his meaning was, doubtless, that which Waterland gives. The same most improper, or at best, most inconvenient because equivocal phrase, has been, as I think, interpolated into our Apostles' Creed.

Ib. p. 436.

Τηροῖτο δ' ἂν, ὡς ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, εἷς μὲν Θεὸς, εἷς ἓν αἴτιον καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ Πνεύματος ἀναφερουένων. κ. τ. λ.—Greg. Naz. Orat. 29.

We may, as I conceive, preserve (the doctrine of) one God, by referring both the Son and the Holy Ghost to one cause, &c.

Another instance of the inconvenience of the Trias compared with the Tetractys.

NOTES ON WATERLAND'S IMPORTANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY.*

Chap. i. p. 18.

It is the property of the Divine Being to be unsearchable; and if he were not so, he would not be divine. Must we therefore reject the most certain truths concerning the Deity, only because they are incomprehensible, &c.?

It is strange that so sound, so admirable a logician as Waterland, should have thought 'unsearchable' and 'incomprehensible' synonymous, or at least equivalent terms:—and this, though St. Paul hath made it the privilege of the full-grown Christian *to search out the deep things of God himself.*

* The importance of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity asserted, in reply to some late pamphlets. 2d edit. Lond. 1734.

Chap. iv. p. 111.

The *delivering over unto Satan* seems to have been a form of excommunication, declaring the person reduced to the state of a heathen; and in the Apostolical age it was accompanied with supernatural or miraculous effects upon the bodies of the persons so delivered.

Unless the passage (*Acts* v. 1–11), be an authority, I must doubt the truth of this assertion, as tending to destroy the essential spirituality of Christian motives, and, in my judgment, as irreconcilable with our Lord's declaration, that his kingdom was *not of this world*. Let me be once convinced that St. Paul, with the elders of an Apostolic Church, knowingly and intentionally appended a palsy or a consumption to the sentence of excommunication, and I shall be obliged to reconsider my old opinion as to the anti-Christian principle of the Romish Inquisition.

Ib. p. 114.

A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject; knowing that he that is such, is subverted, and sinneth, being condemned of himself.—Tit. iii. 10, 11.

This text would be among my minor arguments for doubting the Paulinity of the Epistle to Titus. It seems to me to breathe the spirit of a later age, and a more established Church power.

Ib.

Not every one that mistakes in judgment, though in matters of great importance, in points fundamental, but he that openly espouses such fundamental error. * * Dr. Whitby adds to the definition, the espousing it out of disgust, pride, envy, or some worldly principle, and against his conscience.

Whitby went too far; Waterland not far enough. Every schismatic is not necessarily a heretic; but every heretic is virtually a schismatic. As to the meaning of αὐτοκατάκριτος, Waterland surely makes too much of a very plain matter. What was the sentence passed on a heretic? A public declaration that he was no longer a member of—that is, of one faith with—the Church. This the man himself, after two public notices, admits and involves in the very act of persisting. However confident as to the truth of the doctrine he has set up, he can not, after two public admonitions, be ignorant that it is a doctrine contrary to the articles of his communion with the Church that has admitted him; and in regard of his alienation from that communion, he is

necessarily αὐτοκατάκριτος,—though in his pride of heart he might say with the man of old, "And I banish you."

Ib. p. 123.

——— as soon as the miraculous gifts, or gift of discerning spirits, ceased.

No one point in the New Testament perplexes me so much as these (so called) miraculous gifts. I feel a moral repugnance to the reduction of them to natural and acquired talents, ennobled and made energetic by the life and convergency of faith;—and yet on no other scheme can I reconcile them with the idea of Christianity, or the particular supposed, with the general known, facts. But, thank God! it is a question which does not in the least degree affect our faith or practice. I mean, if God permit, to go through the Middletonian controversy, as soon as I can procure the loan of the books, or have health enough to become a reader in the British Museum.

Ib. p. 126.

And what if, after all, spiritual censures (for of such only I am speaking), should happen to fall upon such a person, he may be in some measure hurt in his reputation by it, and that is all. And possibly hereupon his errors, before invincible through ignorance, may be removed by wholesome instruction and admonition, and so he is befriended in it, &c.

Waterland is quite in the right so far;—but the penal laws, the temporal inflictions—would he have called for the repeal of these? Milton saw this subject with a mastering eye,—saw that the awful power of excommunication was degraded and weakened even to impotence by any the least connection with the law of the State.

Ib. p. 127.

——— who are hereby forbidden to receive such heretics into their houses, or to pay them so much as common civilities. This precept of the Apostle may be further illustrated by his own practice, recorded by Irenæus, who had the information at second-hand from Polycarp, a disciple of St. John's, that St. John, once meeting with Cerinthus at the bath, retired instantly without bathing, for fear lest the bath should fall by reason of Cerinthus being there, the enemy to truth.

Psha! The *bidding him God speed*,—λέγων αὐτῷ χαίρειν,—(2 *John*, 11), is a spirituality, not a mere civility. If St. John knew or suspected that Cerinthus had a cutaneous disease, there would have been some sense in the refusal, or rather, as I

correct myself, some probability of truth in this gossip of Irenæus.

Ib. p. 128.

They corrupted the faith of Christ, and in effect subverted the Gospel. That was enough to render them detestable in the eyes of all men who sincerely loved and valued sound faith.

O, no, no, not 'them!' *Error quidem, non tamen homo errans, abominandus:* or, to pun a little, *abhominandus.* Be bold in denouncing the heresy, but slow and timorous in denouncing the erring brother as a heretic. The unmistakable passions of a factionary and a schismatic, the ostentatious display, the ambition and dishonest arts of a sect-founder, must be superinduced on the false doctrine, before the heresy makes the man a heretic.

Ib. p. 129.

—— the doctrine of the Nicolaitans.

Were the Nicolaitans a sect properly so called? The word is the Greek rendering of 'the children of Balaam;' that is, men of grossly immoral and disorderly lives.

Ib. p. 130.

For if he who *shall break one of the least* moral *commandments, and shall teach men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven* (Matt. v. 19), it must be a very dangerous experiment, &c.

A sad misinterpretation of our Lord's words, which from the context most evidently had no reference to any moral, that is, universal commandment as such, but to the national institutions of the Jewish state, as long as that state should be in existence; that is to say, until *the Heaven* or the Government, and *the Earth* or the People or the Governed, as one *corpus politicum*, or nation, had *passed away.* Till that time,—which was fulfilled under Titus, and more thoroughly under Hadrian,—no Jew was relieved from his duties as a citizen and subject by his having become a Christian. The text, together with the command implied in the miracle of the tribute-money in the fish's mouth, might be fairly and powerfully adduced against the Quakers, in respect of their refusal to pay their tithes, or whatever tax they please to consider as having an un-Christian destination. But are they excluded from the kingdom of heaven, that is, the

Christian Church? No;—but they must be regarded as weak and injudicious members of it.

Chap. v. p. 140.

Accordingly it may be observed, how the unbelievers caress and compliment those complying gentlemen who meet them half-way, while they are perpetually inveighing against the stiff divines, as they call them, whom they can make no advantage of.

Lessing, an honest and frank-hearted Infidel, expresses the same sentiment. As long as a German Protestant divine keeps himself stiff and steadfast to the Augsburg Confession, to the full Creed of Melancthon, he is impregnable, and may bid defiance to skeptic and philosopher. But let him quit the citadel, and the Cossacks are upon him.

Ib. p. 187.

And therefore it is infallibly certain, as Mr. Chillingworth well argues with respect to Christianity in general, that we ought firmly to believe it; because wisdom and reason require that we should believe those things which are by many degrees more credible and probable than the contrary.

Yes, where there are but two positions, one of which must be true. When A. is presented to my mind with probability=5, and B. with probability=15, I must think that B. is three times more probable than A. And yet it is very possible that a C. may be found which will supersede both.

Chap. vi. p. 230.

The Creed of Jerusalem, preserved by Cyril (the most ancient perhaps of any now extant), is very express for the divinity of God the Son, in these words: "And in our Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, true God, begotten of the Father before all ages, by whom all things were made." * * *Καὶ εἰς ἑνὰ Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ μονογενῆ, τὸν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα, Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν, πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο.*

I regard this, both from its antiquity and from the peculiar character of the Church of Jerusalem, so far removed from the influence of the Pythagoreo-Platonic sects of Paganism, as the most important and convincing mere fact of evidence in the Trinitarian controversy.

Ib. p. 233.

—true Son of the Father, *invisible* of invisible, &c.

How is this reconcilable with *John* i. 18—(*no one hath seen God at any time: the only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom*

of the Father, he hath declared him—) or with the *express image*, asserted above. 'Invisible,' I suppose, must be taken in the narrowest sense, that is, to bodily eyes. But then the one 'invisible' would not mean the same as the other.

Ib. p. 236.

Symbola certe Ecclesiæ ex ipso Ecclesiæ sensu, non ex hæreticorum cerebello, exponenda sunt.—Bull. Judic. Eccl. v.

The truth of a Creed must be tried by the Holy Scriptures; but the sense of the Creed by the known sentiments and inferred intention of its compilers.

Ib. p. 238.

The very name of Father, applied in the Creed to the first Person, intimates the relation he bears to a Son, &c.

No doubt: but the most probable solution of the apparent want of distinctness of explication on this article, in my humble judgment, is—that the so-called Apostles' Creed was at first the preparatory confession of the catechumens, the admission-ticket, as it were (*symbolum ad Baptismum*), at the gate of the Church, and gradually augmented as heresies started up. The latest of these seems to have consisted in the doubt respecting the entire death of Jesus on the Cross, as distinguished from suspended animation. Hence in the fifth or sixth century the clause—"and he descended into Hades," was inserted;—that is, the indissoluble principle of the man Jesus, was separated from, and left, the dissoluble, and subsisted apart in *Scheol*, or the abode of separated souls;—but really meaning no more than *vere mortuus est*. Jesus was taken from the Cross dead in the very same sense in which the Baptist was dead after his beheading.

Nevertheless, well adapted as this Creed was to its purposes, I can not but regret the high place and precedence which by means of its title, and the fable to which that title gave rise, it has usurped. It has, as it appears to me, indirectly favored Arianism and Socinianism.

Ib. p. 250.

That St. John wrote his Gospel with a view to confute Cerinthus, among other false teachers, is attested first by Irenæus, who was a disciple of Polycarp, and who flourished within less than a century of St. John's time.

I have little trust and no faith in the gossip and hearsay-anecdotes of the early Fathers, Irenæus not excepted. "Within

less than a century of St. John's time." Alas! a century in the paucity of writers and of men of education in the age succeeding the Apostolic, must be reckoned equal to more than five centuries since the use of printing. Suppose, however, the truth of the Irenæan tradition;—that the Creed of Cerinthus was what Irenæus states it to have been; and that John, at the instance of the Asiatic Bishops, wrote his Gospel as an antidote to the Cerinthian heresy;—does there not thence arise, in his utter silence, an almost overwhelming argument against the Apostolicity of the *Christopædia*, both that prefixed to Luke, and that concorporated with Matthew?

Ib. p. 257.

In him was life, and the life was the light of men. The same Word was life, the λόγος and ζωή, both one. There was no occasion therefore for subtilly distinguishing the Word and Life into two Sons, as some did.

I will not deny the possibility of this interpretation. It may be,—nay, it is,—fairly deducible from the words of the great Evangelist: but I can not help thinking that, taken as the primary intention, it degrades this most divine chapter, which unites in itself the three characters of sublime, profound, and pregnant, and alloys its universality by a mixture of time and accident.

Ib.

And the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness cometh not upon it. So I render the verse, conformable to the rendering of the same Greek verb, καταλαμβάνω, by our translators in another place of this same Gospel. The Apostle, as I conceive, in this 5th verse of his 1st chapter, alludes to the prevailing error of the Gentiles, &c.

O sad, sad! How must the philosopher have been eclipsed by the shadow of antiquarian erudition, in order that a mind like Waterland's could have sacrificed the profound universal import of *comprehend* to an allusion to a worthless dream of heretical nonsense, the mushroom of the day! Had Waterland ever thought of the relation of his own understanding to his reason? But alas! the identification of these two diversities—of how many errors has it been ground and occasion!

Ib. p. 259.

And the Word was made flesh—became personally united with the man Jesus; *and dwelt among us*,—resided constantly in the human nature so assumed.

Waterland himself did but dimly see the awful import of ἐγένετο σὰρξ—the mystery of the alien ground—and the truth, that as the ground such must be the life. He caused himself to *become flesh*, and therein assumed a mortal life into his own person and unity, in order himself to transubstantiate the corruptible into the incorruptible.

Waterland's anxiety to show the anti-heretical force of St. John's Gospel and Epistles, has caused him to overlook their Catholicity—their applicability to all countries and all times—their truth, independently of all temporary accidents and errors; —which Catholicity alone it is that constitutes their claim to Canonicity, that is, to be Canonical inspired writings.

Ib. p. 266.

Hereupon therefore the Apostle, in defence of Christ's real humanity, says, *This is he that came by water and blood.*

'Water and blood,' that is, *serum* and *crassamentum*, mean simply 'blood,' the blood of the animal or carnal life, which, saith Moses, *is the life*. Hence 'flesh' is often taken as, and indeed is a form of, the blood,—blood formed or organized. Thus 'blood' often includes 'flesh,' and 'flesh' includes 'blood.' 'Flesh and blood' is equivalent to blood in its twofold form, or rather as formed and formless. 'Water and blood' has, therefore, two meanings in St. John, but which *in idem coincidunt*:—1. true animal human blood, and no celestial ichor or phantom:—2. the whole sentiently vital body, fixed or flowing, the pipe and the stream. For the ancients, and especially the Jews, had no distinct apprehension of the use or action of the nerves: in the Old Testament 'heart' is used as we use 'head.' *The fool hath said in his heart*—is in English: "the worthless fellow (*vaurien*) hath taken it into his head," &c.

Ib. p. 268.

The Apostle having said that the Spirit is truth, or essential truth (which was giving him a title common to God the Father and to Christ), &c.

Is it clear that the distinct *hypostasis* of the Holy Spirit, in the same sense as the only-begotten Son is hypostatically distinguished from the Father, was a truth that formed an immediate object or intention of St. John? That it is a truth implied in, and fairly deducible from, many texts, both in his Gospel and Epistles, I do not, indeed I can not, doubt:—but only whether

this article of our faith he was commissioned to declare explicitly?

It grieves me to think that such giant *archaspistæ* of the Catholic Faith, as Bull and Waterland, should have clung to the intruded gloss (1 *John* v. 7), which, in the opulence and continuity of the evidences, as displayed by their own master-minds, would have been superfluous, had it not been worse than superfluous, that is, senseless in itself, and interruptive of the profound sense of the Apostle.

Ib. p. 272.

He is come, come in the flesh, and not merely to reside for a time, or occasionally, and to fly off again, but to abide and dwell with man, clothed with humanity.

Incautiously worded at best. Compare our Lord's own declaration to his disciples, that he had dwelt a brief while *with* or *among* them, in order to dwell *in* them permanently.

Ib. p. 286.

It is very observable, that the Ebionites rejected three of the Gospels, receiving only St. Matthew's (or what they called so), and that curtailed. They rejected likewise all St. Paul's writings, reproaching him as an apostate. How unlikely is it that Justin should own such reprobates as those were for fellow-Christians!

I dare avow my belief—or rather I dare not withhold my avowal—that both Bull and Waterland are here hunting on the trail of an old blunder or figment, concocted by the gross ignorance of the Gentile Christians and their Fathers in all that respected Hebrew literature and the Palestine Christians. I persist in the belief that, though a refuse of the persecuted and from neglect degenerating Jew-Christians may have sunk into the mean and carnal notions of their unconverted brethren respecting the Messiah, no proper sect of Ebionites ever existed, but those to whom St. Paul travelled with the contributions of the churches, nor any such man as Ebion; unless indeed it was St. Barnabas, who in his humility may have so named himself, while soliciting relief for the distressed Palestine Christians;—"I am Barnabas the beggar." But I will go further, and confess my belief that the (so-called) Ebionites of the first and second centuries, who rejected the *Christopœdia*, and whose Gospel commenced with the baptism by John, were orthodox Apostolic Christians, who received Christ as the Lord, that is, as Jehovah *manifested in the*

flesh. As to their rejection of the other Gospels and of Paul's writings, I might ask:—"Could they read them?" But the whole notion seems to rest on an anachronical misconception of the *Evangelia.* Every great mother Church, at first, had its own Gospel.

Ib. p. 288.

To say nothing here of the truer reading ("men of your nation"), there is no consequence in the argument. The Ebionites were Christians in a large sense, men of Christian profession, nominal Christians, as Justin allowed the worst of heretics to be. And this is all he could mean by allowing the Ebionites to be Christians.

I agree with Bull in holding *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑμετέρου γένους* the most probable reading in the passage cited from Justin, and am by no means convinced that the celebrated passage in Josephus is an interpolation. But I do not believe that such men, as are here described, ever professed themselves Christians, or were, or could have been, baptized.

Ib. p. 292.

Le Clerc would appear to doubt, whether the persons pointed to in Justin really denied Christ's divine nature or no. It is as plain as possible that they did.

Le Clerc is no favorite of mine, and Waterland is a prime favorite. Nevertheless, in this instance, I too doubt with Le Clerc, and more than doubt.

Ib. p. 338.

Φύσει δὲ τῆς φθορᾶς προσγενομένης, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ὅτι σῶσαι βουλόμενος ἦ τὴν φθοροποιὸν οὐσίαν ἀφανίσας· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἦν ἑτέρως γενέσθαι εἰ μήπερ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ζωὴ προσεπλάκη τῷ τὴν φθορὰν δεξαμένῳ, ἀφανίζουσα μὲν τὴν φθοράν, ἀθανατὸν δὲ τοῦ λοιποῦ τὸ δεξάμενον διατηροῦσα. κ. τ. λ.—Just. M.

Here Justin asserts that it was necessary for essential life, or life by nature, to be united with human nature, in order to save it.

Waterland has not mastered the full force of *ἡ κατὰ θύσιν ζωή.* If indeed he had taken in the full force of the whole of this invaluable fragment, he would never have complimented the following extract from Irenæus, as saying the same thing "in fuller and stronger words." Compared with the fragment from Justin, it is but the flat common-place logic of analogy, so common in the early Fathers.

Ib. p. 340.

*Qui nude tantum hominem eum dicunt ex Joseph generatum * * moriuntur.*

Non nude hominem—not a mere man do I hold Jesus to have been and to be; but a perfect man and, by personal union with the Logos, perfect God. That his having an earthly father might be requisite to his being a perfect man I can readily suppose; but why the having an earthly father should be more incompatible with his perfect divinity, than his having an earthly mother, I can not comprehend. All that John and Paul believed, God forbid that I should not!

Chap. vii. p. 389.

It is a sufficient reason for not receiving either them (*Arian doctrines*), or the interpretations brought to support them, that the ancients, in the best and purest times, either knew nothing of them, or if they did, condemned them.

As excellent means of raising a presumption in the mind of the falsehood of Arianism and Socinianism, and thus of preparing the mind for a docile reception of the great idea itself—I admit and value the testimonies from the writings of the early Fathers. But alas! the increasing dimness, ending in the final want of the idea of this all-truths-including truth of the Tetractys eternally manifested in the Triad;—this, this is the ground and cause of all the main heresies from Semi-Arianism, recalled by Dr. Samuel Clarke, to the last setting ray of departing faith in the necessitarian Psilanthropism of Dr. Priestley.

Ib. p. 412, &c.

I can not but think that Waterland's defence of the Fathers in these pages against Barbeyrac, is below his great powers and characteristic vigor of judgment. It is enough that they, the Fathers of the first three centuries, were the lights of their age, and worthy of all reverence for their good gifts. But it appears to me impossible to deny their credulity; their ignorance, with one or two exceptions, in the interpretation of the Old Testament; or their hardihood in asserting the truth of whatever they thought it for the interest of the Church, and for the good of souls, to have believed as true. A whale swallowed Jonah; but a believer in all the assertions and narrations of Tertullian and Irenæus would be more wonder-working than Jonah; for such a one must have swallowed whales.

NOTES ON SKELTON.*—1825.

BURDY's Life of Skelton, p. 22.

She lived until she was a hundred and five. The omission of his prayers on the morning it happened, he supposed ever after to be the cause of this unhappy accident. So early was his mind impressed with a lively sense of religious duty.

In anecdotes of this kind, and in the instances of eminently good men, it is that my head and heart have their most obstinate falls out. The question is:—To what extent the undoubted subjective truth may legitimately influence our judgment as to the possibility of the objective.

Ib. p. 67.

The Bishop then gave him the living of Pettigo in a wild part of the county of Donegal, having made many removals on purpose to put him in that savage place, among mountains, rocks, and heath, * * *. When he got this living he had been eighteen years curate of Monaghan, and two of Newtown-Butler, during which time he saw, as he told me, many illiterate boys put over his head, and highly preferred in the Church without having served a cure.

Though I have heard of one or two exceptions stated in proof that nepotism is not yet extinct among our Prelates, yet it is impossible to compare the present condition of the Church, and the disposal of its dignities and emoluments with the facts recorded in this Life, without an honest exultation.

Ib. p. 106.

He once declared to me that he would resign his living, if the Athanasian Creed were removed from the Prayer Book; and I am sure he would have done so.

Surely there was more zeal than wisdom in this declaration. Does the Athanasian or rather the *pseudo*-Athanasian Creed differ from the Nicene, or not? If not, it must be dispensable at least, if not superfluous. If it does differ, which of the two am I to follow;—the profession of an anonymous individual, or the solemn decision of upwards of three hundred Bishops convened from all parts of the Christian world?

Vol. i. pp. 177–180.

No problem more difficult or of more delicate treatment than

* The complete Works of the late Rev. Philip Skelton, Rector of Fintona. 6 vols. 8vo. London, 1824.—*Ed.*

the *criteria* of miracles; yet none on which young divines are fonder of displaying their gifts. Nor is this the worst. Their charity too often goes to wreck from the error of identifying the faith in Christ with the arguments by which they think it is to be supported. But surely if two believers meet at the same goal of faith, it is a very secondary question whether they travelled thither by the same road of argument. In this and other passages of Skelton, I recognize and reverence a vigorous and robust intellect; but I complain of a turbidness in his reasoning, a huddle in his sequence, and here and there a semblance of arguing in a circle—from the miracle to the doctrine, and from the doctrine to the miracle. Add to this a too little advertency to the distinction between the evidence of a miracle for A, an eye-witness, and for B, for whom it is the relation of a miracle by an asserted eye-witness; and again between B, and X, Y, Z, for whom it is a fact of history. The result of my own meditations is, that the evidence of the Gospel, taken as a total, is as great for the Christians of the nineteenth century, as for those of the Apostolic age. I should not be startled if I were told it was greater. But it does not follow, that this equally holds good of each component part. An evidence of the most cogent clearness, unknown to the primitive Christians, may compensate for the evanescence of some evidence, which they enjoyed. Evidences comparatively dim have waxed into noon-day splendor; and the comparative wane of others, once effulgent, is more than indemnified by the *synopsis τοῦ πάντος*, which we enjoy, and by the standing miracle of a Christendom commensurate and almost synonymous with the civilized world. I make this remark for the purpose of warning the divinity student against the disposition to overstrain particular proofs, or rest the credibility of the Gospel too exclusively on some one favorite point. I confess that I can not peruse page 179 without fancying that I am reading some Romish Doctor's work, dated from a community where miracles are the ordinary news of the day

P.S. By the by, the Rev. Philip Skelton is of the true Irish breed; that is, a brave fellow, but a bit of a bully. "Arrah, by St. Pathrick! but I shall make cold mutton of you, Misther Arian" Ib. p. 182.

If in this he appears to deal fairly by us, proving such things as admit of it, by reason: and such as do not, by the authority of his miracles, &c.

Are *we* likely to have miracles performed or pretended before our eyes? If not, what may all this mean? If Skelton takes for granted the veracity of the Evangelists, and the precise verity of the Gospels, the truth and genuineness of the miracles is included:—and if not, what does he prove? The exact accordance of the miracles related with the ideal of a true miracle in the reason, does indeed furnish an argument for the probable truth of the relation. But this does not seem to be Skelton's intention.

Ib. p. 185.

But to remedy this evil, as far as the nature of the thing will permit, a genuine record of the true religion must be kept up, that its articles may not be in danger of total corruption in such a sink of opinions.

Any thing rather than seek a remedy in that which Scripture itself declares the only one. Alas! these bewilderments (the Romanists urge) have taken place especially through and by the misuse of the Scriptures. Whatever God has given, we ought to think necessary;—the Scriptures, the Church, the Spirit. Why disjoin them?

Ib. p. 186.

Now a perpetual miracle, considered as the evidence of any thing, is nonsense; because were it at first ever so apparently contrary to the known course of nature, it must in time be taken for the natural effect of some unknown cause, as all physical *phænomena*, if far enough traced, always are; and consequently must fall into a level, as to a capacity of proving any thing, with the most ordinary appearances of nature, which, though all of them miracles, as to the primary cause of their production, can never be applied to the proof of an inspiration, because ordinary and common.

I doubt this, though I have no doubt that it would be pernicious. The yearly blossoming of Aaron's rod is against Skelton, who confounds single facts with classes of *phænomena*, and he draws his conclusion from an arbitrary and, as seems to me, senseless definition of a miracle.

Ib. p. 214. End of Discourse ii.

Skelton appears to have confounded two errors very different in kind and in magnitude;—that of the Infidel, against whom his arguments are with few exceptions irrefragable; and that of the Christian, who, sincerely believing the Law, the Prophecies, the miracles and the doctrines, all in short which in the Scriptures themselves is declared to have been revealed, does not attribute the same immediate divinity to all and every part of the remain-

der. It would doubtless be more Christian-like to substitute the views expressed in the next Discourse (iii.); but still the latter error is not as the former.

Ib. p. 234.

But why should not the conclusion be given up, since it is possible Christ may have had two natures in him, so as to have been less than the Father in respect to the one, and equal to him in respect to the other.

I understand these words (*My Father is greater than I*) of the divinity—and of the Filial subordination, which does not in the least encroach on the equality necessary to the unity of Father, Son, and Spirit. Bishop Bull does the same. See too Skelton's own remarks in Discourse v. p. 265.

Ib. p. 251.

This was necessary, because their Law was ordained by angels.

Now this is an instance of what I can not help regarding as a superstitious excess of reverence for single texts. We know that long before the Epistle to the Hebrews was written, the Alexandrian Church, which by its intercourse with Greek philosophers, chiefly Platonists, had become ashamed of the humanities of the Hebrew Scriptures, in defiance of those Scriptures had pretended, that it was not the Supreme Being who gave the Law in person to Moses, but some of his angels. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, arguing *ad homines*, avails himself of this, in order to prove that on their own grounds the Mosaic was of dignity inferior to the Christian dispensation. To get rid of this no-difficulty in a single verse or two in the Epistles, Skelton throws an insurmountable difficulty on the whole Mosaic history.

Ib. p. 265.

Therefore, he saith, *I* (as a man) *can of myself do nothing.*

Even of this text I do not see the necessity of Skelton's parenthesis (as a man). Nay it appears to me (I confess) to turn a sublime and most instructive truth into a truism. "But if not as the Son of God, therefore *à fortiori* not as the Son of Man, and more especially, as such, in all that refers to the redemption of mankind."

Ib. p. 267.

To this glory Christ, as God, was entitled from all eternity; but did not acquire a right to it as man, till he had paid the purchase by his blood.

I too hold this for a most important truth; but yet could wish it to have been somewhat differently expressed; as thus: "but did not acquire it as man till the means had been provided and perfected by his blood."

Ib. p. 268.

If Christ in one place (*John* xiv. 28), says, *My Father is greater than I;* he must be understood of his relation to the Father as his Son, born of a woman.

I do not see the necessity of this: does not Christ say, *My Father and I will come and we will dwell in you?* Nay, I dare confidently affirm that in no one passage of St. John's Gospel is our Lord declared in any special sense the Son of the First Person of the Trinity in reference to his birth from a woman. And remember it is from St. John's Gospel that the words are cited. So too the answer to Philip ought to be interpreted by ch. i. 18 of the same Gospel.

Ib. p. 276.

I confess I do not agree with Skelton's interpretation of any of these texts entirely. Because I hold the Nicene Faith, and revere the doctrine of the Trinity as the fundamental article of Christianity, I apply to Christ as the Second Person, almost all the texts which Skelton explains of his humanity. At all events I consider *the first-born of every creature* as a false version of the words, which (as the argument and following verse prove) should be rendered *begotten before* (or rather *superlatively before*), *all that was created or made: for by him* they were made.

Ib.

Of that day, and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.

I can not explain myself here; but I have long thought that our Saviour meant in these words *αἰνίττειν τὴν θεότητα αὐτοῦ*— and that like the problem proposed by him to the Scribes, they were intended to prepare the minds of the disciples for this awful mystery—*εἰ μὴ ὁ πατήρ*—"unless, or if not, as the Father knows it;" while in St. Matthew the equivalent sense is given by the omission of the *οὐδ' ὁ υἱός*, and its inclusion in the Father. *As the Father knoweth me, so know I the Father.*

It would have been against the general rule of Scripture prophecies, and the intention of the revelation in Christ, that the

first Christians should have been so influenced in their measures and particular actions, as they could not but have been by a particular foreknowledge of the express and precise time at which Jerusalem was to be destroyed. To reconcile them to this uncertainty, our Lord first teaches them to consider this destruction the close of one great epoch, or *αἰών*, as the type of the final close of the whole world of time, that is, of all temporal things; and then reasons with them thus:—"Wonder not that I should leave you ignorant of the former, when even the highest order of heavenly intelligences know not the latter, *οὐδ' ὁ υἱός, εἰ μὴ ὁ πατήρ*; nor should I myself, but that the Father knows it, all whose will is essentially known to me as the Eternal Son. But even to me it is not revealably communicated." Such seems to me the true sense of this controverted passage in Mark, and that it is borne out by many parallel texts in St. John, and that the correspondent text in Matthew, which omits the *οὐδ' ὁ υἱός*, conveys the same sense in equivalent terms, the word *ἐμοῦ* including the Son in the *πατὴρ μόνος*. For to his only-begotten Son before all time the Father showeth all things.

Ib. p. 279.

But whether we can reconcile these words to our belief of Christ's prescience and divinity, or not, matters little to the debate about his divinity itself; since we can so fully prove it by innumerable passages of Scripture, too direct, express, and positive, to be balanced by one obscure passage, from *whence the Arian is to draw the consequence himself, which may possibly be wrong.*

Very good.

Ib. p. 280.

We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding that we may know him that is true; and we are in him that is true, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life.—1 John v. 20. The whole connection evidently shows the words to be spoken of Christ.

That the words comprehend Christ is most evident. All that can be fairly concluded from 1 Cor. viii. 6, is this:—that the Apostles, Paul and John, speak of the Father as including and comprehending the Son and the Holy Ghost, as his Word and his Spirit; but of these as inferring or supposing the Father, not comprehending him. Whenever, therefore, respecting the Godhead itself, containing both deity and dominion, the term God is distinctively used, it is applied to the Father, and Lord to the Son.

Ib. p. 281.

But, farther, it is objected that Christ can not be God, since God calls him *his servant* more than once, particularly *Isaiah* xlii. 1.

The Prophets often speak of the anti-type, or person typified, in language appropriate to, and suggested by, the type itself. So, perhaps, in this passage, if, as I suppose, Hezekiah was the type immediately present to Isaiah's imagination. However, Skelton's answer is quite sufficient.

Ib. p. 287.

Hence it appears, that in the passage objected (1 *Cor.* xv. 24, &c.), Christ is spoken of purely as that Man whom *God had highly exalted, and to whom he had given a name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow.*—(Phil. ii. 9, 10.)

I must confess that this exposition does not quite satisfy me. I can not help thinking that something more and deeper was meant by the Apostle; and this must be sought for in the mystery of the Trinity itself, *in which* (mystery) *all treasures of knowledge are hidden.*

Ib. p. 318.

Hence, perhaps, may be best explained what St. Peter says in the second Epistle, after pleading a miracle. *We have also a more sure word of prophecy, whereunto you do well that you take heed.*

I believe that St. Peter neither said it, nor meant this; but that βεβαιότερον follows *the prophetic word.* We have also the word of prophecy more firm;—that is; we have, in addition to the evidence of the miracles themselves, this further confirmation, that they are the fulfilment of known prophecies.

Ib. p. 327.

Agreeable to these passages of the Prophet, St. Peter tells us (*Acts* x. 38), *God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost and power.*

I have often to complain that too little attention is paid by commentators to the history and particular period in which certain speeches were delivered, or words written. Could St. Peter with propriety have introduced the truth to a prejudiced audience with its deepest mysteries? Must he not have begun with the most evident facts?

Ib. Disc. viii.

The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity vindicated.

Were I a Clergyman, the paragraphs from p. 366 to p. 370,

both inclusive, of this Discourse should form the conclusion of my Sermon on Trinity Sunday,—whether I preached at St. James's, or in a country village.

Ib. pp. 374–378.

As a reason why we should doubt our own judgment, it is quite fair to remind the objector, that the same difficulty occurs in the scheme of God's ordinary providence. But that a difficulty in a supposed article of revealed truth is solved by the occurrence of the same or of an equivalent difficulty in the common course of human affairs—this I find it hard to conceive. How was the religious, as distinguished from the moral, sense first awakened? What made the human soul feel the necessity of a faith in God, but the apparent incongruity of certain dispensations in this world with the idea of God, with the law written in the heart? Is not the reconciling of these facts or *phænomena* with the divine attributes, one of the purposes of a revealed religion? But even this is not a full statement of the defect complained of in this solution. A difficulty which may be only apparent (like that other of the prosperity of the wicked) is solved by the declaration of its reality! A difficulty grounded on the fact of temporal and outward privations and sufferings, is solved by being infinitely increased, that is, by the assertion of the same principle on the determination of our inward and everlasting weal and woe. That there is nothing in the Christian Faith or in the Canonical Scriptures, when rightly interpreted, that requires such an argument, or sanctions the recourse to it, I believe myself to have proved in the Aids to Reflection. For observe that "to solve" has a scientific, and again a religious sense, and that in the latter, a difficulty is satisfactorily solved, as soon as its insolvability for the human mind is proved and accounted for.

Ib. (Disc. xiv. pp. 500–502.)

Christianity proved by Miracles.

I can not see and never could, the purpose, or *cui bono*, of this reasoning. To whom is it addressed? To a man who denies a God, or that God can reveal his will to mankind? If such a man be not below talking to, he must first be convinced of his miserable blindness respecting these truths; for these are clearly presupposed in every proof of miracles generally.

Again, does he admit the authenticity of the Gospels, and the

veracity of the Evangelists? Does he credit the facts there related, and as related? If not, these points must be proved; for these are clearly presupposed in all reasoning on the particular miracles of the Christian dispensation. If he does, can he deny that many acts of Christ were wonderful;—that reanimating a dead body in which putrefaction had already commenced,—and feeding four thousand men with a few loaves and fishes, so that the fragments left greatly exceeded the original total quantity,—were wonderful events? Should such a man, *compos mentis*, exist (which I more than doubt), what could a wise man do but stare—and leave him? Christ wrought many wonderful works, implying admirable power, and directed to the most merciful and beneficent ends; and these acts were such signs of his divine mission, as rendered inattention or obstinate averseness to the truths and doctrines which he promulgated, inexcusable, and indeed on any hypothesis but that of immoral dispositions and prejudices, utterly inconceivable. In what respect, I pray, can this statement be strengthened by any reasoning about the nature and distinctive essence of miracles *in abstracto*? What purpose can be answered by any pretended definition of a miracle? If I met with a disputatious word-catcher, or logomachist, who sought to justify his unbelief on this ground, I should not hesitate to say—"Never mind whether it is a miracle or no. Call it what you will;—but do you believe the fact? Do you believe that Christ did by force of his will and word multiply instantaneously twelve loaves and a few small fishes, into sufficient food for a hungering multitude of four thousand men and women?" When I meet with, or from credible authority hear of, a man who believes this fact, and yet thinks it no sign of Christ's mission; when I can even conceive of a man in his right senses who, believing all the facts and events related in the New Testament, and as there related, does yet remain a Deist, I may think it time to enter into a disquisition respecting the right definition of a miracle; and meantime, I humbly trust that believing with my whole heart and soul in the wonderful works of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, I shall not forfeit my title of a Christian, though I should not subscribe to this or that divine's right definition of his '*idea*' of a miracle; which word is with me no *idea* at all, but a general term; the common surname, as it were, of

the wonderful works wrought by the messengers of God to man in the Patriarchal, Mosaic, and Christian dispensations.

It is to these notions and general definitions, far more than to the facts themselves, that the arguments of Infidels apply; and from which they derive their plausibility. Nor is this all. The Infidel imitates the divine, and adopts the same mode of arguing, namely, by this substantiation of mere general or collective terms. For instance, Hume's argument (stated, by the by, before he was born, and far more forcibly, by Dr. South, who places it in the mouth of Thomas),*—reduce it to the particular facts in question, and its whole speciousness vanishes. I am speaking of the particular facts and actions of the Gospel; of those, and those only. Now that I should be deceived, or the eye-witnesses have been deceived, under all the circumstances of those miracles, with all antecedents, accompaniments, and consequents, is quite as contrary to, that is, unparalleled in my experience, as the return to life of a dead man.

So again in the second paragraph of page 502,† the position is true or false according to the definition of a miracle. In the narrower sense of the term, miracle,—that is, a consequent presented to the outward senses without an adequate antecedent, *ejusdem generis*,—it is not only false but detractory from the Christian religion. It is a main, nay, an indispensable evidence; but it is not the only, no, nor if comparison be at all allowable, the highest and most efficient; unless, indeed, the term evidence is itself confined to grounds of conviction offered to the senses, but then the position is a mere truism.

There is yet another way of reasoning, which I utterly dislike; namely, by putting imaginary cases of imaginary miracles, as Paley has done. "If a dozen different individuals, all men of known sense and integrity, should each independently of the other pledge their everlasting weal on the truth, that they saw a man beheaded and quartered, and that on a certain person's prayer or bidding, the quarters re-united, and then a new head grew on and from out of the stump of the neck: and should the man

* See South's Works, vol. iii. p. 500. Clarendon edit. 1823.—*Ed.*

† But it will be proper to observe, that it strikes directly at the very root of Revelation, which can not possibly give any other evidence of itself, as the dictate of God, but what must be drawn from miracles, wrought to prove the divine mission of those who publish it to the world.

himself assure you of the same, show you the junctures, and identify himself to you by some indelible mark, with which you had been previously acquainted,—could you withstand this evidence?" What could a judicious man reply but—"When such an event takes place, I will tell you; but what has this to do with the reasons for our belief in the truth of the written records of the Old and New Testament? Why do you fly off from the facts to a gigantic fiction,—when the possibility of the *If* with respect to a much less startling narration is the point in dispute between us?"

Such and so peculiar, and to an honest mind so unmistakable, is the character of veracity and simplicity on the very countenance, as it were, of the Gospel, that every remove of the inquirer's attention from the facts themselves is a remove of his conversion. It is your business to keep him from wandering, not to set him the example.

Never, surely, was there a more unequal writer than Skelton; —in the discourses on the Trinity, the compeer of Bull and Waterland; and yet the writer of these pages, 500, 501! Natural magic! a stroke of art! for example, converting the Nile into blood! And then his definition of a miracle. Suspension of the laws of nature! suspension—laws—nature! Bless me! a chapter would be required for the explanation of each several word of this definition, and little less than omniscience for its application in any one instance. An effect presented to the senses without any adequate antecedent, *ejusdem generis*, is a miracle in the philosophic sense. Thus: the corporeal ponderable hand and arm raised with no other known causative antecedent, but a thought, a pure act of an immaterial essentially invisible imponderable will, is a miracle for a reflecting mind. Add the words, *præter experientiam:* and we have the definition of a miracle in the popular, practical, and appropriated sense.

Vol. iii.

That all our thoughts and views respecting our Faith should be consistent with each other, and with the attributes of God, is most highly desirable; but when the great diversities of men's understandings, and the unavoidable influence of circumstances on the mind, are considered, we may hope from the Divine mercy, that the agreement in the result will suffice; and that he who sincerely and efficiently believes that Christ left the glory which

he had with the Father before all worlds, to become man and die for our salvation,—that by him we may, and by him alone we can, be saved,—will be held a true believer,—whether he interprets the words 'sacrifice,' 'purchase,' 'bargain,' 'satisfaction' of the creditor by full payment of the 'debt,' and the like as proper and literal expressions of the redeeming act and the cause of our salvation, as Skelton seems to have done;—or (as I do) as figurative language truly designating the effects and consequences of this adorable act and process.

Ib. p. 393.

But were the prospect of a better parish, in case of greater diligence, set before him by his Bishop, on the music of such a promise, like one bit by a *tarantula*, we should probably soon see him in motion, and serving God, (O shameful!) for the sake of Mammon, as if his torpid body had been animated anew by a returning soul.

Without any high-flying in Christian morality, I can not keep shrinking from the wish here expressed; at all events, I can not sympathize with, or participate in, the expectation of "an infinite advancement" from men so motived.

Ib. p. 394.

Yet excommunication, the inherent discipline of the Church, which it exercised under persecution, which it is still permitted to exercise under the present establishment.

Rarely I suspect, without exposing the Clergyman to the risk of an action for damages, or some abuse. There are few subjects that more need investigation, yet require more vigor and soundness of judgment to be rightly handled, than this of Christian discipline in a Church established by law. It is indeed a most difficult and delicate problem, and supplied Baxter with a most plausible and to me the only perplexing of his numerous objections to our Ecclesiastical Constitution. On the other hand, I saw clearly that he was requiring an impossibility; and that his argument carried on to its proper consequences concluded against all Church Establishment, not more against the National Church of which he complained, than the one of his own clipping and shaping which he would have substituted; consequently, every proof (and I saw many and satisfactory proofs) of the moral and political necessity of an Established Church, was at the same time a pledge that a deeper insight would detect some flaw in the reasoning of the Disciplinarians. For if A. be right and requisite, B.,

which is incompatible with A., can not be rightly required. And this it was, that first led me to the distinction between the *Ecclesia* and an *Enclesia*, concerning which see my Essay on Establishment and Dissent, in which I have met the objection to my position, that Christian discipline is incompatible with a Church established by law, from the fact of the discipline of the Church of Scotland.* Who denies that is in the power of a legislature to punish certain offences by ignominy, and to make the clergy magistrates in reference to these? The question is, whether it is wise or expedient, which it may be, or rather may have been, in Scotland, and the contrary in England? Wise or unwise, this is not discipline, not Christian discipline, enforced only by spiritual motives, enacted by spiritual authority, and submitted to for conscience' sake.

Ib. p. 446.

Be this as it may the foreknowledge and the decree were both eternal Here now it is a clear point that the moral actions of all accountable agents were, with certainty, foreknown, and their doom unalterably fixed, long before any one of them existed.

Strange that so great a man as Skelton should first affirm eternity of both, yet in the next sentence talk of "long before." These Reflections† are excellent, but here Skelton offends against his own canons. I should feel no reluctance, moral or speculative, in accepting the apparent necessity of both propositions, as a sufficient reason for believing both; and the transcendency of the subject as a sufficient solution of their apparent incompatibility. But yet I think that another view of the subject, not less congruous with universal reason and more agreeable to the light of reason in the human understanding, might be defended, without detracting from any perfection of the Divine Being. Nay, I think that Skelton needed but one step more to have seen it.

Ib. p. 478.

In fine.

To what purpose were these Reflections, taken as a whole, written? I can not answer. To dissuade men from reasoning on a subject beyond our faculties? Then why all this reasoning?

* The Editor is not aware of the existence of the Essay here mentioned. But see for the distinction of the *Ecclesia* and *Enclesia*, the Church and State.—*Ed.*

† On Predestination, as far as p. 445.

Vol. iv. p. 28. Deism Revealed.

Shepherd. Were you ever at Constantinople, Sir?

Dechaine. Never.

Shep. Yet I believe you have no more doubt there is such a city, than that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones?

Temp. I am sure I have not.

Dech. Nor I; but what then?

Shep. Pray, Mr. Dechaine, did you see Julius Cæsar assassinated in the Capitol?

Dech. A pretty question! No indeed, Sir.

Shep. Have you any doubts about the truth of what is told us by the historians concerning that memorable transaction?

Dech. Not the least.

Shep Pray, is it either self-evident or demonstrable to you, at this time and place, that there is any such city as Constantinople, or that there ever was such a man as Cæsar?

Dech. By no means.

Shep. And you have all you know concerning the being of either the city, or the man, merely from the report of others, who had it from others, and so on, through many links of tradition?

Dech. I have.

Shep. You see then, that there are certain cases, in which the evidence of things not seen nor either sensibly or demonstrably perceived, can justly challenge so entire an assent, that he who should pretend to refuse it in the fullest measure of acquiescence, would be deservedly esteemed the most stupid or perverse of mankind.

That there is a sophism here, every one must feel in the very fact of being *non-plus'd* without being convinced. The sophism consists in the instance being *haud ejusdem generis* (ἔλεγχος μεταβάσεως εἰς ἄλλο γένος); and what the allogeneity is between the assurance of the being of Madrid or Constantinople, and the belief of the fact of the resurrection of Christ, I have shown elsewhere. The universal belief of the *tyrannicidium* of Julius Cæsar is doubtless a fairer instance, but the whole mode of argument is unsound and unsatisfying. Why run off from the fact in question, or the class at least to which it belongs? The victory can be but accidental—a victory obtained by the unguarded logic or want of logical foresight of the antagonist, who needs only narrow his positions to narrations of facts and events, in our judgment of which we are not aided by the analogy of previous and succeeding experience, to deprive you of the opportunity of skirmishing thus on No Man's land. But this is Skelton's ruling passion, sometimes his strength—too often his weakness. He

must force the reader to believe : or rather he has an antagonist, a wilful infidel or heretic always and exclusively before his imagination ; or if he thinks of the reader at all, it is as of a partisan enjoying every hard thump, and smashing *fister* he gives the adversary, whom Skelton hates too cordially to endure to obtain any thing from him with his own liking. No! It must be against his will, and in spite of it. No thanks to him—the dog could not help himself! How much more effectual would he have found it to have commenced by placing himself in a state of sympathy with the supposed skeptic or unbeliever ;—to have stated to him his own feelings, and the real grounds on which they rested ;—to have shown himself the difference between the historical facts which the skeptic takes for granted and believes spontaneously, as it were,—and those which are to be the subject of discussion ; and this brings the question at once to the proof. And here, after all, lies the strength of Skelton's reasoning, which would have worked far more powerfully, had it come first and single, with the whole attention directed towards it.

Ib. p. 35.

Templeton. Surely the resurrection of Christ, or any other man can not be a thing impossible with God. It is neither above his power, nor, when employed for a sufficient purpose, inconsistent with his majesty, wisdom, and goodness.

This is the ever open and vulnerable part of Deism. The Deist, as a Deist, believes *implicite* at least, so many and stupendous miracles as to render his disbelief of lesser miracles, simply because they are miraculous, gross inconsistencies. To have the battle fairly fought out, Spinoza, or a Bhuddist, or a Burmese Gymnosoph, should be challenged. Then, I am deeply persuaded, would the truth appear in full evidence, that no Christ, no God, —and conversely, if the Father, then the Son. I can never too often repeat, that revealed religion is a pleonasm.—Religion is revelation, and revelation the only religion.

Ib. p. 37.

Shep. Those believers, whose faith is to rely on the truth of the Christian history, rest their assent on a written report made by eye-witnesses ; which report the various Churches and sects, jealous of one another, took care to preserve genuine and uncorrupted, at least in all material points, and all the religious writers in every age since have amply attested.

A divine of the present day who shall undertake the demon-

stration of the truth of Christianity by external evidences, or historically, must not content himself with assuming or asserting this. He must either prove it; or prove that such proof is not necessary. I myself should be quite satisfied if I proved the former position in respect to the fourth Gospel, and showed that the evidence of the other three was equivalent to a record by an eye-witness; which would not be at all inconsistent with my contending at the same time for the authenticity of the first Gospel, or rather for the Catholic interpretation of the title-words *Κατὰ Ματθαῖον*, as the more probable opinion, which a sound divine will neither abandon nor overload, neither place it in the foundation, nor on the other hand suffer it to be extruded from the wall. Believe me, there is great, very great, danger in these broad unqualified assertions that Skelton deals in. Even though the balance of evidence should be on his side, yet the inquirer will be unfavorably affected by the numerous doubts and difficulties which an acquaintance with the more modern works of Biblical criticism will pour upon him, and for which his mind is wholly unprepared. To meet with a far weaker evidence than we had taken it for granted we were to find, gives the same shake to the mind, that missing a stair gives to the body.

Ib. p. 243.

Temp. You, Mr. Dechaine, seem to forget that God is just: and you, Mr. Shepherd, that he is merciful.

Dech. I insist, that, as God is merciful, he will forgive.

Shep. And I insist, that, as he is just, he will punish.

Temp. Pray, Mr. Dechaine, are you able, upon the Deistical scheme, to rid yourself of this difficulty?

Dech. I see no difficulty in it at all. God gives us laws only for our good, and will never suffer those laws to become a snare to us, and the occasion of our eternal misery.

Here is the *cardo!* The man of sense asserts that it is necessary for the good of all, that a code of laws should exist, while yet it is impossible that all should at all times be obeyed by each person: but what is impossible can not be required. Nevertheless, it may be required that no *iota* of any one of these laws should be wilfully and deliberately transgressed, nor is there any one for the transgression of which the transgressor must not hold himself punishable. "And yet" (says our man of sense), "what may not be said of any one point, or any one moment, can not be denied of the collective agency of a whole life, or any

considerable section of it. Here we find ourselves constrained by our best feelings to praise or condemn, to reward or punish, according as a great predominance of acts of obedience or disobedience, and a continued love of the better, or the lusting after the worst, manifests the maxim (*regula maxima*), the radical will and proper character of the individual. So parents judge of their children; so schoolmasters of their scholars; so friends of friends, and even so will God judge his creatures, if we are to trust in our common sense, or believe the repeated declarations in the Old Testament." And now I should be glad to hear any satisfactory *sensible* reply to this, or any answer that does not fly higher than *sense* can follow, and pierce into "the thick clouds" of decried metaphysics! For no fair reply can be imagined, but one which would find the root of the moral evil, the true πονηρόν, in this very impossibility.

Ib. p. 249.

Cunningham. But how does all this discourse about sacrifices and the natural light show that your faith does not ascribe injustice to God in putting an innocent person to death for the transgressions of the guilty?

Shep. Was Christ innocent?

Cunn. He was without sin.

Shep. And he was put to death by the appointment and predetermination of God?

Cunn. The Jews put him to death.

Shep. Do not evade the question. Was he not *the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world?* Was he not *so delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, that the Jews, having taken him, by wicked hands crucified and slew him?*

Cunn. And what then?

Shep. Nothing; but that you are to answer, as well as I, for saying that God predetermined the death of this only innocent person.

I am less pleased with this volume than with any of the preceding. Ask your own heart and conscience whether (for instance) they are satisfied with this defence *duri per durius:* or whether frightening a modest query into silence by perverting it into an accusation of the Almighty, by virtue of a conclusion borrowed from the Calvinistic theory of Predestination, is not more in the spirit of Job's comforters, than becomes a minister of the Apostolic Church of England and Ireland? Such arguments are but edge-tools at the safest, but more often they may rather be likened to the two-edged blade of Parysatis's knife, the one of which was poisoned. Leave them to Calvin, or those

who dare appropriate Calvin's words, that "God's absolute will is the only rule of his justice;"—thus dividing the divine attributes. Yet Calvin himself distinguishes the hidden from the revealed God, even as the Greek Fathers distinguished the θέλημα Θεοῦ, the absolute ground of all being, from the βουλὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ, as the cause and disposing providence of all existence.

But I disapprove of the plan and spirit of this work (Deism Revealed). The cold-hearted, worldly-minded, cunning Deist, or the coarse, sensual Infidel, is of all men the least likely to be converted; and the conscientious, inquiring, though misled and perplexed Skeptic will throw aside a book at once, as not applicable to his case, which treats every doubt as a crime, and supposes that there is no doubt at all possible but in a bad heart and from wicked wishes. Compare this with St. Paul's language concerning the Jews.

So again, pp. 225, &c. of this volume. Do not the plainest intuitions of our moral and rational being confirm the positions here attributed to the Deist, Dechaine? Are they not the same by which Melancthon de-Calvinized, at least de-Augustinized, the heroic Luther;—those which constitute one of the only two essential differences between the Augsburg Confession and the Calvinistic Articles of Faith? And can any thing be more flittery and special-pleading than Skelton's objections? And again, p. 507, "and that prayer which he (Tindal) is reported to have used a little before his death, 'If there is a God, I desire he may have mercy on me;'"—was it Christian-like to publish and circulate a blind report—so improbable and disgusting, as to demand the strongest and most unsuspicious testimony for its reception?

Ib. p. 268.

Shep. Pray, Mr. Dechaine, if a person, whom you knew to be an honest and clear-sighted man, should solemnly assure you he saw a dead man restored to life, what would you think of his testimony?

Dech. As I could not possibly have as strong an assurance of his honesty, clear-sightedness, and penetration, as of the great improbability of the fact, I should not believe him.

Shep. Well; it is true he might be deceived himself, or intend to impose on you. But in case ten such persons should all, at different times, confirm the same report, how would this affect you?

There is one inconvenience, not to say danger, in this argument of Mr. Shepherd's; namely, that of its not standing in the

same force, when it comes to be repeated in the particular miraculous facts in support of which it is adduced.

Ib. p. 281.

No other ancient book can be so well proved to have been the work of the author it is now ascribed to, as every book of the New Testament can be proved to have been written by him whose name it hath all along borne.

This is true to the full extent that the defence of the divinity of our religion needs, or perhaps permits, and I see no advantage gained by asserting more. I must lose all power of distinction before I can affirm that the genuineness of the first Gospel—that in its present form it was written by Matthew, or is a literal translation of a Gospel written by him—rests on as strong external evidence as Luke's, or as strong internal evidence as St. John's. Sufficient that the evidence greatly preponderates in its favor.

NOTES ON ANDREW FULLER'S CALVINISTIC AND SOCINIAN SYSTEMS EXAMINED AND COMPARED.* 1807.

Letter iii. p. 38.

They (the Jews) did not deny that to be God's own Son was to be equal with the Father, nor did they allege that such an equality would destroy the divine unity: a thought of this kind never seems to have occurred to their minds.

In so truly excellent a book as this is, I regret that this position should rest on an assertion. The equality of Christ would not, indeed, destroy the unity of God the Father, considered as one Person: but, unless we presume the Jews in question acquainted with the great truth of the Tri-unity, we must admit that it would be considered as implying Ditheism. Now that some among the Jews had made very near approaches, though blended with errors, to the doctrines taught in John, c. i., we can prove from the writings of Philo;—and the Socinians can never prove that these Jews did not know at least of the doctrine of their schools

* The Calvinistic and Socinian Systems examined and compared, as to their moral tendency; in a series of Letters addressed to the friends of vital and practical religion; especially those amongst Protestant Dissenters. By Andrew Fuller. Market Harborough. 1793.

concerning the only-begotten Word—*Λόγος μονογενής*,—not as an attribute, much less as an abstraction or personification—but as a distinct *Hypostasis συμφυσική* :—and hence it might be shown that their offence was that the carpenter's son, the Galilean, should call himself the *Θεὸς φανερός*. This might have been rendered more than probable by the concluding sentence of Christ's answer to the disciples of John ;—*and blessed is he, whosoever shall not be offended in me* (Luke vii. 23) ; which appears to have no adequate or even tolerable meaning, unless in reference to the passage in Isaiah (lxi. 1, 2), prophesying that Jehovah himself would come among them, and do the things which our Saviour states himself to have done. Thus, too, I regret that the answer of our Lord (John x. 34–36), being one of the imagined strong-holds of the Socinians, should not have been more fully cleared up. I doubt not that Fuller's is a true interpretation ; and that no other is consistent with our Lord's various other declarations. But the words in and by themselves admit a more plausible misinterpretation than is elsewhere the case of Socinian displanations. In short, I think both passages would have been better deferred to a further part of the work.

Let me add that a mighty and comparatively new argument against the Socinians may be most unanswerably deduced from this reply of our Lord's, even were it considered as a mere *argumentum ad homines:*—namely, that it was not his Messiahship that so offended the Jews, but his Sonship ; otherwise, our Saviour's language would have neither force, motive, or object. " Even were I no more than the Messiah, in your meanest conceptions of that character, yet after what I have done before your eyes, nothing but malignant hearts could have prevented you from adopting a milder interpretation of my words, when in your own Scriptures there exists a precedent that so much more than merely justifies me." And this I believe to be the meaning of the words as intended to be understood by the Jews in question ; though, doubtless, Fuller's sense exists *implicite*. No candid person would ever call it an evasion, to prove the injustice and malignity of an accuser even from his own grounds : —" You charge me falsely ; but even were your charge true, namely, that I am a mere man, and yet call myself the Son of God, still it would not follow that I have been guilty of blasphemy." But as understood by the modern Unicists, it would

verily, verily, be an evasive ambiguity, most unworthy of Christian belief concerning his Saviour. Common charity would have demanded of him to have said :—"I am a mere man : I do not pretend to be more ; but I used the words in analogy to the words, *Ye are as Gods;* and I have a right to do so : for though a mere man, I am the great Prophet and Messenger which Moses promised you."

Letter v. p. 72.

If Dr. Priestley had formed his estimate of human virtue by that great standard which requires love to God with all the heart, soul, mind, and strength, and our neighbor as ourselves,—instead of representing men by nature as having "more virtue than vice,"—he must have acknowledged with the Scripture, that *the whole world lieth in wickedness—that every thought and imagination of their heart is only evil continually*—and that *there is none* of them *that doeth good, no not one.*

To this the Unicists would answer, that by *the whole world* is meant all the worldly-minded ;—no matter in how direct opposition to half a score other texts ! "One text at a time !"—sufficient for the day is the evil thereof !—and in this way they go on pulling out hair by hair from the horse's tail (say rather, dreaming that they do so), and then conclude with a shout that the horse never had a tail ! For why ? This hair is not a tail, nor that, nor the third, and so on to the very last ; and how can all do what none of all does ?—Ridiculous as this is, it is a fair image of Socinian logic. Thank God, their plucking out is a mere fancy ;—and the sole miserable reality is the bare rump which they call their religion :—but that is the ape's own growth.

Ib. p. 77.

First, that all punishments are designed for the good of the whole, and less or corrective punishments for the good of the offender, is admitted. * * God never inflicts punishment for the sake of punishing.

This is not, ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, sufficiently guarded. That all punishments work for the good of the whole, and that the good of the whole is included in God's design, I admit : but that this is the sole cause, and the sole justification of divine punishment, I can not, I dare not concede ;—because I should thus deny the essential evil of guilt, and its inherent incompatibility with the presence of a Being of infinite holiness. Now, exclusion from God implies the sum and utmost of punishment ; and this would follow from

the very essence of guilt and holiness, independently of example, consequence, or circumstance.

Letter vi. p. 90.

(The systems compared as to their tendency to promote morality in general.)

I have hitherto made no objection to, no remark on, any one part of this Letter; for I object to the whole—not as Calvinism, but—as what Calvin would have recoiled from. How was it that so good and shrewd a man as Andrew Fuller should not have seen, that the difference between a Calvinist and a Priestleyan Materialist-Necessitarian consists in this:—The former not only believes a will, but that it is equivalent to the *ego ipse*, to the actual self, in every moral agent; though he believes that in human nature it is an enslaved, because a corrupt will. In denying free-will to the unregenerated he no more denies will, than in asserting the poor negroes in the West Indies to be slaves, I deny them to be men. Now the latter, the Priestleyan, uses the word will,—not for any real, distinct, correspondent power, but, —for the mere result and aggregate of fibres, motions, and sensations; in short, it is a mere generic term with him, just as when we say, the main current in a river.

Now by not adverting to this, and alas! misled by Jonathan Edwards's book, Fuller has hidden from himself and his readers the damnable nature of the doctrine—not of necessity (for that in its highest sense is identical with perfect freedom; they are definitions each of the other); but—of extraneous compulsion. O! even this is not adequate to the monstrosity of the thought. A denial of all agency;—or an assertion of a world of agents that never act, but are always acted upon, and yet without any one being that acts;—this is the hybrid of Death and Sin, which throughout this letter is treated so amicably! Another fearful mistake, and which is the ground of the former, lies in conceding to the Materialist, *explicite et implicite*, that the νούμενον, the *intelligibile*, the *ipseitas supersensibilis* of guilt is in time, and of time, and, consequently, a mechanism of cause and effect;—in other words, in confounding the φαινόμενα, τὰ ῥέοντα, τὰ μὴ ὄντως ὄντα,—all which belong to time, and can not be even thought of except as effects necessarily predetermined by the precedent causes (themselves in their turn effects of other causes), —with the trans-sensual ground or actual power.

After such admissions, no other possible defence can be made for Calvinism or any other *ism* than the wretched recrimination : "Why, yours, Dr. Priestley, is just as bad !"—Yea, and no wonder :—for in essentials both are the same. But there was no reason for Fuller's meddling with the subject at all,—metaphysically, I mean.

Ib. p. 95.

If the unconditionality of election render it unfriendly to virtue, it must be upon the supposition of that view of things, "which attributes more to God, and less to man," having such ascendency ; which is the very reverse of what Dr. Priestley elsewhere teaches, and that in the same performance.

But in both systems, as Fuller has erroneously stated his own, man is annihilated. There is neither more nor less ; it is all God ; all, all are but *Deus infinite modificatus* :—in brief, both systems are not Spinosism, for no other reason than that the logic and logical consequency of 10 Fullers + 10 × 10 Dr. Priestleys, piled on each other, would not reach the calf of Spinoza's leg. Both systems of necessity lead to Spinosism, nay, to all the horrible consequences attributed to it by Spinoza's enemies. O, why did Andrew Fuller quit the high vantage-ground of notorious facts, plain durable common sense, and express Scripture, to delve in the dark in order to countermine mines under a spot, on which he had no business to have wall, tent, temple, or even standing-ground !

NOTES ON WHITAKER'S ORIGIN OF ARIANISM DISCLOSED.*—1810.

Chap. i. 4, p. 30.

Making himself equal with God.

Whoever reads the four verses (John v. 16–19) attentively, judging of the meaning of each part by the context must needs, I think, see that the ἴσον ἑαυτὸν ποιῶν τῷ Θεῷ (18) refers,—not to the πατέρα ἴδιον ἔλεγε τὸν Θεὸν, (18) or the ὁ πατήρ μου (17), but—to the ἐργάζεται, κἀγὼ ἐργάζομαι (17). The 19th verse, which is directly called Jesus' reply, takes no notice whatever of the ὁ πατήρ μου (17), but consists wholly of a justification of the κἀγὼ ἐργάζομαι. 1803.

* The Origin of Arianism Disclosed. By John Whitaker, B.D. London, 1791.

The above was written many years ago. I still think the remark plausible, though I should not now express myself so positively. I imagined the Jews to mean: "he has evidently used the words *ὁ πατήρ μου*—not in the sense in which all good men may use them, but—in a literal sense, because by the words that followed, *ἐργάζεται, κἀγὼ ἐργάζομαι*, he makes himself equal to God." To justify these words seemed to me to be the purport of Christ's reply.

Chap. ii. 1, p. 34.

(*Φιλὼν*)—*περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰ θεῖα καὶ πάτρια μαθήματα, πόσον τε καὶ πηλίκον εἰσενήνεκται πόνον, ἔργῳ πᾶσι δῆλος· καὶ περὶ τὰ φιλόσοφα δὲ καὶ ἐλευθέρια τῆς ἔξωθεν παιδείας οἷός τις ἦν, οὐδὲν δεῖ λέγειν· ὅτι καὶ μάλιστα τὴν κατὰ Πλάτωνα καὶ Πυθαγόραν ἐζηλωκὼς ἀγωγὴν, διένεγκεν ἅπαντας τοὺς καθ' ἑαυτὸν, ἱστορεῖται.*—Euseb. Hist. ii. 4.

Philo's acquaintance with the doctrines of the heathens was known only by historical report to Eusebius; while the writings of Philo displayed his knowledge in the religion of the Jews.

Strange comment. Might I not, after having spoken of Dun Scotus's works, say;—"he is reported to have surpassed all his contemporaries in subtlety of logic:"—yet still mean no other works than those before mentioned? Are not Philo's works full of, crowded with, Platonic and Pythagorean philosophy? Eusebius knew from his works that he was a great Platonic scholar; but that he was greater than any other man of his age, he could only learn from report or history. That Virgil is a great poet I know from his poems; but that he was the greatest of the Augustan age, I must learn from Quinctilian and others.

Ib. p. 35.

Philo and the author of the Wisdom of Solomon,—(or rather, perhaps, authors; for the first ten chapters form a complete work of themselves,)—were both Cabalistico-Platonizing Jews of Alexandria. As far as, being such, they must agree, so far they do agree; and as widely as such men could differ, do they differ. Not only the style of the Wisdom of Solomon is generically different from Philo's,—so much so that I should deem it a free translation from a Hebrew original,—but also in all the *minutiæ* of traditional history and dogma it contradicts Philo. Philo attributes the creation of man to angels; and they infused the evil principle through their own imperfections. In the Book of Wisdom, God created man spotless, and the Devil tempting him oc-

casioned the Fall. So the whole account of the plagues of Egypt differs as widely as possible, even to absolute contradiction. The origin of idolatry is explained altogether differently by Philo, and by the Book of Wisdom. In short, so unsupported is the tradition that many have supposed an elder Philo as the author. That the second and third chapters allude to Christ is a groundless hypothesis. The *just man* is called *the Son of God*, Jehovah, *παῖς Κυρίου* ;—but Christ's specific title which was deemed blasphemous by the Jews, was *Ben Elohim*, *υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* ;—and the fancy that Philo was a Christian in heart, but dared not openly profess himself such, is too absurd. Why no traces in his latest work, or those of his middle age ? Why not the least variation in his religious or philosophical creeds in his latter works, written long after the resurrection, from those composed by him before, or a few years after, Christ's birth ? Some of Philo's earlier works must have been written when our Lord was in his infancy, or at least boyhood.

In short, just take all those passages of Philo which most closely resemble others in the Wisdom of Solomon, and contain the same or nearly the same thoughts, and write them in opposite columns, and no doubt will remain that Philo was not the composer of the Book of Wisdom. Philo subtle, and with long involved periods knit together by logical connectives : the Book of Wisdom sententious, full of parallelisms, assertory, and Hebraistic throughout. It was either composed by a man who tried to Hebraize the Greek, or if a translator, by one who tried to Greecize the Hebraisms of his original—not to disguise or hide them—but only so as to prevent them from repelling or misleading the Greek reader. The different use of the Greek particles in the Wisdom of Solomon, and in the works of Philo, is sufficient to confute the hypothesis of Philo being the author. As little could it have been written by a Christian. For it could not have been a Christian of Palestine, from the overflowing Alexandrine Platonism ;—nor a Christian at all ; for it contradicts the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, and in no wise connects any redemptory or sacrificial virtue with the death of his *just man ;*—denies original sin in the Christian sense, and explains the vice and virtue of mankind by the actions of the souls of men in a state of pre-existence. No signs or miracles are referred to in the account of *the just man ;* and that it was intended as a general-

ization is evident from the change of the singular into the plural number in the third chapter.

The result is, in my judgment, that this Book was composed by an unknown Jew of Alexandria, either some time before, or at the same time with, Christ. I do not think St. Paul's parallel passages amount to any proof of quotation or allusion ;—they contain the common doctrine of the spiritualized Judaism in the Cabala ;—and yet the work could scarcely have been written long before Christ, or it would certainly have been quoted or mentioned by Philo, and most probably by Josephus. And this, too, is an answer to the splendid and well-supported hypothesis of its being a translation from a Chaldaic original, composed by Jerubbabel. The variations of the Syriac translation,—which are so easily explained by translating the passage into the Chaldaic, when the cause of the mistake in the Greek or of the variation in the Syriac, is seen at once,—are certainly startling ; but they are too free ; and how could the Fathers, Jerome for example, remain ignorant of the existence of this Chaldaic original ? My own opinion is, as I said before, that the Book was written in Greek by an Alexandrian Jew, who had formed his style on that of the LXX., and was led still further to an imitation of the Old Testament manner by the nature of his fiction, and as a dramatic propriety, and yet deviated from it partly on account of the very remoteness of his Platonic conceptions from the simplicity and poverty of the Hebrew ; and partly because of the wordy rhetoric epidemic in Alexandria : and that it was written before the death, if not the birth, of Christ, I am induced to believe, because I do not think it probable that a book composed by a Jew, who had confessed Christ after the resurrection, would so soon have been received by the Christians, and so early placed in the very next rank to works of full inspiration.

Taken, therefore, as a work *ante*, or at least *extra, Christum*, it is most valuable as ascertaining the opinions of the learned Jews on many subjects, and the general belief concerning immortality, and a day of judgment. On this ground Whitaker might have erected a most formidable battery, that would have played on the very camp and battle-array of the Socinians, that is, of those who consider Christ only as a teacher of important truths.

In referring to the Cabala, I am not ignorant of the date of the oldest Rabbinical writings which contain or refer to this philoso-

phy, but I coincide with Eichorn, and very many before Eichorn, that the foundations of the Cabala were laid and well known long before Christ, though not all the fanciful superstructure. I am persuaded that new light might be thrown on the Apocalypse by a careful study of the Book Sohar, and of whatever else there may be of that kind. The introduction (i. 4) is clearly Cabala: —the ὁ ὢν, καὶ ὁ ἦν, καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος = 3, and the *seven spirits* = 10 *Sephiroth*, constituting together the *Adam Kadmon*, the second Adam of St. Paul, the incarnate one in the Messiah.

Were it not for the silence of Philo and Josephus, which I am unable to explain if the Wisdom of Solomon was written so long before Christ, I might perhaps incline to believe it composed shortly after, if not during, the persecution of the Jews in Egypt under Ptolemy Philopator. This hypothesis would give a particular point to the bitter exposure of idolatry, to the comparison between the sufferings of the Jews, and those of idolatrous nations, to the long rehearsal and rhetorical declaration of the plagues of Egypt, and to the reward of *the just man* after a death of martyrdom; and would besides help to explain the putting together of the first ten chapters, and the fragment contained in the remaining chapters. They were works written at the same time, and by the same author: nay, I do not think it absurd to suppose, that the chapters after the tenth were annexed by the writer himself, as a long explanatory appendix; or, possibly, if they were once a separate work, these nine concluding chapters were parts of a book composed during the persecution in Egypt, the introduction and termination of which, being personal and of local application, were afterwards omitted or expunged in order not to give offence to the other Egyptians,—perhaps, to spare the shame of such Jews as had apostatized through fear, and in general not to revive heart-burnings. In modern language I should call these chapters in their present state a Note on c. x. 15–19.

On a re-perusal of this Book, I rather believe that these latter chapters never formed part of any other work, but were composed as a sort of long explanatory Postscript, with particular bearing on certain existing circumstances, to which this part of the Jewish history was especially applicable. Nay, I begin to find the science of Philo and Josephus less inexplicable, and to imagine that I discover the solution of this problem in the very title of the Book. No one expects to find any but works of authenticity

enumerated in these writers; but to this a work, calling itself the Wisdom of Solomon, both being a fiction and never meant to pass for any thing else, could make no pretensions. To have approximated it to the Holy Books of the nation would have injured the dignity of the Jewish Canon, and brought suspicion on the genuine works of Solomon, while it would have exposed to a charge of forgery a composition which was in itself only an innocent dramatic monologue. N.B. This hypothesis possesses all the advantages, and involves none of the absurdity of that which would attribute the *Ecclesiasticus* to the infamous Jason, the High Priest. More than one commentator, I find, has suspected that the Wisdom of Solomon and the second book of Maccabees were by the same author. I think this nothing.

Ib. p. 36.

Philo throws out a number of declarations, that show his own and the Jewish belief in a secondary sort of God, a God subordinate in origin to the Father of all, yet most intimately united with him, and sharing his most unquestionable honors.

The belief of the Alexandrian Jews who had acquired Greek philosophy, no doubt;—but of the Palestine Jews?

Ib. 2, p. 48.

St. John also is witnessed by a heathen (Amelius), and by one who put him down for a barbarian, to have represented the Logos as "the Maker of all things," as "with *God*," and as "God." And St. John is attested to have declared this, "not even as shaded over, but on the contrary as placed in full view."

Stranger still. Whitaker could scarcely have read the Greek. Amelius says, that these truths, if stripped of their allegorical dress (*μεταπεφρασμένα ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Βαρβάρου θεολογίας*) would be plain;—that is, that John in an allegory, as of one particular man, had shadowed out the creation of all things by the Logos, and the after-union of the Logos with human nature,—that is, with all men. That this is his meaning, consult Plotinus.

Ib. 9, p. 107.

"Seest thou not," adds Philo, in the same spirit of subtilizing being into power, and dividing the Logos into two.

Who that had even rested but in the porch of the Alexandrian philosophy, would not rather say, 'of substantiating powers and attributes into being?' What is the whole system from Philo to Plotinus, and thence to Proclus inclusively, but one fanciful pro-

cess of hypostasizing logical conceptions and generic terms? In Proclus it is Logolatry run mad.

Chap. iii. 1, pp. 131–2.

Such would be the evidence for that divinity, to accompany the Book of Wisdom, if we considered it to be as old as Solomon, or only as the Son of Sirach. But I consider it to be much later than either, and actually a work of Philo's. * * The language is very similar to Philo's; flowing, lively and happy.

How is it possible to have read the short Hebraistic sentences of the Book of Wisdom, and the long involved periods that characterize the style of all Philo's known writings, and yet attribute both to one writer? But indeed I know no instance of assertions made so audaciously, or of passages misrepresented and even mistranslated so grossly, as in this work of Whitaker. His system is absolute naked Tritheism.

Ib

The righteous man is shadowed out by the author with a plain reference to our Saviour himself. "*Let us lie in wait for the righteous*," &c.

How then could Philo have remained a Jew?

Ib. 2, p. 195.

In all effects that are voluntary, the cause must be prior to the effect, as the father is to the son in human generation. But in all that are necessary, the effect must be coeval with the cause; as the stream is with the fountain, and light with the sun. Had the sun been eternal in its duration, light would have been co-eternal with it.

A just remark; but it cuts two ways. For these necessary effects are not really but only logically different or distinct from the cause:—the rays of the sun are only the sun diffused, and the whole rests on the sensitive form of material space. Take away the notion of material space, and the whole distinction perishes.

Chap. iv. 1, p. 266.

Justin accordingly sets himself to show, that in the beginning, before all creatures, God generated a certain rational power out of himself.

Is it not monstrous that the Jews having, according to Whitaker, fully believed a Trinity, one and all, but half a century or less before Trypho, Justin should never refer to this general faith, never reproach Trypho with the present opposition to it as a heresy from their own forefathers, even those who rejected Christ, or rather Jesus as Christ?—But no!—not a single objection ever

strikes Mr. Whitaker, or appears worthy of an answer. The stupidest become authentic—the most fantastic abstractions of the Alexandrine dreamers substantial realities! I confess this book has satisfied me how little erudition will gain a man now-a-days the reputation of vast learning, if it be only accompanied with dash and insolence. It seems to me impossible, that Whitaker can have written well on the subject of Mary, Queen of Scots, his powers of judgment being apparently so abject. For instance, he says that the grossest moral improbability is swept away by positive evidence :—as if positive evidence (that is, the belief I am to yield to A. or B.) were not itself grounded on moral probabilities. Upon my word Whitaker would have been a choice judge for Charles II. and Titus Oates.

Ib. p. 267.

Justin therefore proceeds to demonstrate it (the pre-existence of Christ), asserting Joshua to have given only a temporary inheritance to the Jews, &c.

A precious beginning of a precious demonstration! It is well for me that my faith in the Trinity is already well grounded by the Scriptures, by Bishop Bull, and the best parts of Plotinus, or this man would certainly have made me either a Socinian or a Deist.

Ib. 2, p. 270.

The general mode of commencing and concluding the Epistles of St. Paul, is a prayer of supplication for the parties, to whom they were addressed: in which he says, *Grace to you and peace from God our Father, and*—from whom besides?—*the Lord Jesus Christ;* in which our Saviour is at times invoked alone, as *the Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all;* and is even *invoked* the first at times as, *the Grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all;* shows us plainly, &c.

Invoked! Surely a pious wish is not an invocation. "May good angels attend you!" is no invocation or worship of angels. The essence of religious adoration consists in the attributing, by an act of prayer or praise, a necessary presence to an object—which not being distinguishable, if the object be sensuously present, we may safely define adoration as an acknowledgment of the actual and necessary presence of an intelligent being not present to our senses. "May lucky stars shoot influence on you!" would be a very foolish superstition,—but to say in earnest! "O ye

stars, I pray to you, shoot influences on me," would be idolatry. Christ was visually present to Stephen; his invocation therefore was not perforce an act of religious adoration, an acknowledgment of Christ's deity.

NOTES ON OXLEE ON THE TRINITY AND INCARNATION.* 1827.

STRANGE—yet from the date of the book of the Celestial Hierarchies of the pretended Dionysius the Areopagite to that of its translation by Joannes Scotus Erigena, the contemporary of Alfred, and from Scotus to the Rev. John Oxlee in 1815, not unfrequent—delusion of mistaking Pantheism, disguised in a fancy dress of pious phrases, for a more spiritual and philosophic form of Christian Faith! Nay, stranger still:—to imagine with Scotus and Mr. Oxlee that in a scheme which more directly than even the grosser species of Atheism, precludes all moral responsibility and subverts all essential difference of right and wrong, they have found the means of proving and explaining, "the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation," that is, the great and only sufficient antidotes of the right faith against this insidious poison. For Pantheism—trick it up as you will—is but a painted Atheism. A mask of perverted Scriptures may hide its ugly face, but can not change a single feature.

Introduction, p. 4.

In the infancy of the Christian Church, and immediately after the general dispersion which necessarily followed the sacking of Jerusalem and Bither, the Greek and Latin Fathers had the fairest opportunity of disputing with the Jews, and of evincing the truth of the Gospel dispensation; but unfortunately for the success of so noble a design, they were totally ignorant of the Hebrew Scriptures, and so wanted in every argument that stamp of authority, which was equally necessary to sanction the principles of Christianity, and to command the respect of their Jewish antagonists. For the confirmation of this remark I may appeal to the Fathers themselves, but especially to Barnabas, Justin, and Irenæus, who in their several attempts at Hebrew learning betray such portentous signs of ignorance and stupidity, that we are covered with shame at the sight of their criticisms.

Mr. Oxlee would be delighted in reading Jacob Rhenferd's

* The Christian Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation considered and maintained on the principles of Judaism. By the Rev. John Oxlee. London, 1815.

Disquisition on the Ebionites and other supposed heretics among the Jewish Christians. And I can not help thinking that Rhenferd, who has so ably anticipated Mr. Oxlee on this point, and in Jortin's best manner displayed the gross ignorance of the Gentile Fathers in all matters relating to Hebrew learning, and the ludicrous yet mischievous results thereof, has formed a juster though very much lower opinion of these Fathers, with a few exceptions, than Mr. Oxlee. I confess that till the light of the twofoldness of the Christian Church dawned on my mind, the study of the history and literature of the Church during the first three or four centuries infected me with a spirit of doubt and disgust which required a frequent recurrence to the writings of John and Paul to preserve me whole in the Faith.

Prop. i. ch. i. p. 16.

The truth of the doctrine is vehemently insisted on, in a variety of places, by the great R. Moses ben Maimon; who founds upon it the unity of the Godhead, and ranks it among the fundamental articles of the Jewish religion. Thus in his celebrated Letter to the Jews of Marseilles, he observes, &c.

But what is obtained by quotations from Maimonides more than from Alexander Hales, or any other Schoolman of the same age? The metaphysics of the learned Jew are derived from the same source, namely, Aristotle; and his object was the same, as that of the Christian Schoolmen, namely, to systematize the religion he professed on the form and in the principles of the Aristotelian philosophy.

By the by, it is a serious defect in Mr. Oxlee's work, that he does not give the age of the writers whom he cites. He can not have expected all his readers to be as learned as himself.

Ib. ch. iii. p. 26.

Mr. Oxlee seems too much inclined to identify the Rabbinical interpretations of Scripture texts with their true sense; when in reality the Rabbis themselves not seldom used those interpretations as a convenient and popular mode of conveying their own philosophic opinions. Neither have I been able to admire the logic so general among the divines of both Churches, according to which if one, two, or perhaps three sentences in any one of the Canonical books appear to declare a given doctrine, all assertions of a different character must have been meant to be taken metaphorically.

Ib. pp. 26–7.

The Prophet Isaiah, too, clearly inculcates the spirituality of the Godhead in the following declaration: *But Egypt is man, and not God; and their horses flesh, and not spirit.*—(c. xxxi. 3.) * * * In the former member the Prophet declares that Egypt was man, and not God; and then in terms of strict opposition enforces the sentiment by adding, that their cavalry was flesh, and not spirit; which is just as if he had said: *But Egypt, which has horses in war, is only a man, that is, flesh, and not God, who is spirit.*

Assuredly this is a false interpretation, and utterly unpoetical. It is even doubtful whether רוח (*ruach*) in this place means *spirit* in contradistinction to *matter* at all, and not rather air or wind. At all events, the poetic decorum, the proportion, and the antithetic parallelism, demand a somewhat as much below God, as the horse is below man. The opposition of *flesh* and *spirit* in the Gospel of St. John, who thought in Hebrew, though he wrote in Greek, favors our common version,—*flesh and not spirit;* but the place in which this passage stands, namely, in one of the first forty chapters of Isaiah, and therefore written long before the Captivity, together with the majestic simplicity characteristic of Isaiah's name gives perhaps a greater probability to the other: *Egypt is man, and not God; and her horses flesh, and not wind.* If Mr. Oxlee renders the fourth verse of Psalm civ.—*He maketh spirits his messengers* (for our version—*He maketh his angels spirits*—is without a violent inversion senseless), this is a case in point for the use of the word, *spirits*, in the sense of incorporeal beings. (Mr. Oxlee will hardly, I apprehend, attribute the opinion of some later Rabbis, that God alone and exclusively is a Spirit, to the Sacred Writers, easy as it would be to quote a score of texts in proof of the contrary.) I, however, can not doubt that the true rendering of the above-mentioned verse in the Psalms is;—*He maketh the winds his angels or messengers, and the lightnings his ministrant servants.*

As to Mr. Oxlee's 'abstract intelligences,' I can not but think 'abstract' for 'pure,' and even pure intelligences for incorporeal, a lax use of terms. With regard to the point in question, the truth seems to be this. The ancient Hebrews certainly distinguished the principle or ground of life, understanding, and will from ponderable, visible matter. The former they considered and called *spirit*, and believed it to be an emission from the Almighty Father of Spirits: the latter they called *body;* and in

this sense they doubtless believed in the existence of incorporeal beings. But that they had any notion of immaterial beings in the sense of Des Cartes, is contrary to all we know of them, and of every other people in the same degree of cultivation. Air, fire, light, express the degrees of ascending refinement. In the infancy of thought the life, soul, mind, are supposed to be air—*anima*, *animus*, that is, ἄνεμος, *spiritus*, πνεῦμα. In the childhood, they are fire, *mens ignea*, *ignicula*, and God himself πῦρ νοερὸν, πῦρ ἀείζωον. Lastly, in the youth of thought, they are refined into light; and that light is capable of subsisting in a latent state, the experience of the stricken flint, of lightning, from the clouds, and the like, served to prove, or at least, it supplied a popular answer to the objection;—"If the soul be light, why is it not visible?" That the purest light is invisible to our gross sense, and that visible light is a compound of light and shadow, were answers of a later and more refined period. Observe, however, that the Hebrew Legislator precluded all unfit applications of the materializing fancy by forbidding the people to *imagine* at all concerning God. For the ear alone, to the exclusion of all other bodily sense, was he to be designated, that is, by the Name. All else was for the mind—by power, truth, wisdom, holiness, mercy.

Prop. ii. ch. ii. p. 36.

I fear I must surrender my hope that Mr. Oxlee was an exception to the rule, that the study of Rabbinical literature either finds a man *whimmy*, or makes him so. If neither the demands of poetic taste, nor the peculiar character of oracles, were of avail, yet morality and piety might seem enough to convince any one that this vision of Micaiah (2 *Chron.* c. xviii. 18, &c.) was the poetic form, the veil, of the Prophet's meaning. And a most sublime meaning it was. Mr. Oxlee should recollect that the forms and personages of visions are all and always symbolical.

Ib. pp. 39–40.

It will not avail us much, however, to have established their incorporeity or spirituality, if what R. Moses affirms be true * * *. This impious paradox * *. Swayed, however, by the authority of so great a man, even R. David Kimchi has dilapsed into the same error, &c.

To what purpose then are the crude metaphysics of these later Rabbis brought forward, differing as they do in no other respect from the theological *dicta* of the Schoolmen, but that they are

written in a sort of Hebrew. I am far from denying that an interpreter of the Scriptures may derive important aids from the Jewish commentators: Aben Ezra (about 1150) especially, was a truly great man. But of this I am certain, that he only will be benefited who can look down upon their works, whilst studying them;—that is, he must thoroughly understand their weaknesses, superstitions, and rabid appetite for the marvellous and the monstrous; and then read them as an enlightened chemist of the present day would read the writings of the old alchemists, or as a Linnæus might peruse the works of Pliny and Aldrovandus. If he can do this, well;—if not, he will line his skull with cobwebs.

Ib. pp. 40, 41.

But how, I would ask, is this position to be defended? Surely not by contradicting almost every part of the inspired volumes, in which such frequent mention occurs of different and distinct angels appearing to the Patriarchs and Prophets, sometimes in groups, and sometimes in limited numbers * *. It is, indeed, so wholly repugnant to the general tenor of the Sacred Writings, and so abhorrent from the piety of both Jew and Christian, that the learned author himself, either forgetting what he had before advanced, or else postponing his philosophy to his religion, has absolutely maintained the contrary in his explication of the Cherubim, &c.

I am so far from agreeing with Mr. Oxlee on these points, that I not only doubt whether before the Captivity any fair proof of the existence of Angels, in the present sense, can be produced from the inspired Scriptures,—but think also that a strong argument for the divinity of Christ, and for his presence to the patriarchs and under the Law, rests on the contrary, namely, that the Seraphim were images no less symbolical than the Cherubim. Surely it is not presuming too much of a Clergyman of the Church of England to expect that he would measure the importance of a theological tenet by its bearings on our moral and spiritual duties, by its practical tendencies. What is it to us whether angels are the spirits of just men made perfect, or a distinct class of moral and rational creatures? Augustine has well and wisely observed that reason recognizes only three essential kinds;—God, man, beast. Try as long as you will, you can never make an Angel any thing but a man with wings on his shoulders.

Ib. ch. iii. p. 58.

But this deficiency in the Mosaic account of the creation is amply sup-

plied by early tradition, which inculcates not only that the angels were created, but that they were created, either on the second day, according to R. Jochanan, or on the fifth, according to R. Chanania.

Inspired Scripture amply supplied by the Talmudic and Rabbinical traditions!—This from a Clergyman of the Church of England!

I am, I confess, greatly disappointed. I had expected, I scarce know why, to have had some light thrown on the existence of the Cabala in its present form, from Ezekiel to Paul and John. But Mr. Oxlee takes it as he finds it, and gravely ascribes this patchwork of corrupt Platonism or Plotinism, with Chaldean, Persian, and Judaic fables and fancies, to the Jewish Doctors, as an original, profound, and pious philosophy in its fountain-head! The indispensable requisite not only to a profitable but even to a safe study of the Cabala is a familiar knowledge of the docimastic philosophy, that is, a philosophy which has for its object the trial and testing of the weights and measures themselves, the first principles, definitions, postulates, axioms of logic and metaphysics. But this is in no other way possible but by our enumeration of the mental faculties, and an investigation of the constitution, function, limits, and applicability *ad quas res*, of each. The application to this subject of the rules and forms of the understanding, or discursive logic, or even of the intuitions of the reason itself, if reason be assumed as the first and highest, has Pantheism for its necessary result. But this the Cabalists did: and consequently the Cabalistic theosophy is Pantheistic, and Pantheism, in whatever drapery of pious phrases disguised, is (where it forms the whole of a system) Atheism, and precludes moral responsibility, and the essential difference of right and wrong. One of the two contradistinctions of the Hebrew Revelation is the doctrine of positive creation. This, if not the only, is the easiest and surest criterion between the idea of God and the notion of a *mens agitans molem*. But this the Cabalists evaded by their double meaning of the term, *nothing*, namely as naught=0, and as no *thing*; and by their use of the term, as designating God. Thus in words and to the ear they taught that the world was made out of nothing; but in fact they meant and inculcated, that the world was God himself expanded. It is not, therefore, half a dozen passages respecting the first three *proprietates** in the Sephiroth, that will lead

* That is, Intelligence or the Crown, Knowledge, Wisdom.—*Ed.*

a wise man to expect the true doctrine of the Trinity in the Cabalistic scheme; for he knows that the scholastic value, the theological necessity, of this doctrine consists in its exhibiting an idea of God, which rescues our faith from both extremes, Cabalo-Pantheism, and Anthropomorphism. It is, I say, to prevent the necessity of the Cabalistic inferences that the full and distinct development of the doctrine of the Trinity becomes necessary in every scheme of dogmatic theology. If the first three *proprietates* are God, so are the next seven, and so are all ten. God according to the Cabalists is all in each and one in all. I do not say that there is not a great deal of truth in this; but I say that it is not, as the Cabalists represent it, the whole truth. Spinoza himself describes his own philosophy as in substance the same with that of the ancient Hebrew Doctors, the Cabalists—only unswathed from the Biblical dress.

Ib. p. 61.

Similar to this is the declaration of R. Moses ben Maimon. "For that influence, which flows from the Deity to the actual production of abstract intelligences flows also from the intelligences to their production from each other in succession," &c.

How much trouble would Mr. Oxlee have saved himself, had he in sober earnest asked his own mind, what he meant by emanation; and whether he could attach any intelligible meaning to the term at all as applied to spirit.

Ib. p. 65.

Thus having, by variety of proofs, demonstrated the fecundity of the Godhead, in that all spiritualities, of whatever gradation, have originated essentially and substantially from it, like streams from their fountain; I avail myself of this as another sound argument, that in the sameness of the divine essence subsists a plurality of Persons.

A plurality with a vengeance! Why, this is the very scoff of a late Unitarian writer,—only that he inverts the order. Mr. Oxlee proves ten trillions of trillions in the Deity, in order to deduce *à fortiori* the rationality of three: the Unitarian from the Three pretends to deduce the equal rationality of as many thousands.

Ib. p. 66.

So, if without detriment to piety great things may be compared with small, I would contend, that every intelligency, descending by way of emanation or impartition from the Godhead, must needs be a personality of

that Godhead, from which it has descended, only so vastly unequal to it in personal perfection, that it can form no part of its proper existency.

Is not this to all intents and purposes ascribing partibility to God? Indeed it is the necessary consequence of the emanation scheme?—Unequal!—Aye, various *wicked* personalities of the Godhead?—How does this rhyme?—Even as a metaphor, emanation is an ill-chosen term; for it applies only to fluids. *Ramenta*, unravellings, threads, would be more germane.

NOTES ON A BARRISTER'S HINTS ON EVANGELICAL PREACHING. 1810.*

For only that man understands in deed
Who well remembers what he well can do;
The faith lives only where the faith doth breed
Obedience to the works it binds us to.
And as the Life of Wisdom hath exprest—
If this ye know, then do it and be blest.

LORD BROOK.

In initio.

THERE is one misconception running through the whole of this Pamphlet, the rock on which, and the quarry out of which, the whole reasoning is built;—an error therefore which will not indeed destroy its efficacy as a μίσητρον or anti-philtre to inflame the scorn of the enemies of Methodism, but which must utterly incapacitate it for the better purpose of convincing the consciences or allaying the fanaticism of the Methodists themselves; this is the uniform and gross mis-statement of the one great point in dispute, by which the Methodists are represented as holding the compatibility of an impure life with a saving faith: whereas they only assert that the works of righteousness are the consequence, not the price, of Redemption, a gift included in the great gift of salvation;—and therefore not of merit but of imputation through the free love of the Saviour.

Part i. p. 49.

It is enough, it seems, that all the disorderly classes of mankind, prompted as they are by their worst passions to trample on the public welfare, should

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* Hints to the Public and the Legislature on the nature and effect of Evangelical Preaching. By a Barrister. Fourth Edition, 1808.

know that they are, what every one else is convinced they are, the pests of society, and the evil is remedied. They are not to be exhorted to honesty, sobriety, or the observance of any laws, human or divine—they must not even be entreated to do their best. "Just as *absurd* would it be," we are told, "in a physician to send away his patient, when laboring under some desperate disease, with a recommendation to do his utmost towards his own cure, and then to come to him to finish it, as it is in the minister of the *Gospel* to propose to the sinner to *do his best*, by way of healing the disease of the soul—and then to come to the Lord Jesus to perfect his recovery. The *only* previous qualification is to *know* our misery, and the remedy is prepared." See Dr. Hawker's Works, vol. vi. p. 117.

For "know," let the Barrister substitute "feel;" that is, we know it as we know our life; and then ask himself whether the production of such a state of mind in a sinner would or would not be of greater promise as to his reformation than the repetition of the Ten Commandments with paraphrases on the same.—But why not both? The Barrister is at least as wrong in the undervaluing of the one as the pseudo-Evangelists in the exclusion of the other.

Ib. p. 51.

Whatever these new Evangelists may teach to the contrary, the present state of public morals and of public happiness would assume a very different appearance if the thieves, swindlers, and highway robbers, would *do their best* towards maintaining themselves by honest labor, instead of perpetually planning new systems of fraud, and new schemes of depredation.

That is, if these thieves had a different will—not a mere wish however anxious:—for this wish "the libertine" doubtless has, as described in p. 50,—but an effective will. Well, and who doubts this? The point in dispute is, as to the means of producing this reformation in the will; which, whatever the Barrister may think, Christ at least thought so difficult as to speak of it, not once or twice, but uniformly, as little less than miraculous, as tantamount to a re-creation. This Barrister may be likened to an ignorant but well-meaning Galenist, who writing against some infamous quack, who lived by puffing and vending pills of mercurial sublimate for all cases of a certain description, should have no stronger argument than to extol *sarsaparilla*, and *lignum vitæ*, or *senna* in contempt of all mercurial preparations.

Ib. p. 56.

Not for the revenues of an Archbishop would he exhort them to a duty *unknown in Scripture*, of adding their five talents to the five they have received, &c.

All this is mere calumny and wilful mis-statement of the tenets of Wesley, who never doubted that we are bound to improve our *talents*, or, on the other hand, that we are equally bound, having done so, to be equally thankful to the Giver of all things for the power and the will by which we improved the talents, as for the original capital which is the object of the improvement. The question is not whether Christ will say, *Well done, thou good and faithful servant*, &c. ;—but whether the servant is to say it of himself. Now Christ has delivered as positive a precept against our doing this as the promise can be that he will impute it to us, if we do not impute it to our own merits.

Ib. p. 60.

The complaints of the profligacy of servants of every class, and of the depravity of the times are in every body's hearing :—and these Evangelical tutors—the dear Mr. Lovegoods of the day—deserve the best attention of the public for thus instructing the ignorant multitude, who are always ready enough to neglect their moral duties, to despise and insult those by whom they are taught.

All this is no better than infamous slander, unless the Barrister can prove that these depraved servants and thieves are Methodists, or have been wicked in proportion as they were proselyted to Methodism. O folly ! This is indeed to secure the triumph of these enthusiasts.

Ib.

It must afford him (Rowland Hill) great consolation, amidst the increasing immorality * * * that when their village Curate exhorts them, if they have *faith* in the doctrine of a world to come, to add to it those *good works* in which the sum and substance of religion consist, he has led them to ridicule him, as *chopping a new-fashioned* logic.

That this is either false or nugatory, see proved in The Friend.

Ib. p. 68.

Tom Paine himself never labored harder to root all virtue out of society. —Mandeville nor Voltaire never even labored so much.

Indeed !

Ib.

They were content with declaring their disbelief of a future state.

In what part of their works ? Can any wise man read Mandeville's Fable of the Bees, and not see that it is a keen satire on the inconsistency of Christians, and so intended ?

Ib. p. 71.

When the populace shall be once brought to a conviction that the Gospel, as they are told, has neither terms nor conditions * * *, that no sins can be too great, no life too impure, *no offences too many or too aggravated*, to disqualify the perpetrators of them for—salvation, &c.

Merely insert the words "sincere repentance and amendment of heart and life, and therefore for" salvation,—and is not this truth, and Gospel truth? And is it not the meaning of the preacher? Did any Methodist ever teach that salvation may be attained without sanctification? This Barrister forever forgets that the whole point in dispute is not concerning the possibility of an immoral Christian being saved, which the Methodist would deny as strenuously as himself, and perhaps give an austerer sense to the word immoral; but whether morality, or as the Methodists would call it, sanctification, be the price which we pay for the purchase of our salvation with our own money, or a part of the same free gift. God knows, I am no advocate for Methodism; but for fair statement I am, and most zealously—even for the love of logic, putting honesty out of sight.

Ib. p. 72.

"In every age," says the moral divine (Blair), "the practice has prevailed of substituting certain appearances of piety in the place of the great *duties* of humanity and mercy," &c.

Will the Barrister rest the decision of the controversy on a comparison of the lives of the Methodists and non-Methodists? Unless he knows that their "morality has declined, as their piety has become more ardent," is not his quotation mere laboring—nay, absolute pioneering—for the triumphal chariot of his enemies?

Ib. pp. 75–79.

It is but fair to select a specimen of Evangelical preaching from one of its most celebrated and popular champions. * *

He will preface it with the solemn and woful communication of the Evangelist John, in order to show how exactly they accord, how clearly the doctrines of the one are deduced from the Revelation of the other, and how justly, therefore, it assumes the exclusive title of evangelical. *And I saw the dead * * * and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works. And the sea gave up the dead * * and they were judged every man according to his works.* Rev. xx. 12, 13. Let us recall to mind the urgent caution conveyed in the writings of Paul * * *Be not deceived; God is not mocked; for whatsoever a man soweth,*

that shall he also reap. And let us further add * * the confirmation * * of the Saviour himself:—*When the Son of Man shall come in his glory,* * * *but the righteous into life eternal.* Matt. xxv. 31, *ad finem.* Let us now attend to the Evangelical preacher (Toplady). "The Religion of Jesus Christ stands eminently distinguished, and essentially differenced, from every other religion that was ever proposed to human reception, by this remarkable peculiarity; that, look abroad in the world, and you will find that every religion, *except one,* puts you upon *doing something,* in order to recommend yourself to God. A Mahometan * * A Papist * * It is only the religion of Jesus Christ that runs counter to all the rest, by affirming that we are *saved* and called with a holy calling, *not* according to our works, but according to the Father's own purpose and grace, which was *not* sold to us *on certain conditions to be fulfilled by ourselves,* but was given us in Christ before the world began." Toplady's Works: Sermon on James ii. 18.

Si sic omnia! All this is just and forcible; and surely nothing can be easier than to confute the Methodist by showing that his very *no-doing,* when he comes to explain it, is not only an act, a work, but even a very severe and perseverant energy of the will. He is therefore to be arraigned of nonsense and abuse of words rather than of immoral doctrines.

Ib. p. 84.

The sacred volume of Holy Writ declares that *true* (pure?) *religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widow in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world.* James i. 27.

This is now at least, whatever might have been the meaning of the word 'religion' in the time of the Translators, a false version. St. James is speaking of persons eminently zealous in those public or private acts of worship, which we call divine service, *θρησκεία.* It should be rendered, *True worship,* &c. The passage is a fine burst of rhetoric, and not a mere truism; just as when we say:—"A cheerful heart is a perpetual thanksgiving, and a state of love and resignation the truest utterance of the Lord's Prayer." St. James opposes Christianity to the outward signs and ceremonial observances of the Jewish and Pagan religions. But these are the only sure signs, these are the most significant ceremonial observances by which your Christianity is to be made known,—*to visit the fatherless,* &c. True religion does not consist *quoad essentiam* in these acts, but in that habitual state of the whole moral being, which manifests itself by these acts—and which acts are to the religion of Christ that which ablutions, sacrifices and Temple-going were to the Mosaic religion, namely, its genuine *θρησκεία.* That which was the religion of

Moses is the ceremonial or cult of the religion of Christ. Moses commanded all good works, even those stated by St. James, as the means of temporal felicity; and this was the Mosaic religion; and to these he added a multitude of symbolical observances; and these formed the Mosaic cult (*cultus religionis*, θρησκεια). Christ commands holiness out of perfect love, that is, Christian religion; and adds to this no other ceremony or symbol than a pure life and active beneficence; which (says St. James) are the *true cult.**

Ib. p. 86.

There is no one whose writings are better calculated to do good (than those of Paley) by inculcating the essential duties of common life, and the sound truths of practical Christianity.

Indeed! Paley's whole system is reducible to this one precept:—"Obey God, and benefit your neighbor, because you love yourself above all." Christ has himself comprised his system in—"Love your neighbor as yourself, and God above all." These "sound truths of practical Christianity" consist in a total subversion, not only of Christianity, but of all morality;—the very words virtue and vice being but lazy synonymes of prudence and miscalculation,—and which ought to be expunged from our vocabularies, together with Abraxas and Abracadabra, as charms abused by superstitious or mystic enthusiasts.

Ib. p. 94.

Eventually the whole direction of the popular mind, in the affairs of religion, will be gained into the hands of a set of ignorant fanatics of such low origin and vulgar habits as can only serve to degrade religion in the eyes of those to whom its influence is most wanted. Will such persons venerate or respect it in the hands of a sect composed in the far greater part of bigoted, coarse, illiterate, and low-bred enthusiasts? Men who have abandoned their lawful callings, in which by industry they might have been useful members of society, to take upon themselves concerns the most sacred, with which nothing but their vanity and their ignorance could have excited them to meddle.

It is not the buffoonery of the reverend joker of the Edinburgh Review; not the convulsed grin of mortification which, sprawling prostrate in the dirt from "the whiff and wind" of the masterly disquisition in the Quarterly Review, the itinerant preacher would pass off for the broad grin of triumph; no, nor even the over-valued distinction of miracles,—which will prevent him

* See Aids to Reflection. I. p. 127.—*Ed.*

from seeing and showing the equal applicability of all this to the Apostles and primitive Christians. We know that Trajan, Pliny, Tacitus, the Antonines, Celsus, Lucian and the like,—much more the ten thousand philosophers and joke-smiths of Rome,—did both feel and apply all this to the Galilean Sect; and yet—*Vicisti, O Galilæe!*

Ib. p. 95.

They never fail to refer to the proud Pharisee, whom they term self-*righteous;* and thus, having greatly misrepresented his character, they proceed to declaim on the arrogance of founding any expectation of reward from the performance of our *moral duties*:—whereas the plain truth is that the Pharisee was *not righteous*, but merely arrogated to himself that character; he had neglected all the *moral duties* of life.

Who told the Barrister this? Not the Gospel, I am sure.

The Evangelical has only to translate these sentences into the true statement of his opinions, in order to baffle this angry and impotent attack; the self-righteousness of all who expect to claim salvation on the plea of their own personal merit. "Pay to A. B. at sight—value received by me."—To Messrs. Stone & Co. Bankers, Heaven-Gate. It is a short step from this to the Popish. "Pay to A. B. *or order*." Once assume merits, and I defy you to keep out supererogation and the old *Monte di Pietà*.

Ib. p. 97.

—— and from thence occasion is taken to defame all those who strive to prepare themselves, during this their state of trial, for that judgment which they must undergo at that day, when they will receive either reward or punishment, according as they shall be found to have *merited* the one, or *deserved* the other.

Can the Barrister have read the New Testament? Or does he know it only by quotations?

Ib.

——— a swarm of new Evangelists who are everywhere teaching the people that no reliance is to be placed on holiness of life as a ground of future acceptance.

I am weary of repeating that this is false. It is only denied that mere acts, not proceeding from faith, are or can be holiness. As surely (would the Methodist say) as the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, so surely does sanctification from redemption, and not *vice versa*,—much less from self-sanctifiedness, that ostrich

with its head in the sand, and the plucked rump of its merits staring on the divine *Αιη venatrix!*

Ib. p. 102.

He that doeth righteousness is righteous. Since then it is plain that each must *himself* be righteous, if he be so at all, what do they mean who thus inveigh against *self* righteousness, since Christ himself declares there is no other?

Here again the whole dispute lies in the word "himself." In the outward and visible sense both parties agree; but the Methodist calls it "the will in us," given by grace; the Barrister calls it "our own will," or "we ourselves." But why does not the Barrister reserve a part of his wrath for Dr. Priestley, according to whom a villain has superior claims on the divine justice as an innocent martyr to the grand machinery of Providence;—for Dr. Priestley, who turns the whole dictionary of human nature into verbs impersonal with a perpetual *subauditur* of *Deus* for their common nominative case;—which said *Deus*, however, is but another *automaton*, self-worked indeed, but yet worked, not properly working, for he admits no more freedom or will to God than to man? The Lutheran leaves the free will whining with a broken back in the ditch; and Dr. Priestley puts the poor animal out of his misery!—But seriously, is it fair or even decent to appeal to the Legislature against the Methodists for holding the doctrine of the Atonement? Do we not pray by Act of Parliament twenty times every Sunday *through the only merits of Jesus Christ?* Is it not the very nose which (of flesh or wax) this very Legislature insists on as an indispensable qualification for every Christian face? Is not the lack thereof a felonious deformity, yea, the grimmest feature of the *lues confirmata* of statute heresy? What says the reverend critic to this? Will he not rise in wrath against the Barrister,—he the Pamphagus of Homilitic, Liturgic, and Articular orthodoxy,—the Garagantua, whose ravenous maw leaves not a single word, syllable, letter, no, not one *iota* unswallowed, if we are to believe his own recent and voluntary manifesto?* What says he to this Barrister, and his Hints to the Legislature?

Ib. p. 105.

If the new faith be the only true one, let us embrace it; but let not those

* Quart. Review, vol. ii. p. 187.—*Ed.*

who vend these *new articles* expect that we should choose them with our eyes shut.

Let any man read the Homilies of the Church of England, and if he does not call this either blunt impudence or blank ignorance, I will plead guilty to both! New articles!! Would to Heaven some of them at least were! Why, Wesley himself was scandalized at Luther's Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, and cried off from the Moravians (the strictest Lutherans) on that account.

Ib. p. 114.

The catalogue of authors, which this Rev. Gentleman has pleased to specify and recommend, begins with Homer, Hesiod, the Argonautics, Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Pindar, Theognis, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, Diodorus Siculus. * * * 'This catalogue,' says he, 'might be considerably extended, but I study brevity. It is only necessary for me to add that the recommendation of these books is not to be considered as expressive of my approbation of every particular sentiment they contain.' It would indeed be a grievous injustice if this writer's reputation should be injured by the occasional unsoundness of opinion in writers whom it is more than probable he may never have read, and for whose sentiments he ought no more to be made answerable than the compiler of Lackington's Catalogue, from which it is not unlikely that his own was abridged.

Very good.

Ib. pp. 115–16.

These high-strained pretenders to godliness, who deny the power of the sinner to help himself, take good care always to attribute his *saving change* to the blessed effect of some sermon preached by some one or other of *their* Evangelical fraternity. They always hold *themselves* up to the multitude as the instruments producing all those marvellous conversions which they relate. No instance is recorded in their Saints' Calendar of any sinner resolving, in consequence of a reflective and serious perusal of the Scriptures, to lead a new life. No instance of a daily perusal of the Bible producing a daily progress in virtuous habits. No, the *Gospel* has no such effect.—It is always the *Gospel Preacher* who works the miracle, &c.

Excellent and just. In this way are the Methodists to be attacked:—even as the Papists were by Baxter, not from their doctrines, but from their practices, and the spirit of their Sect. There is a fine passage in Lord Bacon concerning a heresy of manner being not less pernicious than heresy of matter.

Ib. p. 118.

But their Saints, who would stop their ears if you should mention with admiration the name of a Garrick or a Siddons;—who think it a sin to

support such an *infamous profession* as that through the medium of which a Milton, a Johnson, an Addison, and a Young have labored to mend the heart, &c.

Whoo! See Milton's Preface to the Samson Agonistes.

Ib. p. 133.

In the Evangelical Magazine is the following article: "At ——— in Yorkshire, after a handsome collection (for the Missionary Society) a poor man, whose wages are about 28*s.* per week, brought a donation of 20 guineas. Our friends hesitated to receive it * * when he answered * *— 'Before I knew the grace of our Lord I was a poor drunkard: I never could save a shilling. My family were in beggary and rags; but since it has pleased God to renew me by his grace, we have been industrious and frugal: we have not spent many idle shillings; and we have been enabled to put something into the Bank; and this I freely offer to the blessed cause of our Lord and Saviour.' This is the second donation of this same poor man to the same amount!" Whatever these Evangelists may think of such conduct, they ought to be ashamed of thus basely taking advantage of this poor ignorant enthusiast, &c.

Is it possible to read this affecting story without finding in it a complete answer to the charge of demoralizing the lower classes? Does the Barrister really think, that this generous and grateful enthusiast is as likely to be unprovided and poverty-stricken in his old age, as he was prior to his conversion? Except indeed that at that time his old age was as improbable as his distresses were certain if he did live so long. This is singing *Io Pæan!* for the enemy with a vengeance.

Part ii. p. 14.

It behooved him (Dr. Hawker in his Letter to the Barrister) to show in what manner a covenant can exist without terms or conditions.

According to the Methodists there is a condition,—that of faith in the power and promise of Christ, and the virtue of the Cross. And were it otherwise, the objection is scarcely appropriate except at the Old Bailey, or in the Court of King's Bench. The Barrister might have framed a second law-syllogism, as acute as his former. The laws of England allow no binding covenant in a transfer of goods or chattels without value received. But there can be no value received by God:—*Ergo*, there can be no covenant between God and man. And if Jehovah should be as courteous as the House of Commons, and acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Courts at Westminster, the pleading might hold perhaps, and the Pentateuch be quashed after an argument before the

judges. Besides, how childish to puff up the empty bladder of an old metaphysical foot-ball on the *modus operandi interior* of Justification into a show of practical substance; as if it were no less solid than a cannon-ball! Why, drive it with all the vehemence that five toes can exert, it would not kill a louse on the head of Methodism. Repentance, godly sorrow, abhorrence of sin as sin, and not merely dread from forecast of the consequences, these the Arminian would call means of obtaining salvation, while the Methodist (more philosophically perhaps) names them signs of the work of free grace commencing and the dawning of the sun of redemption. And pray where is the practical difference?

Ib. p. 26.

Jesus answered him thus—*Verily, I say unto you, unless a man be born of water and of the spirit, he can not enter into the kingdom of God.*—The true sense of which is obviously this:—Except a man be initiated into my religion by Baptism (which *at that time* was always *preceded by a confession of faith*), and unless he manifest his sincere reception of it, by leading that upright and *spiritual* life which it enjoins, *he can not enter the kingdom of heaven*, or be a partaker of that happiness which it belongs to me to confer on those who believe in my name and keep my sayings.

Upon my faith as a Christian, if no more is meant by being born again than this, the speaker must have had the strongest taste in metaphors of any teacher in verse or prose on record, Jacob Behmen himself not excepted. The very Alchemists lag behind. Pity, however, that our Barrister has not shown us how this plain and obvious business of Baptism agrees with ver. 8. of the same chapter: *The wind bloweth where it listeth*, &c. Now if this does not express a visitation of the mind by a somewhat not in the own power or forethought of the mind itself, what are words meant for?

Ib. p. 29.

The true meaning of being *born again*, in the sense in which our Saviour uses the phrase, implies nothing more or less, in plain terms, than this:—to repent; to lead for the future a religious life instead of a life of disobedience; to believe the Holy Scriptures, and to pray for grace and assistance to persevere in our obedience to the end. All this any man of common sense might explain in a few words.

Pray, then (for I will take the Barrister's own commentary), what does the man of common sense mean by grace? If he will explain grace in any other way than as the circumstances *ab ex-*

tra (which would be mere mockery and in direct contradiction to a score of texts), and yet without mystery, I will undertake for Dr. Hawker and Co. to make the new birth itself as plain as a pikestaff, or a whale's foal, or Sarah Robarts's rabbits.

Ib. p. 30.

So that they go on in their sin waiting for a new birth, &c.

"So that they go on in their sin!"—Who would not suppose it notorious that every Methodist meeting-house was a cage of Newgate larks making up their minds to die game?

Ib.

The following account is extracted from the Methodist Magazine for 1798: "The Lord astonished *Sarah Roberts* with his mercy, by *setting her at liberty, while employed* in the necessary business of *washing* for her family," &c.

N.B. Not the famous rabbit-woman.—She was Robarts.

Ib. p. 31.

A washerwoman has *all her sins blotted out* in the twinkling of an eye, and while reeking with suds is received in the family of the Redeemer's kingdom. Surely this is a most abominable profanation of all that is serious, &c.

And where pray is the absurdity of this? Has Christ declared any antipathy to washerwomen, or the Holy Ghost to warm suds? Why does not the Barrister try his hand at the "abominable profanation," in a story of a certain woman with an issue of blood who was made free by touching the hem of a garment, without the previous knowledge of the wearer?

Rode, caper, vitem: tamen hinc cum stabis ad aras,
In tua quod fundi cornua possit, erit.

Ib. p. 32.

The leading design of John the Baptist * * was * this:—to prepare the minds of men for the reception of that pure system of moral truth which the Saviour, by divine authority, was speedily to inculcate, and of those sublime doctrines of a resurrection and a future judgment, which, as powerful motives to the practice of holiness, he was soon to reveal.

What then? Did not John the Baptist himself teach a pure system of moral truth? Was John so much more ignorant than Paul before his conversion, and the whole Jewish nation, except a few rich freethinkers, as to be ignorant of the "sublime doctrines of a resurrection and a future judgment?" This, I well know, is the strong-hold of Socinianism; but surely one single unprejudiced perusal of the New Testament—not to suppose an

acquaintance with Kidder or Lightfoot—would blow it down, like a house of cards!

Ib. p. 33.

—their faiths in the efficacy of their own rites, and creeds, and ceremonies, and their whole train of *substitutions* for *moral duty*, was so entire, and in their opinion was such a *saving faith*, that they could not at all interpret any language that seemed to dispute their value, or deny their importance.

Poor strange Jews! They had doubtless what Darwin would call a specific *paralysis* of the auditory nerves to the writings of their own Prophets, which yet were read Sabbath after Sabbath in their public Synagogues. For neither John nor Christ himself ever did, or indeed could, speak in language more contemptuous of the folly of considering rites as substitutions for moral duty, or in severer words denounce the blasphemy of such an opinion. Why need I refer to Isaiah or Micah?

Ib. p. 34.

Thus it was that this moral preacher explained and enforced the duty of repentance, and thus it was that he prepared the way for the greatest and best of teachers, &c.

Well then, if all this was but a preparation for the doctrines of Christ, those doctrines themselves must surely have been something different, and more difficult? Oh no! John's preparation consisted in a complete rehearsal of the *Drama didacticum*, which Christ and the Apostles were to exhibit to a full audience!—Nay, prithee, good Barrister! do not be too rash in charging the Methodists with a monstrous burlesque of the Gospel!

Ib. p. 37.

—the logic of the new Evangelists will convince him that it is a contradiction in terms even to *suppose* himself *capable of doing any thing* to help *or bringing any thing to recommend himself to the Divine favor.*

Now, suppose the wisdom of these endless attacks on an old abstruse metaphysical notion to be allowed, yet why in the name of common candor does not the Barrister ring the same *tocsin* against his friend Dr. Priestley's Scheme of Necessity;—or against his idolized Paley, who explained the will as a sensation, produced by the action of the intellect on the muscles, and the intellect itself as a catenation of ideas, and ideas as configurations of the organized brain? Would not every syllable apply, yea, and

more strongly, more indisputably? And would his fellow-sectaries thank him, or admit the consequences? Or has any late Socinian divine discovered, that Do as you would be done unto, is an interpolated precept?

Ib. p. 39.

"Even repentance and faith" (says Dr. Hawker), "those most essential qualifications of the mind, for the participation and enjoyment of the blessings of the Gospel (and which all real disciples of the Lord Jesus can not but possess), are *never supposed as a condition which the sinner performs to entitle him to mercy*, but merely as evidences that he is brought and has obtained mercy. *They can not be the conditions* of obtaining salvation."

Ought not this single quotation to have satisfied the Barrister, that no practical difference is deducible from these doctrines? "Essential qualifications," says the Methodist:—"terms and conditions," says the spiritual higgler. But if a man begins to reflect on his past life, is he to withstand the inclination? God forbid! exclaim both. If he feels a commencing shame and sorrow, is he to check the feeling? God forbid! cry both in one breath! But should not remembrancers be thrown in the way of sinners, and the voice of warning sound through every street and every wilderness? Doubtless, quoth the Rationalist. We do it, we do it! shout the Methodists. In every corner of every lane, in the high road, and in the waste, we send forth the voice —Come to Christ, and repent, and be cleansed! Aye, quoth the Rationalist, but I say, Repent, and become clean, and go to Christ.—Now, is not Mr. Rationalist as great a bigot as the Methodists, as he is, *me judice*, a worse psychologist?

Part ii. p. 40.

The former authorities on this subject I had quoted from the Gospel according to St. Luke: that Gospel most positively and most solemnly declares the *repentance* of sinners to be the *condition* on which *alone* salvation can be obtained. But the doctors of the new divinity *deny* this: they tell us distinctly *it can not be.* For the future, the Gospel according to Calvin must be received as the truth. Sinners will certainly prefer it as the more comfortable of the two beyond all comparison.

Mercy! but only to read Calvin's account of that repentance, without which there is no sign of election, and to call it "the more comfortable of the two?" The very term by which the German New-Birthites express it is enough to give one goose-flesh—*das Herzknirschen*—the very heart crashed between the teeth of a lock-jaw'd agony!

Ib.

What is *faith?* Is it not a conviction produced in the mind by adequate testimony?

No! that is not the meaning of faith in the Gospel, nor indeed anywhere else. Were it so, the stronger the testimony, the more adequate the faith. Yet who says, I have faith in the existence of George II., as his present Majesty's antecessor and grandfather?—If testimony, then evidence too;—and who has faith that the two sides of all triangles are greater than the third? In truth, faith, even in common language, always implies some effort, something of evidence which is not universally adequate or communicable at will to others. "Well! to be sure he has behaved badly hitherto, but I have faith in him." If it were otherwise, how could it be imputed as righteousness? Can morality exist without choice;—nay, strengthen in proportion as it becomes more independent of the will? "A very meritorious man! he has faith in every proposition of Euclid, which he understands."

Ib. p. 41.

"I could as easily create a world (says Dr. Hawker) as create either faith or repentance in my own heart." Surely this is a most monstrous confession. What! is not the Christian religion a *revealed* religion, and have we not the most miraculous attestation of its truth?

Just look at the answer of Christ himself to Nicodemus, *John* iii. 2, 3. Nicodemus professed a full belief in Christ's divine mission. Why? It was attested by his miracles. What answered Christ? "Well said, O believer?" No, not a word of this; but the proof of the folly of such a supposition. *Verily, verily, I say unto thee; except a man be born again, he can not see the kingdom of God*,—that is, he can not have faith in me.

Ib. p. 42.

How can this evangelical preacher declaim on the necessity of seriously searching into the truth of revelation, for the purpose either of producing or confirming our belief of it, when he has already pronounced it to be just as possible to arrive at conviction as to create a world?

Did Dr. Hawker say that it was impossible to produce an assent to the historic credibility of the facts related in the Gospel? Did he say that it was impossible to become a Socinian by the weighing of outward evidences? No! but Dr. Hawker says,—and I say,—that this is not, can not be, what Christ means by faith,

which, to the misfortune of the Socinians, he always demands as the condition of a miracle, instead of looking forward to it as the natural effect of a miracle. How came it that Peter saw miracles countless, and yet was without faith till the Holy Ghost descended on him? Besides, miracles may or may not be adequate evidence for Socinianism; but how could miracles prove the doctrine of Redemption, or the divinity of Christ? But this is the creed of the Church of England.

It is wearisome to be under the necessity, or at least the constant temptation, of attacking Socinianism, in reviewing a work professedly written against Methodism. Surely such a work ought to treat of those points of doctrine and practice, which are peculiar to Methodism. But to publish a *diatribe* against the substance of the Articles and Catechism of the English Church, nay, of the whole Christian world, excepting the Socinians, and to call it "Hints concerning the dangerous and abominable absurdities of Methodism," is too bad.

Ib. p. 43.

But this Calvinistic Evangelist tells us, by way of accounting for the utter impossibility of producing in himself either faith or repentance, that both are of divine origin, and like the light, and the rain, and the dew of heaven, which tarrieth not for man, neither waiteth for the sons of men, are from above, and come down from the Father of lights, from whom alone cometh every good and perfect gift!

Is the Barrister—are the Socinian divines—inspired, or infallibly sure that it is a crime for a Christian to understand the words of Christ in their plain and literal sense, when a Socinian chooses to give his paraphrase,—often, too, as strongly remote from the words, as the old spiritual paraphrases on the Song of Solomon?

Ib. p. 46.

According to that Gospel which hath hitherto been the pillar of the Christian world, we are taught that whosoever endeavors to the best of his ability to reform his manners, and amend his life, will have pardon and acceptance.

As interpreted by whom? By the Socini, or the Barrister?—Or by Origen, Chrysostom, Jerome, the Gregories, Eusebius, Athanasius?—By Thomas Aquinas, Bernard, Thomas-a-Kempis?—By Luther, Melancthon, Zuinglius, Calvin?—By the Reformers and martyrs of the English Church?—By Cartwright and the

learned Puritans?—By Knox?—By George Fox?—With regard to this point, that mere external evidence is inadequate to the production of a saving faith, and in the majority of other opinions, all these agree with Wesley. So they all understood the Gospel. But it is not so! *Ergo*, the Barrister is infallible.

Ib. p. 47.

When the wicked man turneth away from the wickedness which he hath committed, and doeth that which is lawful and right, he shall save his soul alive. This gracious declaration the old moral divines of our Church have placed in the front of its Liturgy.

In the name of patience, over and over again, who has ever denied this? The question is, by what power, his own, or by the free grace of God through Christ, the wicked man is enabled to turn from his wickedness. And again and again I ask:—Were not these "old moral divines" the authors and compilers of the Homilies? If the Barrister does not know this, he is an ignorant man; if knowing it, he has yet never examined the Homilies, he is an unjust man; but if he have, he is a slanderer and a sycophant.

Is it not intolerable to take up three bulky pamphlets against a recent Sect, denounced as most dangerous, and which we all know to be most powerful and of rapid increase, and to find little more than a weak declamatory abuse of certain metaphysical dogmas concerning free will, or free will forfeited, *de libero vel servo arbitrio*—of grace, predestination, and the like;—dogmas on which, according to Milton, God and the Logos conversed, as soon as man was in existence, they in heaven, and Adam in paradise, and the devils in hell; dogmas common to all religions, and to all ages and sects of the Christian religion;—concerning which Brahmin disputes with Brahmin, Mahometan with Mahometan, and Priestley with Price;—and all this to be laid on the shoulders of the Methodists collectively: though it is a notorious fact, that a radical difference on this abstruse subject is the ground of the schism between the Whitfieldite and Wesleyan Methodists; and that the latter coincide in opinion with Erasmus and Arminius, by which latter name they distinguish themselves; and the former with Luther, Calvin, and their great guide, St. Augustine? This I say is intolerable,—yea, a crime against sense, candor, and white paper.

Ib. p. 50.

"For so very peculiarly directed to the sinner, and to him only (says the

evangelical preacher) is the blessed Gospel of the Lord Jesus, that unless you are a sinner, you are not interested in its saving truths."

Does not Christ himself say the same in the plainest and most unmistakable words? *I come not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance. They that be whole need not a physician, but they that are sick.* Can he, who has no share in the danger, be interested in the saving? Pleased from benevolence he may be; but interested he can not be. *Estne aliquid inter salvum et salutem; inter liberum et libertatem? Salus est pereuntis, vel saltem periditantis: redemptio, quasi pons divinus, inter servum et libertatem,—amissam, ideoque optatam.*

Ib. p. 52.

It was reserved for these days of *new discovery* to announce to mankind, that, unless they are sinners, they are excluded from the promised blessings of the Gospel.

Merely read 'that unless they are sick they are precluded from the offered remedies of the Gospel;' and is not this the dictate of common sense, as well as of Methodism? But does not Methodism cry aloud that all men are sick—sick to the very heart? *If we say we are without sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.* This shallow-pated Barrister makes me downright piggish, and without the stratagem of that famed philosopher in pig-nature almost drives me into the Charon's hoy of Methodism by his rude and stupid tail-hauling me back from it.

Ib. p. 53.

I can assure these gentlemen that I regard with a reverence as pure and awful as can enter into the human mind, that blood which was shed upon the Cross.

That is, in the Barrister's creed, that mysterious flint, which with the subordinate aids of mutton, barley, salt, turnips, and potherbs, makes most wonderful fine flint broth. Suppose Christ had never shed his blood, yet if he had worked his miracles, raised Lazarus, and taught the same doctrines, would not the result have been the same?—Or if Christ had never appeared on earth, yet did not Daniel work miracles as stupendous, which surely must give all the authority to his doctrines that miracles can give? And did he not announce by the Holy Spirit the resurrection to judgment, of glory or of punishment?

Ib. p. 54.

Let them not attempt to escape it by quoting a few disconnected phrases

in the Epistles, but let them adhere solely and steadfastly to that Gospel of which they affect to be the exclusive preachers.

And whence has the Barrister learnt that the Epistles are not equally binding on Christians as the four Gospels? Surely, of St. Paul's at least, the authenticity is incomparably clearer than that of the first three Gospels; and if he give up, as doubtless he does, the plenary inspiration of the Gospels, the personal authority of the writers of all the Epistles is greater than two at least of the four Evangelists. Secondly, the Gospel of John and all the Epistles were purposely written to teach the Christian Faith; whereas the first three Gospels are as evidently intended only as *memorabilia* of the history of the Christian Revelation, as far as the process of Redemption was carried on in the life, death, and resurrection of the divine Founder. This is the blank, brazen, blushless, or only brass-blushing, impudence of an Old Bailey Barrister, attempting to browbeat out of Court the better and more authentic half of the witnesses against him. If I wished to understand the laws of England, shall I consult Hume or Blackstone—him who has written his volumes expressly as comments on those laws, or the historian who mentions them only as far as the laws were connected with the events and characters which he relates or describes? Nay, it is far worse than this; for Christ himself repeatedly defers the publication of his doctrines till after his death, and gives the reason too, that till he had sent the Holy Ghost, his disciples were not capable of comprehending them. Does he not attribute to an immediate influence of especial inspiration even Peter's acknowledgment of his Filiation to God, or Messiahship?—Was it from the Gospels that Paul learned to know Christ?—Was the Church sixty years without the awful truths taught exclusively in John's Gospel?

Part iii. p. 5.

The *nostrum* of the mountebank will be preferred to the prescription of the regular practitioner. Why is this? Because there is something in the authoritative arrogance of the pretender, by which ignorance is overawed.

This is something; and true as far as it goes; that is, however, but a very little way. The great power of both spiritual and physical mountebanks rests on that irremovable property of human nature, in force of which indefinite instincts and sufferings find no echo, no resting-place, in the definite and compre-

hensible. Ignorance unnecessarily enlarges the sphere of these: but a sphere there is,—facts of mind and cravings of the soul there are,—in which the wisest man seeks help from the indefinite, because it is nearer and more like the infinite, of which he is made the image:—for even we are infinite, even in our finiteness infinite, as the Father in his infinity. In many caterpillars there is a large empty space in the head, the destined room for the pushing forth of the *antennæ* of its next state of being.

Ib. p. 12.

But the anti-moralists aver * * that they are quoted unfairly;—that although they disavow, it is true, the necessity, and deny the value, of practical morality and personal holiness, and declare them to be totally irrelevant to our future salvation, yet that * * I might have found occasional recommendations of moral duty which I have neglected to notice.

The same *crambe bis decies cocta* of one self-same charge grounded on one gross and stupid misconception and mis-statement: and to which there needs no other answer than this simple fact. Let the Barrister name any one gross offence against the moral law, for which he would shun a man's acquaintance, and for that same vice the Methodist would inevitably be excluded publicly from their society; and I am inclined to think that a fair list of the Barrister's friends and acquaintances would prove that the Calvinistic Methodists are the austerer and more watchful censors of the two. If this be the truth, as it notoriously is, what but the cataract of stupidity uncouched, or the thickest film of bigot-slime, can prevent a man from seeing that this tenet of justification by faith alone is exclusively a matter between the Calvinist's own heart and his Maker, who alone knows the true source of his words and actions; but that to his neighbors and fellow-creedsmen, his spotless life and good works are demanded, not, indeed, as the prime efficient causes of his salvation, but as the necessary and only possible signs of that faith, which is the means of that salvation of which Christ's free grace is the cause, and the sanctifying Spirit the perfecter. But I fall into the same fault I am arraigning, by so often exposing and confuting the blunder, which has no claim even at its first enunciation to the compliment of a philosophical answer. But why, in the name of common sense, all this endless whoop and hubbub against the Calvinistic Methodists? I had understood that the Arminian Methodists, or Wesleyans, are the more numerous body by far.

Has there been any union lately? Have the followers of Wesley abjured the doctrines of their founder on this head?

Ib. p. 16.

We are told by our new spiritual teachers, that reason is not to be applied to the inquiry into the truth or falsehood of their doctrines; they are spiritually discerned, and carnal reason has no concern with them.

Even under this aversion to reason, as applied to religious grounds, a very important truth lurks: and the mistake (a very dangerous one I admit), lies in the confounding two very different faculties of the mind under one and the same name;—the pure reason or *vis scientifica;* and the discourse, or prudential power, the proper objects of which are the *phænomena* of sensuous experience. The greatest loss which modern philosophy has through wilful scorn sustained, is the grand distinction of the ancient philosophers between the *νούμενα*, and *φαινόμενα*. This gives the true sense of Pliny—*venerare Deos* (that is, their statues, and the like), *et numina Deorum*, that is, those spiritual influences which are represented by the images and persons of Apollo, Minerva, and the rest.

Ib. p. 17.

Religion has for its object the moral care and the moral cultivation of man. Its beauty is not to be sought in the regions of mystery, or in the flights of abstraction.

What ignorance! Is there a single moral precept of the Gospels not to be found in the Old Testament? Not one. A new edition of White's *Diatessaron*, with a running comment consisting entirely of parallel passages from the Hebrew, Greek, and Roman writers before Christ, and those after him who, it is morally certain, drew no aids from the New Testament, is a grand *desideratum;* and if any thing could open the eyes of Socinians, this would do it.

Ib. p. 24.

The masculine strength and moral firmness which once distinguished the great mass of the British people is daily fading away. Methodism with all its cant, &c.

Well! but in God's name can Methodism be at once the effect and the cause of this loss of masculine strength and moral firmness?—Did Whitfield and Wesley blow them out at the first puff—these grand virtues of masculine strength and moral firmness? Admire, I pray you, the happy antithesis. Yet "femi-

nine" would be an improvement, as then the sense too would be antithetic. However, the sound is sufficient, and modern rhetoric possesses the virtue of economy.

Ib. p. 27.

So with the Tinker; I would give him the care of the kettles, but I would not give him *the cure of souls*. So long as he attended to the management and mending of his pots and pans, I would wish success to his ministry: but when he came to declare *himself* a "chosen vessel," and demand permission to take the souls of the people into his holy keeping, I should think that instead of a *license*, it would be more humane and prudent to give him a passport to St. Luke's. Depend upon it, such men were never sent by Providence to rule or to regulate mankind.

Whoo! Bounteous Providence that always looks at the body clothes and the parents' equipage before it picks out the proper soul for the baby! Ho! the Duchess of Manchester is in labor: —quick, Raphael, or Uriel, bring a soul out of the Numa bin, a young Lycurgus. Or the Archbishop's lady:—ho! a soul from the Chrysostom or Athanasian locker.—But poor Moll Crispin is in the throes with twins:—well! there are plenty of cobbler's and tinkers' souls in the hold—John Bunyan!! Why, thou miserable Barrister, it would take an angel an eternity to tinker thee into a skull of half his capacity!

Ib. pp. 30, 31.

"A *truly* awakened conscience" (these anti-moral editors of the Pilgrim's Progress assure us), "can never find relief from the law (that is, the *moral law*). The more he looks for peace *this way, his guilt*, like a heavy burden, becomes more intolerable; when he becomes *dead* to the *law*,—as to *any dependence upon it for salvation*,—by the body of Christ, and married to him, who was raised from the dead, then, and not till then, his heart is set at liberty, to run the way of God's commandments."

Here we are taught that the *conscience* can never find relief from obedience to the law of the Gospel.

False. We are told by Bunyan and his editors that the conscience can never find relief for its disobedience to the Law in the Law itself;—and this is as true of the moral as of the Mosaic Law. I am not defending Calvinism or Bunyan's theology; but if victory, not truth, were my object, I could desire no easier task than to defend it against our doughty Barrister. Well, but I repent—that is, regret it!—Yes! and so you doubtless regret the loss of an eye or arm:—will that make it grow again?—Think you this nonsense as applied to morality? Be it so! But

yet nonsense most tremendously suited to human nature it is, as the Barrister may find in the arguments of the Pagan philosophers against Christianity, who attributed a large portion of its success to its holding out an expiation, which no other religion did. Read but that most affecting and instructive anecdote selected from the Hindostan Missionary Account by the Quarterly Review.* Again let me say I am not giving my own opinion on this very difficult point; but of one thing I am convinced, that the *I am sorry for it, that's enough*-men mean nothing but regret when they talk of repentance, and have consciences either so pure or so callous, as not to know what a direful and strange thing remorse is, and how absolutely a fact *sui generis!* I have often remarked, and it can not be too often remarked (vain as this may sound), that this essential heterogeneity of regret and remorse is of itself a sufficient and the best proof of free will and reason, the co-existence of which in man we call conscience, and on this rests the whole superstructure of human religion—God, immortality, guilt, judgment, redemption. Whether another and different superstructure may be raised on the same foundation, or whether the same edifice is susceptible of important alteration, is another question. But such is the edifice at present, and this is its foundation: and the Barrister might as rationally expect to blow up Windsor Castle by discharging a popgun in one of its cellars, as hope to demolish Calvinism by such arguments as his.

Ib. pp. 35, 36.

"And behold a certain lawyer stood up and tempted him, saying, Master, what shall I do *to inherit eternal life?*"

"He said unto him, *What is written in the law? How readest thou?*"

"And he answering said, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with *all thy strength*, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself."

"And he said unto him, *Thou hast answered right. This do, and thou shall live.*" Luke x. 25–28.

So would Bunyan, and so would Calvin have preached;—would both of them in the name of Christ have made this assurance to the Barrister—*This do, and thou shalt live.* But what if he has not done it, but the very contrary? And what if the Querist should be a stanch disciple of Dr. Paley: and hold

* See vol. i. p. 217.—*Ed.*

himself "morally obliged" not to hate or injure his fellow-man, not because he is compelled by conscience to see the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and to abhor sin as sin, even as he eschews pain as pain,—no, not even because God has forbidden it;—but ultimately because the great Legislator is able and has threatened to put him to unspeakable torture if he disobeys, and to give him all kind of pleasure if he does not?* Why, verily, in this case, I do foresee that both the Tinker and the Divine would wax warm, and rebuke the said Querist for vile hypocrisy, and a most nefarious abuse of God's good gift, intelligible language. What! do you call this *loving the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your strength, and all your mind, —and your neighbor as yourself?* Whereas in truth you love nothing, not even your own soul; but only set a superlative value on whatever will gratify your selfish lust of enjoyment, and insure you from hell-fire at a thousand times the true value of the dirty property. If you have the impudence to persevere in mis-naming this "love," supply any one instance in which you use the word in this sense? If your son did not spit in your face, because he believed that you would disinherit him if he did, and this were his main moral obligation, would you allow that your son loved you—and with all his heart, and mind, and strength, and soul? —Shame! Shame!

Now the power of loving God, of willing good as good (not of desiring the agreeable, and of preferring a larger though distant delight to an infinitely smaller immediate qualification, which is mere selfish prudence), Bunyan considers supernatural, and seeks its source in the free grace of the Creator through Christ the Redeemer:—this the Kantean also avers to be super-

* "And from this account of obligation it follows, that we can be obliged to nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by; for nothing else can be a violent motive to us. As we should not be obliged to obey the laws, or the magistrate, unless rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other depended upon our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the commands of God."—*Paley's Moral and Polit. Philosophy*, B. ii. c. 2.

"The difference, and the only difference (*between prudence and duty*), is this: that in the one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world; in the other case, we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come."—Ib. c. 3.—*Ed.*

sensual indeed, but not supernatural, but in the original and essence of human nature, and forming its grand and awful characteristic. Hence he calls it *die Menschheit*—the principle of humanity ;—but yet no less than Calvin or the Tinker declares it a principle most mysterious, the undoubted object of religious awe, a perpetual witness of that God, whose image (εἰκὼν) it is; a principle utterly incomprehensible by the discursive intellect ; and moreover teaches us, that the surest plan for stifling and paralyzing this divine birth in the soul (a phrase of Plato's as well as of the Tinker's) is by attempting to evoke it by, or to substitute for it, the hopes and fears, the motives and calculations of prudence ; which is an excellent and in truth indispensable servant, but considered as master and primate of the moral diocese precludes the possibility of virtue (in Bunyan's phrase, holiness of spirit), by introducing legality ; which is no cant phrase of Methodism, but of authenticated standing in the ethics of the profoundest philosophers—even those who rejected Christianity, as a miraculous event, and revelation itself as far as any thing supernatural is implied in it. I must not mention Plato, I suppose,—he was a mystic ; nor Zeno,—he and his were visionaries : —but Aristotle, the cold and dry Aristotle, has in a very remarkable passage in his lesser tract of Ethics asserted the same thing ; and called it " a divine principle, lying deeper than those things which can be explained or enunciated discursively."

Ib. pp. 45, 46.

Sure I am that no father of a family that can at all estimate the importance of keeping from the infant mind whatever might raise impure ideas or excite improper inquiries will ever commend the Pilgrim's Progress to their perusal.

And in the same spirit and for the same cogent reasons that the holy monk Lewis prohibited the Bible in all decent families ; —or if they must have something of that kind, would propose in preference Tirante the White ! O how I abhor this abominable heart-haunting impurity in the envelope of modesty ! Merciful Heaven ! is it not a direct consequence from this system, that we all purchase our existence at the price of our mother's purity of mind ? See what Milton has written on this subject in the passage quoted in The Friend in the essays on the communication of truth.*

* Friend, Essays x. and xi. II. pp. 69–80.—*Ed.*

Ib. p. 47.

Let us ask whether the female mind is likely to be trained to purity by studying this manual of piety, and by expressing its devotional desires after the following example. "Mercy being a *young* and *breeding* woman *longed* for something," &c.

Out upon the fellow! I could find it in my heart to suspect him of any vice that the worst of men could commit!

Ib. pp. 55–56.

As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made rightcous. The interpretation of this text is simply this:—As by following the fatal example of one man's disobedience many were made sinners; so by that pattern of perfect obedience which Christ has set before us shall many be made righteous.

What may not be explained thus? And into what may not any thing be thus explained? It comes out little better than nonsense in any other than the literal sense. For let any man of sincere mind and without any system to support look round on all his Christian neighbors, and will he say or will they say that the origin of their well-doing was an attempt to imitate what they all believe to be inimitable, Christ's perfection in virtue, his absolute sinlessness? No—but yet perhaps some particular virtues; for instance, his patriotism in weeping over Jerusalem, his active benevolence in curing the sick and preaching to the poor, his divine forgiveness in praying for his enemies?—I grant all this. But then how is this peculiar to Christ? Is it not the effect of all illustrious examples, of those probably most which we last read of, or which made the deepest impression on our feelings? Were there no good men before Christ, as there were no bad men before Adam? Is it not a notorious fact that those who most frequently refer to Christ's conduct for their own actions, are those who believe him the incarnate Deity—consequently, the best possible guide, but in no strict sense an example;—while those who regard him as a mere man, the chief of the Jewish Prophets, both in the pulpit and from the press ground their moral persuasions chiefly on arguments drawn from the propriety and seemliness—or the contrary—of the action itself, or from the will of God known by the light of reason? To make St. Paul prophesy that all Christians will owe their holiness to their exclusive and conscious imitation of Christ's actions, is to make St. Paul a false prophet;—and what in such case becomes of the boasted in-

fluence of miracles? Even as false would it be to ascribe the vices of the Chinese, or even our own, to the influence of Adam's bad example. As well might we say of a poor scrofulous innocent: "See the effect of the bad example of his father on him!" I blame no man for disbelieving, or for opposing with might and main, the dogma of Original Sin; but I confess that I neither respect the understanding nor have confidence in the sincerity of him, who declares that he has carefully read the writings of St. Paul, and finds in them no consequence attributed to the fall of Adam but that of his bad example, and none to the Cross of Christ but the good example of dying a martyr to a good cause. I would undertake from the writings of the later English Socinians to collect paraphrases on the New Testament texts that could only be paralleled by the spiritual paraphrase on Solomon's Song to be found in the recent volume of "A Dictionary of the Holy Bible, by John Brown, Minister of the Gospel at Haddington:" third edition, in the Article, Song.

Ib. pp. 63, 64.

Call forth the robber from his cavern, and the midnight murderer from his den; summon the seducer from his couch, and beckon the adulterer from his embrace; cite the swindler to appear; assemble from every quarter all the various miscreants whose vices deprave, and whose villanies distress, mankind; and when they are thus thronged round in a circle, assure them —not that there is a God that judgeth the earth—not that punishment in the great day of retribution will await their crimes, &c. &c.—Let every sinner in the throng be told that they will stand *justified* before God; that the *righteousness* of *Christ* will be imputed to *them*, &c.

Well, do so.—Nay, nay! it has been done; the effect has been tried; and slander itself can not deny that the effect has been the conversion of thousands of those very sinners whom the Barrister's fancy thus convokes. O shallow man! not to see that here lies the main strength of the cause he is attacking; that, to repeat my former illustration, he draws the attention to patients in that worst state of disease which perhaps alone requires and justifies the use of the white pill, as a mode of exposing the frantic quack who vends it promiscuously! He fixes on the empiric's cures to prove his murders!—not to forget what ought to conclude every paragraph in answer to the Barrister's Hints; "and were the case as alleged, what does this prove against the present Methodists as Methodists?" Is not the tenet of imputed righteousness the faith of all the Scotch Clergy, who are not false to

their declarations at their public assumption of the ministry? Till within the last sixty or seventy years, was not the tenet preached Sunday after Sunday in every nook of Scotland; and has the Barrister heard that the morals of the Scotch peasants and artisans have been improved within the last thirty or forty years, since the exceptions have become more and more common? —Was it by want of strict morals that the Puritans were distinguished to their disadvantage from the rest of Englishmen during the reigns of Elizabeth, James I. Charles I. and II.? And that very period, which the Barrister affirms to have been distinguished by the moral vigor of the great mass of Britons,—was it not likewise the period when this very doctrine was preached by the Clergy fifty times for once that it is heard from the same pulpits in the present and preceding generation? Never, never can the Methodists be successfully assailed, if not honestly, and never honestly or with any chance of success, except as Methodists;—for their practices, their alarming theocracy, their stupid, mad, and mad-driving superstitions. These are their property *in peculio;* their doctrines are those of the Church of England, with no other difference than that in the Church Liturgy, and Articles, and Homilies, Calvinism and Lutheranism are joined like the two hands of the Union Fire Office:—the Methodists have unclasped them, and one is Whitfield and the other Wesley.

Ib. p. 75.

"For the same reason that a book written in bad language should never be put into the hands of a child that speaks correctly, a book exhibiting instances of vice should never be given to a child that thinks and acts properly." (Practical Education. By Maria and R. L. Edgeworth)

How mortifying that one is never lucky enough to meet with any of these *virtuosissimos*, fifteen or twenty years of age. But perhaps they are such rare jewels, that they are always kept in cotton! The Kilcrops! I would not exchange the heart, which I myself had when a boy, while reading the life of Colonel Jack, or the Newgate Calendar, for a wagon-load of these brilliants.

Ib. p. 78.

"When a man turns his back on this world, and is in good earnest resolved for everlasting life, his carnal friends, and ungodly neighbors, will pursue him with hue and cry; but death is at his heels, and he can not stop short of the city of Refuge" (Notes to the Pilgrim's Progress by Hawker, Burder, &c.) This representation of the state of real Christians is as mischievous as it is false.

Yet Christ's assertion on this head is positive, and universal; and I believe it from my inmost soul, and am convinced that it is just as true A.D. 1810, as A.D. 33.

Ib. p. 82.

The spirit with which all their merciless treatment is to be borne is next pointed out. * * "*Patient bearing of injuries* is true Christian fortitude, and will always be more effectual to *disarm our enemies*, and to bring others to the knowledge of the truth, than all *arguments* whatever."

Is this Barrister a Christian of any sort or sect, and is he not ashamed, if not afraid, to ridicule such passages as these? If they are not true, the four Gospels are false.

Ib. p. 86.

It is impossible to give them credit for integrity when we behold the obstinacy and the artifice with which they defend their system against the strongest argument, and against the clearest evidence.

Modest gentleman! I wonder he finds time to write bulky pamphlets: for surely modesty, like his, must secure success and clientage at the bar. Doubtless he means his own arguments, the evidence he himself has adduced:—I say doubtless, for what are these pamphlets but a long series of attacks on the doctrines of the strict Lutherans and Calvinists (for the doctrines he attacks are common to both), and if he knew stronger arguments, clearer evidence, he would certainly have given them;—and then what obstinate rogues must our Bishops be, to have suffered these Hints to pass into a third edition, and yet not have brought a bill into Parliament for a new set of Articles? I have not heard that they have even the grace to intend it.

Ib. p. 88.

On this subject I will quote the just and striking observations of an excellent modern writer. "In whatever village," says he, "the fanatics get a footing, drunkenness and swearing,—sins which, being more exposed to the eye of the world, would be ruinous to their great pretensions to superior sanctity—will, perhaps, be found to decline; but I am convinced, from personal observation, that every species of fraud and falsehood—sins which are not so readily detected, but which seem more closely connected with worldly advantage—will be found invariably to increase." (Religion without Cant; by R. Fellowes, A.M. of St. Mary's Hall, Oxford.)

In answer to this let me make a "very just observation," by some other man of my opinion, to be hereafter quoted "from an excellent modern writer;"—and it is this, that from the birth of Christ to the present hour, no sect or body of men were zealous

in the reformation of manners in society, without having been charged with the same vices in the same words. When I hate a man, and see nothing bad in him, what remains possible but to accuse him of crimes which I can not see, and which can not be disproved, because they can not be proved? Surely, if Christian charity did not preclude these charges, the shame of convicted parrotry ought to prevent a man from repeating and republishing them. The very same thoughts, almost the words, are to be found of the early Christians; of the poor Quakers; of the Republicans; of the first Reformers. Why need I say this? Does not every one know, that a jovial pot-companion can never believe a water-drinker not to be a sneaking cheating knave who is afraid of his thoughts; that every libertine swears that those who pretend to be chaste, either have their mistress in secret, or far worse, and so on?

Ib. p. 89.

The same religious abstinence from all appearance of recreation on the Lord's day; and the same neglect of the weightier matters of the moral law, in the course of the week, &c.

This sentence thus smuggled in at the bottom of the chest ought not to pass unnoticed; for the whole force of the former depends on it. It is a true trick, and deserves reprobation.

Ib. p. 97.

Note. It was procured, Mr. Collyer informs us, by the merit of his "Lectures on Scripture facts." It should have been "Lectures on *Scriptural* Facts." What should we think of the grammarian, who, instead of *Historical*, should present us with "Lectures on *History* Facts?"

But Law Tracts? And is not 'Scripture' as often used semi-adjectively?

Ib. p. 98.

"Do you really believe," says Dr. Hawker, "that, because man by his apostasy hath lost his power and ability to obey, God hath lost his right to command? Put the case that you were called upon, as a barrister, to recover a debt due from one man to another, and you knew the debtor had not the ability to pay the *creditor*, would you tell your client that his debtor was under no legal or moral obligation to pay what he had no power to do? And would you tell him that the very expectation of his just right *was as foolish as it was tyrannical?*" * * * I will give my reply to these questions distinctly and without hesitation. * * * Suppose A. to have lent B. a thousand pounds, as a capital to commence trade, and that, when he purchased his stock to this amount, and lodged it in his warehouse, a fire were to break out in the next dwelling, and, extending itself to *his* warehouse,

were to consume the whole of his property, and reduce him to a state of utter ruin. If A., my client, were to ask my opinion as to his right to recover from B., I should tell him that this his right would exist should B. ever be in a condition to repay the sum borrowed; * * * but that to attempt to recover a thousand pounds from a man thus reduced by accident to utter ruin, and who had not a shilling left in the world, would be *as foolish as it was tyrannical.*

But this is rank sophistry. The question is:—Does a thief (and a fraudulent debtor is no better) acquire a claim to impunity by not possessing the power of restoring the goods? Every moral act derives its character (says a Schoolman with an unusual combination of profundity with quaintness) *aut voluntate originis aut origine voluntatis.* Now the very essence of guilt, its dire and incommunicable character, consists in its tendency to destroy the free will;—but when thus destroyed, are the habits of vice thenceforward innocent? Does the law excuse the murder because the perpetrator was drunk? Dr. Hawker put his objection laxly and weakly enough; but a manly opponent would have been ashamed to seize an hour's victory from what a move of the pen would render impregnable.

Ib. pp. 102, 103.

When at this solemn tribunal the sinner shall be called upon to answer for the transgression of those *moral* laws, on obedience to which salvation was made to depend, will it be sufficient that he declares himself to have been taught to believe that the Gospel *had neither terms nor conditions*, and that his salvation was secured by a covenant which procured him pardon and peace, *from all eternity:* a covenant, the effects of which no folly or *after-act whatever* could possibly destroy?—Who could anticipate the sentence of condemnation, and not weep in agony over the deluded victim of ignorance and misfortune who was thus taught a doctrine so fatally false?

What then! God is represented as a tyrant when he claims the penalty of disobedience from the servant, who has wilfully incapacitated himself for obeying,—and yet just and merciful in condemning to indefinite misery a poor "deluded victim of ignorance and imposture," even though the Barrister, spite of his antipathy to Methodists, would "weep in agony" over him! But before the Barrister draws bills of imagination on his tender feelings, would it not have been as well to adduce some last dying speech and confession, in which the culprit attributed his crimes—not to Sabbath-breaking and loose company,—but to sermon-hearing on the *modus operandi* of the divine goodness in the work of redemption? How the Ebenezerites would stare to find the Socinians

and themselves in one flock on the sheep-side of the judgment-seat,—and their cousins, and fellow Methodists, the Tabernaclers, all caprified—goats every man :—and why ? They held that repentance is in the power of every man, with the aid of grace ; while the goats held that without grace no man is able even to repent. A. makes grace the cause, and B. makes it only a necessary auxiliary. And does the Socinian extricate himself a whit more clearly? Without a due concurrence of circumstances no mind can improve itself into a state susceptible of spiritual happiness : and is not the disposition and pre-arrangement of circumstances as dependent on the divine will as those spiritual influences which the Methodist holds to be meant by the word grace? Will not the Socinian find it as difficult to reconcile with mercy and justice the condemnation to hell-fire of poor wretches born and bred in the thieves' nests of St. Giles, as the Methodists the condemnation of those who have been less favored by grace ? I have one other question to ask, though it should have been asked before. Suppose Christ taught nothing more than a future state of retribution and the necessity and sufficiency of good morals, how are we to explain his forbidding these truths to be taught to any but Jews till after his resurrection ? Did the Jews reject those doctrines ? Except perhaps a handful of rich men, called Sadducees, they all believed them, and would have died a thousand deaths rather than have renounced their faith. Besides, what is there in doctrines common to the creed of all religions, and enforced by all the schools of philosophy, except the Epicurean, which should have prevented their being taught to all at the same time ? I perceive, that this difficulty does not press on Socinians exclusively : but yet it presses on them with far greater force than on others. For they make Christianity a mere philosophy, the same in substance with the Stoical, only purer from errors and accompanied with clearer evidence :—while others think of it as part of a covenant made up with Abraham, the fulfilment of which was in good faith to be first offered to his posterity. I ask this only because the Barrister professes to find every thing in the four Gospels so plain and easy.

Ib. p. 106.

The Reformers by whom those articles were framed were educated in the Church of Rome, and opposed themselves rather to the perversion of its power than the errors of its doctrine.

An outrageous blunder.

Ib. p. 107.

Lord Bacon was the first who dedicated his profound and penetrating genius to the cultivation of sound philosophy, &c.

This very same Lord Bacon has given us his *Confessio Fidei* at great length, with full particularity. Now I will answer for the Methodists' unhesitating assent and consent to it; but would the Barrister subscribe it?

Ib. p. 108.

We look back to that era of our history when superstition threw her victim on the pile, and bigotry tied the martyr to his stake:—but we take our eyes from the retrospect and turn them in thankful admiration to that Being who has opened the minds of many, and is daily opening the minds of more amongst us to the reception of these most important of all truths, that there is no true faith but in practical goodness, and that the worst of errors is the error of *the life*.

Such is the conviction of the most enlightened of our Clergy: the conviction, I trust, of the far greater part. * * * They deem it better to inculcate the moral duties of Christianity in the pure simplicity and clearness with which they are revealed, than to go aside in search of *doctrinal mysteries*. For as mysteries can not be made manifest, they, of course, can not be understood; and that which can not be understood can not be believed, and can, consequently, make no part of any system of faith: since no one, till he understands a doctrine, can tell whether it be true or false; till then, therefore, he can have no faith in it, for no one can rationally affirm that he believes that doctrine to be true which he does not know to be so; and he can not know it to be true if he does not understand it. In the religion of a true Christian, therefore, there can be nothing unintelligible; and if the preachers of that religion do not make mysteries, they will never find any.

Who? the Bishops, or the dignified Clergy? Have they at length exploded all "doctrinal mysteries?" Was Horsley "the one red leaf, the last of its clan," that held the doctrines of the Trinity, the corruption of the human Will, and the Redemption by the Cross of Christ? Verily, this is the most impudent attempt to impose a naked Socinianism on the public, as the general religion of the nation, admitted by all but a dunghill of mushroom fanatics, that ever insulted common sense or common modesty! And will "the far greater part" of the English Clergy remain silent under so atrocious a libel as is contained in this page? Do they indeed solemnly pray to their Maker weekly, before God and man, in the words of a Liturgy, which they know "can not be believed?" For heaven's sake, my dear Southey,

do quote this page and compare it with the introduction to and petitions of the Liturgy, and with the Collects on the Advent, &c.

Ib. p. 110.

We shall discover upon an attentive examination of the subject, that all those laws which lay the basis of our constitutional liberties, are no other than the rules of religion transcribed into the judicial system, and enforced by the sanction of civil authority.

What! Compare these laws, first, with Tacitus's account of the constitutional laws of our German ancestors, Pagans; and then with the Pandects and *Novellæ* of the most Christian Justinian, aided by all his Bishops. Observe, the Barrister is asserting a fact of the historical origination of our laws,—and not what no man would deny, that as far as they are humane and just, they coincide with the precepts of the Gospel. No, they were "transcribed."

Ib. p. 113.

Where a man holds a certain system of doctrines, the state is bound to tolerate, though it may not approve, them; but when he demands *a license to teach* this system to the rest of the community, he demands that which ought not to be granted incautiously and without grave consideration. This discretionary power is delegated in trust for the common good, &c.

All this, dear Southey, I leave to the lash of your indignation It would be oppression to do—what the Legislature could not do if it would—prevent a man's thoughts; but if he speaks them aloud, and asks either for instruction and confutation, if he be in error, or assent and honor, if he be in the right, then it is no oppression to throw him into a dungeon! But the Barrister would only withhold a license! Nonsense! What if he preaches and publishes without it, will the Legislature dungeon him or not? If not, what use is either the granting or the withholding? And this too from a Socinian, who by this very book has, I believe, made himself obnoxious to imprisonment and the pillory—and against men, whose opinions are authorized by the most solemn acts of Parliament, and recorded in a Book, of which there must be one, by law, in every parish, and of which there is in fact one in almost every house and hovel!

Part iv. p. 1.

The religion of genuine Christianity is a revelation so distinct and specific in its design, and so clear and intelligible in its rules, that a man of philosophic and retired thought is apt to wonder by what means the endless sys-

tems of error and hostility which divide the world were ever introduced into it.

What means this hollow cant—this fifty times warmed up bubble and squeak? That such parts are intelligible as the Barrister understands? That such parts as it possesses in common with all systems of religion and morality are plain and obvious? In other words, that ABC are so legible that they are legible to every one that has learnt to read? If the Barrister mean other or more than this, if he really mean the whole religion and revelation of Christ, even as it is found in the original records, the Gospels and Epistles, he escapes from the silliness of a truism by throwing himself into the arms of a broad brazen-faced untruth. What! Is the sixth chapter of St. John's Gospel so distinct and specific in its design, that any modest man can wonder that the best and most learned men of every age since Christ have deemed it mysterious? Are the many passages concerning the Devil and demoniacs so very easy? Has this writer himself thrown the least light on, or himself received one ray of light from, the meaning of the word Faith;—or the reason of Christ's paramount declarations respecting its omnific power, its absolutely indispensable necessity? If the word mean only what the Barrister supposes, a persuasion that in the present state of our knowledge the evidences for the historical truth of the miracles of the Gospel outweigh the arguments of the Skeptics, will he condescend to give us such a comment on the assertion, that had we but *a grain of mustard seed* of it, we might control all material nature, without making Christ himself the most extravagant hyperbolist that ever misused language? But it is impossible to make that man blush, who can seriously call the words of Christ as recorded by St. John, plain, easy, common sense, out of which prejudice, artifice, and selfish interest alone can compose any difficulty. The Barrister has just as much right to call his religion Christianity, as to call flour and water plum-pudding:—yet we all admit that in plum-pudding both flour and water do exist.

Ib. p. 7.

Socinus can have no claim upon my veneration: I have never concerned myself with what he believed nor with what he taught, &c.

The Scripture is my authority, and on no other authority will I ever, knowingly, lay the foundation of my faith.

Utterly untrue. It is not the Scripture, but such passages of Scripture as appear to him to accord with his Procrustean bed of so-called reason, and a forcing of the blankest contradictions into the same meaning, by explanations to which I defy him to furnish one single analogy as allowed by mankind with regard to any other writings but the Old and New Testament. It is a gross and impudent delusion to call a Book his authority, which he receives only so far as it is an echo of his own convictions. I defy him to adduce one single article of his whole faith (creed rather), which he really derives from the Scripture. Even the arguments for the Resurrection are and must be extraneous: for the very proofs of the facts are (as every *tyro* in theology must know) the proofs of the authenticity of the Books in which they are contained. This question I would press upon him:—Suppose we possessed the Fathers only with the Ecclesiastical and Pagan historians, and that not a page remained of the New Testament,—what article of his creed would it alter?

Ib. p. 10.

If the Creed of Calvinistic Methodism is really more productive of conversions than the religion of Christianity, let them openly and at once say so.

But Calvinistic Methodism? Why Calvinistic Methodism? Not one in a hundred of the Methodists are Calvinists. Not to mention the impudence of this crow in his abuse of black feathers! Is it worse in a Methodist to oppose Socinianism to Christianity, that is, to the doctrines of Wesley or even Whitfield, which are the same as those of all the Reformed Churches of Christendom, and differ only wherein the most celebrated divines of the same churches have differed with each other,—than for the Barrister to oppose Methodism to Christianity (his Christianity)—that is, to Socinianism, which in every peculiar doctrine of Christianity differs from all divines of all Churches of all ages? For the one tenet in which the Calvinist differs from the majority of Christians, are there not ten in which the Socinian differs from all?

To what purpose, then, this windy declamation about John Calvin? How many Methodists, does the Barrister think, ever saw, much less read, a work of Calvin's? If he scorns the name of Socinus as his authority, and appeals to Scripture, do not the Methodists the same? When do they refer to Calvin? In what work do they quote him? This page is therefore mere dust in

the eyes of the public. And his abuse of Calvin displays only his own vulgar ignorance both of the man, and of his writings. For he seems not to know that the humane Melancthon, and not only he, but almost every Church, Lutheran or Reformed, throughout Europe, sent letters to Geneva, extolling the execution of Servetus, and returning their thanks. Yet it was a murder not the less: Yes! a damned murder: but the guilt of it is not peculiar to Calvin, but common to all the theologians of that age; and, *Nota bene*, Mr. Barrister, the Socini not excepted, who were prepared to inflict the very same punishment on F. Davidi for denying the adorability of Christ. If to wish, will, resolve, and attempt to realize, be morally to commit, an action, then must Socinus and Calvin hunt in the same collar. But, O mercy! if every human being were to be held up to detestation, who in that age would have thought it his duty to have passed sentence *de comburendo heretico* on a man, who had publicly styled the Trinity "a Cerberus," and "a three-headed monster of hell," what would the history of the Reformation be but a list of criminals? With what face indeed can we congratulate ourselves on being born in a more enlightened age, if we so bitterly abuse not the practice but the agents? Do we not admit by this very phrase "enlightened," that we owe our exemption to our intellectual advantages, not primarily to our moral superiority? It will be time enough to boast, when to our own tolerance we have added their zeal, learning, and indefatigable industry.*

Ib. pp. 13, 14.

If religion consists in listening to long prayers, and attending long sermons, in keeping up an outside appearance of devotion, and interlarding the most common discourse with phrases of Gospel usage:—if this is religion, then are the disciples of Methodism pious beyond compare. But in real humility of heart, in mildness of temper, in liberality of mind, in purity of thought, in openness and uprightness of conduct in private life, in those practical virtues which are the vital substance of Christianity,—in these are they superior? No. Public observation is against the fact, and the conclusion to which such observation leads is rarely incorrect. * * The very name of the sect carries with it an impression of meanness and hypocrisy. Scarce an individual that has had any dealings with those belonging to it, but has good cause to remember it from some circumstance of low deception or of shuffling fraud. Its very members trust each other with caution and reluctance. The more wealthy among them are drained and

* See Table Talk, pp. 497 and 499.—*Ed.*

dried by the leeches that perpetually fasten upon them. The leaders, ignorant and bigoted—I speak of them collectively—present us with no counter-qualities that can conciliate respect. They have all the craft of monks without their courtesy, and all the subtlety of Jesuits without their learning.

In the whole *Bibliotheca theologica* I remember no instance of calumny so gross, so impudent, so unchristian. Even as a single robber, I mean he who robs one man, gets hanged, while the robber of a million is a great man, so it seems to be with calumny. This worthy Barrister will be extolled for this audacious slander of thousands, for which, if applied to any one individual, he would be in danger of the pillory. This paragraph should be quoted: for were the charge true, it is nevertheless impossible that the Barrister should know it to be true. He positively asserts as a truth known to him what it is impossible he should know:—he is therefore doubly a slanderer; for first, the charge is a gross calumny; and were it otherwise, he would still be a slanderer, for he could have no proof, no ground for such a charge.

Ib. p. 15.

Amidst all this spirit of research we find nothing—comparatively nothing—of improvement in that science of all others the most important in its influence. * * * Religion, except from the emancipating energy of a few superior minds, which have dared to snap asunder the cords which bound them to the rock of error * * * has been suffered to remain in its principles and in its doctrines, just what it was when the craft of Catholic superstition first corrupted its simplicity.

So, so. Here it comes out at last! It is not the Methodists; no; it is all and each of all Europe, Infidels and Socinians excepted! O impudence! And then the exquisite self-conceit of the blunderer!

Ib. p. 29.

——— If of *different denominations*, how were they thus conciliated to a society of this ominous nature, from which they must themselves of necessity be excluded by that indispensable condition of admittance, "*a union* of religious sentiment in the *great doctrines*:" which very want of union it is that creates these *different denominations?*

No, Barrister! they mean that men of different denominations may yet all believe in the corruption of the human will, the redemption by Christ, the divinity of Christ as consubstantial with the Father, the necessity of the Holy Spirit, or grace (mean-

ing more than the disposition of circumstances), and the necessity of faith in Christ superadded to a belief of his actions and doctrines, —and yet differ in many other points. The points enumerated are called the great points, because all Christians agree in them excepting the Arians and Socinians, who for that reason are not deemed Christians by the rest. The Roman Catholic, the Lutheran, the Calvinist, the Arminian, the Greek, with all their sub-divisions, do yet all accord in these articles :—the booksellers might have said, all who repeat the Nicene Creed. N.B.—I do not approve, or defend, nay, I dislike, these "United Theological Booksellers :" but this utter Barrister is their best friend by attacking them so as to secure to them victory, and all the advantages of being known to have been wickedly slandered ;— the best shield a faulty cause can protend against the javelin of fair opposition.

Ib. p. 56.

Our Saviour never in any single instance reprobated the exercise of reason : on the contrary, he reprehends severely those who did not exercise it. Carnal reason is not a phrase to be found in *his* Gospel ; he appealed to the understanding in all he said, and in all he taught. He never required *faith* in his disciples, without first furnishing sufficient *evidence* to justify it. He reasoned thus : If I have done what no *human power* could do, you must admit that my power is *from above*, &c.

Good heavens ! did he not uniformly require faith as the condition of obtaining the "evidence," as this Barrister calls it— that is, the miracle ? What a shameless perversion of the fact ! He never did reason thus. In one instance only, and then upbraiding the base sensuality of the Jews, he said : "If ye are so base as not to believe what I say from the moral evidence in your own consciences, yet pay some attention to it even for my works' sake." And this, an *argumentum ad hominem*, a bitter reproach (just as if a great chemist should say :—Though you do not care for my science, or the important truths it presents, yet, even as an amusement superior to that of your jugglers to whom you willingly crowd, pay some attention to me)—this is to be set up against twenty plain texts and the whole spirit of the whole Gospel ! Besides, Christ could not reason so ; for he knew that the Jews admitted both natural and demoniacal miracles, and their faith in the latter he never attacked ; though by an *argumentum ad hominem* (for it is no argument in itself) he denied

its applicability to his own works. If Christ had reasoned so, why did not the Barrister quote his words, instead of putting imaginary words in his mouth?

Ib. pp. 60, 61.

Religion is a system of *revealed* truth; and to affirm of any revealed truth, that we *can not understand* it, is, in effect, either to deny that it has been revealed, or—which is the same thing—to admit that it has been revealed in vain.

It is too worthless! I can not go on. Merciful God! hast thou not revealed to us the being of a conscience, and of reason, and of will;—and does this Barrister tell us, that he "understands" them? Let him know that he does not even understand the very word understanding. He does not seem to be aware of the school-boy distinction between the ὅτι ἐστι and the διότι? But to all these silly objections religion must forever remain exposed as long as the word Revelation is applied to any thing that can be *bona fide* given to the mind *ab extra*, through the senses of eye, ear, or touch. No! all revelation is and must be *ab intra;* the external *phænomena* can only awake, recall evidence, but never reveal. This is capable of strict demonstration.

Afterwards the Barrister quotes from Thomas Watson respecting things above comprehension in the study of nature: "in these cases, the *fact* is evident, the cause lies in obscurity, deeply removed from all the knowledge and penetration of man." Then what can we believe respecting these causes? And if we can believe nothing respecting them, what becomes of them as arguments in support of the proposition that we ought, in religion, to believe what we can not understand?

Are there not facts in religion, the causes and constitution of which are mysteries?

NOTES ON DAVISON'S DISCOURSES ON PROPHECY. 1825.*

Disc. iv. Pt. i. p. 140.

As to systems of religion alien from Christianity, if any of them have taught the doctrine of eternal life, the reward of obedience, as a dogma of belief, that doctrine is not their boast, but their burden and difficulty, inasmuch as they could never defend it. They could never justify it on independent grounds of deduction, nor produce their warrant and authority to teach it. In such precarious and unauthenticated principles it may pass for a conjecture, or pious fraud, or a splendid phantom: it can not wear the dignity of truth.

Ah, why did not Mr. Davison adhere to the manly, the glorious strain of thinking from p. 134 (*Since Prophecy*, &c.) to p. 139, (*that mercy*) of this discourse! A fact is no subject of scientific demonstration speculatively: we can only bring analogies, and these Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, and others did bring; but their main argument remains to this day the main argument —namely, that none but a wicked man dares doubt it. When it is not in the light of promise, it is in the law of fear, at all times a part of the conscience, and presupposed in all spiritual conviction.

Ib. p. 160.

Some indeed have sought the *star* and the *sceptre* of Balaam's prophecy, where they can not well be found, in the reign of David; for though a sceptre might be there, the star properly is not.

Surely this is a very weak reason. A far better is, I think, suggested by the words, *I shall see him—I shall behold him;*— which in no intelligible sense could be true of Balaam relatively to David.

Ib. p. 162.

The Israelites could not endure the voice and fire of Mount Sinai. They asked an intermediate messenger between God and them, who should temper the awfulness of his voice, and impart to them the will in a milder way.

Deut. xviii. 15. Is the following argument worthy our con-

* Discourses on Prophecy, in which are considered its structure, use and inspiration, being the substance of twelve Sermons preached in the Chapel of Lincoln's Inn in the Lecture founded by the Right Rev. William Warburton, Bishop of Gloucester. By John Davison, B.D. 2d. edit. London, 1825.

sideration? If, as the learned Eichhorn, Paulus of Jena, and others of their school, have asserted, Moses waited forty days for a tempest, and then, by the assistance of the natural magic he had learned in the temple of Isus, *initiated* the law, all our experience and knowledge of the way in which large bodies of men are affected would lead us to suppose that the Hebrew people would have been keenly excited, interested, and elevated by a spectacle so grand and so flattering to their national pride. But if the voices and appearances were indeed divine and supernatural, well must we assume that there was a distinctive, though verbally inexpressible, terror and disproportion to the mind, the senses, the whole *organismus* of the human beholders and hearers, which might both account for, and even in the sight of God justify, the trembling prayer which deprecated a repetition.

Ib. p. 164.

To justify its application to Christ, the resemblance between him and Moses has often been deduced at large, and drawn into a variety of particulars, among which several points have been taken minute and precarious, or having so little of dignity and clearness of representation in them, that it would be wise to discard them from the prophetic evidence.

With our present knowledge we are both enabled and disposed thus to evolve the full contents of the word *like;* but I can not help thinking that the contemporaries of Moses (if not otherwise orally instructed), must have understood it in the first and historical sense, at least of Joshua.

Ib. p. 168.

A distinguished commentator on the laws of Moses, Michaelis, vindicates their temporal sanction on the ground of the Mosaic Code being of the nature of a civil system, to the statutes of which the rewards of a future state would be incongruous and unsuitable.

I never read either Michaelis's Works, but the same view came before me whenever I reflected on the Mosaic Code. Who expects in realities of any kind the sharp outline and exclusive character of scientific classification? It is the predominance of the characterizing constituent that gives the name and class. Do not even our own statute laws, though co-existing with a separate religious Code, contain many *formulæ* of words which have no sense but for the conscience? Davison's stress on the word *covet*, in the tenth commandment, is, I think, beyond what so ancient a Code warrants;—and for the other instances, Michaelis would remind

him that the Mosaic constitution was a strict theocracy, and that Jehovah, the God of all, was their *king*. I do not know the particular mode in which Michaelis propounds and supports this position; but the position itself, as I have presented it to my own mind, seems to me among the strongest proofs of the divine origin of the Law, and an essential in the harmony of the total scheme of Revelation.

Disc. iv. Pt. ii. p. 180.

But the first law meets him on his own terms; it stood upon a present retribution; the execution of its sentence is matter of history, and the argument resulting from it is to be answered, before the question is carried to another world.

This is rendered a very powerful argument by the consideration, that though so vast a mind as that of Moses, though perhaps even a Lycurgus might have distinctly foreseen the ruin and captivity of the Hebrew people as a necessary result of the loss of nationality, and the abandonment of the law and religion which were their only point of union, their centre of gravity,—yet no human intellect could have foreseen the perpetuity of such a people as a distinct race under all the aggravated curses of the law weighing on them; or that the obstinacy of their adherence to their dividuating institutes in persecution, dispersion, and shame, should be in direct proportion to the wantonness of their apostasy from the same in union and prosperity.

Disc. v. Pt. ii. p. 234.

Except under the dictate of a constraining inspiration, it is not easy to conceive how the master of such a work, at the time when he had brought it to perfection, and beheld it in its lustre, the labor of so much opulent magnificence and curious art, and designed to be *exceeding magnifical, of fame, and of glory throughout all countries*, should be occupied with the prospect of its utter ruin and dilapidation, and that too under the *opprobrium* of God's vindictive judgment upon it, nor to imagine how that strain of sinister prophecy, that forebodes of malediction, should be ascribed to him if he had no such vision revealed.

Here I think Mr. Davison should have crushed the objection of the Infidel grounded on Solomon's subsequent idolatrous impieties. The Infidel argues, that these are not conceivable of a man distinctly conscious of a prior and supernatural inspiration, accompanied with supernatural manifestations of the divine presence.

Disc. vi. Pt. i. p. 283.

In order to evade this conclusion, nothing is left but to deny that Isaiah, or any person of his age, wrote the book ascribed to him.

This too is my conclusion, but (if I do not delude myself) from more evident, though not perhaps more certain, premisses. The age of the Cyrus prophecies is the great object of attack by Eichhorn and his compilers; and I dare not say, that in a controversy with these men Davison's arguments would appear sufficient. But this was not the intended subject of these Discourses.

Disc. vi. Pt. ii. p. 289.

But how does he express that promise? In the images of the resurrection and an immortal state. Consequently, there is implied in the delineation of the lower subject the truth of the greater.

This reminds me of a remark, I have elsewhere made respecting the expediency of separating the arguments addressed to, and valid for, a believer, from the proofs and vindications of Scripture intended to form the belief, or to convict the Infidel.

Disc. vi. Pt. iv. p. 325.

When Cyrus became master of Babylon, the prophecies of Isaiah were shown or communicated to him, wherein were described his victory, and the use he was appointed to make of it in the restoration of the Hebrew people. (*Ezra* i. 1, 2.)

This I had been taught to regard as one of Josephus's legends; but upon this passage who would not infer that it had Ezra for its authority,—who yet does not expressly say that even the prophecy of the far later Jeremiah was known or made known to Cyrus, who (Ezra tells us) fulfilled it? If Ezra had meant the prediction of Isaiah by the words, *he hath charged me*, &c., why should he not have referred to it together with, or even instead of, Jeremiah? Is it not more probable that a living prophet had delivered the charge to Cyrus? See *Ezra* vi. 14. —Again, Davison makes Cyrus speak like a Christian, by omitting the affix *of Heaven* to the *Lord God* in the original. Cyrus speaks as a Cyrus might be supposed to do,—namely, of a most powerful but yet national deity, of a God, not of God. I have seen in so many instances the injurious effect of weak or overstrained arguments in defence of religion, that I am perhaps more jealous than I need be in the choice of evidences. I can never think myself the worse Christian for any opinion I may

have formed, respecting the price of this or that argument, of this or that divine, in support of the truth. For every one that I reject, I could supply two, and these ἀνέκδοτα.

Ib. p. 336.

Meanwhile this long repose and obscurity of Zerubbabel's family, and of the whole house of David, during so many generations prior to the Gospel, was one of the preparations made whereby to manifest more distinctly the proper glory of it, in the birth of the Messiah.

In whichever way I take this, whether addressed to a believer for the purpose of enlightening, or to an inquirer for the purpose of establishing his faith in prophecy, this argument appears to me equally perplexing and obscure. It seems, *prima facie*, almost tantamount to a right of inferring the fulfilment of a prophecy in B., which it does not mention, from its entire failure and falsification in A., which, and which alone, it does mention.

Ib. p. 370.

Behold I will send you Elijah the prophet before the great and dreadful day of the Lord.

Almost every page of this volume makes me feel my own ignorance respecting the interpretation of the language of the Hebrew Prophets, and the want of the one idea which would supply the key. Suppose an Infidel to ask me, how the Jews were to ascertain that John the Baptist was Elijah the Prophet; —am I to assert the pre-existence of John's personal identity as Elijah? If not, why Elijah rather than any other Prophet? One answer is obvious enough, that the contemporaries of John held Elijah as the common representative of the Prophets; but did Malachi do so?

Ib. p. 373.

I can not conceive a more beautiful synopsis of a work on the Prophecies of the Old Testament, than is given in this Recapitulation. Would that its truth had been equally well substantiated! That it can be, that it will be, I have the liveliest faith;—and that Mr. Davison has contributed as much as we ought to expect, and more than any contemporary divine, I acknowledge, and honor him accordingly. But much, very much, remains to be done, before these three pages merit the name of a Recapitulation.

Disc. vii. p. 375.

If I needed proof of the immense importance of the doctrine

of Ideas, and how little it is understood, the following discourse would supply it.

The whole discussion on Prescience and Free-will, with exception of the page or two borrowed from Skelton, displays an unacquaintance with the deeper philosophy, and a helplessness in the management of the particular question, which I know not how to reconcile with the steadiness and clearness of insight evinced in the earlier Discourses. I neither do nor ever could see any other difficulty on the subject, than what is contained and anticipated in the idea of eternity.

By Ideas I mean intuitions not sensuous, which can be expressed only by contradictory conceptions, or, to speak more accurately, are in themselves necessarily both inexpressible and inconceivable, but are suggested by two contradictory positions. This is the essential character of all ideas, consequently of eternity, in which the attributes of omniscience and omnipotence are included. Now prescience and free-will are in fact nothing more than the two contradictory positions by which the human understanding struggles to express successively the idea of eternity. Not eternity in the negative sense, as the mere absence of succession, much less eternity in the senseless sense of an infinite time; but eternity,—the Eternal; as Deity, as God. Our theologians forget that the objection applies equally to the possibility of the divine will; but if they reply that prescience applied to an eternal, *Entis absoluti tota et simultanea fruitio*, is but an anthropomorphism, or term of accommodation, the same answer serves in respect of the human will; for the epithet human does not enter into the syllogism. As to contingency, whence did Mr. Davison learn that it is a necessary accompaniment of freedom, or of free action? My philosophy teaches me the very contrary.

Ib. p. 392.

He contends, without reserve, that the free actions of men are not within the divine prescience; resting his doctrine partly on the assumption that there are no strict and absolute predictions in Scripture of those actions in which men are represented as free and responsible; and partly on the abstract reason, that such actions are in their nature impossible to be certainly foreknown.

I utterly deny contingency except in relation to the limited and imperfect knowledge of man. But the misery is, that men

write about free-will without a single meditation on will absolutely; on the idea κατ' ἐξοχήν without any idea; and so bewilder themselves in the jungle of alien conceptions; and to understand the truth they overlay their reason.

Disc. viii. p. 416.

It would not be easy to calculate the good which a man like Mr. Davison might effect, under God, by a work on the Messianic Prophecies, specially intended for and addressed to the present race of Jews,—if only he would make himself acquainted with their objections and ways of understanding Scripture. For instance, a learned Jew would perhaps contend that this prophecy of Isaiah (c. ii. 2–4), can not fairly be interpreted of a mere local origination of a religion historically; as the drama might be described as going forth from Athens, and philosophy from Academus and the Painted Porch, but must refer to an established and continuing seat of worship, *a house of the God of Jacob*. The answer to this is provided in the preceding verse, *in the top of the mountains;* which irrefragably proves the figurative character of the whole prediction.

Ib. p. 431.

One point, however, is certain and equally important, namely, that the Christian Church, when it comes to recognize more truly the obligation imposed upon it by the original command of its Founder, *Go teach all nations, &c.*

That the duty here recommended is deducible from this text is quite clear to my mind; but whether it is the direct sense and primary intention of the words; whether the first meaning is not negative,—(*Have no respect to what nation a man is of, but teach it to all indifferently whom you have an opportunity of addressing*—this is not so clear. The larger sense is not without its difficulties, nor is this narrower sense without its practical advantages.

Disc. ix. pp. 453, 454.

The striking inferiority of several of these latter Discourses in point of style, as compared with the first 150 pages of this volume, perplexes me. It seems more than mere carelessness, or the occasional *infausta tempora scribendi*, can account for. I question whether from any modern work of a tenth part of the merit of these Discourses, either in matter or in force and felicity of diction and composition, as many uncouth and awkward sen-

tences could be extracted. The paragraph in pages 453 and 454, is not a specimen of the worst. In a volume which ought to be, and which probably will be, in every young Clergyman's library, these *maculæ* are subjects of just regret. The utility of the work, no less than its great comparative excellence, render its revision a duty on the part of the author; specks are no trifles in diamonds.

Disc. xii. p. 519.

Four such ruling kingdoms did arise. The first, the Babylonian, was in being when the prophecy is represented to have been given. It was followed by the Persian; the Persian gave way to the Grecian; the Roman closed the series.

This is stoutly denied by Eichorn, who contends that the Mede or Medo-Persian is the second—if I recollect aright. But it always struck me that Eichhorn, like other learned Infidels, is caught in his own snares. For if the prophecies are of the age of the first Empire, and actually delivered by Daniel, there is no reason why the Roman Empire should not have been predicted; —for superhuman predictions, the last two at least must have been. But if the book was a forgery, or a political poem like Gray's Bard or Lycophron's Cassandra, and later than Antiochus Epiphanes, it is strange and most improbable that the Roman should have escaped notice. In both cases the omission of the last and most important Empire is inexplicable.

Ib. p. 521.

Yet we have it on authority of Josephus, that Daniel's prophecies were read publicly among the Jews in their worship, as well as their other received Scriptures.

It is but fair, however, to remember that the Jewish Church ranked the book of Daniel in the third class only, among the Hagiographic—passionately almost as the Jews before and at the time of our Saviour were attached to it.

Ib. pp. 522–3.

But to a Jewish eye, or to any eye placed in the same position of view in the age of Antiochus Epiphanes, it is utterly impossible to admit that this superior strength of the Roman power to reduce and destroy, this heavier arm of subjugation, could have revealed itself so plainly, as to warrant the express deliberate description of it.

Quære. See Polybius.

Ib.

We shall yet have to inquire how it could be foreseen that this fourth, this yet unestablished empire, should be the last in the line.

This is a sound and weighty argument, which the preceding does not, I confess, strike me as being. On the contrary, the admission that by a writer of the Maccabaic æra the Roman power could scarcely have been overlooked, greatly strengthens this second argument, as naturally suggesting expectations of change, and wave-like succession of empires, rather than the idea of a last. In the age of Augustus this might possibly have occurred to a profound thinker; but the age of Antiochus was too late to permit the Roman power to escape notice; and not late enough to suggest its exclusive establishment so as to leave no source of succession.

NOTES ON IRVING'S BEN-EZRA.* 1827.

Christ the Word.
|
The Scriptures — The Spirit — The Church.
|
The Preacher.

Such seemeth to me to be the scheme of the Faith in Christ. The written Word, the Spirit and the Church, are co-ordinate, the indispensable conditions and the working causes of the perpetuity and continued re-nascence and spiritual life of Christ still militant. The Eternal Word, Christ from everlasting, is the *prothesis* or identity;—the Scriptures and the Church are the two poles, or the *thesis* and *antithesis;* the Preacher in direct line under the Spirit, but likewise the point of junction of the written Word and the Church, being the *synthesis*. And here is another proof of a principle elsewhere by me asserted and exemplified, that divine truths are ever a *tetractys*, or a triad equal to a *tetractys:* $4 = 1$ or $3 = 4 = 1$. But the entire scheme is a pentad—God's hand in the world.†

* The Coming of Messiah in Glory and Majesty. By Juan Josafat Ben-Ezra, a converted Jew. Translated from the Spanish, with a preliminary Discourse. By the Rev. Edward Irving, A.M. London, 1827.

† See *ante*, p. 74.—*Ed.*

It may be not amiss that I should leave a record in my own hand, how far, in what sense, and under what conditions, I agree with my friend, Edward Irving, respecting the second coming of the Son of Man. I. How far? First, instead of the full and entire conviction, the positive assurance, which Mr. Irving entertains, I—even in those points in which my judgment most coincides with his,—profess only to regard them as probable, and to vindicate them as nowise inconsistent with orthodoxy. They may be believed, and they may be doubted, *salva Catholica fide*. Further, from these points I exclude all prognostications of time and event; the mode, the persons, the places, of the accomplishment; and I decisively protest against all parts of Mr. Irving's and of Lacunza's scheme grounded on the books of Daniel or the Apocalypse, interpreted as either of the two, Irving or Lacunza, understands them. Again, I protest against all identification of the coming with the Apocalyptic Millennium, which in my belief began under Constantine. II. In what sense? In this and no other, that the objects of the Christian Redemption will be perfected on this earth;—that the kingdom of God and his Word, the latter as the Son of Man, in which the divine will shall *be done on earth as it is in heaven*, will *come*;—and that the whole march of nature and history, from the first impregnation of Chaos by the Spirit, converges toward this kingdom as the final cause of the world. Life begins in detachment from Nature, and ends in union with God. III. Under what conditions? That I retain my former convictions respecting St. Michael, and the ex-saint Lucifer, and the Genie Prince of Persia, and the re-institution of bestial sacrifices in the Temple at Jerusalem, and the rest of this class. All these appear to me so many pimples on the face of my friend's faith from inward heats, leaving it indeed a fine handsome intelligent face, but certainly not adding to its comeliness. Such are the convictions of S. T. Coleridge, May, 1827.

P.S. I fully agree with Mr. Irving as to the literal fulfilment of all the prophecies which respect the restoration of the Jews. (*Deuteron.* xxv. 1–8.)

It may be long before Edward Irving sees what I seem at least to see so clearly,—and yet, I doubt not, the time will come when he too will see with the same evidentness,—how much grander a front his system would have presented to judicious beholders; on how much more defensible a position he would have placed it,—

and the remark applies equally to Ben Ezra (that is, Emanuel Lacunza)—had he trusted the proof to Scriptures of undisputed catholicity, to the spirit of the whole Bible, to the consonance of the doctrine with the reason, its fitness to the needs and capacities of mankind, and its harmony with the general plan of the divine dealings with the world,—and had left the Apocalypse in the background. But alas! instead of this he has given it such prominence, such prosiliency of relief, that he has made the main strength of his hope appear to rest on a vision, so obscure that his own author and faith's-mate claims a meaning for its contents only on the supposition that the meaning is yet to come!

Preliminary Discourse, p. lxxx.

Now of these three, the office of Christ, as our prophet, is the means used by the Holy Spirit for working the redemption of the understanding of men; that faculty by which we acquire the knowledge on which proceed both our inward principles of conduct and our outward acts of power.

I can not forbear expressing my regret that Mr. Irving has not adhered to the clear and distinct exposition of the understanding, *genere et gradu*, given in the Aids to Reflection.* What can be plainer than to say: the understanding is the medial faculty or faculty of means, as reason on the other hand is the source of ideas or ultimate ends. By reason we determine the ultimate end: by the understanding we are enabled to select and adapt the appropriate means for the attainment of, or approximation to, this end, according to circumstances. But an ultimate end must of necessity be an idea, that is, that which is not representable by the sense, and has no entire correspondent in nature, or the world of the senses. For in nature there can be neither a first nor a last:—all that we can see, smell, taste, touch, are means, and only in a qualified sense, and by the defect of our language, entitled ends. They are only relatively ends in a chain of motives. B. is the end to A.; but it is itself a mean to C., and in like manner C. is a mean to D., and so on. Thus words are the means by which we reduce appearances, or things presented through the senses, to their several kinds, or *genera;* that is, we generalize, and thus think and judge. Hence the understanding, considered specially as an intellective power, is the source and faculty of words;—and on this account the understanding is justly defined, both by Archbishop Leighton, and by

* I. pp. 241–262.—*Ed.*

Immanuel Kant, the faculty that judges by, or according to, sense. However, practical or intellectual, it is one and the same understanding, and the definition, the medial faculty, expresses its true character in both directions alike. I am urgent on this point, because on the right conception of the same, namely, that understanding and sense (to which the sensibility supplies the material of outness, *materiam objectivam*) constitute the natural mind of man, depends the comprehension of St. Paul's whole theological system. And this natural mind, which is named the mind of the flesh, *Φρόνημα σαρκός*, as likewise *ψυχικὴ σύνεσις*, the intellectual power of the living or animal soul, St. Paul everywhere contradistinguishes from the spirit, that is, the power resulting from the union and co-inherence of the will and the reason;—and this spirit both the Christian and elder Jewish Church named, *sophia*, or wisdom.

Ben-Ezra. Part i. c. v. p. 67.

Eusebius and St. Epiphanius name Cerinthus as the inventor of many corruptions. That heresiarch being given up to the belly and the palate, placed therein the happiness of man. And so taught his disciples, that after the Resurrection, * * *. And what appeared most important, each would be master of an entire seraglio, like a Sultan, &c.

I find very great difficulty in crediting these black charges on Cerinthus, and know not how to reconcile them with the fact that the Apocalypse itself was by many attributed to Cerinthus. But Mr. Hunt is not more famous for blacking than some of the Fathers.

Ib. pp. 73, 74.

Against whom a very eloquent man, Dionysius Alexandrinus, a Father of the Church, wrote an elegant work, to ridicule the Millenarian fable, the golden and gemmed Jerusalem on the earth, the renewal of the Temple, the blood of victims. If the book of St. Dionysius had contained nothing but the derision and confutation of all we have just read, it is certain that he doth in no way concern himself with the harmless Millenarians, but with the Jews and Judaizers. It is to be clearly seen that Dionysius had nothing in his eye, but the ridiculous excesses of Nepos, and his peculiar tenets upon circumcision, &c.

Lacunza, I suspect, was ignorant of Greek: and seems not to have known that the object of Dionysius was to demonstrate that the Apocalypse was neither authentic nor a canonical book.

Ib. p. 85.

The ruin of Antichrist, with all that is comprehended under that name,

being entirely consummated, and the King of kings remaining master of the field, St. John immediately continues in the 20th chapter, which thus commenceth: *And I saw an angel come down from heaven, &c. And I saw thrones, &c. And when a thousand years are expired, Satan shall be loosed out of his prison.*

It is only necessary to know that the whole book from the first verse to the last is written in symbols, to be satisfied that the true meaning of this passage is simply, that only the great Confessors and Martyrs will be had in remembrance and honor in the Church after the establishment of Christianity throughout the Roman Empire. And observe, it is the souls that the Seer beholds :—there is not a word of the resurrection of the body ;—for this would indeed have been the appropriate symbol of a resurrection in a real and personal sense.

Ib. c. vi. p. 108.

Now this very thing St. John likewise declareth * * to wit, *that they who have been beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and for the word of God, and they who have not worshiped the beast,* these shall live, *or be raised* at the coming of the Lord, *which is the first resurrection.*

Aye! but by what authority is this synonymizing "or" asserted? The Seer not only does not speak of any resurrection, but by the word ψυχάς, souls, expressly asserts the contrary. In no sense of the word can souls, which descended in Christ's train (*chorus sacer animarum et Christi comitatus*) from Heaven, be said *resurgere.* Resurrection is always and exclusively resurrection in the body ;—not indeed a rising of the *corpus* φανταστικόν, that is, the few ounces of carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, hydrogen, and phosphate of lime, the *copula* of which that gave the form no longer exists,—and of which Paul exclaims :—*Thou fool! not this,* &c.—but the *corpus* ὑποστατικὸν, ἢ νούμενον.

But there is yet another and worse wresting of the text. Who that reads Lacunza, p. 108, last line but twelve, would not understand that the Apocalypt had asserted this enthronement of the souls of the Gentile and Judæo-Christian Martyrs which he beheld in the train or suite of the descending Messiah; and that he had first seen them in the descent, and afterward saw thrones assigned to them? Whereas the sentence precedes, and has positively no connection with these souls. The literal interpretation of the symbols c. xx. v. 4, is, "I then beheld the Christian religion the established religion of the state throughout the Roman

empire ;—emperors, kings, magistrates, and the like, all Christians, and administering laws in the name of Christ, that is, receiving the Scriptures as the supreme and paramount law. Then in all the temples the name of Jesus was invoked as the King of glory, and together with him the old afflicted and tormented fellow-laborers with Christ were revived in high and reverential commemoration," &c. But that the whole Vision from first to last, in every sentence, yea, every word, is symbolical, and in the boldest, largest style of symbolic language ; and secondly, that it is a work of disputed canonicity, and at no known period of the Church could truly lay claim to catholicity ;—but for this, I think this verse would be worth a cartload of the texts which the Romanist divines and catechists ordinarily cite as sanctioning the invocation of Saints.

Ib. p. 110.

You will say nevertheless, that even the wicked will be raised incorruptible to inherit incorruption, because being once raised, their bodies will no more change or be dissolved, but must continue entire, forever united with their sad and miserable souls. Well, and would you call this corruption or incorruptibility? Certainly this is not the sense of the Apostle, when he formally assures us, yea, even threatens us, that corruption can not inherit incorruption. *Neither doth corruption inherit incorruption.* What then may this singular expression mean? This is what it manifestly means ;—that no person, whoever he may be, without any exception, who possesseth a corrupt heart and corrupt actions, and therein persevereth unto death, shall have reason to expect in the resurrection a pure, subtile, active and impassible body.

This is actually dangerous tampering with the written letter.

Without touching on the question whether St. Paul in this celebrated chapter (1 *Cor.* xv.) speaks of a partial or of the general resurrection, or even conceding to Lacunza that the former opinion is the more probable ; I must still vehemently object to this Jesuitical interpretation of corruption, as used in a moral sense, and distinctive of the wicked souls. St. Paul nowhere speaks dogmatically or preceptively (not popularly and incidentally) of a soul as the proper *I*. It is always *we*, or the man. How could a regenerate saint put off corruption at the sound of the trump, if up to that hour it did not in some sense or other appertain to him? But what need of many words? It flashes on every reader whose imagination supplies an unpreoccupied, unrefracting, *medium* to the Apostolic assertion, that corruption in

this passage is a descriptive synonyme of the material sensuous organism common to saint and sinner,—standing in precisely the same relation to the man that the testaceous offensive and defensive armor does to the crab and tortoise. These slightly combined and easily decomponible stuffs are as incapable of subsisting under the altered conditions of the earth as an hydatid in the blaze of a tropical sun. They would be no longer *media* of communion between the man and his circumstances.

A heavy difficulty presses, as it appears to me, on Lacunza's system, as soon as we come to consider the general resurrection. Our Lord (in books of indubitable and never doubted catholicity) speaks of some who rise to bliss and glory, others who at the same time rise to shame and condemnation. Now if the former class live not during the whole interval from their death to the general resurrection, including the Millennium, or *Dies Messiæ*, —how should they, whose imperfect or insufficient merits excluded them from the kingdom of the Messiah on earth, be all at once fitted for the kingdom of heaven ?

Ib. ch. vii. p. 118.

It appears to me that this sentence, being looked to attentively, means in good language this only, that the word *quick*, which the Apostles, full of the Holy Spirit, set down, is a word altogether useless, which might without loss have been omitted, and that it were enough to have set down the word *dead:* for by that word alone is the whole expressed, and with much more clearness and brevity.

The narrow outline within which the Jesuits confined the theological reading of their *alumni* is strongly marked in this (in so many respects) excellent work : for example, the "most believing mind," with which Lacunza takes for granted the exploded fable of the Catechumens' (*vulgo* Apostles') Creed having been the quotient of an Apostolic *pic-nic*, to which each of the twelve contributed his several *symbolum*.

Ib. ch. ix. p. 127.

The Apostle, St. Peter, speaking of the day of the Lord, says, that that day will come suddenly, &c. (2 *Pet.* iii. 10.)

There are serious difficulties besetting the authenticity of the Catholic Epistles under the name of Peter ; though there exist no grounds for doubting that they are of the Apostolic age. A large portion too of the difficulties would be removed by the easy and nowise improbable supposition, that Peter, no great scholar or

grammarian, had dictated the substance, the matter, and left the diction and style to his *amanuensis*, who had been an auditor of St. Paul. The tradition which connects, not only Mark, but Luke the Evangelist, the friend and biographer of Paul, with Peter, as a Secretary, is in favor of this hypothesis. But what is of much greater importance, especially for the point in discussion, is the character of these and other similar descriptions of the *Dies Messiæ*, the *Dies ultima*, and the like. Are we bound to receive them as articles of faith? Is there sufficient reason to assert them to have been direct revelations immediately vouchsafed to the sacred writers? I can not satisfy my judgment that there is;—first, because I find no account of any such events having been revealed to the Patriarchs, or to Moses, or to the Prophets; and because I do find these events asserted, and (for aught I have been able to discover), for the first time, in the Jewish Church by uninspired Rabbis, in nearly or altogether the same words as those of the Apostles, and know that before and in the Apostolic age, these anticipations had become popular, and generally received notions; and lastly, because they were borrowed by the Jews from the Greek philosophy, and like several other notions, taken from less respectable quarters, adapted to their ancient and national religious belief. Now I know of no revealed truth that did not originate in Revelation, and find it hard to reconcile my mind to the belief that any Christian truth, any essential article of faith, should have been first made known by the father of lies, or the guess-work of the human understanding blinded by Paganism, or at best without the knowledge of the true God. Of course I would not apply this to any assertion of any New Testament writer, which was the final aim and primary intention of the whole passage; but only to sentences *in ordine ad* some other doctrine or precept, *illustrandi causa*, or *ad hominem*, or *more suasorio sive ad ornaturam, et rhetorice*.

Ib. Part ii. p. 145.

Second characteristic. *The kingdom shall be divided.*—Third characteristic. *The kingdom shall be partly strong and partly brittle.*—Fourth characteristic. *They shall mingle themselves with the seed of men: but they shall not cleave one to another.*

How exactly do these characters apply to the Greek Empire under the successors of Alexander,—when the Greeks were dispersed over the civilized world, as artists, rhetoricians, *gram-*

matici, secretaries, private tutors, parasites, physicians, and the like!

Ib. p. 153.

For to them he thus speaketh in the Gospel: *And then shall they see the Son of man coming in a cloud with power and great glory. And when these things begin to come to pass, then look up, and lift up your heads; for your redemption draweth nigh.*

I can not deny that there is great force and an imposing verisimilitude in this and the preceding chapter, and much that demands silent thought and respectful attention. But still the great question presses on me :—*coming in a cloud!* What is the true import of this phrase? Has not God himself expounded it? To the Son of Man, the Great Apostle assures us, all power is given in heaven and on earth. He became Providence,—that is, a Divine Power behind the cloudy veil of human agency and worldly events and incidents, controlling, disposing, and directing acts and events to the gradual unfolding and final consummation of the great scheme of Redemption; the casting forth of the evil and alien nature from man, and thus effecting the union of the creature with the Creator, of man with God, in and through the Son of Man, even the Son of God made manifest. Now can it be doubted by the attentive and unprejudiced reader of St. Matthew, c. xxiv, that the Son of Man, in fact, came in the utter destruction and devastation of the Jewish Temple and State, during the period from Vespasian to Hadrian, both included; and is it a sufficient reason for our rejecting the teaching of Christ himself, of Christ glorified and in his kingly character, that his Apostles, who disclaim all certain knowledge of the awful event, had understood his words otherwise, and in a sense more commensurate with their previous notions and the prejudices of their education? They communicated their conjectures, but as conjectures, and these too guarded by the avowal, that they had no revelation, no revealed commentary on their Master's words, upon this occasion, the great apocalypse of Jesus Christ while yet in the flesh. For by this title was this great prophecy known among the Christians of the Apostolic age.

Ib. p. 253.

Never, Oh! our Lady! never, Oh! our Mother! shalt thou fall again into the crime of idolatry.

Was ever blindness like unto this blindness? I can imagine but one way of making it seem possible, namely, that this round square or rectilineal curve—this honest Jesuit, I mean—had confined his conception of idolatry to the worship of false gods;—whereas his saints are genuine godlings, and his *Magna Mater* a goddess in her own right;—and that thus he overlooked the meaning of the word.

Ib. p. 254.

The entire text of the Apostle is as follows:—"*Now we beseech you, brethren, by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and by our gathering together unto him, that ye be not soon shaken in mind,* &c. (2 Thess. ii. 1–10.)

O Edward Irving! Edward Irving! by what fascination could your spirit be drawn away from passages like this, to guess and dream over the rhapsodies of the Apocalypse? For rhapsody, according to your interpretation, the Poem undeniably is;—though, rightly expounded, it is a well-knit and highly poetical evolution of a part of this and our Lord's more comprehensive prediction, *Luke* xvii.

Ib. p. 297.

On the ordinary ideas of the coming of Christ in glory and majesty, it will doubtless appear an extravagance to name the Jews, or to take them into consideration; for, according to these ideas, they should hardly have the least particle of our attention.

In comparing this with the preceding chapter I could not help exclaiming: What an excellent book would this Jesuit have written, if Daniel and the Apocalypse had not existed, or had been unknown to, or rejected by, him!

You may divide Lacunza's points of belief into two parallel columns;—the first would be found to contain much that is demanded by, much that is consonant to, and nothing that is not compatible with, reason, the harmony of Holy Writ, and the idea of Christian faith. The second would consist of puerilities and anilities, some impossible, most incredible; and all so silly, so sensual, as to befit a dreaming Talmudist, not a Scriptural Christian. And this latter column would be found grounded on Daniel and the Apocalypse!

NOTES ON NOBLE'S APPEAL. 1827.*

How natural it is to mistake the weakness of an adversary's arguments for the strength of our own cause! This is especially applicable to Mr. Noble's Appeal. Assuredly, as far as Mr. Beaumont's Notes are concerned, his victory is complete.

Sect. iv. p. 210.

The intellectual spirit is moving upon the chaos of minds, which ignorance and necessity have thrown into collision and confusion; and the result will be a new creation. "Nature" (to use the nervous language of an old writer) "will be melted down and recoined; and all will be bright and beautiful."

Alas! if this be possible now, or at any time henceforward, whence came the dross? If nature be bullion that can be melted and thus purified by the conjoint action of heat and elective attraction, I pray Mr. Noble to tell me to what name or *genus* he refers the dross? Will he tell me, to the Devil? Whence came the Devil? And how was the pure bullion so thoughtlessly made as to have an elective affinity for this Devil?

Sect. v. p. 286.

The next anecdote that I shall adduce is similar in its nature to the last. * * * The relater is Dr. Stilling, Counsellor at the Court of the Duke of Baden, in a work entitled *Die Theorie der Geister-Kunde*, printed in 1808.

Mr. Noble is a man of too much English good sense to have relied on Sung's (*alias* Dr. Stilling's) testimony, had he ever read the work in which this passage is found. I happen to possess the work; and a more anile, credulous, and solemn fop never existed since the days of old Audley. It is strange that Mr. Noble should not have heard, that these three anecdotes were first related by Immanuel Kant, and still exist in his miscellaneous writings.

Ib. p. 315.

"Can he be a sane man who records the subsequent reverie as matter of

* An Appeal in behalf of the views of the eternal world and state, and the doctrines of faith and life, held by the body of Christians who believe that a New Church is signified (in the Revelation, c. xxi.) by the New Jerusalem, including Answers to objections, particularly those of the Rev. G. Beaumont, in his work entitled "The Anti-Swedenborg." Addressed to the reflecting of all denominations. By Samuel Noble, Minister of Hanover-Street Chapel, London. London, 1826.—*Ed.*

fact? The Baron informs us, that on a certain night a man appeared to him in the midst of a strong shining light, and said, 'I am God the Lord, the Creator and Redeemer; I have chosen thee to explain to men the interior and spiritual sense of the Sacred Writings; I will dictate to thee what thou oughtest to write!' From this period, the Baron relates he was so illumined, as to behold, in the clearest manner, what passed in the spiritual world, and that he could converse with angels and spirits as with men," &c.

I remember no such passage as this in Swedenborg's works. Indeed it is virtually contradicted by their whole tenor. Swedenborg asserts himself to relate *visa et audita*,—his own experience, as a traveller and visitor of the spiritual world,—not the words of another as a mere *amanuensis*. But altogether this Gulielmus must be a silly Billy.

Ib. p. 321.

The Apostolic canon in such cases is, *Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they be of God.* (1 John iv. 1.) And the touchstone to which they are to be brought is pointed out by the Prophet: *To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no truth in them.* (Is. viii. 20.) But instead of this canon you offer another. * * * It is simply this: Whoever professes to be the bearer of divine communications, is insane. To bring Swedenborg within the operation of this rule, you quote, as if from his own works, a passage which is nowhere to be found in them, but which you seem to have taken from some biographical dictionary or cyclopædia; few or none of which give any thing like a fair account of the matter.

Aye! my memory did not fail me, I find. As to insanity in the sense intended by Gulielmus, namely, as *mania*,—I should as little think of charging Swedenborg with it, as of calling a friend mad who labored under an *acyanoblepsia*.

Ib. p. 323.

Did you never read of one who says, in words very like your version of the Baron's reverie: *It came to pass, that, as I took my journey, and was come nigh unto Damascus, about noon, suddenly there shone from heaven a great light round about me: and I fell on the ground, and heard a voice saying unto me, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?*

In the short space of four years the newspapers contained three several cases, two of which I cut out, and still have among my ocean of papers, and which, as stated, were as nearly parallel, in external accompaniments, to St. Paul's as cases can well be:—struck with lightning,—heard the thunder as an articulate voice,—blind for a few days, and suddenly recovered their sight. But then there was no Ananias, no confirming revelation to an-

other. This it was that justified St. Paul as a wise man in regarding the incident as supernatural, or as more than a providential omen. N.B. Not every revelation requires a sensible miracle as the credential; but every revelation of a new series of *credenda*. The prophets appealed to records of acknowledged authority, and to their obvious sense literally interpreted. The Baptist needed no miracle to attest his right of calling sinners to repentance. See *Exodus* iv. 10.

Ib. pp. 346–7.

This sentiment, that miracles are not the proper evidences of doctrinal truth, is, assuredly, the decision of the Truth itself; as is obvious from many passages in Scripture. We have seen that the design of the miracles of Moses, as external performances, was not to instruct the Israelites in spiritual subjects, but to make them obedient subjects of a peculiar species of political state. And though the miracles of Jesus Christ collaterally served as testimonies to his character, he repeatedly intimates that this was not their main design. * * * At another time more plainly still, he says, that it is *a wicked and adulterous generation* (that) *seeketh after a sign;* on which occasion, according to Mark, *he sighed deeply in his spirit.* How characteristic is that touch of the Apostle, *The Jews require a sign; and the Greeks seek after wisdom!* (where by wisdom he means the elegance and refinement of Grecian literature).

Agreeing, as in the main I do, with the sentiments here expressed by this eloquent writer, I must notice that he has, however, mistaken the sense of the σημεῖον, which the Jews would have tempted our Saviour to show,—namely, the signal for revolt by openly declaring himself their king, and leading them against the Romans. The foreknowledge that this superstition would shortly hurry them into utter ruin caused the deep sigh,—as on another occasion, the bitter tears. Again, by the σοφία of the Greeks their disputatious σοφιστική is meant. The sophists pretended to teach wisdom as an art: and *sophistæ* may be literally rendered, wisdom-mongers, as we say, iron-mongers.

Ib. p. 350.

Some probably will say, "What argument can induce us to believe a man in a concern of this nature who gives no visible credentials to his authority?" * * * But let us ask in return, "Is it worthy of a being wearing the figure of a man to require such proofs as these to determine his judgment?" * * * The beasts act from the impulse of their bodily senses, but are utterly incapable of seeing from reason why they should so act: and it might easily be shown, that while a man thinks and acts under the influence of a miracle, he is as much incapable of perceiving from any rational ground why he should thus think and act, as a beast is. "What!" our opponents

will perhaps reply, * * * "Was it not by miracles that the prophets (some of them) testified their authority? Do you not believe these facts?" Yes, my friends, I do most entirely believe them, &c.

There is so much of truth in all this reasoning on miracles, that I feel pain in the thought that the result is false,—because it was not the whole truth. But this is the grounding, and at the same time pervading, error of the Swedenborgians;—that they overlook the distinction between congruity with reason, truth of consistency, or internal possibility of this or that being objectively real, and the objective reality as fact. Miracles, *quoad* miracles, can never supply the place of subjective evidence, that is, of insight. But neither can subjective insight supply the place of objective sight. The certainty of the truth of a mathematical arch can never prove the fact of its existence. I anticipate the answers; but know that they likewise proceed from the want of distinguishing between ideas, such as God, Eternity, the responsible Will, the Good, and the like,—the actuality of which is absolutely subjective, and includes both the relatively subjective and the relatively objective as higher or transcendent realities, which alone are the proper objects of faith, the great postulates of reason in order to its own admission of its own being;—the not distinguishing, I say, between these, and those positions which must be either matters of fact or fictions. For such latter positions it is that miracles are required in lieu of experience. A.'s testimony of experience supplies the want of the same experience for B. C. D., &c. For example, how many thousands believe the existence of red snow on the testimony of Captain Parry! But who can expect more than hints in a marginal note?

Sect. vi. pp. 378, 379; 380, 381.

In the general views, then, which are presented in the writings of Swedenborg on the subject of Heaven and Hell, as the abodes, respectively, of happiness and misery, while there certainly is not any thing which is not in the highest degree agreeable both to reason and Scripture, there also seems nothing which could be deemed inconsistent with the usual conceptions of the Christian world.

What tends to render thinking readers a little skeptical, is the want of a distinct boundary between the deductions from reason, and the articles, the truth of which is to rest on the Baron's personal testimony, his *visa et audita*. Nor is the Baron himself (as it appears to me) quite consistent on this point.

Ib. p. 434.

Witness, again, the poet Milton, who introduces active sports among the recreations which he deemed worthy of angels, and (strange indeed for a Puritan!) included even dancing among the number.

How could a man of Noble's sense and sensibility bring himself thus to profane the awful name of Milton, by associating it with the epithet "Puritan?"

I have often thought of writing a work to be entitled *Vindiciæ Heterodoxæ, sive celebrium virorum παραδογματιζόντων defensio;* that is, Vindication of Great Men unjustly branded; and at such times the names prominent to my mind's eye have been Giordano Bruno, Jacob Behmen, Benedict Spinoza, and Emanuel Swedenborg. Grant, that the origin of the Swedenborgian theology is a problem; yet on whichever of the three possible hypotheses—(possible I mean for gentlemen, scholars, and Christians)—it may be solved—namely;—1. Swedenborg's own assertion and constant belief in the hypothesis of a supernatural illumination; or, 2. that the great and excellent man was led into this belief by becoming the subject of a very rare, but not (it is said) altogether unique, conjunction of the somnaitive faculty (by which the products of the understanding, that is to say, words, conceptions and the like, are rendered instantaneously into forms of sense) with the voluntary and other powers of the waking state; or, 3. the modest suggestion that the first and second may not be so incompatible as they appear—still it ought never to be forgotten that the merit and value of Swedenborg's system do only in a very secondary degree depend on any one of the three. For even though the first were adopted, the conviction and conversion of such a believer must, according to a fundamental principle of the New Church, have been wrought by an insight into the intrinsic truth and goodness of the doctrines, severally and collectively, and their entire consonance with the light of the written and of the eternal word, that is, with the Scriptures and with the sciential and the practical reason. Or say that the second hypothesis were preferred, and that by some hitherto unexplained affections of Swedenborg's brain and nervous system, he from the year 1743, thought and reasoned through the *medium* and instrumentality of a series of appropriate and symbolic visual and auditaul images, spontaneously rising before him, and these so clear and so distinct, as at length to overpower perhaps his first suspicions of their

subjective nature, and to become objective for him, that is, in his own belief of their kind and origin,—still the thoughts, the reasonings, the grounds, the deductions, the facts illustrative, or in proof, and the conclusions, remain the same; and the reader might derive the same benefit from them as from the sublime and impressive truths conveyed in the Vision of Mirza or the Tablet of Cebes. So much even from a very partial acquaintance with the works of Swedenborg, I can venture to assert; that as a moralist Swedenborg is above all praise; and that as a naturalist, psychologist, and theologian, he has strong and varied claims on the gratitude and admiration of the professional and philosophical student.—April, 1827.

P.S. Notwithstanding all that Mr. Noble says in justification of his arrangement, it is greatly to be regretted that the contents of this work are so confusedly tossed together. It is, however, a work of great merit.

FENELON ON CHARITY.*

Note to pages 196, 197. This chapter is plausible, showy, insinuating, and (as indeed is the character of the whole work) "makes the amiable." To many—to myself formerly,—it has appeared a mere dispute about words; but it is by no means of so harmless a character, for it tends to give a false direction to our thoughts, by diverting the conscience from the ruined and corrupted state, in which we are without Christ. Sin is the disease. What is the remedy? What is the antidote?—Charity? —Pshaw! Charity in the large apostolic sense of the term is the health, the state to be obtained by the use of the remedy, not the sovereign balm itself,—faith of grace,—faith in the God-manhood, the cross, the mediation, and perfected righteousness, of Jesus, to the utter rejection and abjuration of all righteousness of our own! Faith alone is the restorative. The Romish scheme is preposterous;—it puts the rill before the spring. Faith is the source,—charity, that is, the whole Christian life, is the stream from it. It is quite childish to talk of faith being imperfect without charity. As wisely might you say that a fire,

* Communicated by Mr. Gillman.—*Ed.*

however bright and strong, was imperfect without heat, or that the sun, however cloudless, was imperfect without beams. The true answer would be:—it is not faith,—but utter reprobate faithlessness, which may indeed very possibly co-exist with a mere acquiescence of the understanding in certain facts recorded by the Evangelists. But did John, or Paul, or Martin Luther, ever flatter this barren belief with the name of saving faith? No. Little ones! Be not deceived. Wear at your bosoms that precious amulet against all the spells of antichrist, the 20th verse of the 2d chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Galatians:—*I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless, I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life, which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.*

Thus we see even our faith is not ours in its origin: but is the faith of the Son of God graciously communicated to us. Beware, therefore, that you do not frustrate the grace of God: for if righteousness come by the Law, then Christ is dead in vain. If, therefore, we are saved by charity, we are saved by the keeping of the Law, which doctrine St. Paul declared to be an apostasy from Christ, and a bewitching of the soul from the truth. But, you will perhaps say, can a man be saved without charity?—The answer is, a man without charity can not be saved: the faith of the Son of God is not in him.

NOTE ON A SERMON ON THE PREVALENCE OF INFIDELITY AND ENTHUSIASM, BY WALTER BIRCH, B.D.

In the description of enthusiasm, the author has plainly had in view individual characters, and those too in a light, in which they appeared to him; not clear and discriminate ideas. Hence a mixture of truth and error, of appropriate and inappropriate terms, which it is scarcely possible to disentangle. Part applies to fanaticism; part to enthusiasm; and no small portion of this latter to enthusiasm not pure, but as it exists in particular men, modified by their imperfections—and bad because not wholly enthusiasm. I regret this, because it is evidently the discourse of a very powerful mind;—and because I am convinced that the dis-

ease of the age is want of enthusiasm, and a tending to fanaticism. You may very naturally object that the senses, in which I use the two terms, fanaticism and enthusiasm, are private interpretations equally as, if not more than, Mr. Birch's. They are so; but the difference between us is, that without reference to either term, I have attempted to ascertain the existence and diversity of two states of moral being; and then having found in our language two words of very fluctuating and indeterminate use, indeed, but the one word more frequently bordering on the one state, the other on the other, I try to fix each to that state exclusively. And herein I follow the practice of all scientific men, whether naturalists or metaphysicians, and the dictate of common sense, that one word ought to have but one meaning. Thus by Hobbes and others of the materialists, compulsion and obligation were used indiscriminately; but the distinction of the two senses is the condition of all moral responsibility. Now the effect of Mr. Birch's use of the words is to continue the confusion. Remember, we could not reason at all, if our conceptions and terms were not more single and definite than the things designated. Enthusiasm is the absorption of the individual in the object contemplated from the vividness or intensity of his conceptions and convictions: fanaticism is heat, or accumulation and direction, of feeling acquired by contagion, and relying on the sympathy of sect or confederacy; intense sensation with confused or dim conceptions. Hence the fanatic can exist only in a crowd, from inward weakness anxious for outward confirmation; and, therefore, an eager proselyter and intolerant. The enthusiast, on the contrary, is a solitary, who lives in a world of his own peopling, and for that cause is disinclined to outward action. Lastly, enthusiasm is susceptible of many degrees (according to the proportionateness of the objects contemplated), from the highest grandeur of moral and intellectual being, even to madness; but fanaticism is one and the same, and appears different only from the manners and original temperament of the individual. There is a white and a red heat; a sullen glow as well as a crackling flame; cold-blooded as well as hot-blooded fanaticism. Enthusiasts, ἐνθουσιασταὶ from ἔνθεος, οἷς ὁ θεὸς ἔνεστι, or possibly from ἐν θυσίαις, those who, in sacrifice to, or at, the altar of truth or falsehood, are possessed by a spirit or influence mightier than their own individuality. *Fanatici—qui circum fana favorem mutuo contrahunt et afflant*—those who

in the same conventicle, or before the same shrine, relique or image, heat and ferment by co-acervation.

I am fully aware that the words are used by the best writers indifferently, but such must be the case in very many words in a composite language, such as the English, before they are desynonymized. Thus imagination and fancy; chronicle and temporal, and many others.

NOTES ON LETTERS FROM SPAIN BY DON LEUCADIO DOBLADO.

Pp. 111, 112.

I have often heard the question, how could such men as Bossuet and Fénelon adhere to the Church of Rome and reject the Protestant Faith? The answer appears to me obvious. Because, according to their fixed principles on this matter, they must have been either Catholics or Infidels. Laying it down as an axiom, that Christianity was chiefly intended to reveal a system of doctrines necessary for salvation, they naturally and constantly inferred the existence of an authorized judge upon questions of faith, otherwise the inevitable doubts arising from private judgment would defeat the object of revelation.

THE most striking, certainly, and most fearful, but far from the only, instance of the practical mischiefs resulting from the confusion of Belief and Faith. In the German the same word expresses both, viz. *Glaube*. A grievous defect! But even where this is not the case, as in the Latin and in our own language, by how many divines are they regarded, as synonymes! The great Object of Christianity is *Faith*, fealty to the spiritual in our humanity, to that which indeed contra-distinguishes us as human, to that power, in which the Will, the Reason and the Conscience are three in One, and by which alone spiritual truths, *i. e.* the only living and substantial truths, can be discerned. To this power, under the name of Faith, every thought of the understanding, of the mind of the Flesh, must be brought into subjection. And belief of particular Dogmata, *i. e.* the perception of the arguments for, over those against, their verity, is then only essential, when such belief is implied in the state of Faith. Hence St. Paul tolerates many, and those not trifling errors of belief, even while he exposes them. Be satisfied, each of you,

in his own mind, and exercise charity toward such of the Brethren, as profess different persuasions; but cling all of you to the bond of love in the unity of Faith. Yet how early the dangerous identification of the two words began, we learn from the Epistle of James, who, arguing *ex absurdo* on the assumption, that Faith means Belief, justly remarks—The Devils believe, and so thoroughly too, that they believe and tremble. Belief, therefore, can not be the proper and essential ground of Salvation in the soul. But Faith *is*, and by Christ himself is solemnly declared to be so. Therefore, Belief can not be the same as Faith! though the Belief of the truths essential to the Faith in Christ is the necessary accompaniment and consequent of the Faith. *Ex. gr.* I can not sincerely trust in Christ, and entirely love the Lord Jesus, without at the same time believing, first, that he is, and secondly, that he is most trust- and love-worthy. But I can love him, trust in him, and earnestly desire to obey his commands, without having even heard of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary, or having troubled my head respecting even her aei-partheny.

Pp. 156, 157.

The unresisting nun put the water to her lips, and stopped. The physician was urging her to proceed, when to his great amazement he found the contents of the glass reduced to one lump of ice.

I wonder that I never asked Mr. White what he really meant by the insertion of this *thumper*. Perhaps I had passed over this page and the opposite, the leaves sticking: for I certainly read the volume, when first sent to me by the author.

P. 157.

Our visit to the other convent made me acquainted with one of the most pitiable objects ever produced by superstition—a *reluctant* nun.

Say rather a *diseased*.

A sense of decorum, and the utter hopelessness of relief, keep the bitter regrets of many an imprisoned female a profound secret to all but their confessor. In the present case, however, the vehemence of the sufferer's feelings had laid open to the world the state of her harassed mind. She was a good-looking woman, of little more than thirty: but the contrast between the monastic weeds, and an indescribable air of wantonness which, in spite of all caution, marked her every glance and motion, raised a mixed feeling of disgust and pity, that made us uncomfortable during the whole visit.

And I should fear that in this climate, cases of nymphomania in the Nunneries are not rare.

P. 157. Continued from "lump of ice."

We had the account of this wonder from the clergyman who introduced us to the nun. Of his veracity I can entertain no doubt (!! S. T. C.): while he on the other hand was equally confident of Doctor Carnero's.

Pray, was not Dr. Carnero put to his oath whether he had ascertained that it was water and not ice in the glass when the attendant brought it to him? But the more probable solution is, that Dr. Carnero was humming the clergyman.

P. 167.

In the intervals of the dance we were sometimes treated with dramatic scenes, of which the dialogue is composed on the spot by the actors. This amusement is not uncommon in country towns. It is known by the name of *juegos*—a word literally answering to *plays*.

Qy? The same as the Venetian Fabas, to which Gozzi's genius has given celebrity?

Notes to Doblado's Letters, p. 412.

The dispute on the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin began between the Dominicans and Franciscans as early as the thirteenth century.

It may deserve attention from the zealous advocates of the authenticity of the *Evangelium Infantiæ* prefixed to the Gospel of Luke, and concorporated with the canonical revision of Matthew's—whether the immaculate conceptien of the Virgin is not a legitimate corollary of the miraculous conception of our Lord, so far at least that the same reason, that rendered it incompossible for him to have a maculate father, is equally cogent for the necessity of an immaculate mother.

But alas! in subjects of this sort we can only stave off the difficulty. It is a point in a circle, on whichever side we remove from it, we are sure to come round to it again. So here. Either the Virgin's ancestors, paternal and maternal, from Adam and Eve downward, were all sinless; or her immediate father and mother were not so, but like the rest of mankind, involved in original sin. But if a sin-stained father and mother could produce an immaculate offspring in one instance, why not in the other? That the union of the Divine Word with the seed and nature of man should preclude the contagion of sin in the Holy Child, is as much to be expected on the one supposition of our Lord's birth as on the other. So far from being a greater miracle, it seems so necessarily involved in the miracle of the Incar-

nation, common to both, as scarcely to be worthy of being called an additional miracle. The accidental circumstance, that the Unitarian party, most palpably to their own* disadvantage, reject or question the chapter in question, is the chief cause of the horror, with which our orthodox divines recoil from every free investigation of the point.

NOTE ON SOUTHEY'S OMNIANA.

GIFT OF TONGUES.

Vol. i. p. 226.

In no instance is the love of the marvellous more strikingly exhibited than in the ordinary interpretations of this plain and simple narration of St. Luke's. On the inrush of the Spirit the new converts of Jesus from all parts of the Roman empire then met at Jerusalem, rushed out of the house, and addressed the crowd, each his own countrymen, and, to the scandal of some and surprise of all, in the vernacular dialects instead of the sacred (Syro-Chaldaic) language,—just as if a man should pray aloud in a Catholic Church in any other than Latin prayers. The Apostles sate still the while. At length, observing the workings in the minds of the auditors, the twelve rose at once, and Peter, as the Foreman, made the address recorded, and expressly tells them, that the *miracle* they had witnessed, was a fulfilment of Joel's prophecy, viz. that laymen should preach in the Spirit in the common tongues.

* The conception by the overshadowing of the Holy Spirit being the only plausible explanation, which a Socinian can give to the often-repeated antithesis Son of God and Son of Man, of one and the same person. The believer in the Trinity, the Incarnation of the Filial God, and Redemption by the Blood of the divine Mediator, has an interest therefore in the removal, rather than in the up-propment, of this strongest, nay, only, buttress of the *extreme* Heresy.

NOTES ON THE MISCELLANEOUS WORKS OF ROBERT ROBINSON, IN FOUR VOLUMES.

Vol. iii. p. 42.

A PLEA for the divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Let us take a single passage of the Old Testament, and let us see what the application of it to Jesus Christ proves. John the Baptist sends two of his disciples to Jesus Christ to ask him whether he were the expected Messiah, &c.

I scarcely miss any *desiderand* in this fine treatise, but an occasional reply to, or rather anticipation of, natural and unavoidable objections, not from the Socinians, but from the sincere searchers after truth. A case is very imperfectly stated by giving the arguments on *one* side. *Audi alteram partem.* Now I confess, that all the arguments *ostensibly* in favor of Socinianism would, if proved and real, be *to me* proofs of Deism or rejection of Revelation. Therefore those not grounded on verbal criticisms and trifles of that sort, but on plain common sense, ought to be met or anticipated. Such is the present instance. John had baptized Christ, his own cousin, of whom such miracles must have been told him both by his aunt Mary and his mother Elizabeth. At the baptism he recognized him as the Messiah from Heaven; yet *now* he sends to inquire as of one unknown.

P. 69.

We will illustrate this remark by two passages from the worthy and reverend Mr. Lindsey. These are his words:—

—Rev. v. 13. *Blessing and honor be unto him, that sitteth on the throne, and to the Lamb forever and ever.* The blessing and honor is tendered to the object PRESENT and VISIBLE. But we have observed in St. Stephen's case, that idolatry doth not consist in worshiping an *invisible* object. The *visibility* and the *invisibility* of the object have nothing to do with the nature of the act.

In this paragraph, as likewise in pages 27, 28, Robinson has fallen into an unintentional sophism; first in making "worship" a specific, whereas it is a general term to be specified by its object. "The people fell on their faces, and worshiped God and the King."—(David.)—*Chronicles.* Secondly (herein perhaps misled by Lindsey's lax phraseology), in confining the words "seen" and "unseen" to the sight, whereas the word was meant to imply the knowledge of actual, yet contingent, presence, however obtained. Surely a blind man (see p. 27) may discover that

such a one is in the room as certainly as one with eyes. Expressed philosophically, Lindsey's argument would run thus: Worship is either of God or of a creature; but the former is distinguished from the latter by always implying the acknowledgment of *necessary* presence (*i. e.* omni-presence); while in the latter an accidental presence (*ergo* absence elsewhere) only is attributed. The people worshiped, *i. e. adored religiously*, the omnipresent Jehovah, and they likewise worshiped, *i. e. honored and did homage to*, King David, who *happened* then to be present. Now the *essence* of idolatry consists in destroying the essence of all religion, viz.—the sense of necessary presence, by attributing it to a creature, or *vice versa*, by attributing accidental and creaturely presence to the Creator. I agree therefore with Lindsey, that the *divine* worship of Christ can not be *certainly* declared from *this* text, which *may* be explained as *χριστοδουλεία* and not *χριστολατρεία*; though the words "forever and ever" would incline me to the latter. But that Christ was visually present to St. Stephen at the moment of his death is a mere presumption of the Unitarians. Besides, are we not commanded to pray to God *through* Jesus Christ, our *Lord* and *Mediator?* Now it is impossible for me to pray to A. through B. without implying that B. hears my prayer either first, or at the same time as A. Whatever presence is attributed to A. is equally applied to B. In the present instance this is omnipresence. Therefore the Unitarian, who obeys the Scripture, adores Christ as God.

P. 75.

> The Lord Jesus encouraged his followers to believe, that the Spirit of truth should abide with them forever: yet it appears by the event, Jesus Christ did not include in the promise that first great truth of Christianity, on which all the rest are founded, the doctrine of his *person*, &c.

Though there is doubtless a certain degree of weight in this argument, yet, I think, Robinson rests too much upon it, and repeats it too often; for it is a fact not less certain than melancholy, that an immense majority of Christians (*ex. gr.* all the Russias, all the Christians of Asia, and of Africa, and of South America, the larger and more populous portions of Poland and of Germany, nine tenths of France, and all Spain, Portugal, Italy, Sicily, &c. &c.) have been given up to the most despicable and idolatrous superstitions. When Christ comes shall he find faith on the earth? I say unto you, Nay.

P. 84.

Thus far, my brethren, revelation conducts the plain Christian traveller; here it stops; and, as he who goes forward must travel either without a guide or with one who is ignorant of the road, we ought not to be astonished if he lose his way. Happy for Christians had they rested here without *philosophical explications*. Were this a proper place (but I am not writing on the doctrine of the Trinity), I believe it would be very easy to prove, that the primitive Christians received this simple testimony just as revelation gave it; and that when, about 200 years after Christ, they began to practise the art of explaining what they did not understand, they produced a novel notion called a Trinity, and with it disputes, creeds, subscriptions, proscriptions, persecutions, wars, and other calamitous consequences, which have disgraced Christianity and Christians from that day to this.

A Scripture Trinity undoubtedly there is:—but our present concern is with our Lord's divinity.

Is this not strange? If not writing on the Trinity, how could he justify this harsh gratis dictum ("a novel notion called a Trinity") to plain unlearned people? If there be "undoubtedly a Scripture Trinity" there must be a Scripture Triunity: and what other there can be than that of the Nicene Creed, or wherein this differs from Scripture, I am at a loss even to imagine. *All* Scripture from Genesis to the Apocalypse declares, there is but one God. In the New Testament three distinct Agents are spoken of, the Father, the Son, and the Paraclete or Holy Ghost. (My *Father* and *I* will come and *we* will dwell with you.—Sins against the Father and against the Son may be expiated; but not against the Holy Ghost, &c. &c.) to each of these the name, names, and incommunicable attributes of the Supreme Being are given. Ergo, there are three, and these Three are One.—This is the Scripture Trinity; and what other is contained in the Nicene Creed? Of the unauthorized creed of the fierce individual, whom from ignorance of his real name we may call Pseudo-Athanasius, I agree with many learned and orthodox Fathers of the English Church in wishing that *we were well rid*.

Q. Does not the Christian faith discard reason?

A. God forbid! Reason asks and obtains evidence that God speaks, and Faith believes what He says. Is it irrational to believe him who *can not lie?* (*Titus* i. 2.) A believer admits the *evidence of things* NOT SEEN. By faith Noah, being warned of God OF THINGS NOT SEEN AS YET, prepared an Ark. By faith Abraham, when he was called, obeyed, and went out, NOT KNOWING WHITHER HE WENT. *All* the Patriarchs *died*

in the belief of a proposition, of which they had but obscure and imperfect ideas (Heb. xi.) A philosopher speculates objects with his own eyes; a believer beholds them, as it were, with the eyes of God himself. A Christian neither hides his reason in a napkin, nor drives an illicit trade with it; he puts it into the hands of the best exchanger, and receives his own with usury.

Here is the gap in the evidence: and unless this be filled up, all the rest can but perplex the mind. Reason *can not* obtain evidence, that it is God who hath spoken, unless what is spoken is compatible with the co-existence (or, if I dared coin such a phrase, with the *sub-existence* at least) of Reason. As the groundwork therefore of all positive proof, the negative condition must be pre-monstrated, that the doctrine does not contradict, though it may and must transcend, the Reason; that it is incomprehensible but not absurd.

P. 89.

Men mistake by not distinguishing objects of *pure* revelation from objects of natural reason, and therefore they confound believing with reasoning. I am not required to believe any thing about the moon; it is a sensible object, and I am to look at it, and to reason about it. God requires me to believe the deity of Jesus Christ. Deity is an invisible object. I never saw nor ever conceived an object analogous to it. I can not reason about it; I believe it.

This is strange! We can not believe without knowing what it is we believe, and this we can not know but by distinguishing it from all other notions, at least by *negatives*—and what is this but reasoning? A. can not be at once one and three, *reasons* the Socinian. Not in the same sense, reasons the Trinitarian; but A., which in one sense is *three*, in another sense may be *one*. Both alike *reason;* or they could not believe. Were I to work a miracle and then say to an illiterate Englishman, εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος, ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης, is a divine truth, men might have good reason to believe my *veracity*, and that *something* (*what*, *I* knew, though *he* did not) was true; but *that* truth he could not believe. I dwell the more on this, because I am convinced by experience, that this mode of arguing is, and has been, the main occasion of Socinianism in liberal minds. It is one thing to *apprehend*, and another to *comprehend*. Reason apprehends the existence of the Supreme Being, though that Being alone can comprehend it.

P. 98.

There are many passages in the New Testament, which express the inferiority of Jesus Christ to the Father. *My Father is GREATER than I,—ALL power is GIVEN unto me,—Of that day knoweth no man, no not the angels, NEITHER THE SON; but the Father.* If I embrace the doctrine of Christ's mere humanity, I meet with no difficulty in two of these texts, and but a few in the middle one.

I believe that the sense of this text (which, in its ordinary interpretation seems equally hostile to the Socinian and the Trinitarian, and therefore naturally the pet text of the Arians) is—"no not the Angels—neither the Son in his character as contra-distinguished from the Father, but as one with the Father or as in the Father." Were the sense what the Arians suppose, the words should be ἀλλὰ μόνος ὁ Πατὴρ—but the Father alone. This confirmed by the corresponding text in St. Mark.

POSTSCRIPT.

Proofs and Illustrations of the Divinity of Jesus Christ.

P. 120.

There is (if I may express my meaning so) a real and a relative infinity. Real infinity belongs to God alone. Relative infinity may belong to one creature in regard to another.

The real distinction is infinite *improprie, i. e. præter numerum;* and infinite *proprie, i. e. contra numerum, quicquid numerum excludit.* The one (as the material Universe for instance) is the excess of number and measure—the other (pure spirit) is the opposite, the contradiction, to number and measure. The immortality of the first created Angel may, or will hereafter, include the excess of time—God's eternity the absence of time.

P. 124.

Had I been born a Greenlander, I should have said, "My kajak did not make itself. More skill is displayed in the structure of the meanest bird, than in that of the best kajak, and more still in that of man than in the composition of either."

Had Robinson been a Greenlander he would have thought thus: My kajak was *made*—the bird *grew*—and never have reasoned from one to the other.

P. 130.

Plato, who travelled into Egypt to improve his knowledge, learnt the

Jewish notion of Memra or Logos, and, affixing ideas to the term, of which the ancient Jews had never thought, returned it to the Jews in his writings, full of dark, pagan, enigmatical ideas. All things were new except the term. It was Moses Atticized indeed!

It became fashionable in time for men of science to speak and think as Plato spoke and thought; and Philo the Jew, and after him many Christian divines, took up the *Platonic* Logos, and thus brought the *Memra* of the old Targumists, and the Logos of St. John, into obscurity and disguise; although it does not appear that St. John knew any thing about Plato's ideas of it.

I suspect that Robinson had not studied Plato or Philo very profoundly. Horsley did not hesitate to pronounce the agreement of the Platonic with the Christian Trinity.

Vol. IV. Sermon VII.

The Sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures.

P. 17.

And on this principle we prize the understandings of those, who give sailors Bibles *only*, because the gift implies several just and honorable principles; principles, I mean, which do honor to the understandings and hearts of those, who admit them.

First this donation implies, that, in the opinion of the donor, the Bible is a *plain*, easy book; either that all the truths of revelation are simple, plain, and clear, or that such truths as are essential to salvation are so.

!! What if I were to call Newton's *Principia* a plain, easy book because certain detached passages were axiomatic, and because the results were evident to common sense?—What? The Pentateuch? The Solomon's Song? The Prophets in general, and Ezekiel in particular? What? The Ecclesiastes? The praise of Jael? of Ehud? of David? What? St. John's Gospel and his Revelation? The *apparent* discordances of the Evangelists in the most important narrations, as that of the Resurrection? What? St. Paul's Epistles, declared by a contemporary Apostle, dark and hard? are these parts of a plain and easy book?

The writer of the preceding note reverences the Bible, he trusts, as much, and believes its contents with a far stricter consistency with Protestant orthodoxy (in the common received meaning of the word, orthodoxy), than the amiable author of this discourse, as appears by his own letters.—But never, never can he believe, that the many and various writings of so many various and distant ages,

as brought together form the book; that this book, or *collectaneum*, the interpretation of which *has* occupied, and will occupy all the highest powers of the noblest and best intellects even to the consummation of all things, can be called *in toto*, or even on the average, "a plain and easy book." That what is necessary for each man's salvation (in *his* particular state, he making the best use of the means in his power, and walking humbly with his God), is sufficiently plain for that *his* purpose, the writer of this note cheerfully acknowledges, and with thanks to the Author of all inspiration and of all good gifts.

P. 18.

The nature and perfections of God, the superintendence of Providence, the folly, the guilt, the misery of sin, the purity and perfection of the law, the depravity of human nature, the imperfection of unassisted knowledge and obedience, the nature and offices of Christ, the place and use of Scripture, the influence of the Holy Spirit, the nature and necessity of faith and obedience, the promise of eternal life to the righteous, the threatening of endless punishments to the wicked, the resurrection of the dead and the final judgment, how clear and explicit are the oracles of God on all these important subjects!

And yet on every one of these points have long and obstinate controversies been carried on by learned and by unlearned. And yet scarce one can be mentioned, which some one sect does not interpret in a sense different from, or opposite to, that of another.

Ib.

Some pretended mysteries are not Scripture propositions at all, but mere creatures of the schools. Others called mysteries are contained in Scripture, but are not mysteries; the Lord's Supper never was accounted a mystery till transubstantiation made it so.

Whoo!

P. 19.

Secondly: the donation of a Bible only, implies, that each reader hath *a right of private judgment*. This is another just notion, truly Scriptural, and entirely Protestant. To give a man a book to read, and to deny him the right of judging of its meaning, seems the summit of absurdity. What pity that such absurdity should not be universally exploded! A right founded in nature, attached inalienably by the God of nature to the very existence of mankind, openly avowed and confirmed by Scripture, constantly exercised by all, even by such as deny it (for who does not think for himself?) this right, I say, can not be evaded without the greatest inconsistency.

Doubtless!—but may there not be folly in giving a child (and

an ignorant man is a child in knowledge) a book he can not understand, without any assistance to enable him so to do? To an ignorant man I would not give Newton at all: for not only he can not understand it, but he may do very well without it. To the same man I would give the Bible, though a very large part would be worse than unintelligible, for it would be misintelligible —yet as it does concern him, I would give it, only with "all the means and appliances to boot," that would preclude a dangerous misinterpretation.

Sermon XI. *On Sacramental Tests.*

P. 108.

We suppose our Saviour in the text forbade the exercise of this parental dominion in his favor. It was to his honor that he did so, for had he directed,—impose my name upon all your descendants without their knowledge or consent; introduce the unjust and capricious *patriæ potestas* of the Romans into my kingdom, and let the Christian Church be the wise and the ignorant, the profligate and the pure; he would have rendered his Gospel suspected. It would have seemed what it ought not to seem, as if it shrunk from a fair investigation.

This dominion which hath been exercised for many ages, continues to be so. When children first begin to think, Christianity is not proposed to their examination, but they are informed they are Christians already disposed of by a contract made for them by proxies whom they are taught to call godfathers and godmothers, who promised and vowed three things in their name, that they should renounce Satan and the pomps of the world, that they should believe all the articles of the Christian faith, and that they should keep God's holy commandments all the days of their lives; and when they are asked whether they hold themselves bound to perform these engagements of their proxies, each is taught to answer, yes verily, and by God's help so I will.

I hope such of you, my brethren, as practise the baptism of infants, will not imagine I am censuring you. You baptize infants because you sincerely believe infant baptism is agreeable to Scripture, but you do not incorporate them into your churches.

Who dare presume himself secure against prejudice, when the Historian of Baptism could so merge in himself the rational common-sense Robert Robinson, as to call from his pen such *Rousseau* trash as is contained in this paragraph!!—What? Do not the Baptists teach their children to pray to and through Christ long before they can understand Christianity? Do they defer teaching them to read and write till the age of discretion has enabled them to have such a conviction of its advantages, as inspires the spon-

taneous wish, produces a request to be taught? In the English Church does not Confirmation supply the same means as Baptism with the Baptists? When the Baptist says, "I attribute no saving importance to Baptism, no loss of divine power to Infant Baptism; but I think myself obliged to obey Christ scrupulously, and, believing that he did not command Infant Baptism, but on the contrary Baptism under conditions incompatible with infancy (faith and repentance) therefore I can not with innocence, because I can not in faith, baptize an infant at all, or an adult otherwise than by immersion;—" I honor the man, and incline to his doctrine as the more Scriptural. But to declaim about offering Christianity to a child's *choice* and *judgment*, and to treat the inculcation of it on his docile and believing spirit as a truth and a duty, as being an instance of superstition and *tyrannidos patriæ*—O this should have been in the *Emilius* of the sickly Genevan, not in the sober sermon of Robert Robinson!

When Constantine entered the Christian Church, he brought along with him all his imperial titles and his absolute dominion. Like a true politician he joined himself to the most numerous and the most powerful party of Christians, and they being at the same time the least enlightened and the most depraved of all other parties of Christians, taught him to exercise his pagan authority over all his subjects both Pagan and Christian.

This assertion should have been accompanied with proofs.

P. 118.

In brief they refused to conform; and for non-conformity they suffered fines and bonds, exile and death. I own it is not in my power to censure this numerous host of Christians.

But these very non-conformists were, nine out of ten, equally eager and pitiless in imposing their Covenant Oath and the articles of Westminster, and as soon as they possessed the power in North America, began hanging and imprisoning and burning with more than episcopal glee. In short, Intolerance was the vice of the age, not of particular sects, though Toleration was the peculiar virtue and glory of the Quakers and Independents.

P. 122.

Some complain of a profanation of a sacred institute. Whether we, sinful men, have any religion or not, surely there are some who have given unsuspected proofs of piety; and they say, we always think of the Supreme Being with the most profound reverence; we consider the worship of him with the deepest veneration as the most serious and important business of life; we adore the Father of mankind for all his works, and chiefly for send-

ing his Son to enlighten our minds, and to regulate our actions; and when we behold the holy institutes of a kingdom not of this world, now imposed upon the wicked, and now refused to the good diverted from the original end of their appointment, and prostituted to secular purposes, we blush and tremble at the sight.

I don't know exactly *how* it is, but *so* it is, that the same phrases which in the New Testament I read with awe and delight, yet introduced as they are in this paragraph and a thousand others of like kind in other writings, shock me with the grossness of the *anthropomorphism*. In the New Testament God assumes the Human Nature (*νούμενον*)—In paragraphs like these the author seems to turn God into man (*φαινόμενον*).

P. 123.

But it is not this sort of men, it is not atheists, deists and profligates, upon whom the test law is intended to spend its force, but another, a class of virtuous characters, exposed to scorn for imaginary offences called schism and heresy. Yet what have states to do with heresy? They create the crime and then punish it; but could statesmen be persuaded to let religion alone, there would remain no such crime to be punished. Among the brave and virtuous Goths, there was no such word in all their primitive codes of law; and *opinions the most preposterous do no injury to the state*, as daily experience proves. Where men's lives are innocent their speculations ought to be free.

No! neither do the nits in a child's head bite him; but nits become lice. Adders before birth have no fangs, but we kill the young in the mother's womb.

DEFINITION OF MIRACLE.

A PHÆNOMENON in no connection with any other phænomenon, as its immediate cause, is a miracle; and what is believed to have been such, is miraculous for the person so believing. When it is strange and surprising, that is, without any analogy in our former experience, it is called a miracle. The kind defines the thing:—the circumstances the word.*

To stretch out my arm is a miracle, unless the materialists

* A reader of this definition compared it with the following saying of Doctor Johnson: "There is undoubtedly a sense in which all life is miraculous, as it is an union of powers of which we can image no connection, a succession of motions of which the first cause must be supernatural."—*Life of Sir Thomas Browne.*—S. C.

should be more cunning than they have proved themselves hitherto. To reanimate a dead man by an act of the will, no intermediate agency employed, not only is, but is called, a miracle. A Scripture miracle, therefore, must be so defined, as to express, not only its miraculous essence, but likewise the condition of its appearing miraculous; add therefore to the preceding, the words *præter omnem priorem experientiam.*

It might be defined likewise an effect, not having its cause in any thing congenerous. That thought calls up thought is no more miraculous than that a billiard ball moves a billiard ball; but that a billiard ball should excite a thought, that is, be perceived, is a miracle, and, were it strange, would be called such. For take the converse, that a thought should call up a billiard ball! Yet where is the difference, but that the one is a common experience, the other never yet experienced?

It is not strictly accurate to affirm, that every thing would appear a miracle, if we were wholly uninfluenced by custom, and saw things as they are:—for then the very ground of all miracles would probably vanish, namely, the heterogeneity of spirit and matter. For the *quid ulterius?* of wonder, we should have the *ne plus ultra* of adoration.

Again—the word miracle has an objective, a subjective, and a popular meaning; as objective,—the essence of a miracle consists in the heterogeneity of the consequent and its causative antecedent:—as subjective,—in the assumption of the heterogeneity. Add the wonder and surprise excited, when the consequent is out of the course of experience, and we know the popular sense and ordinary use of the word.

NOTE ON THEOLOGICAL LECTURES OF BENJAMIN WHEELER, D.D.

Vol. i. p. 77. A miracle, usually so termed, is the exertion of a supernatural power in some act, and contrary to the regular course of nature, &c.

Where is the proof of this as drawn from Scripture, from fact recorded, or from doctrine affirmed? Where the proof of its logical possibility,—that is, that the word has any representable sense? Contrary to $2 \times 2 = 4$ is $2 \times 2 = 5$, or that the same

fire acting at the same moment on the same subject should burn it and not burn it.

The course of nature is either one with, or a reverential synonyme of, the ever present divine agency; or it is a self-subsisting derivative from, and dependent on, the divine will. In either case this author's assertion would amount to a charge of self-contradiction on the Author of all things. Before the spread of Grotianism, or the Old Bailey *nolens volens* Christianity, such language was unexampled. A miracle is either *super naturam*, or it is simply *præter experientiam*. If nature be a collective term for the sum total of the mechanical powers,—that is, of the act first manifested to the senses in the conductor A, arriving at Z by the sensible chain of intermediate conductors, B, C, D, &c.;—then every motion of my arm is *super naturam*. If this be not the sense, then nature is but a wilful synonyme of experience, and then the first noticed aerolithes, Sulzer's first observation of the galvanic arch, &c. must have been miracles.

As erroneous as the author's assertions are logically, so false are they historically, in the effect, which the miracles in and by themselves did produce on those, who, rejecting the doctrine, were eye-witnesses of the miracles;—and psychologically, in the effect which miracles, as miracles, are calculated to produce on the human mind. Is it possible that the author can have attentively studied the first two or three chapters of St. John's gospel?

There is but one possible tenable definition of a miracle,—namely, an immediate consequent from a heterogeneous antecedent. This is its essence. Add the words *præter experientiam adhuc*, or *id temporis*, and you have the full and popular or practical sense of the term miracle.*

ASGILL'S ARGUMENT.

That according to the covenant of eternal life revealed in the Scriptures, man may be translated from hence into that eternal life, without passing through death, although the human nature of Christ himself could not be thus translated till he had passed through death. Edit. 1715.

If I needed an illustrative example of the distinction between

* See The Friend, Essay ii., II. pp. 388-399.—*Ed.*

the reason and the understanding, between spiritual sense and logic, this treatise of Asgill's would supply it. Excuse the defect of all idea, or spiritual intuition of God, and allow yourself to bring Him as plaintiff or defendant into a common-law court,—and then I can not conceive a clearer or cleverer piece of special pleading than Asgill has here given. The language is excellent —idiomatic, simple, perspicuous, at once significant and lively, that is, expressive of the thought, and also of a manly proportion of feeling appropriate to it. In short, it is the ablest attempt to exhibit a scheme of religion without ideas, that the inherent contradiction in the thought renders possible.

It is of minor importance how a man represents to himself his redemption by the Word Incarnate,—within what scheme of his understanding he concludes it, or by what supposed analogies (though actually no better than metaphors) he tries to conceive it, provided he has a lively faith in Christ, the Son of the living God, and his Redeemer, the faith may and must be the same in all who are thereby saved; but every man more or less, construes it into an intelligible belief through the shaping and coloring optical glass of his own individual understanding. Mr. Asgill has given a very ingenious common-law scheme. *Valeat quantum valere potest!* It would make a figure before the Benchers of the Middle Temple. For myself, I prefer the belief that man was made to know that a finite free agent could not stand but by the coincidence, and independent harmony, of a separate will with the will of God. For only by the will of God can he obey God's will. Man fell as a soul to rise a spirit. The first Adam was a living soul; the last a life-making spirit.

In the Word was life, and that life is the light of men. And as long as the light abides within its own sphere, that is, appears as reason,—so long it is commensurate with the life, and is its adequate representative. But not so, when this light shines downward into the understanding; for there it is always, more or less, refracted, and differently in every different individual; and it must be re-converted into life to rectify itself, and regain its universality, or *all-commonness*, *Allgemeinheit*, as the German more expressibly says. Hence in faith and charity the church is catholic: so likewise in the fundamental articles of belief, which constitute the right reason of faith. But in the minor *dogmata*, in modes of exposition, and the vehicles of faith and reason to the

understandings, imaginations, and affections of men, the churches may differ, and in this difference supply one object for charity to exercise itself on by mutual forbearance.

O! there is a deep philosophy in the proverbial phrase,—"his heart sets his head right!" In our commerce with heaven, we must cast our local coins and tokens into the melting pot of love, to pass by weight and bullion. And where the balance of trade is so immensely in our favor, we have little right to complain, though they should not pass for half the nominal value they go for in our own market.

P. 46.

And I am so far from thinking this covenant of eternal life to be an allusion to the forms of title amongst men, that I rather adore it as the precedent for them all, from which our imperfect forms are taken: believing with that great Apostle, that *the things on earth are but the patterns of things in the heavens, where the originals are kept.*

Aye! this, is the pinch of the argument, which Asgill should have proved, not merely asserted. Are these human laws, and these forms of law, absolutely good and wise, or only conditionally so—the limited powers and intellect, and the corrupt will of men being considered?

P. 64.

And hence, though the dead shall not arise with the same identity of matter with which they died, yet being in the same form, they will not know themselves from themselves, being the same to all uses, intents, and purposes. * * * * But then as God, in the resurrection, is not bound to use the same matter, neither is he obliged to use a different matter.

The great objection to this part of Asgill's scheme, which has had, and still, I am told, has, many advocates among the chief dignitaries of our church, is—that it either takes death as the utter extinction of being,—or it supposes a continuance, or at least a renewal, of consciousness after death. The former involves all the irrational, and all the immoral, consequences of materialism. But if the latter be granted, the proportionality, adhesion, and symmetry, of the whole scheme are gone, and the infinite quantity,—that is, immortality under the curse of estrangement from God,—is rendered a mere supplement tacked on to the finite, and comparatively insignificant, if not doubtful, evil, namely, the dissolution of the organic body. See what a poor hand Asgill makes of it, p. 26:—

And therefore to signify the height of this resentment, God raises man from the dead to demand further satisfaction of him.

Death is a commitment to the prison of the grave till the judgment of the great day; and then the grand *Habeas corpus* will issue *to the earth and to the sea*, to give up their dead; to remove the bodies, with the cause of their commitment: and as these causes shall appear, they shall either be released, or else sentenced to the common gaol of hell, there to remain until satisfaction.

P. 66.

Thou wilt not leave my *soul* in the grave. * * *

And that it is translated *soul*, is an Anglicism, not understood in other languages, which have no other word for *soul* but the same which is for life.

How so? *Seele*, the soul, *Leben*, life, in German; ψυχὴ and ζωὴ, in Greek, and so on.

P. 67.

Then to this figure God added *life*, by breathing it into him from himself, whereby this inanimate body became a living one.

And what was this life? Something, or nothing? And had not, first, the Spirit, and next the Word, of God infused life into the earth, of which man as an animal and all other animals were made,—and then, in addition to this, breathed into man a living soul, which he did not breathe into the other animals?

Pp. 75–78–81, *ad finem:*

I have a great deal of business yet in this world, without doing of which heaven itself would be uneasy to me.

And therefore do depend, that I shall not be taken hence in the midst of my days, before I have done all my heart's desire.

But when that is done, I know no business I have with the dead, and therefore do as much depend that I shall not go hence by *returning to the dust*, which is the sentence of that law from which I claim a discharge: but that I shall make my *exit* by way of translation, which I claim as a dignity belonging to that degree in the science of eternal life, of which I profess myself a graduate, according to the true intent and meaning of the covenant of eternal life revealed in the Scriptures.

A man so κατ' ἐξοχὴν clear-headed, so remarkable for the perspicuity of his sentences, and the luminous orderliness of his arrangement,—in short, so consummate an artist in the statement of his case, and in the inferences from his *data*, as John Asgill must be allowed by all competent judges to have been,—was he in earnest or in jest from p. 75 to the end of this treatise?—My belief is, that he himself did not know. He was a thorough hu-

morist: and so much of will, with a spice of the wilful, goes to the making up of a humorist's creed, that it is no easy matter to determine, how far such a man might not have a pleasure in *humming* his own mind, and believing, in order to enjoy a dry laugh at himself for the belief.

But let us look at it in another way. That Asgill's belief, professed and maintained in this tract, is unwise and odd, I can more readily grant, than that it is altogether irrational and absurd. I am even strongly inclined to conjecture, that so early as St. Paul's apostolate there were persons (whether sufficiently numerous to form a sect or party, I can not say), who held the same tenet as Asgill's, and in a more intolerant and exclusive sense; and that it is to such persons that St. Paul refers in the justly admired fifteenth chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians; and that the inadvertence to this has led a numerous class of divines to a misconception of the Apostle's reasoning, and a misinterpretation of his words, in behoof of the Socinian notion, that the resurrection of Christ is the only argument of proof for the belief of a future state, and that this was the great end and purpose of this event. Now this assumption is so destitute of support from the other writers of the New Testament, and so discordant with the whole spirit and gist of St. Paul's views and reasoning everywhere else, that it is *à priori* probable, that the apparent exception in this chapter is only apparent. And this the hypothesis, I have here advanced, would enable one to show, and to exhibit the true bearing of the texts. Asgill contents himself with maintaining that translation without death is one, and the best, mode of passing to the heavenly state. *Hinc itur ad astra.* But his earliest predecessors contended that it was the only mode, and to this St. Paul justly replies:—*If in this life only we have hope, we are of all men the most miserable.* 1827.

INTRODUCTION TO ASGILL'S DEFENCE UPON HIS EXPULSION FROM THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. EDIT. 1712.

P. 28.

For as every faith, or credit, that a man hath attained to, is the result of some knowledge or other; so that whoever hath attained that knowledge, hath that faith (for whatever a man knows, he can not but believe):

So this *all faith* being the result of all knowledge, 'tis easy to conceive

that whoever had once attained to all that knowledge, nothing could be difficult to him.

This whole discussion on faith is one of the very few instances, in which Asgill has got out of his depth. According to all usage of words, science and faith are incompatible in relation to the same object; while, according to Asgill, faith is merely the power which science confers on the will. Asgill says,—What we know, we must believe. I retort,—What we only believe, we do not know. The *minor* here is included by, not included in, the *major*. Minors by difference of quantity are included in their majors; but minors by difference of quality are excluded by them, or superseded. Apply this to belief and science, or certain knowledge. On the confusion of the second, that is, minors by difference of quality, with the first, or minors by difference of quantity, rests Asgill's erroneous exposition of faith.*

* *An argument proving, that according to the covenant of eternal life, revealed in the Scriptures, man may be translated from hence, without passing through death, although the human nature of Christ himself could not be thus translated, till he had passed through death.*—(Title of Asgill's pamphlet.) Asgill died in the year 1738, in the King's Bench prison, where he had been a prisoner for debt thirty years.—*Ed.*

Mr. Coleridge speaks thus of Asgill in the *Table Talk*:—

July 30, 1831.

"Asgill was an extraordinary man, and his pamphlet is invaluable. He undertook to prove that man is literally immortal; or, rather, that any given living man might probably never die. He complains of the cowardly practice of dying. He was expelled from two Houses of Commons for blasphemy and atheism, as was pretended;—I really suspect because he was a staunch Hanoverian. I expected to find the ravings of an enthusiast, or the sullen snarlings of an infidel; whereas I found the very soul of Swift—an intense half self-deceived humorism. I scarcely remember elsewhere such uncommon skill in logic, such lawyer-like acuteness, and yet such a grasp of common sense. Each of his paragraphs is in itself a whole, and yet a link between the preceding and following; so that the entire series forms one argument, and yet each is a diamond in itself."—P. 363.

April 30, 1832.

"I know no genuine Saxon English superior to Asgill's. I think his and Defoe's irony often finer than Swift's".—P. 394.—S. C.

DEATH, AND GROUNDS OF BELIEF IN A FUTURE STATE.

It is an important thought, that death, judged of by corporeal analogies, certainly implies discerption or dissolution of parts; but pain and pleasure do not; nay, they seem inconceivable except under the idea of concentration. Therefore the influence of the body on the soul will not prove the common destiny of both. I feel myself not the slave of nature (nature used here as the *mundus sensibilis*) in the sense in which animals are. Not only my thoughts and affections extend to objects transnatural, as truth, virtue, God; not only do my powers extend vastly beyond all those, which I could have derived from the instruments and organs, with which nature has furnished me; but I can do what nature *per se* can not. I ingraft, I raise heavy bodies above the clouds, and guide my course over ocean and through air. I alone am lord of fire and light; other creatures are but their alms-folk, and of all the so-called elements, water, earth, air, and all their compounds (to speak in the ever-enduring language of the senses, to which nothing can be revealed, but as compact, or fluid, or aerial), I not merely subserve myself of them, but I employ them. *Ergo*, there is in me, or rather I am, a præternatural, that is, a supersensuous thing: but what is not nature, why should it perish with nature? why lose the faculty of vision, because my spectacles are broken?

Now to this it will be objected, and very forcibly too;—that the soul or self is acted upon by nature through the body, and water or caloric, diffused through or collected in the brain, will derange the faculties of the soul by deranging the organization of the brain; the sword can not touch the soul; but by rending the flesh it will rend the feelings. Therefore the violence of nature may, in destroying the body, mediately destroy the soul! It is to this objection that my first sentence applies; and is an important, and, I believe, a new, and the only satisfactory reply I have ever heard.

The one great and binding ground of the belief of God and a hereafter, is the law of conscience: but as the aptitudes and beauty, and grandeur, of the world, are a sweet and beneficent inducement to this belief, a constant fuel to our faith, so here we seek these arguments, not as dissatisfied with the one main ground,

not as *of little faith*, but because, believing it to be, it is natural we should expect to find traces of it, and as a noble way of employing and developing, and enlarging the faculties of the soul, and this, not by way of motive, but of assimilation, producing virtue. 2d April, 1811.

RELIGION.

Amongst the great truths are these :—

I. That religion has no speculative dogmas ; that all is practical, all appealing to the will, and therefore all imperative. *I am the Lord thy God : Thou shalt have none other gods but me.*

II. That, therefore, miracles are not the proofs, but the necessary results, of revelation. They are not the key of the arch and roof of evidence, though they may be a compacting stone in it, which gives while it receives strength. Hence, to make the intellectual faith a fair analogon or unison of the vital faith, it ought to be stamped in the mind by all the evidences duly co-ordinated, and not designed by single pen-strokes, beginning either here or there.

III. That, according to No. I., Christ is not described primarily and characteristically as a teacher, but as a doer; a light indeed, but an effective light, the sun which causes what it shows, as well as shows what it first causes.

IV. That a certain degree of morality is presupposed in the reception of Christianity; it is the *substratum* of the moral interest which substantiates the evidence of miracles. The instance of a profligate suddenly converted, if properly sifted, will be found but an apparent exception.

V. That the being of a God, and the immortality of man, are everywhere assumed by Christ.

VI. That Socinianism is not a religion, but a theory, and that, too, a very pernicious, or a very unsatisfactory, theory. Pernicious,—for it excludes all our deep and awful ideas of the perfect holiness of God, his justice and his mercy, and thereby makes the voice of conscience a delusion, as having no correspondent in the character of the legislator ; regarding God as merely a good-

natured pleasure-giver, so happiness be produced, indifferent as to the means:—Unsatisfactory, for it promises forgiveness without any solution of the difficulty of the compatibility of this with the justice of God; in no way explains the fallen condition of man, nor offers any means for his regeneration. "If you will be good, you will be happy," it says: that may be, but my will is weak; I sink in the struggle.

VII. That Socinianism never did and never can subsist as a general religion. For 1. It neither states the disease, on account of which the human being hungers for revelation, nor prepares any remedy in general, nor ministers any hope to the individual. 2. In order to make itself endurable on scriptural grounds, it must so weaken the texts and authority of scripture, as to leave in scripture no binding ground of proof of any thing. 3. Take a pious Jew, one of the Maccabees, and compare his faith and its grounds with Priestley's; and then, for what did Christ come?

VIII. That Socinianism involves the shocking thought that man will not, and ought not to be expected to, do his duty as a man, unless he first makes a bargain with his Maker, and his Maker with him. Give me, the individual me, a positive proof that I shall be in a state of pleasure after my death, if I do so and so, and then I will do it, not else! And the proof asked is not one dependent on, or flowing from, his moral nature and moral feelings, but wholly *extra*-moral, namely, by his outward senses, the subjugation of which to faith, that is, the passive to the actional and self-created belief, is the great object of all religion!

IX. That Socinianism involves the dreadful reflection, that it can establish its probability (its certainty being wholly out of the question and impossible, Priestley himself declaring that his own continuance as a Christian depended on a contingency) only on the destruction of all the arguments furnished for our permanent and essential distinction from brutes; that it must prove that we have no grounds to obey, but, on the contrary, that in wisdom we ought to reject and declare utterly null, all the commands of conscience, and all that is implied in those commands, reckless of the confusion introduced into our notions of means and ends by the denial of truth, goodness, justice, mercy, and the other fundamental ideas in the idea of God; and all this in order to conduct us to a Mahomet's bridge of a knife's edge, or the breadth

of a spear, to salvation. And, should we discover any new documents, or should an acuter logician make plain the sophistry of the deductions drawn from the present documents (and surely a man who has passed from orthodoxy to the loosest Arminianism, and thence to Arianism, and thence to direct Humanism, has no right from his experience to deny the probability of this)—then to fall off into the hopeless abyss of atheism. For the present life, we know, is governed by fixed laws, which the atheist acknowledges as well as the theist; and if there be no spiritual world, and no spiritual life in a spiritual world, what possible bearing can the admission or rejection of this hypothesis have on our practice or feelings?

Lastly, the Mosaic dispensation was a scheme of national education; the Christian is a world-religion; and the former was susceptible of evidence and probabilities which do not, and can not, apply to the latter. A savage people forced, as it were, into a school of circumstances, and gradually in the course of generations taught the unity of God, first and for centuries merely as a practical abstinence from the worship of any other,—how can the principles of such a system apply to Christianity, which goes into all nations and to all men, the most enlightened, even by preference?

Writing several years later than the date of the preceding paragraphs, I commend the modern Unitarians for their candor in giving up the possible worshipability of Christ, if not very God, —a proof that truth will ultimately prevail. The Arians, then existing, against whom Waterland wrote, were not converted; but in the next generation the arguments made their way. This is fame *versus* reputation.

THE APOSTLES' CREED.

Is it not probable, from what is found in the writings of Cyril, Eusebius, Cyprian, Marcellus of Ancyra, and others, that our present Apostles' Creed is not the very *Symbolum Fidei*, which was not to be written,* but was always repeated at baptism?

* "So either by the Apostles, *or at the leastwise out of their writings*, we have the substance of Christian belief compendiously drawn into few and

For this latter certainly contained the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Logos; and, therefore, it seems likely that the present Apostles' Creed was an introductory, and, as it were, alphabetical, creed for young catechumens in their first elementation. Is it to be believed that the *Symbolum Fidei* contained nothing but the mere history of Jesus, without any of the peculiar doctrines, or that, if it did not contain something more, the great and vehement defenders of the Trinity would speak of it so magnificently as they do, even preferring its authority to that of the Scriptures?—Besides, does not Austin positively say that our present Apostles' Creed was gathered out of the Scriptures? Whereas the *Symbolum Fidei* was elder than the Gospels, and probably contained only the three doctrines of the Trinity, the Redemption, and the Unity of the Church. May it not have happened, when baptism was administered so early, and at last even to infants, that the old *Symbolum Fidei* became gradually *inusitatum*, as being appropriated to adult proselytes from Judaism or Paganism? This seems to me even more than probable; for in proportion to the majority of born over converted Christians, must the creed of instruction have been more frequent than that of doctrinal profession.

EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.*

I. Miracles—as precluding the contrary evidence of no miracles.

II. The material of Christianity, its existence and history.

III. The doctrines of Christianity, and the correspondence of human nature to those doctrines,—illustrated, 1st, historically—as the actual production of the new world, and the dependence of the fate of the planet upon it;—2d, individually—from its appeal for its truth to an asserted fact,—which, whether it be

short articles," &c. *Hooker's* Eccl. Pol. vol. ii. p. 81. Keble's edit. B. v. C. 18, 3.

See the passage from Ruffinus quoted at the same place: *Hæc non scribi chartulis atque membranis, sed retineri cordibus tradiderunt, ut certum esset, neminem hæc ex lectione, quæ interdum pervenire etiam ad infideles solet, sed ex Apostolorum traditione didicisse.—Ed.*

* Dictated to, and communicated by, Dr. Brabant of Devizes.—*Ed.*

real or not, every man possessing reason has an equal power of ascertaining within himself;—namely, a will which has more or less lost its freedom, though not the consciousness that it ought to be and may become free:—the conviction that this can not be achieved without the operation of a principle connatural with itself;—the evident rationality of an entire confidence in that principle, being the condition and means of its operation;—the experience in his own nature of the truth of the process described by Scripture as far as he can place himself within the process, aided by the confident assurances of others as to the effects experienced by them, and which he is striving to arrive at. All these form a practical Christian. Add, however, a gradual opening out of the intellect to more and more clear perceptions of the strict coincidence of the doctrines of Christianity, with the truths evolved by the mind, from reflections on its own nature. To such a man one main test of the objectivity, the entity, the objective truth of his faith, is its accompaniment by an increase of insight into the moral beauty and necessity of the process which it comprises, and the dependence of that proof on the causes asserted. Believe, and if thy belief be right, that insight which gradually transmutes faith into knowledge will be the reward of that belief. The Christian, to whom, after a long profession of Christianity, the mysteries remain as much mysteries as before, is in the same state as a school-boy with regard to his arithmetic to whom the *facit* at the end of the examples in his ciphering book is the whole ground for his assuming that such and such figures amount to so and so.

3d. In the above I include the increasing discoveries in the correspondence of the history, the doctrines and the promises of Christianity, with the past, present, and probable future of human nature; and in this state a fair comparison of the religion as a divine philosophy, with all other religions which have pretended to revelations and all other systems of philosophy; both with regard to the totality of its truth and its identification with the manifest march of affairs.

I should conclude that, if we suppose a man to have convinced himself that not only the doctrines of Christianity, which may be conceived independently of history or time, as the Trinity, spiritual influences, &c., are coincident with the truths which his reason, thus strengthened, has evolved from its own sources, but

that the historical dogmas, namely, of the incarnation of the creative Logos, and his becoming a personal agent, are themselves founded in philosophical necessity; then it seems irrational, that such a man should reject the belief of the actual appearance of a religion strictly correspondent therewith, at a given time recorded, even as much as that he should reject Cæsar's account of his wars in Gaul, after he has convinced himself *a priori* of their probability.

As the result of these convictions he will not scruple to receive the particular miracles recorded, inasmuch as it would be miraculous that an incarnate God should not work what must to mere men appear as miracles; inasmuch as it is strictly accordant with the ends and benevolent nature of such a being, to commence the elevation of man above his mere senses by attracting and enforcing attention, first through an appeal to those senses. But with equal reason will he expect that no other or greater force should be laid on these miracles as such; that they should not be spoken of as good in themselves, much less as the adequate and ultimate proof of that religion; and likewise he will receive additional satisfaction, should he find these miracles so wrought, and on such occasions, as to give them a personal value as symbols of important truths when their miraculousness was no longer needful or efficacious.

ESSAY ON FAITH.

Faith may be defined, as fidelity to our own being—so far as such being is not and can not become an object of the senses; and hence, by clear inference or implication, to being generally, as far as the same is not the object of the senses: and again to whatever is affirmed or understood as the condition or concomitant, or consequence of the same. This will be best explained by an instance or example. That I am conscious of something within me peremptorily commanding me to do unto others as I would they should do unto me;—in other words, a categorical (that is, primary and unconditional) imperative;—that the maxim (*regula maxima* or supreme rule) of my actions, both inward and outward, should be such as I could, without any contradiction

arising therefrom, will to be the law of all moral and rational beings;—this, I say, is a fact of which I am no less conscious (though in a different way), nor less assured, than I am of any appearance presented by my outward senses. Nor is this all; but in the very act of being conscious of this in my own nature, I know that it is a fact of which all men either are or ought to be conscious;—a fact, the ignorance of which constitutes either the non-personality of the ignorant, or the guilt, in which latter case the ignorance is equivalent to knowledge wilfully darkened. I know that I possess this consciousness as a man, and not as Samuel Taylor Coleridge; hence knowing that consciousness of this fact is the root of all other consciousness, and the only practical contra-distinction of man from the brutes, we name it the conscience; by the natural absence or presumed presence of which, the law, both divine and human, determines whether X Y Z be a thing or a person:—the conscience being that which never to have had places the objects in the same order of things as the brutes, for example, idiots; and to have lost which implies either insanity or apostasy. Well—this we have affirmed is a fact of which every honest man is as fully assured as of his seeing, hearing or smelling. But though the former assurance does not differ from the latter in the degree, it is altogether diverse in the kind; the senses being morally passive, while the conscience is essentially connected with the will, though not always, nor indeed in any case, except after frequent attempts and aversion of will, dependent on the choice. Thence we call the presentations of the senses impressions, those of the conscience commands or dictates. In the senses we find our receptivity, and as far as our personal being is concerned, we are passive;—but in the fact of the conscience we are not only agents, but it is by this alone, that we know ourselves to be such; nay, that our very passiveness in this latter is an act of passiveness, and that we are patient (*patientes*)—not, as in the other case, *simply* passive.

The result is, the consciousness of responsibility; and the proof is afforded by the inward experience of the diversity between regret and remorse.

If I have sound ears, and my companion speaks to me with a due proportion of voice, I may persuade him that I did not hear, but can not deceive myself. But when my conscience speaks to me, I can, by repeated efforts, render myself finally insensible; to

which add this other difference in the case of conscience, namely, that to make myself deaf is one and the same thing with making my conscience dumb, till at length I become unconscious of my conscience. Frequent are the instances in which it is suspended, and as it were drowned, in the inundation of the appetites, passions, and imaginations, to which I have resigned myself, making use of my free-will; and there are not, I fear, examples wanting of the conscience being utterly destroyed, or of the passage of wickedness into madness;—that species of madness, namely, in which the reason is lost. For so long as the reason continues, so long must the conscience exist either as a good conscience, or as a bad conscience.

It appears, then, that even the very first step, that the initiation of the process, the becoming conscious of a conscience, partakes of the nature of an act. It is an act, in and by which we take upon ourselves an allegiance, and consequently the obligation of fealty; and this fealty or fidelity implying the power of being unfaithful, it is the first and fundamental sense of Faith. It is likewise the commencement of experience, and the result of all other experience. In other words, conscience, in this its simplest form, must be supposed in order to consciousness, that is, to human consciousness. Brutes may be, and are scious, but those beings only, who have an I, *scire possunt hoc vel illud una cum seipsis;* that is, *conscire vel scire aliquid mecum*, or to know a thing in relation to myself, and in the act of knowing myself as acted upon by that something.

Now the third person could never have been distinguished from the first but by means of the second. There can be no He without a previous Thou. Much less could an I exist for us, except as it exists during the suspension of the will, as in dreams; and the nature of brutes may be best understood, by conceiving them as somnambulists. This is a deep meditation, though the position is capable of the strictest proof,—namely, that there can be no I without a Thou, and that a Thou is only possible by an equation in which I is taken as equal to Thou, and yet not the same. And this again is only possible by putting them in opposition as correspondent opposites, or correlatives. In order to this, a something must be affirmed in the one which is subjected in the other, and this something is the will. I do not will to consider myself as equal to myself, for in the very act of constituting myself *I*, I

take it as the same, and therefore as incapable of comparison, that is, of any application of the will. If then, I *minus* the will be the *thesis*;* Thou *plus* will must be the *antithesis*, but the equation of Thou with I, by means of a free act, negativing the sameness in order to establish the equality, is the definition of conscience. But as without a Thou there can be no You, so without a You no They, These, or Those; and as all these conjointly form the materials and subjects of consciousness, and the conditions of experience, it is evident that the conscience is the root of all consciousness,—*à fortiori*, the pre-condition of all experience,—and that the conscience can not have been in its first revelation deduced from experience.

Soon, however, experience comes into play. We learn that there are other impulses beside the dictates of conscience; that there are powers within us and without us ready to usurp the throne of conscience, and busy in tempting us to transfer our allegiance. We learn that there are many things contrary to conscience, and therefore to be rejected, and utterly excluded, and many that can coexist with its supremacy only by being subjugated, as beasts of burthen; and others again, as, for instance, the social tendernesses and affections, and the faculties and excitations of the intellect, which must be at least subordinated. The preservation of our loyalty and fealty under these trials and against these rivals constitutes the second sense of Faith; and we shall need but one more point of view to complete its full import. This is the consideration of what is presupposed in the human conscience. The answer is ready. As in the equation of the cor-

* There are four kinds of *Theses*, θέσεις, puttings or placings.

1. *Prothesis.*

2. *Thesis.* 3. *Antithesis.*

4. *Synthesis.*

A. and B. are said to be *thesis* and *antithesis*, when if A. be the *thesis*, B. is the *antithesis* to A., and if B. be made the *thesis*, then A. becomes the *antithesis*. Thus making me the *thesis*, you are thou to me, but making you the *thesis*, I become thou to you. *Synthesis* is a putting together of the two, so that a third something is generated. Thus the *synthesis* of hydrogen and oxygen is water, a third something, neither hydrogen or oxygen. But the blade of a knife and its handle when put together do not form a *synthesis*, but still remain a blade and a handle. And as a *synthesis* is a unity that results from the union of two things, so a *prothesis* is a primary unity that gives itself forth into two things.

relative I and Thou, one of the twin constituents is to be taken as *plus* will, the other as *minus* will, so is it here; and it is obvious that the reason or *super*-individual of each man, whereby he is man, is the factor we are to take as *minus* will; and that the individual will or personalizing principle of free agency (arbitrement is Milton's word) is the factor marked *plus* will;—and again, that as the identity or coinherence of the absolute will and the reason, is the peculiar character of God; so is the *synthesis* of the individual will and the common reason, by the subordination of the former to the latter, the only possible likeness or image of the *prothesis*, or identity, and therefore the required proper character of man. Conscience, then, is a witness respecting the identity of the will and the reason effected by the self-subordination of the will, or self, to the reason, as equal to, or representing the will of God. But the personal will is a factor in other moral *syntheses;* for example, appetite *plus* personal will=sensuality; lust of power, *plus* personal will,=ambition, and so on, equally as in the *synthesis*, on which the conscience is grounded. Not this therefore, but the other *synthesis*, must supply the specific character of the conscience; and we must enter into an analysis of reason. Such as the nature and the objects of the reason are, such must be the functions and objects of the conscience. And the former we shall best learn by recapitulating those constituents of the total man which are either contrary to, or disparate from, the reason.

I. Reason, and the proper objects of reason, are wholly alien from sensation. Reason is supersensual, and its antagonist is appetite, and the objects of appetite the lust of the flesh.

II. Reason and its objects do not appertain to the world of the senses inward or outward; that is, they partake not of sense or fancy. Reason is super-sensuous, and here its antagonist is the lust of the eye.

III. Reason and its objects are not things of reflection, association, discursion, discourse in the old sense of the word as opposed to intuition: "discursive or intuitive," as Milton has it. Reason does not indeed necessarily exclude the finite, either in time or in space, but it includes them *eminenter*. Thus the prime mover of the material universe is affirmed to contain all motion as its cause, but not to be, or to suffer, motion in itself.

Reason is not the faculty of the finite. But here I must pre-

mise the following. The faculty of the finite is that which reduces the confused impressions of sense to their essential forms,—quantity, quality, relation, and in these action and reaction, cause and effect, and the like; thus raises the materials furnished by the senses and sensations into objects of reflection, and so makes experience possible. Without it, man's representative powers would be a delirium, a chaos, a scudding cloudage of shapes; and it is therefore most appropriately called the understanding, or substantiative faculty. Our elder metaphysicians, down to Hobbes inclusively, called this likewise discourse, *discursus, discursio,* from its mode of action as not staying at any one object, but running as it were to and fro to abstract, generalize, and classify. Now when this faculty is employed in the service of the pure reason, it brings out the necessary and universal truths contained in the infinite into distinct contemplation by the pure act of the sensuous imagination, that is, in the production of the forms of space and time abstracted from all corporeity, and likewise of the inherent forms of the understanding itself abstractedly from the consideration of particulars, as in the case of geometry, numeral mathematics, universal logic, and pure metaphysics. The discursive faculty then becomes what our Shakspeare with happy precision calls "discourse of reason."

We will now take up our reasoning again from the words "motion in itself."

It is evident then, that the reason, as the irradiative power, and the representative of the infinite, judges the understanding as the faculty of the finite, and can not without error be judged by it. When this is attempted, or when the understanding in its *synthesis* with the personal will, usurps the supremacy of the reason, or affects to supersede the reason, it is then what St. Paul calls the mind of the flesh (*φρόνημα σαρκός*) or the wisdom of this world. The result is, that the reason is super-finite; and in this relation, its antagonist is the insubordinate understanding, or mind of the flesh.

IV. Reason, as one with the absolute will (*In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God*), and therefore for man the certain representative of the will of God, is above the will of man as an individual will. We have seen in III. that it stands in antagonism to all mere particulars; but here it stands in antagonism to all mere individual interests

as so many selves, to the personal will as seeking its objects in the manifestation of itself for itself—*sit pro ratione voluntas ;*—whether this be realized with adjuncts, as in the lust of the flesh, and in the lust of the eye ; or without adjuncts, as in the thirst and pride of power, despotism, egoistic ambition. The fourth antagonist, then, of reason is the lust of the will.

Corollary. Unlike a million of tigers, a million of men is very different from a million times one man. Each man in a numerous society is not only coexistent with, but virtually organized into, the multitude of which he is an integral part. His *idem* is modified by the *alter*. And there arise impulses and objects from this *synthesis* of the *alter et idem*, myself and my neighbor. This, again, is strictly analogous to what takes takes place in the vital organization of the individual man. The cerebral system of nerves has its correspondent *antithesis* in the abdominal system : but hence arises a *synthesis* of the two in the pectoral system as the intermediate, and, like a drawbridge, at once conductor and boundary. In the latter as objectized by the former arise the emotions, affections, and in one word, the passions as distinguished from the cognitions and appetites. Now the reason has been shown to be super-individual, generally, and therefore not less so when the form of an individualization subsists in the *alter*, than when it is confined to the *idem ;* not less when the emotions have their conscious or believed object in another, than when their subject is the individual personal self. For though these emotions, affections, attachments, and the like, are the prepared ladder by which the lower nature is taken up into, and made to partake of, the highest room,—as we are taught to give a feeling of reality to the higher *per medium commune* with the lower, and thus gradually to see the reality of the higher (namely, the objects of reason) and finally to know that the latter are indeed and pre-eminently real, as if you love your earthly parents whom you see, by these means you will learn to love your Heavenly Father who is invisible ;—yet this holds good only so far as the reason is the president, and its object the ultimate aim ; and cases may arise in which the Christ as the Logos or Redemptive Reason declares, *He that loves father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me ;* nay, he that can permit his emotions to rise to an equality with the universal reason, is in enmity with that reason. Here then reason appears as the love of God ; and its

antagonist is the attachment to individuals wherever it exists in diminution of, or in competition with, the love which is reason.

In these five paragraphs I have enumerated and explained the several powers or forces belonging or incidental to human nature, which in all matters of reason the man is bound either to subjugate or subordinate to reason. The application to Faith follows of its own accord. The first or most indefinite sense of faith is fidelity: then fidelity under previous contract or particular moral obligation. In this sense faith is fealty to a rightful superior: faith is the duty of a faithful subject to a rightful governor. Then it is allegiance in active service; fidelity to the liege lord under circumstances, and amid the temptations, of usurpation, rebellion, and intestine discord. Next we seek for that rightful superior on our duties to whom all our duties to all other superiors, on our faithfulness to whom all our bounden relations to all other objects of fidelity, are founded. We must inquire after that duty in which all others find their several degrees and dignities, and from which they derive their obligative force. We are to find a superior, whose rights, including our duties, are presented to the mind in the very idea of that Supreme Being, whose sovereign prerogatives are predicates implied in the subjects, as the essential properties of a circle are co-assumed in the first assumption of a circle, consequently underived, unconditional, and as rationally insusceptible, so probably prohibitive, of all further question. In this sense then faith is fidelity, fealty, allegiance of the moral nature to God, in opposition to all usurpation, and in resistance to all temptation to the placing any other claim above or equal with our fidelity to God.

The will of God is the last ground and final aim of all our duties, and to that the whole man is to be harmonized by subordination, subjugation, or suppression alike in commission and omission. But the will of God, which is one with the supreme intelligence, is revealed to man through the conscience. But the conscience, which consists in an inappellable bearing-witness to the truth and reality of our reason, may legitimately be construed with the term reason, so far as the conscience is prescriptive; while as approving or condemning, it is the consciousness of the subordination or insubordination, the harmony or discord, of the personal will of man to and with the representative of the will of God. This brings me to the last and fullest sense of

Faith, that is, as the obedience of the individual will to the reason, in the lust of the flesh as opposed to the supersensual; in the lust of the eye as opposed to the supersensuous; in the pride of the understanding as opposed to the infinite, in the φρόνημα σαρκός in contrariety to the spiritual truth; in the lust of the personal will as opposed to the absolute and universal; and in the love of the creature, as far as it is opposed to the love which is one with the reason, namely, the love of God.

Thus then to conclude. Faith subsists in the *synthesis* of the reason and the individual will. By virtue of the latter therefore it must be an energy, and inasmuch as it relates to the whole moral man, it must be exerted in each and all of his constituents or incidents, faculties and tendencies;—it must be a total, not a partial; a continuous, not a desultory or occasional energy. And by virtue of the former, that is, reason, faith must be a light, a form of knowing, a beholding of truth. In the incomparable words of the Evangelist, therefore—*faith must be a light originating in the Logos, or the substantial reason, which is co-eternal and one with the Holy Will, and which light is at the same time the life of men.* Now as life is here the sum or collective of all moral and spiritual acts, in suffering, doing, and being, so is faith the source and the sum, the energy and the principle of the fidelity of man to God, by the subordination of his human will, in all provinces of his nature to his reason, as the sum of spiritual truth, representing and manifesting the will Divine.

TO ADAM STEINMETZ K——.*

My dear Godchild,

I offer up the same fervent prayer for you now, as I did kneeling before the altar, when you were baptized into Christ, and solemnly received as a living member of His spiritual body, the Church.

Years must pass before you will be able to read with an understanding heart what I now write; but I trust that the all-gracious God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father

* See *ante*, p. 192.—*Ed.*

of mercies, who, by his only-begotten Son (all mercies in one sovereign mercy!) has redeemed you from the evil ground, and willed you to be born out of darkness, but into light—out of death, but into life—out of sin, but into righteousness, even into the *Lord our Righteousness:* I trust that He will graciously hear the prayers of your dear parents, and be with you as the spirit of health and growth in body and mind.

My dear Godchild!—You received from Christ's minister at the baptismal font, as your Christian name, the name of a most dear friend of your father's, and who was to me even as a son, the late Adam Steinmetz, whose fervent aspiration and ever-paramount aim, even from early youth, was to be a Christian in thought, word, and deed—in will, mind, and affections.

I too, your Godfather, have known what the enjoyments and advantages of this life are, and what the more refined pleasures which learning and intellectual power can bestow; and with all the experience which more than threescore years can give, I now, on the eve of my departure, declare to you (and earnestly pray that you may hereafter live and act on the conviction) that health is a great blessing,—competence obtained by honorable industry a great blessing,—and a great blessing it is to have kind, faithful, and loving friends and relatives; but that the greatest of all blessings, as it is the most ennobling of all privileges, is to be indeed a Christian. But I have been likewise, through a large portion of my later life, a sufferer, sorely afflicted with bodily pains, languors, and bodily infirmities; and, for the last three or four years, have, with few and brief intervals, been confined to a sick-room, and at this moment, in great weakness and heaviness, write from a sick-bed, hopeless of a recovery, yet without prospect of a speedy recovery; and I, thus on the very brink of the grave, solemnly bear witness to you that the Almighty Redeemer, most gracious in His promises to them that truly seek Him, is faithful to perform what he hath promised, and has preserved, under all my pains and infirmities, the inward peace that passeth all understanding, with the supporting assurance of a reconciled God, who will not withdraw His Spirit from me in the conflict, and in His own time will deliver me from the Evil One!

O, my dear Godchild! eminently blessed are those who begin early to seek, fear, and love their God, trusting wholly in the

righteousness and mediation of their Lord, Redeemer, Saviour, and everlasting High Priest, Jesus Christ!

O, preserve this as a legacy and bequest from your unseen Godfather and friend,

S. T. COLERIDGE.

July 13, 1834.*

* He died on the 25th day of the same month.

CONFESSIONS

OF

AN INQUIRING SPIRIT.

BY

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE.

EDITED FROM THE AUTHOR'S MS.

BY HENRY NELSON COLERIDGE, ESQ., M.A.

NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS.
1853.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Letters on the Inspiration of the Scriptures were left by Mr. Coleridge in MS. at his death. The Reader will find in them a key to most of the Biblical criticism scattered throughout the Author's own writings, and an affectionate, pious, and, as the Editor humbly believes, a profoundly wise attempt to place the study of the Written Word on its only sure foundation,—a deep sense of God's holiness and truth, and a consequent reverence for that Light—the image of Himself—which He has kindled in every one of His rational creatures.

Lincoln's Inn,
September 22, 1840.

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Being persuaded of nothing more than of this, that whether it be in matter of speculation or of practice, no untruth can possibly avail the patron and defender long, and that things most truly are likewise most behoovefully spoken.

Hooker.

Any thing will be pretended, rather than admit the necessity of internal evidence, or acknowledge, among the external proofs, the convictions and experiences of Believers, though they should be common to all the faithful in every age of the Church. But in all superstition there is a heart of unbelief; and, *vice versa*, where a man's belief is but a superficial acquiescence, credulity is the natural result and accompaniment, if only he be not required to sink into the depths of his being, where the sensual man can no longer draw breath.

THE PENTAD OF OPERATIVE CHRISTIANITY.

Prothesis
Christ, the Word.

Thesis	*Mesothesis*, or the Indifference,	*Antithesis*
The Scriptures.	The Holy Spirit	The Church.

Synthesis
The Preacher.

The Scriptures, the Spirit, and the Church, are co-ordinate ; the indispensable conditions and the working causes of the perpetuity and continued renascence and spiritual life of Christ still militant. The Eternal Word, Christ from everlasting, is the *Prothesis*, or identity ;—the Scriptures and the Church are the two poles, or *Thesis* and *Antithesis;* and the Preacher in direct line under the Spirit, but likewise the point of junction of the Written Word and the Church, is the *Synthesis*.

This is God's Hand in the World.

LETTERS

ON

THE INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES.

SEVEN Letters to a Friend concerning the bounds between the right, and the superstitious, use and estimation of the Sacred Canon ; in which the Writer submissively discloses his own private judgment on the following Questions :—

I. Is it necessary or expedient, to insist on the belief of the divine origin and authority of all, and every part of the Canonical Books as the condition, or first principle, of Christian Faith :

II. Or, may not the due appreciation of the Scriptures collectively be more safely relied on as the result and consequence of the belief in Christ ;—the gradual increase,—in respect of particular passages—of our spiritual discernment of their truth and authority supplying a test and measure of our own growth and progress as individual believers, without the servile fear that prevents or overclouds the free honor which cometh from love ? 1 *John* iv. 18.

LETTER I.*

My dear Friend,

I employed the compelled and most unwelcome leisure of severe indisposition in reading *The Confessions of a Fair Saint* in Mr. Carlyle's recent translation of the *Wilhelm Meister*, which might, I think, have been better rendered literally, *The Confessions of a Beautiful Soul.*† This, acting in conjunction with the concluding sentences of your Letter, threw my thoughts inward on my own religious experience, and gave the immediate occasion to the following Confessions of one, who is neither fair nor saintly, but who—groaning under a deep sense of infirmity and manifold imperfection—feels the want, the necessity, of religious support;—who can not afford to lose any the smallest buttress, but who not only loves Truth even for itself, and when it reveals itself aloof from all interest, but who loves it with an indescribable awe, which too often withdraws the genial sap of his activity from the columnar trunk, the sheltering leaves, the bright and fragrant flower, and the foodful or medicinal fruitage, to the deep root, ramifying in obscurity and labyrinthine way-winning—

> In darkness there to house unknown,
> Far underground,
> Pierc'd by no sound
> Save such as live in Fancy's ear alone,
> That listens for the uptorn mandrake's parting groan!

I should, perhaps, be a happier—at all events a more useful—man if my mind were otherwise constituted. But so it is: and

* The reader will be interested in comparing the general view of Inspiration contained in this tract, with the exposition which *Twesten* gives of this subject, *Dogmatik Th.* I, § 26; and which *Tholuck* presents in his essay on the Canonical authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews, *Commentar; Einleitung sechstes Capitel.—Am. Ed.*

† *Bekenntnisse einer schönen Seele.—Ed.*

even with regard to Christianity itself, like certain plants, I creep towards the light, even though it draw me away from the more nourishing warmth. Yea, I should do so, even if the light had made its way through a rent in the wall of the Temple. Glad, indeed, and grateful am I, that not in the Temple itself, but only in one or two of the side chapels—not essential to the edifice, and probably not coeval with it—have I found the light absent, and that the rent in the wall has but admitted the free light of the Temple itself.

I shall best communicate the state of my faith by taking the creed, or system of *credenda*, common to all the Fathers of the Reformation—overlooking, as non-essential, the differences between the several Reformed Churches—according to the five main classes or sections into which the aggregate distributes itself to my apprehension. I have then only to state the effect produced on my mind by each of these, or the *quantum* of recipiency and coincidence in myself relatively thereto, in order to complete my Confession of Faith.

I. The Absolute; the innominable *Αὐτοπάτωρ* et *Causa Sui*, in whose transcendent I AM, as the Ground, *is* whatever *verily* is:—the Triune God, by whose Word and Spirit, as the transcendent Cause, *exists* whatever *substantially* exists:—God Almighty—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, undivided, unconfounded, co-eternal. This class I designate by the word, *Στάσις*.

II. The Eternal Possibilities; the actuality of which hath not its origin in God: *Chaos spirituale*:—*Ἀπόστασις*.

III. The Creation and Formation of the heaven and earth by the Redemptive Word:—the Apostasy of Man:—the Redemption of Man:—the Incarnation of the Word in the Son of Man:—the Crucifixion and Resurrection of the Son of Man:—the Descent of the Comforter:—Repentance (*μετάνοια*):—Regeneration:—Faith:—Prayer:—Grace: Communion with the Spirit: Conflict: Self-abasement: Assurance through the righteousness of Christ: Spiritual Growth: Love: Discipline:—Perseverance: Hope in death:—*Μετάστασις*—*Ἀνάστασις*.

IV. But these offers, gifts, and graces are not for one, or for a few. They are offered to all. Even when the Gospel is preached to a single individual, it is offered to him as to one of a great Household. Not only Man, but, says St. Paul, the whole Creation, is included in the consequences of the Fall—*τῆς ἀπο-*

σιάσεως— ; so also in those of the Change at the Redemption—τῆς μεταστάσεως, καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως. We too shall be raised *in the Body*. Christianity is fact no less than truth. It is spiritual, yet so as to be historical ; and between these two poles there must likewise be a mid-point, in which the historical and spiritual meet. Christianity must have its history—a history of itself, and likewise the history of its introduction, its spread, and its outward-becoming ; and, as the mid-point above mentioned, a portion of these facts must be miraculous, that is, *phænomena* in nature that are beyond nature. Furthermore, the history of all historical nations must in some sense be its history ; —in other words, all history must be providential, and this a providence, a preparation, and a looking forward to Christ.

Here then we have four out of the five classes. And in all these the sky of my belief is serene, unclouded by a doubt. Would to God that my faith, that faith which works on the whole man, confirming and conforming, were but in just proportion to my belief, to the full acquiescence of my intellect, and the deep consent of my conscience ! The very difficulties argue the truth of the whole scheme and system for my understanding, since I see plainly that so must the truth appear, if it be the truth.

V. But there is a Book, of two parts—each part consisting of several books. The first part—(I speak in the character of an uninterested critic or philologist)—contains the reliques of the literature of the Hebrew people, while the Hebrew was still the living language. The second part comprises the writings, and, with one or two inconsiderable and doubtful exceptions, all the writings of the followers of Christ within the space of ninety years from the date of the Resurrection. I do not myself think that any of these writings were composed as late as A.D. 120 ; but I wish to preclude all dispute. This Book I resume, as read, and yet unread,—read and familiar to my mind in all parts, but which is yet to be perused as a whole ;—or rather, a work, *cujus particulas et sententiolas omnes et singulas recogniturus sum*, but the component integers of which, and their conspiration, I have yet to study. I take up this work with the purpose to read it for the first time as I should read any other work,—as far at least as I can or dare. For I neither can, nor dare, throw off a strong and awful prepossession in its favor—certain as I am that a large part of the light and life, in and by which I see, love, and

embrace the truths and the strengths co-organized into a living body of faith and knowledge in the four preceding classes, has been directly or indirectly derived to me from this sacred volume,—and unable to determine what I do not owe to its influences. But even on this account, and because it has these inalienable claims on my reverence and gratitude, I will not leave it in the power of unbelievers to say, that the Bible is for me only what the Koran is for the deaf Turk, and the Vedas for the feeble and acquiescent Hindoo. No; I will retire *up into the mountain*, and hold secret commune with my Bible above the contagious blastments of prejudice, and the fog-blight of selfish superstition. *For fear hath torment.* And what though *my* reason be to the power and splendor of the Scriptures but as the reflected and secondary shine of the moon compared with the solar radiance;—yet the sun endures the occasional co-presence of the unsteady orb, and leaving it visible seems to sanction the comparison. There is a Light higher than all, even *the Word that was in the beginning;*—the Light, of which light itself is but the *shechinah* and cloudy tabernacle;—the Word that is light for every man, and life for as many as give heed to it. If between this Word and the written Letter I shall anywhere seem to myself to find a discrepance, I will not conclude that such there actually is; nor on the other hand will I fall under the condemnation of them that would *lie for God*, but seek as I may, be thankful for what I have—and wait.

With such purposes, with such feelings, have I perused the books of the Old and New Testaments,—each book as a whole, and also as an integral part. And need I say that I have met everywhere more or less copious sources of truth, and power, and purifying impulses;—that I have found words for my inmost thoughts, songs for my joy, utterances for my hidden griefs, and pleadings for my shame and my feebleness? In short whatever *finds* me, bears witness for itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit, even from the same Spirit, *which remaining in itself, yet regenerateth all other powers, and in all ages entering into holy souls, maketh them friends of God, and prophets.* (Wisd. vii.) And here, perhaps, I might have been content to rest, if I had not learned that, as a Christian, I can not,—must not,—stand alone; or if I had not known that more than this was holden and required by the Fathers of the Reformation, and

by the Churches collectively, since the Council of Nice at latest; the only exceptions being that doubtful one of the corrupt Romish Church implied, though not avowed, in its equalization of the Apocryphal Books with those of the Hebrew Canon,* and the irrelevant one of the few and obscure Sects who acknowledge no historical Christianity. This somewhat more, in which Jerome, Augustine, Luther, and Hooker, were of one and the same judgment, and less than which not one of them would have tolerated —would it fall within the scope of my present doubts and objections? I hope it would not. Let only their general expressions be interpreted by their treatment of the Scriptures in detail, and I dare confidently trust that it would not. For I can no more reconcile the Doctrine which startles my belief with the practice and particular declarations of these great men, than with the convictions of my own understanding and conscience. At all events—and I can not too early or too earnestly guard against any misapprehension of my meaning and purpose—let it be distinctly understood that my arguments and objections apply exclusively to the following Doctrine or Dogma. To the opinions which individual divines have advanced in lieu of this doctrine, my only objection, as far as I object, is—that I do not understand them. The precise enunciation of this doctrine I defer to the commencement of the next Letter.

Farewell.

* *Si quis—(Esdræ primum et secundum, Tobiam, Judith, Esther, &c.)—pro sacris et canonicis non susceperit, * * * anathema sit.* Conc. Trid. Decr. Sess. iv.—*Ed.*

LETTER II.

My dear Friend,

In my last Letter I said that in the Bible there is more that *finds* me than I have experienced in all other books put together; that the words of the Bible find me at greater depths of my being; and that whatever finds me brings with it an irresistible evidence of its having proceeded from the Holy Spirit. But the Doctrine in question requires me to believe, that not only what finds me, but that all that exists in the sacred volume, and which I am bound to find therein, was—not alone inspired by, that is, composed by men under the actuating influence of, the Holy Spirit, but likewise—dictated by an Infallible Intelligence;—that the writers, each and all, were divinely informed as well as inspired. Now here all evasion, all excuse, is cut off. An Infallible Intelligence extends to all things, physical no less than spiritual. It may convey the truth in any one of the three possible languages, —that of Sense, as objects appear to the beholder on this earth; —or that of Science, which supposes the beholder placed in the centre;—or that of Philosophy, which resolves both into a supersensual reality. But whichever be chosen—and it is obvious that the incompatibility exists only between the first and second, both of them being indifferent and of equal value to the third—it must be employed consistently; for an Infallible Intelligence must intend to be intelligible, and not to deceive. And, moreover, whichever of these three languages be chosen, it must be translatable into Truth. For this is the very essence of the Doctrine, that one and the same Intelligence is speaking in the unity of a Person; which unity is no more broken by the diversity of the pipes through which it makes itself audible, than is a tune by the different instruments on which it is played by a consummate musician, equally perfect in all. One instrument may be more capacious than another, but as far as its compass extends, and in what it sounds forth, it will be true to the conception of the master. I

can conceive no softenings here which would not nullify the Doctrine, and convert it to a cloud for each man's fancy to shift and shape at will. And this Doctrine, I confess, plants the vineyard of the Word with thorns for me, and places snares in its pathways. These may be delusions of an evil spirit; but ere I so harshly question the seeming angel of light—my reason, I mean, and moral sense in conjunction with my clearest knowledge—I must inquire on what authority this Doctrine rests. And what other authority dares a truly catholic Christian admit as coercive in the final decision, but the declarations of the Book itself,—though I should not, without struggles and a trembling reluctance, gainsay even a universal tradition?

I return to the Book. With a full persuasion of soul respecting all the articles of the Christian Faith, as contained in the first four Classes, I receive willingly also the truth of the history, namely, that the Word of the Lord did come to Samuel, to Isaiah, to others;—and that the words which gave utterance to the same are faithfully recorded. But though the origin of the words, even as of the miraculous acts, be supernatural—yet the former once uttered—the latter once having taken their place among the *phænomena* of the senses, the faithful recording of the same does not of itself imply, or seem to require, any supernatural working, other than as all truth and goodness are such. In the books of Moses, and once or twice in the prophecy of Jeremiah, I find it indeed asserted that not only the words were given, but the recording of the same enjoined by the special command of God, and doubtless executed under the special guidance of the Divine Spirit. As to all such passages, therefore, there can be no dispute; and all others in which the words are by the sacred historian declared to have been the Word of the Lord supernaturally communicated, I receive as such with a degree of confidence proportioned to the confidence required of me by the writer himself, and to the claims he himself makes on my belief.

Let us, therefore, remove all such passages, and take each Book by itself; and I repeat that I believe the writer in whatever he himself relates of his own authority, and of its origin. But I can not find any such claim, as the Doctrine in question supposes, made by these writers, explicitly or by implication. On the contrary, they refer to other documents, and in all points express themselves as sober-minded and veracious writers under

ordinary circumstances are known to do. But, perhaps, they bear testimony, the successor to his predecessor?—Or some one of the number has left it on record, that by especial inspiration *he* was commanded to declare the plenary inspiration of all the rest?—The passages, which can without violence be appealed to as substantiating the latter position, are so few, and these so incidental,*—the conclusion drawn from them involving likewise so obviously a *petitio principii*, namely, the supernatural dictation, word by word, of the book in which the question is found (for until this is established, the utmost that such a text can prove, is the current belief of the writer's age and country concerning the character of the books, then called the Scriptures);—that it can not but seem strange, and assuredly is against all analogy of Gospel Revelation, that such a Doctrine—which, if true, must be an article of faith, and a most important, yea, essential article of faith,—should be left thus faintly, thus obscurely, and, if I may so say, *obitaneously*, declared and enjoined. The time of the formation and closing of the Canon unknown,—the selectors and compilers unknown, or recorded by known fabulists;—and (more perplexing still), the belief of the Jewish Church—the belief, I mean, common to the Jews of Palestine and their more cultivated brethren in Alexandria (no reprehension of which is to be found in the New Testament)—concerning the nature and import of the *θεοπνευστία* attributed to the precious remains of their Temple Library;—these circumstances are such, especially the last, as in effect to evacuate the Tenet, of which I am speaking, of the only meaning in which it practically means any thing at all, tangible, steadfast, or obligatory. In infallibility there are no degrees. The power of the High and Holy One is one and the same, whether the sphere, which it fills, be larger or smaller;—the area traversed by a comet, or the oracle of the house, the holy place beneath the wings of the Cherubim;—the Pentateuch of the Legislator, who drew near to the thick darkness where God was, and who spake in the cloud whence the thunderings and lightnings came, and whom God answered by a voice;—or but a Letter of thirteen

* With only one seeming exception, the texts in question refer to the Old Testament alone. That exception is 2 *Peter* iii. 16. The word *λοιπὰς* (*γραφάς*) is, perhaps, not necessarily so to be interpreted; and this very text formed one of the objections to the Apostolic antiquity of the Epistle itself.

verses from the affectionate *Elder to the elect lady and her children, whom he loved in the truth.* But at no period was this the judgment of the Jewish Church respecting all the canonical books. To Moses alone—to Moses in the recording no less than in the receiving of the Law—and to all and every part of the five books, called the Books of Moses, the Jewish Doctors of the generation before, and coeval with, the Apostles assigned that unmodified and absolute *theopneusty*, which our divines, in words at least, attribute to the Canon collectively. In fact it was from the Jewish Rabbis,—who, in opposition to the Christian scheme, contended for a perfection in the Revelation by Moses, which neither required nor endured any addition, and who strained their fancies in expressing the transcendency of the books of Moses in aid of their opinion,—that the founders of the Doctrine borrowed their notions and phrases respecting the Bible throughout. Remove the metaphorical drapery from the doctrine of the Cabbalists, and it will be found to contain the only intelligible and consistent idea of that plenary inspiration, which later divines extend to all the canonical books; as thus:—"The Pentateuch is but *one Word*, even the Word of God; and the letters and articulate sounds, by which this Word is communicated to our human apprehensions, are likewise divinely communicated."

Now, for 'Pentateuch' substitute 'Old and New Testament,' and then I say that this is the doctrine which I reject as superstitious and unscriptural. And yet, as long as the conceptions of the Revealing Word and the Inspiring Spirit are identified and confounded, I assert that whatever says less than this, says little more than nothing. For how can absolute infallibility be blended with fallibility? Where is the infallible criterion? How can infallible truth be infallibly conveyed in defective and fallible expressions? The Jewish teachers confined this miraculous character to the Pentateuch. Between the Mosaic and the Prophetic inspiration they asserted such a difference as amounts to a diversity; and between both the one and the other, and the remaining books comprised under the title of *Hagiographa*, the interval was still wider, and the inferiority in kind, and not only in degree, was unequivocally expressed. If we take into account the habit, universal with the Hebrew Doctors, of referring all excellent or extraordinary things to the great First Cause, without mention of the proximate and instrumental causes,—a strik-

ing illustration of which may be obtained by comparing the narratives of the same event in the Psalms and in the Historical Books;—and if we further reflect that the distinction of the Providential and the Miraculous did not enter into their forms of thinking,—at all events not into their mode of conveying their thoughts—the language of the Jews respecting the *Hagiographa* will be found to differ little, if at all, from that of religious persons among ourselves, when speaking of an author abounding in gifts, stirred up by the Holy Spirit, writing under the influence of special grace, and the like.

But it forms no part of my present purpose to discuss the point historically, or to speculate on the formation of either Canon. Rather, such inquiries are altogether alien from the great object of my pursuits and studies, which is, to convince myself and others, that the Bible and Christianity are their own evidence. But it concerns both my character and my peace of mind to satisfy unprejudiced judges, that if my present convictions should in all other respects be found consistent with the faith and feelings of a Christian,—and if in many and those important points they tend to secure that faith and to deepen those feelings—the words of the Apostle,* rightly interpreted, do not require their condemnation. Enough, if what has been stated above respecting the general doctrine of the Hebrew Masters, under whom the Apostle was bred, shall remove any misconceptions that might prevent the right interpretation of his words. Farewell.

* 2 *Tim.* iii. 16.

LETTER III.

My dear Friend,

Having in the former two Letters defined the doctrine which I reject, I am now to communicate the views that I would propose to substitute in its place.

Before, however, I attempt to lay down on the theological chart the road-place, to which my bark has drifted, and to mark the spot and circumscribe the space, within which I swing at anchor, let me, first, thank you for, and then attempt to answer, the objections,—or at least the questions,—which you have urged upon me.

"The present Bible is the Canon, to which Christ and the Apostles referred?"

Doubtless.

"And in terms which a Christian must tremble to tamper with?"

Yea. The expressions are as direct as strong; and a true believer will neither attempt to divert or dilute their strength.

"The doctrine which is considered as the orthodox view seems the obvious and most natural interpretation of the texts in question?"

Yea, and Nay. To those whose minds are prepossessed by the Doctrine itself,—who from earliest childhood have always meant this doctrine by the very word, Bible,—the doctrine being but its exposition and paraphrase—Yea. In such minds the words of our Lord and the declarations of St. Paul can awaken no other sense. To those on the other hand, who find the doctrine senseless and self-confuting, and who take up the Bible as they do other books, and apply to it the same rules of interpretation,—Nay.

And, lastly, he who, like myself, recognizes in neither of the two the state of his own mind,—who can not rest in the former,

and feels, or fears, a presumptuous spirit in the negative dogmatism of the latter,—he has his answer to seek. But so far I dare hazard a reply to the question,—In what other sense can the words be interpreted?—beseeching you, however, to take what I am about to offer but as an attempt to delineate an arc of oscillation,—that the eulogy of St. Paul is in no wise contravened by the opinion, to which I incline, who fully believe the Old Testament collectively, both in the composition and in its preservation, a great and precious gift of Providence;—who find in it all that the Apostle describes, and who more than believe that all which the Apostle spoke of was of divine inspiration, and a blessing intended for as many as are in communion with the Spirit through all ages. And I freely confess that my whole heart would turn away with an angry impatience from the cold and captious mortal, who, the moment I had been pouring out the love and gladness of my soul, while book after book, Law, and Truth, and Example, Oracle and lovely Hymn, and choral Song of ten thousand thousands, and accepted Prayers of Saints and Prophets, sent back, as it were, from Heaven, like doves, to be let loose again with a new freight of spiritual joys and griefs and necessities, were passing across my memory,—at the first pause of my voice, and whilst my countenance was still speaking—should ask me, whether I was thinking of the Book of Esther, or meant particularly to include the first six chapters of Daniel, or verses 6–20 of the 109th Psalm, or the last verse of the 137th Psalm? Would any conclusion of this sort be drawn in any other analogous case? In the course of my Lectures on Dramatic Poetry I in half a score instances referred my auditors to the precious volume before me —Shakspeare—and spoke enthusiastically, both in general and with detail of particular beauties, of the plays of Shakspeare, as in all their kinds, and in relation to the purposes of the writer, excellent. Would it have been fair, or according to the common usage and understanding of men, to have inferred an intention on my part to decide the question respecting Titus Andronicus, or the larger portion of the three parts of Henry VI.? Would not every genial mind understand by Shakspeare that unity or total impression comprising, and resulting from, the thousandfold several and particular emotions of delight, admiration, gratitude, excited by his works? But if it be answered, 'Aye! but we must not interpret St. Paul as we may and should interpret any other

honest and intelligent writer or speaker,'—then, I say, this is the very *petitio principii* of which I complain.

Still less do the words of our Lord* apply against my view. Have I not declared—do I not begin by declaring—that whatever is referred by the sacred Penman to a direct communication from God, and wherever it is recorded that the Subject of the history had asserted himself to have received this or that command, this or that information or assurance, from a super-human Intelligence, or where the writer in his own person, and in the character of an historian, relates that the *Word of the Lord came* unto priest, prophet, chieftain, or other individual—have I not declared that I receive the same with full belief, and admit its inappellable authority? Who more convinced than I am—who more anxious to impress that conviction on the minds of others—that the Law and the Prophets speak throughout of Christ? That all the intermediate applications and realizations of the words are but types and repetitions—translations, as it were, from the language of letters and articulate sounds into the language of events and symbolical persons?

And here again let me recur to the aid of analogy. Suppose a Life of Sir Thomas More by his son-in-law, or a Life of Lord Bacon by his chaplain; that a part of the records of the Court of Chancery belonging to these periods were lost; that in Roper's or in Rawley's biographical work there were preserved a series of *dicta* and judgments attributed to these illustrious Chancellors, many and important specimens of their table discourses, with large extracts from works written by them, and from some that are no longer extant. Let it be supposed, too, that there are no grounds, internal or external, to doubt either the moral, intellectual, or circumstantial competence of the biographers. Suppose, moreover, that wherever the opportunity existed of collating their documents and quotations with the records and works still preserved, the former were found substantially correct and faithful, the few differences in no wise altering or disturbing the spirit and purpose of the paragraphs in which they were found, and that of what was not collatable, and to which no test *ab extra* could be applied, the far larger part bore witness in itself of the same spirit and origin; and that not only by its characteristic features, but by its surpassing excellence, it rendered the chances of its

* *John* v. 39.

having had any other author than the giant-mind, to whom the biographer ascribes it, small indeed! Now, from the nature and objects of my pursuits, I have, we will suppose, frequent occasion to refer to one or other of these works; for example, to Rawley's *Dicta et Facta Francisci de Verulam.* At one time I might refer to the work in some such words as,—"Remember what Francis of Verulam said or judged;" or,—"If you believe not me, yet believe Lord Bacon." At another time I might take the running title of the volume, and at another, the name of the biographer;—"Turn to your Rawley! *He* will set you right;" or,—"*There* you will find a depth, which no research will ever exhaust;" or whatever other strong expression my sense of Bacon's greatness and of the intrinsic worth and the value of the proofs and specimens of that greatness, contained and preserved in that volume, would excite and justify. But let my expressions be as vivid and unqualified as the most sanguine temperament ever inspired, would any man of sense conclude from them that I meant—and meant to make others believe—that not only each and all of these anecdotes, adages, decisions, extracts, incidents had been dictated, word by word, by Lord Bacon; and that all Rawley's own observations and inferences, all the connectives and disjunctives, all the recollections of time, place, and circumstance, together with the order and succession of the narrative, were in like manner dictated and revised by the spirit of the deceased Chancellor? The answer will be—must be;—No man in his senses! "No man in his senses—in *this* instance; but in that of the Bible it is quite otherwise;—for (I take it as an admitted point that) it—*is* quite otherwise!"

And here I renounce any advantage I might obtain for my argument by restricting the application of our Lord's and the Apostle's words to the Hebrew Canon. I admit the justice—I have long felt the full force—of the remark—"We have all that the occasion allowed." And if the same awful authority does not apply so directly to the Evangelical and Apostolical writings as to the Hebrew Canon, yet the analogy of faith justifies the transfer. If the doctrine be less decisively Scriptural in its application to the New Testament or the Christian Canon, the temptation to doubt it is likewise less. So at least we are led to infer; since in point of fact it is the apparent or imagined contrast, the diversity of spirit which sundry individuals have be-

lieved themselves to find in the Old Testament and in the Gospel, that has given occasion to the doubt;—and, in the heart of thousands who yield a faith of acquiescence to the contrary, and find rest in their humility,—supplies fuel to a fearful wish that it were permitted to make a distinction.

But, lastly, you object, that—even granting that no coercive, positive, reasons for the belief—no direct and not inferred assertions—of the plenary inspiration of the Old and New Testament, in the generally received import of the term, could be adduced, yet—in behalf of a doctrine so catholic, and during so long a succession of ages affirmed and acted on by Jew and Christian, Greek, Romish, and Protestant, you need no other answer than: —"Tell me first, why it should not be received? Why should I not believe the Scriptures throughout dictated, in word and thought, by an infallible Intelligence?"—I admit the fairness of the retort; and eagerly and earnestly do I answer: For every reason that makes me prize and revere these Scriptures;—prize them, love them, revere them, beyond all other books! *Why* should I not? Because the doctrine in question petrifies at once the whole body of Holy Writ with all its harmonies and symmetrical gradations,—the flexile and the rigid,—the supporting hard and the clothing soft,—the blood *which is the life*,—the intelligencing nerves, and the rudely-woven, but soft and springy, cellular substance, in which all are imbedded and lightly bound together. This breathing organism, this glorious *panharmonicon*, which I had seen stand on its feet as a man, and with a man's voice given to it, the Doctrine in question turns at once into a colossal Memnon's head, a hollow passage for a voice, a voice that mocks the voices of many men, and speaks in their names, and yet is but one voice, and the same;—and no man uttered it, and never in a human heart was it conceived. *Why* should I not?—Because the Doctrine evacuates of all sense and efficacy the sure and constant tradition, that all the several books bound up together in our precious family Bible were composed in different and widely distant ages, under the greatest diversity of circumstances, and degrees of light and information, and yet that the composers, whether as uttering or as recording what was uttered and what was done, were all actuated by a pure and holy Spirit, one and the same—(for is there any spirit pure and holy, and yet not proceeding from God—and yet not proceeding in and

with the Holy Spirit?)—one Spirit, working diversly.* now awakening strength, and now glorifying itself in weakness, now giving power and direction to knowledge, and now taking away the sting from error! Ere the summer and the months of ripening had arrived for the heart of the race; while the whole sap of the tree was crude, and each and every fruit lived in the harsh and bitter principle; even then this Spirit withdrew its chosen ministers from the false and guilt-making centre of Self. It converted the wrath into a form and an organ of love, and on the passing storm-cloud impressed the fair rainbow of promise to all generations. Put the lust of Self in the forked lightning, and should it not be a Spirit of Moloch? But God maketh the lightnings his ministers, fire and hail, vapors and stormy winds fulfilling his word.

Curse ye Meroz, said the angel of the Lord; curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof—sang Deborah. Was it that she called to mind any personal wrongs—rapine or insult—that she or the house of Lapidoth had received from Jabin or Sisera? No; she had dwelt under her palm-tree in the depth of the mountain. But she was a *mother in Israel;* and with a mother's heart, and with the vehemency of a mother's and a patriot's love, she had shot the light of love from her eyes, and poured the blessings of love from her lips, on the people that had *jeoparded their lives unto the death* against the oppressors; and the bitterness, awakened and borne aloft by the same love, she precipitated in curses on the selfish and coward recreants who *came not to the help of the Lord, to the help of the Lord, against the mighty.* As long as I have the image of Deborah before my eyes, and while I throw myself back into the age, country, circumstances, of this Hebrew Bonduca in the not yet tamed chaos of the spiritual creation;—as long as I contemplate the impassioned, high-souled, heroic woman in all the prominence and individuality of will and character,—I feel as if I were among the first ferments of the great affections—the proplastic waves of the microcosmic chaos, swelling up against—and yet towards—the outspread wings of the Dove that lies brooding on the troubled

* I use the adverb *diversly* from the adjective *divers* in order to distinguish the Scriptural and Pauline sense of the word—the sense in which I here use it—from the logical usage of the term *diversely* from *diverse*, that is, different in kind, heterogeneous. The same Spirit may act and impel diversly, but, being a good Spirit, it can not act diversely.

waters. So long, all is well,—all replete with instruction and example. In the fierce and inordinate I am made to know and be grateful for the clearer and purer radiance which shines on a Christian's paths, neither blunted by the preparatory veil, nor crimsoned in its struggle through the all-enwrapping mist of the world's ignorance ; whilst in the self-oblivion of these heroes of the Old Testament, their elevation above all low and individual interest,—above all, in the entire and vehement devotion of their total being to the service of their divine Master, I find a lesson of humility, a ground of humiliation, and a shaming, yet rousing, example of faith and fealty. But let me once be persuaded that all these heart-awakening utterances of human hearts—of men of like faculties and passions with myself, mourning, rejoicing, suffering, triumphing—are but as a *Divina Commedia* of a superhuman—O bear with me, if I say—Ventriloquist ;—that the royal Harper, to whom I have so often submitted myself as a *many-stringed instrument*, for his fire-tipt fingers to traverse, while every several nerve of emotion, passion, thought, that thrids the flesh-and-blood of our common humanity, responded to the touch,—that this *sweet Psalmist of Israel* was himself as mere an instrument as his harp, an *automaton* poet, mourner, and supplicant ;—all is gone,—all sympathy, at least, and all example. I listen in awe and fear, but likewise in perplexity and confusion of spirit.

Yet one other instance, and let this be the crucial test of the Doctrine. Say that the Book of Job throughout was dictated by an infallible Intelligence. Then reperuse the book, and still, as you proceed, try to apply the tenet: try if you can even attach any sense or semblance of meaning to the speeches which you are reading. What! were the hollow truisms, the unsufficing half-truths, the false assumptions and malignant insinuations of the supercilious bigots, who corruptly defended the truth :—were the impressive facts, the piercing outcries, the pathetic appeals, and the close and powerful reasoning with which the poor sufferer—smarting at once from his wounds, and from the oil of vitriol which the orthodox *liars for God* were dropping into them—impatiently, but uprightly and holily, controverted this truth, while in will and in spirit he clung to it ;—were both dictated by an infallible Intelligence ?—Alas ! if I may judge from the manner in which both indiscriminately are recited, quoted,

appealed to, preached upon, by the *routiniers* of desk and pulpit, I can not doubt that they think so,—or rather without thinking, take for granted that so they are to think;—the more readily, perhaps, because the so thinking supersedes the necessity of all after-thought.

Farewell.

LETTER IV.

My dear Friend,

You reply to the conclusion of my Letter: "What have we to do with *routiniers? Quid mihi cum homunculis putata putide reputantibus?* Let nothings count for nothing, and the dead bury the dead! Who but such ever understood the Tenet in this sense?"—

In what sense then, I rejoin, do others understand it? If, with exception of the passages already excepted, namely, the recorded words of God—concerning which no Christian can have doubt or scruple,—the Tenet in this sense be inapplicable to the Scripture, destructive of its noblest purposes, and contradictory to its own express declarations,—again and again I ask:—What am I to substitute? What other sense is conceivable that does not destroy the doctrine which it professes to interpret—that does not convert it into its own negative? As if a geometrician should name a sugar loaf an ellipse, adding—"By which term I here mean a cone;"—and then justify the misnomer on the pretext that the ellipse is among the conic sections! And yet—notwithstanding the repugnancy of the Doctrine, in its unqualified sense, to Scripture, Reason, and Common Sense theoretically, while to all practical uses it is intractable, unmalleable, and altogether unprofitable, notwithstanding its irrationality, and in the face of your expostulation, grounded on the palpableness of its irrationality,—I must still avow my belief that, however flittingly and unsteadily, as through a mist, it *is* the Doctrine which the generality of our popular divines receive as orthodox, and this the sense which they attach to the words.

For on what other ground can I account for the whimsical *subintelligiturs* of our numerous harmonists,—for the curiously inferred facts, the inventive circumstantial detail, the complemental and supplemental history which, in the utter silence of all historians, and absence of all historical documents, they bring

to light by mere force of logic ?—And all to do away some half-score apparent discrepancies in the chronicles and memoirs of the Old and New Testaments ;—discrepancies so analogous to what is found in all other narratives of the same story by several narrators,—so analogous to what is found in all other known and trusted histories by contemporary historians, when they are collated with each other (nay, not seldom when either historian is compared with himself), as to form in the eyes of all competent judges a characteristic mark of the genuineness, independency, and (if I may apply the word to a book) the veraciousness of each several document ; a mark the absence of which would warrant a suspicion of collusion, invention, or at best of servile transcription ;—discrepancies so trifling in circumstance and import, that, although in some instances it is highly probable, and in all instances, perhaps, possible that they are only apparent and reconcilable, no wise man would care a straw whether they were real or apparent, reconciled or left in harmless and friendly variance. What, I ask, could have induced learned and intelligent divines to adopt or sanction subterfuges, which, neutralizing the ordinary *criteria* of full or defective evidence in historical documents, would, taken as a general rule, render all collation and cross-examination of written records ineffective, and obliterate the main character by which authentic histories are distinguished from those traditional tales, which each successive reporter enlarges and fashions to his own fancy and purpose, and every different edition of which more or less contradicts the other ? Allow me to create chasms *ad libitum*, and *ad libitum* to fill them up with imagined facts and incidents, and I would almost undertake to harmonize Falstaff's account of the rogues in buckram into a coherent and consistent narrative. What, I say, could have tempted grave and pious men thus to disturb the foundation of the Temple, in order to repair a petty breach or rat-hole in the wall, or fasten a loose stone or two in the outer court, if not an assumed necessity arising out of the peculiar character of Bible history ?

The substance of the syllogism, by which their procedure was justified to their own minds, can be no other than this. That, without which two assertions—both of which *must* be alike true and correct—would contradict each other, and consequently be, one or both, false or incorrect, must itself be true. But every

word and syllable existing in the original text of the Canonical Books, from the *Cherethi* and *Phelethi** of David to the name in the copy of a family register, the site of a town, or the course of a river, were dictated to the sacred *amanuensis* by an infallible Intelligence. Here there can be neither more nor less. Important or unimportant gives no ground of difference; and the number of the writers as little. The secretaries may have been many,—the historian was one and the same, and he infallible. This is the *minor* of the syllogism; and if it could be proved, the conclusion would be at least plausible; and there would be but one objection to the procedure, namely, its uselessness. For if it have been proved already, what need of proving it over again, and by means—the removal, namely, of apparent contradictions —which the infallible Author did not think good to employ? But if it have not been proved, what becomes of the argument which derives its whole force and legitimacy from the assumption?

In fact, it is clear that the harmonists and their admirers held and understood the Doctrine literally. And must not that divine likewise have so understood it, who, in answer to a question concerning the transcendent blessedness of Jael, and the righteousness of the act, in which she inhospitably, treacherously, perfidiously, murdered sleep, the confiding sleep, closed the controversy by observing that he wanted no better morality than that of the Bible, and no other proof of an action's being praiseworthy than that the Bible had declared it worthy to be praised; an observation, as applied in this instance, so slanderous to the morality and moral spirit of the Bible as to be inexplicable, except as a consequence of the Doctrine in dispute?—But let a man be once fully persuaded that there is no difference between the two positions— "The Bible contains the religion revealed by God"—and— "Whatever is contained in the Bible is religion, and was revealed by God"—; and that whatever can be said of the Bible, collectively taken, may and must be said of each and every sentence of the Bible, taken for and by itself;—and I no longer wonder at these paradoxes. I only object to the inconsistency of those who profess the same belief, and yet affect to look down with a contemptuous or compassionate smile on John Wesley for rejecting the Copernican system as incompatible therewith; or who ex-

* 2 *Sam.* xx. 23. 1 *Chron.* xviii. 17.—*Ed.*

claim "Wonderful!" when they hear that Sir Matthew Hale sent a crazy old woman to the gallows in honor of the Witch of Endor.* In the latter instance it might, I admit, have been an erroneous (though even at this day the all but universally received) interpretation of the word, which we have rendered by *witch;* —but I challenge these divines and their adherents to establish the compatibility of a belief in the modern astronomy and natural philosophy with their and Wesley's doctrine respecting the inspired Scriptures, without reducing the Doctrine itself to a plaything of wax;—or rather to a half-inflated bladder, which, when the contents are rarefied in the heat of rhetorical generalities, swells out round, and without a crease or wrinkle: but bring it into the cool temperature of particulars, and you may press, and as it were except, what part you like—so it be but one part at a time—between your thumb and finger.

Now, I pray you, which is the more honest, nay, which the

* He sent two, nor does it appear that the poor creatures were at all crazy.

Rose Cullender and Amy Duny, widows, of Lowestoff, Suffolk, were tried for witchcraft, on the 10th of March, 1665, at Bury St. Edmunds. Sir M. Hale told the jury, "that he would not repeat the evidence unto them, lest by so doing he should wrong the evidence on the one side or the other. Only this he acquainted them, that they had two things to inquire after: first, whether or no these children were bewitched; secondly, whether the prisoners at the bar were guilty of it.

"*That there were such creatures as witches, he made no doubt at all. For, first, the Scriptures had affirmed so much. Secondly, the wisdom of all nations had provided laws against such persons, which is an argument of their confidence of such a crime.* And such hath been the judgment of this kingdom, as appears by that Act of Parliament, which hath provided punishments proportionable to the quality of the offence. And desired them strictly to observe their evidence; and desired the great God of Heaven to direct their hearts in the weighty thing they had in hand. For to condemn the innocent, and to let the guilty go free were both an abomination to the Lord."

They were found guilty on thirteen indictments. The bewitched got well of all their pains the moment after the conviction; "only Susan Chandler felt a pain like pricking of pins in her stomach."

"The Judge and all the Court felt fully satisfied with the verdict, and thereupon gave judgment against the witches that they should be hanged."

"They were much urged to confess, but would not."

"They were executed on Monday, the 17th of March following, but they confessed nothing."—*State Trials*, vi. p. 700.—*Ed.*

more reverential, proceeding,—to play at fast and loose in this way; or to say at once, "See here in these several writings one and the same Holy Spirit, now sanctifying a chosen vessel, and fitting it for the reception of heavenly truths proceeding immediately from the mouth of God, and elsewhere working in frail and fallible men like ourselves, and like ourselves instructed by God's word and laws?"—The first Christian martyr had the form and features of an ordinary man, nor are we taught to believe that these features were miraculously transfigured into superhuman symmetry; but *he being filled with the Holy Ghost, they that looked steadfastly on him, saw his face as it had been the face of an angel.* Even so has it ever been, and so it ever will be, with all who with humble hearts and a rightly disposed spirit scan the Sacred Volume. And they who read it with *an evil heart of unbelief*, and an alien spirit—what boots for them the assertion that every sentence was miraculously communicated to the nominal author by God himself? Will it not rather present additional temptations to the unhappy scoffers, and furnish them with a pretext of self-justification?

When, in my third Letter, I first echoed the question, 'Why should I not?'—the answers came crowding on my mind. I am well content, however, to have merely suggested the main points, in proof of the positive harm which, both historically and spiritually, our religion sustains from this Doctrine. Of minor importance, yet not to be overlooked, are the forced and fantastic interpretations, the arbitrary allegories and mystic expansions of proper names, to which this indiscriminate Bibliolatry furnished fuel, spark, and wind. A still greater evil, and less attributable to the visionary humor and weak judgment of the individual expositors, is the literal rendering of Scripture in passages, which the number and variety of images employed in different places, to express one and the same verity, plainly mark out for figurative. And, lastly, add to all these the strange—in all other writings unexampled—practice of bringing together into logical dependency detached sentences from books composed at the distance of centuries, nay, sometimes a *millennium*, from each other, under different dispensations, and for different objects. Accommodations of elder Scriptural phrases—that favorite ornament and garnish of Jewish eloquence—incidental allusions to popular notions, traditions, apologues—(for example, the dispute between the

Devil and the Archangel Michael about the body of Moses. *Jude* 9),—fancies and anachronisms imported from the synagogue of Alexandria into Palestine by, or together with, the Septuagint Version, and applied as mere *argumenta ad homines*—(for example, the delivery of the Law by the disposition of Angels, *Acts* vii. 53, *Gal.* iii. 19, *Heb.* ii. 2)—these, detached from their context, and, contrary to the intention of the sacred writer, first raised into independent *theses*, and then brought together to produce or sanction some new *credendum*, for which neither separately could have furnished a pretence! By this strange mosaic, Scripture texts have been worked up into passable likenesses of Purgatory, Popery, the Inquisition, and other monstrous abuses. But would you have a Protestant instance of the superstitious use of Scripture arising out of this dogma? Passing by the Cabbala of the Hutchinsonian School as the dotage of a few weak-minded individuals, I refer you to Bishop Hacket's Sermons on the Incarnation. And if you have read the same author's Life of Archbishop Williams, and have seen and felt (as every reader of this latter work must see and feel) his talent, learning, acuteness, and robust good sense, you will have no difficulty in determining the quality and character of a dogma, which could engraft such fruits on such a tree.*

It will perhaps appear a paradox, if, after all these reasons, I should avow that they weigh less in my mind against the Doctrine, than the motives usually assigned for maintaining and enjoining it. Such, for instance, are the arguments drawn from the anticipated loss and damage that would result from its abandonment; as that it would deprive the Christian world of its only infallible arbiter in questions of Faith and Duty, suppress the only common and inappellable tribunal; that the Bible is the only

* 'Did not the Life of Archbishop Williams prove otherwise, I should have inferred from these Sermons that Hacket from his first boyhood had been used to make themes, epigrams, copies of verses, and the like on all the feasts and festivals of the Church; had found abundant nourishment for this humor of points, quirks, and quiddities, in the study of the Fathers and glossers; and remained a *junior soph* all his life long.' * * * * 'Let any competent judge read Hacket's Life of Archbishop Williams, and then these Sermons, and so measure the stultifying, nugifying, effect of a blind and uncritical study of the Fathers, and the exclusive prepossession in favor of their authority in the minds of many of our Church dignitaries in the reign of Charles I.' See *ante*, pp. 128 and 128.—*Ed.*

religious bond of union and ground of unity among Protestants, and the like. For the confutation of this whole reasoning it might be sufficient to ask:—Has it produced these effects? Would not the contrary statement be nearer to the fact? What did the Churches of the first four centuries hold on this point? To what did they attribute the rise and multiplication of heresies? Can any learned and candid Protestant affirm that there existed and exists no ground for the charges of Bossuet and other eminent Romish divines? It is no easy matter to know how to handle a party maxim, so framed that, with the exception of a single word, it expresses an important truth, but which by means of that word is made to convey a most dangerous error.

The Bible is the appointed conservatory, an indispensable criterion, and a continual source and support of true Belief. But that the Bible is the sole source; that it not only contains, but constitutes, the Christian Religion; that it is, in short, a Creed, consisting wholly of articles of Faith; that consequently we need no rule, help, or guide, spiritual or historical, to teach us what parts are and what are not articles of Faith—all being such,—and the difference between the Bible and the Creed being this, that the clauses of the latter are all unconditionally necessary to salvation, but those of the former conditionally so, that is, as soon as the words are known to exist in any one of the canonical Books; and that, under this limitation, the belief is of the same necessity in both, and not at all affected by the greater or lesser importance of the matter to be believed;—this scheme differs widely from the preceding, though its adherents often make use of the same words in expressing their belief. And this latter scheme, I assert, was brought into currency by and in favor of those by whom the operation of grace, the aids of the Spirit, the necessity of regeneration, the corruption of our nature, in short, all the peculiar and spiritual mysteries of the Gospel were explained and diluted away.

And how have these men treated this very Bible?—I, who indeed prize and reverence this sacred library, as of all outward means and conservatives of Christian faith and practice the surest and the most reflective of the inward Word;—I, who hold that the Bible contains the religion of Christians, but who dare not say that whatever is contained in the Bible is the Christian religion, and who shrink from all question respecting the compara-

tive worth and efficacy of the written Word as weighed against the preaching of the Gospel, the discipline of the Churches, the continued succession of the Ministry, and the communion of Saints, lest by comparing I should seem to detach them ;—I tremble at the processes, which the Grotian divines without scruple carry on in their treatment of the sacred Writers, as soon as any texts declaring the peculiar tenets of our Faith are cited against them,—even tenets and mysteries which the believer at his baptism receives as the title-writ and bosom-roll of his adoption ; and which, according to my scheme, every Christian born in Church-membership ought to bring with him to the study of the sacred Scriptures as the master-key of interpretation. Whatever the doctrine of infallible dictation may be in itself, in *their* hands it is to the last degree nugatory, and to be paralleled only by the Romish tenet of Infallibility,—in the existence of which all agree, but where, and in whom it exists, is still matter of debate. Every sentence found in a canonical Book, rightly interpreted, contains the *dictum* of an infallible Mind ;—but what the right interpretation is,—or whether the very words now extant are corrupt or genuine—must be determined by the industry and understanding of fallible, and alas ! more or less prejudiced theologians.

And yet I am told that this Doctrine must not be resisted or called in question, because of its fitness to preserve unity of faith, and for the prevention of schism and sectarian by-ways !—Let the man who holds this language trace the history of Protestantism, and the growth of sectarian divisions, ending with Dr. Hawker's *ultra*-Calvinistic Tracts, and Mr. Belsham's New Version of the Testament. And then let him tell me that for the prevention of an evil which already exists, and which the boasted preventive itself might rather seem to have occasioned, I must submit to be silenced by the first learned Infidel, who throws in my face the blessings of Deborah, or the cursings of David, or the Grecisms and heavier difficulties in the biographical chapters of the Book of Daniel, or the hydrography and natural philosophy of the Patriarchal ages.—I must forego the means of silencing, and the prospect of convincing, an alienated brother, because I must not thus answer :—" My Brother ! What has all this to do with the truth and the worth of Christianity ? If you reject *à priori* all communion with the Holy Spirit, there is indeed a chasm between us, over which we can not even make our

voices intelligible to each other. But if—though but with the faith of a Seneca or an Antonine—you admit the co-operation of a divine Spirit in souls desirous of good, even as the breath of heaven works variously in each several plant according to its kind, character, period of growth, and circumstance of soil, clime, and aspect;—on what ground can you assume that its presence is incompatible with all imperfection in the subject,—even with such imperfection as is the natural accompaniment of the unripe season? If you call your gardener or husbandman to account for the plants or crops he is raising, would you not regard the special purpose in each, and judge of each by that which it was tending to? Thorns are not flowers, nor is the husk serviceable. But it was not for its thorns, but for its sweet and medicinal flowers that the rose was cultivated; and he who can not separate the husk from the grain, wants the power because sloth or malice has prevented the will. I demand for the Bible only the justice which you grant to other books of grave authority, and to other proved and acknowledged benefactors of mankind. Will you deny a spirit of wisdom in Lord Bacon, because in particular facts he did not possess perfect science, or an entire immunity from the positive errors which result from imperfect insight? A Davy will not so judge his great predecessor. For he recognizes the spirit that is now working in himself, and which under similar defects of light and obstacles of error had been his guide and guardian in the morning twilight of his own genius. Must not the kindly warmth, awaken and vivify the seed, in order that the stem may spring up and rejoice in the light? As the genial warmth to the informing light, even so is the predisposing Spirit to the revealing Word."

If I should reason thus—but why do I say *if?*—I have reasoned thus with more than one serious and well-disposed Skeptic; and what was the answer?—"*You* speak rationally, but seem to forget the subject. I have frequently attended meetings of the British and Foreign Bible Society, where I have heard speakers of every denomination, Calvinist and Arminian, Quaker and Methodist, Dissenting Ministers and Clergymen, nay, dignitaries of the Established Church,—and still have I heard the same doctrine,—that the Bible was not to be regarded or reasoned about in the way that other good books are or may be;—that the Bible was different in kind, and stood by itself. By some indeed

this doctrine was rather implied than expressed, but yet evidently implied. But by far the greater number of the speakers it was asserted in the strongest and most unqualified words that language could supply. What is more, their principal arguments were grounded on the position, that the Bible throughout was dictated by Omniscience, and therefore in all its parts infallibly true and obligatory, and that the men, whose names are prefixed to the several books or chapters, were in fact but as different pens in the hand of one and the same Writer, and the words the words of God himself;—and that on this account all notes and comments were superfluous, nay, presumptuous,—a profane mixing of human with divine, the notions of fallible creatures, with the oracles of Infallibility,—as if God's meaning could be so clearly or fitly expressed in man's as in God's own words! But how often you yourself must have heard the same language from the pulpit!"—

What could I reply to this?—I could neither deny the fact, nor evade the conclusion,—namely, that such is at present the popular belief. Yes—I at length rejoined—I have heard this language from the pulpit, and more than once from men who in any other place would explain it away into something so very different from the literal sense of their words as closely to resemble the contrary. And this, indeed, is the peculiar character of the doctrine, that you can not diminish or qualify but you reverse it. I have heard this language from men, who knew as well as myself that the best and most orthodox divines have in effect disclaimed the doctrine, inasmuch as they confess it can not be extended to the words of the sacred Writers, or the particular import,—that therefore the Doctrine does not mean all that the usual wording of it expresses, though what it does mean, and why they continue to sanction this hyperbolical wording, I have sought to learn from them in vain. But let a thousand orators blazon it at public meetings, and let as many pupils echo it, surely it behooves you to inquire whether you can not be a Christian on your own faith; and it can not but be beneath a wise man to be an Infidel on the score of what other men think fit to include in their Christianity!

Now suppose—and, believe me, the supposition will vary little from the fact—that in consequence of these views the Skeptic's mind had gradually opened to the reception of all the truths enu-

merated in my first Letter. Suppose that the Scriptures themselves from this time had continued to rise in his esteem and affection—the better understood, the more dear; as in the countenance of one, whom through a crowd of prejudices we have at last learned to love and value above all others, new beauties dawn on us from day to day, till at length we wonder how we could at any time have thought it other than most beautiful. Studying the sacred Volume in the light and in the freedom of a faith already secured, at every fresh meeting my Skeptic friend has to tell me of some new passage, formerly viewed by him as a dry stick on a rotten branch, which has *budded*, and like the rod of Aaron, *brought forth buds and bloomed blossoms, and yielded almonds*. Let these results, I say, be supposed,—and shall I still be told that my friend is nevertheless an alien in the household of Faith? Scrupulously orthodox as I know you to be, will you tell me that I ought to have left this Skeptic as I found him, rather than attempt his conversion by such means; or that I was deceiving him, when I said to him:—

"Friend! The truth revealed through Christ has its evidence in itself, and the proof of its divine authority in its fitness to our nature and needs;—the clearness and cogency of this proof being proportioned to the degree of self-knowledge in each individual hearer. Christianity has likewise its historical evidences, and these as strong as is compatible with the nature of history, and with the aims and objects of a religious dispensation. And to all these Christianity itself, as an existing Power in the world, and Christendom as an existing Fact, with the no less evident fact of a progressive expansion, give a force of moral demonstration that almost supersedes particular testimony. These proofs and evidences would remain unshaken, even though the sum of our religion were to be drawn from the theologians of each successive century, on the principle of receiving that only as divine, which should be found in all—*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ad omnibus*. Be only, my Friend! as orthodox a believer as you would have abundant reason to be, though from some accident of birth, country, or education the precious boon of the Bible, with its additional evidence, had up to this moment been concealed from you;—and then read its contents with only the same piety which you freely accord on other occasions to the writings of men, considered the best and wisest of their several ages! What you find

therein coincident with your pre-established convictions, you will of course recognize as the Revealed Word, while, as you read the recorded workings of the Word and the Spirit in the minds, lives, and hearts of spiritual men, the influence of the same Spirit on your own being, and the conflicts of grace and infirmity in your own soul, will enable you to discern and to know in and by what spirit they spake and acted,—as far at least as shall be needful for you, and in the times of your need.

"Thenceforward, therefore, your doubts will be confined to such parts or passages of the received Canon, as seem to you irreconcilable with known truths, and at variance with the tests given in the Scriptures themselves, and as shall continue so to appear after you have examined each in reference to the circumstances of the Writer or Speaker, the dispensation under which he lived, the purpose of the particular passage, and the intent and object of the Scriptures at large. Respecting these, decide for yourself: and fear not for the result. I venture to tell it you beforehand. The result will be, a confidence in the judgment and fidelity of the compilers of the Canon increased by the apparent exceptions. For they will be found neither more nor greater than may well be supposed requisite, on the one hand, to prevent us from sinking into a habit of slothful, undiscriminating, acquiescence, and on the other to provide a check against those presumptuous fanatics, who would rend the *Urim and Thummim from the breastplate of judgment*, and frame oracles by private divination from each letter of each disjointed gem, uninterpreted by the Priest, and deserted by the Spirit, which shines in the parts only as it pervades and irradiates the whole."

Such is the language in which I have addressed a halting friend,—halting, yet with his face toward the right path. If I have erred, enable me to see my error. Correct me or confirm me.

Farewell.

LETTER V.

YES! my dear Friend, it is my conviction that in all ordinary cases the knowledge and belief of the Christian Religion should precede the study of the Hebrew Canon. Indeed with regard to both Testaments, I consider oral and catechismal instruction as the preparative provided by Christ himself in the establishment of a visible Church. And to make the Bible, apart from the truths, doctrines, and spiritual experiences contained therein, the subject of a special article of faith, I hold an unnecessary and useless abstraction, which in too many instances has the effect of substituting a barren acquiescence in the letter for the lively *faith that cometh by hearing;* even as the hearing is productive of this faith, because it is the word of God that is heard and preached (*Rom.* x. 8, 17). And here I mean the written word preserved in the armory of the Church to be the sword of faith *out of the mouth* of the preacher, as Christ's ambassador and representative (*Rev.* i. 16), and out of the heart of the believer, from generation to generation. Who shall dare dissolve or loosen this holy bond, this divine reciprocality, of Faith and Scripture? Who shall dare enjoin aught else as an object of saving faith, beside the truths that appertain to salvation? The imposers take on themselves a heavy responsibility, however defensible the opinion itself, as an opinion, may be. For by imposing it, they counteract their own purposes. They antedate questions, and thus in all cases aggravate the difficulty of answering them satisfactorily. And not seldom they create difficulties that might never have occurred. But, worst of all, they convert things trifling or indifferent into mischievous pretexts for the wanton, fearful difficulties for the weak, and formidable objections for the inquiring. For what man *fearing God* dares think any the least point indifferent, which he is required to receive as God's own immediate word miraculously infused, miraculously recorded, and

by a succession of miracles preserved unblended and without change ?—Through all the pages of a large and multifold volume, at each successive period, at every sentence, must the question recur :—" Dare I believe—do I in my heart believe—these words to have been dictated by an infallible reason, and the immediate utterance of Almighty God ?"—No ! It is due to Christian charity that a question so awful should not be put unnecessarily, and should not be put out of time. The necessity I deny. And out of time the question must be put, if after enumerating the several articles of the Catholic Faith I am bound to add :—" and further you are to believe with equal faith, as having the same immediate and miraculous derivation from God, whatever else you shall hereafter read in any of the sixty-six books collected in the Old and New Testaments."

I would never say this. Yet let me not be misjudged as if I treated the Scriptures as a matter of indifference. I would not say this : but where I saw a desire to believe, and a beginning love of Christ, I would there say :—" There are likewise sacred Writings, which, taken in connection with the institution and perpetuity of a visible Church, all believers revere as the most precious boon of God, next to Christianity itself, and attribute both their communication and preservation to an especial Providence. In them you will find all the revealed truths, which have been set forth and offered to you, clearly and circumstantially recorded; and, in addition to these, examples of obedience and disobedience both in states and individuals, the lives and actions of men eminent under each dispensation, their sentiments, maxims, hymns, and prayers,—their affections, emotions and conflicts ;—in all which you will recognize the influence of the Holy Spirit, with a conviction increasing with the growth of your own faith and spiritual experience."

Farewell.

LETTER VI.

My dear Friend,

In my last two Letters I have given the state of the argument, as it would stand between a Christian thinking as I do, and a serious well-disposed Deist. I will now endeavor to state the argument, as between the former and the advocates for the popular belief,—such of them, I mean, as are competent to deliver a dispassionate judgment in the cause. And again, more particularly, I mean the learned and reflecting part of them, who are influenced to the retention of the prevailing dogma by the supposed consequences of a different view, and, especially, by their dread of conceding to all alike, simple and learned, the privilege of picking and choosing the Scriptures that are to be received as binding on their consciences. Between these persons and myself the controversy* may be reduced to a single question :—

* It is remarkable that both parties might appeal to the same text of St. Paul,—*πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος καὶ ὠφέλιμος πρὸς διδασκαλίαν, κ. τ. λ.* (2 *Tim.* iii. 16), which favors the one or the other opinion accordingly as the words are construed; and which, again, is the more probable construction, depends in great measure on the preference given to one or other of two different readings, the one having and the other omitting the conjunction copulative *καὶ*.

[The English version is :—*All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable, &c.* And in this rendering of the original the English is countenanced by the established Version of the Dutch Reformed Church :—*Alle de Schrift is van Godt ingegeven, ende is nuttigh &c.* And by Diodati :—*Tutta la Scrittura è divinamente inspirata, ed util, &c.* And by Martin : *Toute l'Ecriture est divinement inspirée, et profitable, &c.* And by Beza :—*Tota Scriptura divinitus est inspirata, et utilis, &c.*

The other rendering is supported by the Vulgate :—*Omnis Scriptura, divinitus inspirata, utilis est ad, &c.* By Luther :—*Denn alle Schrift von Gott eingegeben, ist nütze zur, &c.* And by Calmet :—*Toute l'Ecriture, qui est inspirée de Dieu, est utile, &c.* And by the common Spanish translation :—*Toda Escritura, divinamente inspirada, es util para enseñar &c.* This is also the rendering of the Syriac (Pesch.) and two Arabic Versions, and is

Is it safer for the Individual, and more conducive to the interests of the Church of Christ, in its twofold character of pastoral and militant, to conclude thus :—The Bible is the Word of God, and therefore true, holy, and in all parts unquestionable ;—or thus, —The Bible, considered in reference to its declared ends and purposes, is true and holy, and for all who seek truth with humble spirits an unquestionable guide, and therefore it is the Word of God ?—

In every generation, and wherever the light of Revelation has shone, men of all ranks, conditions, and states of mind have found in this Volume a correspondent for every movement toward the Better felt in their own hearts. The needy soul has found supply, the feeble a help, the sorrowful a comfort ; yea, be the recipiency the least that can consist with moral life, there is an answering grace ready to enter. The Bible has been found a spiritual World,—spiritual, and yet at the same time outward and common to all. You in one place, I in another, all men somewhere or at some time, meet with an assurance that the hopes and fears, the thoughts and yearnings that proceed from, or tend to, a right spirit in us, are not dreams or fleeting singularities, no voices heard in sleep, or spectres which the eye suffers but perceives. As if on some dark night a pilgrim, suddenly beholding a bright star moving before him, should stop in fear and perplexity. But lo ! traveller after traveller passes by him, and each, being questioned whither he is going, makes answer, " I am following yon guiding Star !" The pilgrim quickens his own steps, and presses onward in confidence. More confident still will he be, if by the wayside he should find, here and there, ancient monuments, each with its votive lamp, and on each the name of some former pilgrim, and a record that there he had first seen or begun to follow the benignant Star !

No otherwise is it with the varied contents of the Sacred Volume. The hungry have found food, the thirsty a living spring, the feeble a staff, and the victorious wayfarer songs of welcome and strains of music ; and as long as each man asks on account

followed by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and most of the Fathers. See the note in Griesbach. Tertullian represents the sense thus :—*Legimus, Omnem Scripturam, ædificationi habilem, divinitus inspirari.* De Habit. Mul. c. iii. Origen has it several times, *Θεόπνευστος οὖσα, ὠφέλιμός ἐστι,* and once as in the received text.—*Ed.*]

of his wants, and asks what he wants, no man will discover aught amiss or deficient in the vast and many-chambered storehouse. But if instead of this, an idler or a scoffer should wander through the rooms, peering or peeping, and either detects, or fancies he has detected, here a rusted sword or pointless shaft, there a tool of rude construction, and superseded by later improvements (and preserved, perhaps, to make us more grateful for them);—
—which of two things will a sober-minded man,—who from his childhood upward had been fed, clothed, armed, and furnished with the means of instruction from this very magazine,—think the fitter plan?—Will he insist that the rust is not rust, or that it is a rust *sui generis*, intentionally formed on the steel for some mysterious virtue in it, and that the staff and astrolabe of a shepherd astronomer are identical with, or equivalent to, the quadrant and telescope of Newton or Herschel?—Or will he not rather give the curious inquisitor joy of his mighty discoveries, and the credit of them for his reward?—

Or lastly, put the matter thus. For more than a thousand years the Bible, collectively taken, has gone hand in hand with civilization, science, law,—in short, with the moral and intellectual cultivation of the species, always supporting, and often leading the way. Its very presence, as a believed Book, has rendered the nations emphatically a chosen race, and this too in exact proportion as it is more or less generally known and studied. Of those nations, which in the highest degree enjoy its influences, it is not too much to affirm, that the differences public and private, physical, moral and intellectual, are only less than what might be expected from a diversity in species. Good and holy men, and the best and wisest of mankind, the kingly spirits of history, enthroned in the hearts of mighty nations, have borne witness to its influences, have declared it to be beyond compare the most perfect instrument, the only adequate organ, of Humanity; the organ and instrument of all the gifts, powers, and tendencies, by which the individual is privileged to rise above himself—to leave behind, and lose his individual phantom self, in order to find his true Self in that Distinctness where no division can be,—in the Eternal I Am, the Ever-living Word, of whom all the elect from the archangel before the throne to the poor wrestler with the Spirit *until the breaking of day* are but the fainter and still fainter echoes. And are all these testimonies and lights of experience to lose their

value and efficiency, because I feel no warrant of history, or Holy Writ, or of my own heart for denying, that in the framework and outward case of this instrument a few parts may be discovered of less costly materials and of meaner workmanship? Is it not a fact that the Books of the New Testament were tried by their consonance with the rule, and according to the analogy, of Faith? Does not the universally admitted canon—that each part of Scripture must be interpreted by the spirit of the whole—lead to the same practical conclusion as that for which I am now contending;—namely, that it is the spirit of the Bible, and not the detached words and sentences, that is infallible and absolute?—Practical, I say, and spiritual too;—and what knowledge not practical or spiritual are we entitled to seek in our Bibles? Is the grace of God so confined,—are the evidences of the present and actuating Spirit so dim and doubtful,—that to be assured of the same we must first take for granted that all the life and co-agency of our humanity is miraculously suspended?

Whatever is spiritual, is *eo nomine* supernatural; but must it be always and of necessity miraculous? Miracles could open the eyes of the body; and he that was born blind beheld his Redeemer. But miracles, even those of the Redeemer himself, could not open the eyes of the self-blinded, of the Sadducean sensualist or the self-righteous Pharisee;—while to have said, *I saw thee under the fig-tree*, sufficed to make a Nathanael believe.

To assert and to demand miracles without necessity was the vice of the unbelieving Jews of old; and from the Rabbis and Talmudists the infection has spread. And would I could say that the symptoms of the disease are confined to the Churches of the Apostasy! But all the miracles, which the legends of Monk or Rabbi contain, can scarcely be put in competition, on the score of complication, inexplicableness, the absence of all intelligible use or purpose, and of circuitous self-frustration, with those that must be assumed by the maintainers of this doctrine, in order to give effect to the series of miracles, by which all the nominal composers of the Hebrew nation before the time of Ezra, of whom there are any remains, were successively transformed into *automaton* compositors,—so that the original text should be in sentiment, image, word, syntax, and composition an exact impression of the divine copy! In common consistency the theologians, who impose this belief on their fellow-Christians, ought to insist equally

on the superhuman origin and authority of the Masora, and to use more respectful terms, than has been their wont of late, in speaking of the false Aristeas's legend concerning the Septuagint. And why the miracle should stop at the Greek Version, and not include the Vulgate, I can discover no ground in reason. Or if it be an objection to the latter, that this belief is actually enjoined by the Papal Church, yet the number of Christians who read the Lutheran, the Genevan, or our own authorized, Bible, and are ignorant of the dead languages, greatly exceeds the number of those who have access to the Septuagint. Why refuse the writ of consecration to these, or to the one at least appointed by the assertors' own Church? I find much more consistency in the opposition made under pretext of this doctrine to the proposals and publications of Kennicot, Mill, Bentley, and Archbishop Newcome.

But I am weary of discussing a tenet, which the generality of divines and the leaders of the Religious Public have ceased to defend, and yet continue to assert or imply. The tendency manifested in this conduct, the spirit of this and the preceding century, on which, not indeed the tenet itself, but the obstinate adherence to it against the clearest light of reason and experience, is grounded,—this it is which, according to my conviction, gives the venom to the error, and justifies the attempt to substitute a juster view. As long as it was the common and effective belief of all the Reformed Churches (and by none was it more sedulously or more emphatically enjoined than by the great Reformers of our Church), that by the good Spirit were the spirits tried, and that the light, which beams forth from the written Word, was its own evidence for the children of light;—as long as Christians considered their Bible as a plenteous entertainment, where every guest, duly called and attired, found the food needful and fitting for him, and where each—instead of troubling himself about the covers not within his reach—beholding all around him glad and satisfied, praised the banquet and thankfully glorified the Master of the feast,—so long did the Tenet—that the Scriptures were written under the special impulse of the Holy Ghost, remain safe and profitable. Nay, in the sense, and with the feelings, in which it was asserted, it was a truth—a truth to which every spiritual believer now and in all times will bear witness by virtue of his own experience. And if in the overflow of love and grati-

tude they confounded the power and presence of the Holy Spirit, working alike in weakness and in strength, in the morning mists and in the clearness of the full day;—if they confounded this communion and co-agency of divine grace, attributable to the Scripture generally, with those express, and expressly recorded, communications and messages of the Most High, which form so large and prominent a portion of the same Scriptures;—if, in short, they did not always duly distinguish the inspiration, the imbreathment, of the predisposing and assisting SPIRIT from the revelation of the informing WORD,—it was at worst a harmless hyperbole. It was holden by all, that if the power of the Spirit from without furnished the text, the grace of the same Spirit from within must supply the comment.

In the sacred Volume they saw and reverenced the bounden wheat-sheaf that *stood upright* and had *obeisance* from all the other sheaves—(the writings, I mean, of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church)—sheaves depreciated indeed, more or less, with tares,

> And furrow-weeds,
> Darnel and many an idle flower that grew
> Mid the sustaining corn;*

yet sheaves of the same harvest, the sheaves of brethren! Nor did it occur to them, that, in yielding the more full and absolute honor to the sheaf of the highly favored of their Father, they should be supposed to attribute the same worth and quality to the straw-bands which held it together. The bread of life was there. And this in an especial sense was *bread from heaven;* for nowhere had the same been found wild; no soil or climate dared claim it for its natural growth. In simplicity of heart they received the Bible as the precious gift of God, providential alike in origin, preservation, and distribution, without asking the nice question, whether all and every part were likewise miraculous. The distinction between the providential and the miraculous, between the divine Will working with the agency of natural causes, and the same Will supplying their place by a special *fiat*—this distinction has, I doubt not, many uses in speculative divinity. But its weightiest practical application is shown, when it is employed to free the souls of the unwary and weak in faith from the nets and snares, the insidious queries and

* Lear, Act iv. sc. iv.

captious objections, of the Infidel by calming the flutter of their spirits. They must be quieted, before we can commence the means necessary for their disentanglement. And in no way can this be better effected than when the frightened captives are made to see in how many points the disentangling itself is a work of expedience rather than of necessity; so easily and at so little loss might the web be cut or brushed away!

First, let their attention be fixed on the history of Christianity as learnt from universal tradition, and the writers of each successive generation. Draw their minds to the fact of the progressive and still continuing fulfilment of the assurance of a few fishermen, that both their own religion, though of divine origin, and the religion of their conquerors, which included or recognized all other religions of the known world, should be superseded by the faith in a man recently and ignominiously executed. Then induce them to meditate on the universals of Christian Faith,—on Christianity, taken as the sum of belief common to Greek and Latin, to Romanist and Protestant. Show then that this and only this is the *ordo traditionis, quam tradiderunt Apostoli iis quibus committebant ecclesias*, and which we should have been bound to follow, says Irenæus, *si neque Apostoli quidem Scripturas reliquissent.* This is that *regula fidei*, that *sacramentum symboli memoriæ mandatum*, of which St. Augustine says;—*noveritis hoc esse Fidei Catholicæ fundamentum super quod edificium surrexit Ecclesiæ.* This is the *norma Catholici et Ecclesiastici sensus*, determined and explicated, but not augmented, by the Nicene Fathers, as Waterland has irrefragably shown;—a norm or model of Faith grounded on the solemn affirmations of the Bishops collected from all parts of the Roman Empire, that this was the essential and unalterable Gospel received by them from their predecessors in all the churches as the *παράδοσις ἐκκλησιαστική*, *cui*, says Irenæus, *assentiunt multæ gentes eorum qui in Christum credunt sine charta et atramento, scriptam habentes per Spiritum in cordibus suis salutem, et veterum traditionem diligenter custodientes.* Let the attention of such as have been shaken by the assaults of Infidelity be thus directed, and then tell me wherein a spiritual physician would be blameworthy, if he carried on the cure by addressing his patient in this manner:—

"All men of learning, even learned unbelievers, admit that the greater part of the objections, urged in the popular works of Infi-

delity, to this or that verse or chapter of the Bible, prove only the ignorance or dishonesty of the objectors. But let it be supposed for a moment that a few remain hitherto unanswered,—nay, that to your judgment and feelings they appear unanswerable. What follows? That the Apostles' and Nicene Creed is not credible, the Ten Commandments not to be obeyed, the clauses of the Lord's Prayer not to be desired, or the Sermon on the Mount not to be practised?—See how the logic would look. David cruelly tortured the inhabitants of Rabbah (2 *Sam.* xii. 31. 1 *Chr.* xx. 3), and in several of the Psalms he invokes the bitterest curses on his enemies: therefore it is not to be believed that *the love of God towards us was manifested in sending his only-begotten Son into the world that we might live through him* (1 John iv. 9). Or: Abijah is said to have collected an army of 400,000 men, and Jeroboam to have met him with an army of 800,000, each army consisting of chosen men (2 *Chr.* xiii. 3), and making together a host of 1,200,000 and Abijah to have slain 500,000 out of the 800,000; therefore, the words which admonish us that *if God so loved us we ought also to love one another* (1 John iv. 11), even our enemies, yea, *to bless them that curse* us, and to *do good to them that hate* us (Matt. v. 44), can not proceed from the Holy Spirit. Or: The first chapters of the Book of Daniel contain several words and phrases irreconcilable with the commonly received dates, and those chapters and the Book of Esther have a traditional and legendary character unlike that of the other historical books of the Old Testament; therefore, those other books, by contrast with which the former appear suspicious, and the historical document, 1 *Cor.* xv. 1–8, are not to be credited!"

We assuredly believe that the Bible contains all truths necessary to salvation, and that therein is preserved the undoubted Word of God. We assert likewise that, besides these express oracles and immediate revelations, there are Scriptures which to the soul and conscience of every Christian man bear irresistible evidence of the Divine Spirit assisting and actuating the authors; and that both these and the former are such as to render it morally impossible that any passage of the small inconsiderable portion, not included in one or other of these, can supply either ground or occasion of any error in faith, practice, or affection, except to those who wickedly and wilfully seek a pretext for their unbelief.

And if in that small portion of the Bible which stands in no necessary connection with the known and especial ends and purposes of the Scriptures, there should be a few apparent errors resulting from the state of knowledge then existing—errors which the best and holiest men might entertain uninjured, and which without a miracle those men must have entertained ; if I find no such miraculous prevention asserted, and see no reason for supposing it—may I not, to ease the scruples of a perplexed inquirer, venture to say to him : "Be it so. What then ? The absolute infallibility even of the inspired writers in matters altogether incidental and foreign to the objects and purposes of their inspiration is no part of my Creed ; and even if a professed divine should follow the doctrine of the Jewish Church so far as not to attribute to the *Hagiographa*, in every word and sentence, the same height and fulness of inspiration as to the Law and the Prophets, I feel no warrant to brand him as a heretic for an opinion, the admission of which disarms the Infidel without endangering a single article of the Catholic Faith."—If to an unlearned but earnest and thoughtful neighbor, I give the advice ;—"Use the Old Testament to express the affections excited, and to confirm the faith and morals taught you, in the New, and leave all the rest to the students and professors of theology and Church history! You profess only to be a Christian :"—am I misleading my brother in Christ ?

This I believe by my own dear experience,—that the more tranquilly an inquirer takes up the Bible as he would any other body of ancient writings, the livelier and steadier will be his impressions of its superiority to all other books, till at length all other books and all other knowledge will be valuable in his eyes in proportion as they help him to a better understanding of his Bible. Difficulty after difficulty has been overcome from the time that I began to study the Scriptures with free and unboding spirit, under the conviction that my faith in the Incarnate Word and his Gospel was secure, whatever the result might be ;—the difficulties that still remain being so few and insignificant in my own estimation, that I have less personal interest in the question than many of those who will most dogmatically condemn me for presuming to make a question of it.

So much for scholars—for men of like education and pursuits as myself. With respect to Christians generally, I object to the

consequence drawn from the Doctrine rather than to the Doctrine itself;—a consequence not only deducible from the premises, but actually and imperiously deduced; according to which every man that can but read is to sit down to the consecutive and connected perusal of the Bible under the expectation and assurance that the whole is within his comprehension, and that, unaided by note or comment, catechism or liturgical preparation, he is to find out for himself what he is bound to believe and practise, and that whatever he conscientiously understands by what he reads, is to be *his* religion. For he has found it in his Bible, and the Bible is the Religion of Protestants!

Would I then withhold the Bible from the cottager and the artisan?—Heaven forefend! The fairest flower that ever clomb up a cottage window is not so fair a sight to my eyes, as the Bible gleaming through the lower panes. Let it but be read as by such men it used to be read; when they came to it as to a ground covered with manna, even the bread which the Lord had given for his people to eat: where he that gathered much had nothing over, and he that gathered little had no lack. They gathered every man according to his eating. They came to it as to a treasure-house of Scriptures; each visitant taking what was precious and leaving as precious for others;—Yea, more, says our worthy old Church-historian, Fuller, where "the same man at several times may in his apprehension prefer several Scriptures as best, formerly most affected with one place, for the present more delighted with another, and afterwards, conceiving comfort therein not so clear, choose other places as more pregnant and pertinent to his purpose. Thus God orders it, that divers men (and perhaps the same man at divers times), make use of all his gifts, gleaning and gathering comfort, as it is scattered through the whole field of the Scripture."

Farewell.

LETTER VII.

You are now, my dear Friend, in possession of my whole mind on this point,—one thing only excepted which has weighed with me more than all the rest, and which I have therefore reserved for my concluding Letter. This is the impelling principle, or way of thinking, which I have in most instances noticed in the assertors of what I have ventured to call Bibliolatry, and which I believe to be the main ground of its prevalence at this time, and among men whose religious views are any thing rather than enthusiastic. And I here take occasion to declare, that my conviction of the danger and injury of this principle was and is my chief motive for bringing the Doctrine itself into question; the main error of which consists in the confounding of two distinct conceptions, revelation by the Eternal Word, and actuation of the Holy Spirit. The former indeed is not always or necessarily united with the latter—the prophecy of Balaam is an instance of the contrary,—but yet, being ordinarily, and only not always, so united, the term Inspiration has acquired a double sense.

First, the term is used in the sense of Information miraculously communicated by voice or vision; and secondly, where without any sensible addition or infusion, the writer or speaker uses and applies his existing gifts of power and knowledge under the predisposing, aiding, and directing actuation of God's Holy Spirit. Now—between the first sense, that is, inspired revelation, and the highest degree of that grace and communion with the Spirit, which the Church under all circumstances, and every regenerate member of the Church of Christ, is permitted to hope, and instructed to pray, for—there is a positive difference of kind,—a chasm, the pretended overleaping of which constitutes imposture, or betrays insanity. Of the first kind are the Law and the Prophets, no jot or tittle of which can pass unfulfilled, and the substance and last interpretation of which passes not away; for they

wrote of Christ, and shadowed out the everlasting Gospel. But with regard to the second, neither the holy writers—the so-called *Hagiographi*—themselves, nor any fair interpretations of Scripture, assert any such absolute diversity, or enjoin the belief of any greater difference of degree, than the experience of the Christian world, grounded on, and growing with, the comparison of these Scriptures with other works holden in honor by the Churches, has established. And *this* difference I admit; and doubt not that it has in every generation been rendered evident to as many as read these Scriptures under the gracious influence of the spirit in which they were written.

But alas! this is not sufficient; this can not but be vague and unsufficing to those, with whom the Christian Religion is wholly objective, to the exclusion of all its correspondent subjective. It must appear vague, I say, to those whose Christianity, as matter of belief, is wholly external, and, like the objects of sense, common to all alike;—altogether historical, an *opus operatum*,—its existing and present operancy in no respect differing from any other fact of history, and not at all modified by the supernatural principle in which it had its origin in time. Divines of this persuasion are actually, though without their own knowledge, in a state not dissimilar to that, into which the Latin Church sank deeper and deeper from the sixth to the fourteenth century; during which time religion was likewise merely objective and superstitious, a letter proudly emblazoned and illuminated, but yet a dead letter that was to be read by its own outward glories without the light of the Spirit in the mind of the believer. The consequence was too glaring not to be anticipated, and, if possible, prevented. Without that spirit in each true believer, whereby we know the spirit of truth and the spirit of error in all things appertaining to salvation, the consequence must be—So many men, so many minds!—And what was the antidote which the Priests and Rabbis of this purely objective Faith opposed to this peril?—Why, an objective, outward Infallibility; concerning which, however, the differences were scarcely less or fewer than those which it was to heal;—an Infallibility, which, taken literally and unqualified, became the source of perplexity to the well-disposed, of unbelief to the wavering, and of scoff and triumph to the common enemy;—and which was, therefore, to be qualified and limited, and then it meant so much and so little, that to men

of plain understandings and single hearts it meant nothing at all. It resided here. No! there. No! but in a third subject. Nay! neither here, nor there, nor in the third, but in all three conjointly!

But even this failed to satisfy; and what was the final resource,—the doctrine of those who would not be called a Protestant Church, but in which doctrine the Fathers of Protestantism in England would have found little other fault, than that it might be affirmed as truly of the decisions of any other Bishop as of the Bishop of Rome? The final resource was to restore what ought never to have been removed—the correspondent subjective, that is, the assent and confirmation of the Spirit promised to all true believers, as proved and manifested in the reception of such decision by the Church Universal in all its rightful members.

I comprise and conclude the sum of my conviction in this one sentence. Revealed Religion (and I know of no religion not revealed) is in its highest contemplation the unity, that is, the identity or co-inherence, of Subjective and Objective. It is in itself, and irrelatively, at once inward Life and Truth, and outward Fact and Luminary. But as all Power manifests itself in the harmony of correspondent Opposites, each supposing and supporting the other,—so has Religion its objective, or historic and ecclesiastical pole, and its subjective, or spiritual and individual pole. In the miracles, and miraculous parts of religion—both in the first communication of divine truths, and in the promulgation of the truths thus communicated—we have the union of the two, that is, the subjective and supernatural displayed objectively—outwardly and phenomenally—*as* subjective and supernatural.

Lastly, in the Scriptures, as far as they are not included in the above as miracles, and in the mind of the believing and regenerate Reader and Meditator, there is proved to us the reciprocity, or reciprocation, of the Spirit as subjective and objective, which in conformity with the Scheme proposed by me, in aid of distinct conception and easy recollection, I have named the Indifference.*

* "The Papacy elevated the Church to the virtual exclusion or suppression of the Scriptures: the modern Church of England, since Chillingworth, has so raised up the Scriptures as to annul the Church: both alike have quenched the Holy Spirit, as the *mesothesis* or indifference of the two, and substituted an alien compound for the genuine Preacher, which should be the *synthesis* of the Scriptures and the Church, and the sensible voice of the Holy Spirit."—*Lit. Rem.* V. p. 74.—*Ed.*

What I mean by this, a familiar acquaintance with the more popular parts of Luther's Works, especially his Commentaries, and the delightful volume of his Table Talk, would interpret for me better than I can do for myself. But I do my best, when I say that no Christian probationer, who is earnestly working out his salvation, and experiences the conflict of the spirit with the evil and the infirmity within him and around him, can find his own state brought before him and, as it were, antedated, in writings reverend even for their antiquity and enduring permanence, and far more, and more abundantly, consecrated by the reverence, love, and grateful testimonies of good men through the long succession of ages, in every generation, and under all states of minds and circumstances of fortune,—that no man, I say, can recognize his own inward experiences in such Writings, and not find an objectiveness, a confirming and assuring outwardness, and all the main characters of reality, reflected therefrom on the spirit, working in himself and in his own thoughts, emotions, and aspirations—warring against sin, and the motions of sin. The unsubstantial, insulated Self passes away as a stream; but these are the shadows and reflections of the Rock of Ages, and of the Tree of Life that starts forth from its side.

On the other hand, as much of reality, as much of objective truth, as the Scriptures communicate to the subjective experiences of the Believer, so much of present life, of living and effective import, do these experiences give to the letter of these Scriptures. In the one *the Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit*, that we have received the *spirit of adoption;* in the other our spirit bears witness to the power of the Word, that it is indeed the Spirit that proceedeth from God. If in the holy men thus actuated all imperfection of knowledge, all participation in the mistakes and limits of their several ages had been excluded, how could these Writings be or become the history and example, the echo and more lustrous image of the work and warfare of the sanctifying Principle in us?—If after all this, and in spite of all this, some captious litigator should lay hold of a text here or there—St. Paul's *cloak left at Troas with Carpus*, or a verse from the Canticles, and ask: "Of what spiritual use is this?"—the answer is ready:—It proves to us that nothing can be so trifling as not to supply an evil heart with a pretext for unbelief.

Archbishop Leighton has observed that the Church has its ex-

tensive and intensive states, and that they seldom fall together. Certain it is, that since kings have been her nursing fathers, and queens her nursing mothers, our theologians seem to act in the spirit of fear rather than in that of faith; and too often instead of inquiring after the Truth in the confidence, that whatever is truth must be fruitful of good to all who *are in Him that is true*, they seek with vain precautions *to guard against the possible inferences* which perverse and distempered minds may pretend, whose whole Christianity,—do what we will—is and will remain nothing but a Pretence.

You have now my entire mind on this momentous Question, the grounds on which it rests, and the motives which induce me to make it known; and I now conclude by repeating my request —Correct me, or confirm me.

Farewell.

END OF VOL. V.

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

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